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John Vincent GRIFFITH, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
 Appellant-Defendant, John Vincent Griffith (Griffith), appeals his conviction and sentence for criminal confinement, a Level 2 felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(a).
 We affirm.
 Griffith presents two issues on appeal, which we restate as the following three issues:
(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Griffith's motion to continue;
(2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Griffith's motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and
(3) Whether Griffith's sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
 On August 3, 2017, Griffith violated a protective order by breaking into the home of his ex-fiancée, Amber Gross (Gross). Gross was home with her mother, Joyce Bulington (Bulington), when she heard Griffith breaking in, she fled to the garage and locked the door. Bulington was in the bedroom asleep. Once inside, Griffith assaulted Bulington in her bedroom by repeatedly striking and choking her. Griffith then forcibly relocated Bulington to the living room, where he continued to brutally assault her, causing several bruises all over her body and a deep laceration inside her left ear, which resulted in bleeding.
 At about 11:30 p.m., Gross called 911. Upon arrival, Officers Christopher Cain (Officer Cain) and John Davis (Officer Davis) of the Rensselaer Police Department were flagged down by Gross, who was now outside the garage who informed the officers that Bulington was being held hostage inside the house by Griffith. The officers approached the front door and confirmed it was locked. At this point, Griffith yelled to the officers that he would kill Bulington if they tried to enter the home. He also expressed his desire for “suicide by cop.” (Appellants App. Vol. II, p. 139). As a result of the threat, the officers retreated from the door. Officer Davis spoke with Gross while Officer Cain maintained surveillance of the front door. Moments later, Officer Cain saw Griffith open the house's main door while keeping the screen door shut. He then pulled Bulington to her knees and “wrapped his arms around her throat, as if to strangle her.” (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 139). Officer Davis reported this to Officer Cain, and they requested additional units. Once again, Griffith ordered the officers to retreat farther away from the home and threatened to “stab Bulington with a screwdriver” if they did not comply. (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 139).
 The Jasper County Sheriff's Office dispatched Deputies Adam Suarez (Deputy Suarez), Robert Barrett (Deputy Barret), and Kevin Holm-Hansen (Deputy Holm-Hansen) to aid at the scene. While the officers were maintaining surveillance from across the street, Griffith opened the front door and “yelled [that] he was a hunter and a hillbilly”, and he threatened to “stab [ ] Bulington in the neck” if the officers attempted to approach the residence. (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 135). Griffith also dragged Bulington to the front door and slammed her head into the doorframe. He issued further threats and profane statements toward the officers through the screen door, declaring “it was go time” and that he was “loaded and ready to go.” (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 139). Moments later, Bulington exited the house, ran, and hid behind a vehicle in the driveway, and Griffith followed her. After receiving orders from the officers to get on the ground, Griffith retreated into the house.
 As Officer Davis escorted Bulington to safety, additional units from the Jasper County Sheriff's Office arrived. Griffith continued to ignore the officers’ commands to exit the house, and he threw his cell phone out of the front door after the police called him. At some point, Griffith emerged from the house and stood on the front porch holding a “knife to his neck stating that he was going to kill himself” and then went back inside. (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 136). Several times he opened the door and said he had cut the gas line to the stove and water heater and planned to blow up the house. Officer Davis and Deputy Suarez evacuated neighbors’ homes, and dispatch notified the gas department to turn off the gas to the house. The Fire Department was also on standby. Finally, Griffith exited the home and walked toward the officers while holding his knife. Despite repeated demands to drop the knife, Griffith refused to comply and was shot once in the chest with a “less lethal shotgun” which caused him to spin around, drop two knives and fall on the ground. (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 136). The officers then placed Griffith in custody.
 On August 9, 2017, the State filed an Information, charging Griffith with Level 2 felony criminal confinement, Level 3 felony burglary, two Counts of Level 6 felony strangulation, three Counts of Level 6 felony battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. The State later filed its notice of intent to seek a habitual offender sentencing enhancement, alleging that Griffith had three prior unrelated convictions. On November 8, 2017, Griffith filed a motion for a psychological examination, which the trial court later granted on the condition that Griffith present a proposal or quote from a health expert. Griffith did so on February 6, 2018.
 On April 24, 2018, Griffith entered into a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to Level 2 felony criminal confinement and, in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss all remaining charges, as well as charges filed under four different cause numbers.1 The plea agreement left sentencing open to the trial court, which stated, “TO BE ARGUED.” (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 95). In addition, Griffith signed a waiver of rights form that specified that by signing it, he was waving the “right to appeal [his] sentence”. (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 97). The trial court conducted a guilty plea hearing on the same day. Griffith confirmed that he was represented by an attorney who had fully advised him of the terms of the plea agreement. Griffith confirmed that he had not been forced or threatened to plead guilty, that he had read the plea agreement before signing it, and that he was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol, nor had he been diagnosed with any mental illness or disability that would affect his understanding of the plea agreement. Griffith also confirmed that he understood the waiver of rights form he was signing as part of his plea agreement, and he then testified that he was voluntarily giving up “all those rights” including the right to appeal his conviction and sentence. (Transcript p. 48). After laying the foundation of the charge to which Griffith was pleading, Griffith pleaded guilty. The trial court subsequently accepted his plea.
 The following day, April 25, 2018, Griffith wrote a non-verified, handwritten letter seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. Griffith, in part, stated:
I want a 100% to withdraw on the plea agreement due to the fact I'm not in the right mental condition to sign it. I'm totally confused on what I signed. I was not aware of the standards of the plea, therefore I 100% want to withdraw it. I'm also aware that I have 10 days to do so, after it is signed. This is only day 1 for the record. I haven't been evaluated yet [which] you court ordered, and I don't want to plea [un]till after my evaluation [which] I told [my lawyer] several times. There are things I thought that were in the plea that are not, Purposeful Incarceration, it being able to be Appealed down the line, that other charges could not be brought up by[ ] signing. I thought that I was signing a 10-17.5 year to be Argued also, not a 10-30 yr with all other charges dismissed․ I don't want to run out of time to withdraw[,] that's why I'm writing to you personally. Can I have a court date to withdraw before 5-4-2018, that's my ten days. This is important and I'm facing a long time․
(Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 98-99) (grammar mistakes in original).
 On June 6, 2018, at the start of the sentencing hearing, the trial court addressed Griffith's motion to withdraw his guilty plea but denied the motion. The trial court also denied Griffith's oral motion to continue the sentencing hearing so that he could obtain a psychological evaluation. At the close of the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Griffith to serve an all-executed term of twenty-seven years in the Department of Correction.
 Griffith now appeals. Additional information will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Motion to Continue
 Griffith first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance of the sentencing hearing so that a psychological examination could be conducted. Griffith does not claim that his motion for continuance is based on Indiana Code section 35-36-7-1. Rulings of whether to grant a continuance when the motion is not based on statutory grounds lies within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Jackson v. State, 758 N.E.2d 1030, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) trans. denied. A court abuses its discretion if the ruling contradicts the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the record shows prejudice as a result of denying the continuance. Gardner v. State, 641 N.E.2d 641, 645 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). It is always presumed that the trial court appropriately exercised its discretion in ruling on a non-statutory continuance motion. Elmore v. State, 657 N.E.2d 1216, 1218 (Ind. 1995).
 At the sentencing hearing, Griffith explained that he had sent public records from his casefile, including the Information and the probable cause affidavit, to the doctor who was supposed to review and schedule his psychological evaluation and that his casefile was lost twice, which caused a delay in scheduling the evaluation. Despite these setbacks, the State argues that Griffith had five months to complete the evaluation or request a continuance.
 We agree with the State that Griffith could have requested a continuance after his case files were lost, but he waited until the sentencing hearing to do so. This timing goes against the general disfavor of last-minute continuances. See Wine v. State, 539 N.E.2d 932, 935 (Ind. 1989). Furthermore, Griffith's motion for continuance offers a vague explanation and no specific information of what could have been obtained from a psychological evaluation. As we held in Anderson v. State, 695 N.E.2d 156, 158 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), the trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to continue where the contentions made in the motion are vague and unsubstantiated.
 Even still, the presentencing investigation report (PSI) contained information about Griffith's mental health, which establishes that the trial court's ruling did not prejudice Griffith. According to the PSI, Griffith had been diagnosed with depression, bipolar disorder, anxiety, and schizophrenia, and he was taking medication for some of these conditions. Some of these diagnoses were mentioned in Griffith's other medical records, which were submitted as exhibits at the sentencing hearing. Notably, the PSI revealed that Griffith was not taking his medications when he committed the instant offense because they “made [him] feel dizzy.” (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 72). He also admitted to failing to request an adjustment of his medication from his physician despite experiencing adverse effects. Under the circumstances, we find that the trial court had access to information about Griffith's mental health that would have been similar to what a psychological evaluation would have possibly revealed. Griffith has failed to establish prejudice, and we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Griffith's request for a continuance to conduct a psychological evaluation at a later time.
II. Withdrawal of Guilty Plea
 Next, Griffith contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. According to Indiana Code section 35-35-1-4(b), a trial court must grant a request to withdraw a guilty plea only if the defendant proves that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. McGraw v. State, 938 N.E.2d 1218, 1220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. In contrast, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea must be denied by the trial court if it would cause significant harm to the interests of the State. Id. Apart from such situations, the trial court has the discretion to decide the disposition of the motion, and it will be overturned only if the court has abused its discretion. Id.
 A trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea “arrives in this court with a presumption in favor of the ruling”, and we will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Coomer v. State, 652 N.E.2d 60, 62 (Ind. 1995)). In determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, we examine the statements made by the defendant at the guilty plea hearing to decide whether the plea was offered “ ‘freely and knowingly.’ ” Id. (quoting Coomer, 652 N.E.2d at 62).
 Indiana Code section 35-35-1-4(b) requires that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea be in writing and verified and must state facts in support of the relief demanded. A defendant's failure to submit a written, verified motion to withdraw a guilty plea results in a waiver of the issue of wrongful denial of the request. Smith v. State, 593 N.E.2d 1208, 1209 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). Griffith's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was procedurally deficient because it was not verified, despite being in writing. As a result of failing to meet the statutory requirement, Griffith has waived any right to seek relief regarding the withdrawal of his plea. Waiver notwithstanding, we choose to address Griffith's claim based on our “strong preference to decide issues on their merits[.]” Collins v. State, 639 N.E.2d 653, 655 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied.
 Griffith contends that he moved to withdraw his plea within 24 hours of the guilty plea hearing based on his “mental state and lack of understanding of the agreement he entered into.” (Appellant's Br. p. 10). Griffith presented his arguments about why he was withdrawing his plea, asserting that after talking to his fellow inmates, he decided to withdraw his plea due to the possibility of jeopardizing his appeal, as well as a lack of understanding of what an advisory sentence means and the limited time available to contemplate and sign the waiver of rights and plea form. The State claims that the record reveals that Griffith pleaded freely and voluntarily, and that he was aware of the range of sentences contained in the plea agreement.
 At the time of signing the plea agreement, Griffith also executed a waiver of rights form and affirmed that he had reviewed both documents with the advice of his counsel. Griffith confirmed that he was not coerced to plead guilty, that he was not suffering from any mental illness or disability that could impair his understanding, and that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Moreover, Griffith claimed to have understood the potential sentence for his Level 2 felony criminal confinement charge. When the factual basis for the charge to which Griffith was pleading guilty was established, Griffith entered a guilty plea. At the sentencing hearing, Griffith recanted his prior affirmations claiming that he did not fully understand the terms of the plea agreement and the waiver of rights form. However, the trial court rejected his assertion by stating:
Well, [ ] Griffith, you seemed to understand the law well enough to file motions, to try [to] cite code citations and things, and I think you're playing a game with the [c]ourt. That's what I think you're doing and I think you're trying to avoid sentencing. I think you're trying to blame your attorney. I noticed in your [PSI], you did a very good job blaming one of the victims for the situation you're in. Blaming the system that you're in. [ ] And I find no reason to correct a manifest in justice. [ ] [Y]ou made a decision to plead guilty. And you did it knowingly and you did it intentionally and now you're trying to complain and get out because you don't like the fact that we're here for sentencing and you may receive time, or the rubber's meeting the road, whatever you want to call that day, and I think you're playing a cat and mouse game and trying to blame everybody else for your problems and I'm not going to allow it. [Your attorney] has done a fine job representing you. You faced multiple charges and multiple cases. I believe four of the five cases are being dismissed as part of the Plea Agreement which, based upon the law, would have to be consecutive to these charges. And I find it also not a coincidence that, at the same time that you're claiming you didn't do this and blaming [ ] Gross for all of these problems, that she writes a letter saying that she doesn't want to cooperate and doesn't want the charges to go forward. And she wants all the charges dropped which, you know, I think could prejudice the State that all of a sudden[,] we get a plea of guilty and now she wants-one of the witnesses wants it dropped, because I assume that was your significant other or girlfriend or something. And I'm not doing it. I'm not granting a continuance and we're proceeding with sentencing. If you don't like what happens you have remedies. Those remedies can be found in post-conviction relief. It's not like you're denied all rights of appeal.
(Tr. pp. 10-11).
 Nothing in the record suggests that Griffith did not comprehend the terms outlined in the plea agreement or the waiver of rights form. As the trial court correctly found, Griffith's newly desired plea of innocence based on his assertion that he did not fully comprehend or understand his guilty plea conflicted with the record. Brightman, 758 N.E.2d at 46 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's request to withdraw his guilty plea where the trial court observed the defendant's testimony at the guilty plea hearing and the hearing on his request to withdraw and found that his testimony at the latter was not credible). It is worth noting that the State did not argue that the withdrawal of Griffith's plea would have caused substantial prejudice and, in fact, stated its readiness to proceed to trial. Nevertheless, the trial court recognized that Gross, a crucial witness for the State, desired to recant all prior statements she had offered to the police, was requesting the charges against Griffith dismissed, and had expressed unwillingness to cooperate with the prosecution of Griffith, thus leading to a significant change in circumstances that was prejudicial to the State's case. See McGraw, 938 N.E.2d at 1220 (holding that a trial court must deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea if the withdrawal would result in substantial prejudice to the State).
 Based on our review, Griffith's claims on appeal are not enough to satisfy his burden to show an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice, as the record reflects that all necessary procedural safeguards were in place during the plea hearing, and his assertion that he lacked understanding of the plea is unsupported by the evidence. See Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 868-69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (rejecting a challenge to the trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw guilty plea when the defendant affirmed that he understood his rights and terms of the plea, was not forced or threatened, and understood his potential sentence but later claimed that he did not fully comprehend his possible sentence), trans. denied. We, therefore, do not disturb the trial court's denial of Griffith's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
III. Appropriateness of Sentence
 Griffith claims that his twenty-seven-year sentence is inappropriate given the nature of the offense and his character. The State asserts that Griffith waived his right to appeal his sentence by signing the waiver of rights form along with his plea agreement.
 When a court convicts or sentences a defendant for a crime, the defendant has a constitutional right to appeal that conviction or sentence. Miller v. State, 702 N.E.2d 1053, 1058 (Ind. 1998). When a defendant pleads guilty, he waives the right to appeal his conviction. Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230, 231 (Ind. 2004). A defendant may also waive the right to appeal his sentence as part of a written plea agreement. Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73, 75 (Ind. 2008). This is true even if the trial court, after accepting a plea agreement containing a provision waiving the right to appeal, misadvises the defendant at sentencing that he does have the right to appeal. Id. at 77.
 The waiver of rights form, which was presented together with the plea agreement at the guilty plea hearing, provided that Griffith was waiving his right to “appeal [his] sentence[.]” (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 97).2 At the guilty plea hearing, the trial court confirmed that Griffith knew that he had given up his right to appeal the sentence. See Creech, 887 N.E.2d at 74-75 (providing that Creech had waived his right to appeal his sentence, including his claim that his sentence was inappropriate, under the express language in his written plea agreement stating that he waived his right to appeal his sentence “so long as the Judge sentence[d] [him] within the terms of [his] plea agreement”). In accordance with Creech, Griffith's waiver to appeal his sentence is therefore binding. That said, despite Griffith having waived his right to appeal his sentence, we will still examine and evaluate the substance of his sentence challenge.
 Although a trial court may have acted within its lawful discretion in imposing a sentence, Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that an appellate court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The main role of Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008).
 Whether we regard a sentence as appropriate at the end of the day turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other considerations that emerge in a given case. Suprenant v. State, 925 N.E.2d 1280, 1284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. An appellant bears the burden of persuading this court that his sentence is inappropriate. Corbally v. State, 5 N.E.3d 463, 471 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
 The sentencing range for a Level 2 felony is between ten and thirty years, with the advisory being seventeen and one-half years. I.C. § 35-50-2-4.5. The trial court sentenced Griffith to twenty-seven years. When reviewing the nature of the offense, we look at the details and circumstances of the offense and the defendant's participation therein. Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Griffith committed a series of heinous crimes when he unlawfully entered Gross’ and Bulington's residence in the middle of the night. Of importance to the Level 2 felony criminal confinement charge to which he pleaded guilty, the record shows that he first assaulted Bulington in her bedroom by repeatedly striking and choking her. Griffith then forcibly relocated Bulington to the living room, where he continued to brutally assault her, causing several bruises all over her body and a deep laceration inside her left ear, which resulted in bleeding. Upon the arrival of law enforcement, Griffith announced that he was holding Bulington hostage and brandished a screwdriver menacingly against her neck, threatening to end her life. Then in a shocking display of defiance to authority, he continued to brutalize Bulington in the presence of the officers, slamming her head repeatedly against the doorframe. It is vital to note that at the time of the incident, Griffith was violating the protective order issued against him in favor of Bulington's daughter, Gross, who was present. Here, we cannot say that Griffith's sentence is inappropriate, considering the nature of his offense.
 When analyzing the character of an offender, it is important to consider various factors such as his or her age, criminal history, background, previous efforts at rehabilitation, and expression of remorse. Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021). Griffith's criminal history is extensive. As a juvenile, he was adjudicated delinquent for illegally possessing an alcoholic beverage, battery, leaving the scene of an accident, criminal trespass, and intimidation. As an adult, Griffith was convicted of check deception, domestic battery in the presence of a child, battery resulting in bodily injury (multiple), interference with reporting a crime, battery (multiple), resisting law enforcement, failure to return to detention, operating while intoxicated, strangulation, and residential entry. Further, although he was placed on probation six times for some of his adult convictions, ten petitions were filed to revoke his probation, and his probation was ultimately revoked four times. Griffith was also not able to successfully complete one of his probation terms at the time of sentencing. Furthermore, Griffith's pending charges across four different cause numbers, which were ultimately dismissed when he pleaded guilty to the instant offense, convey a proclivity for committing crimes. In addition, we find that his lengthy criminal history shows a lack of respect for the law and an inability to conform to society's norms. Here, we find that Griffith's vast criminal history undermines his character and supports the sentence imposed by the trial court.
 While Griffith concedes that his criminal history is extensive, he argues that his “offenses demonstrate a pattern of maladaptive behavior stemming from substance abuse and mental illness.” (Appellant's Br. p. 13). We disagree. Although Griffith was aware of his issues with substance abuse, he failed to benefit from opportunities available to him, particularly during his probation and incarceration, to address them. Griffith began consuming alcohol at the age of twelve and has been using it regularly since he turned twenty. Despite being diagnosed with alcohol dependency in 2015 and being advised to undergo another six months of rehabilitative treatment, he ignored the recommendation and stopped. Griffith also began using cocaine and marijuana at the age of seventeen and continues to use marijuana weekly. Moreover, since turning thirty years old in 2017, Griffith started using methamphetamine, which he now considers his preferred drug. It is worth noting that when he committed the current offense, he had just completed a two-week binge on methamphetamine.
 Finally, we find that despite being aware of his mental health diagnoses, Griffith discontinued his medication due to adverse side effects rather than exploring alternative dosages or medications. At the time of the offense, Griffith had not taken his medication. During the preparation of the PSI, Griffith was questioned about why he had not contacted a doctor to adjust his medication, and he responded, “I just didn't.” (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 78). His decision to use methamphetamine during a two-week period while not taking his medication contradicts his assertion that he had to stop taking his medication due to the nature of his work which required him to work “high up in the air.” (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 78). Given Griffith's history of substance abuse and unaddressed mental health issues, a reduction in his sentence is not warranted.
 In sum, we hold that although Griffith waived his right to appeal his sentence, the sentence imposed is not inappropriate given the nature of the offense and his character.
 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Griffith's motion for continuance and motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In addition, we conclude that Griffith's sentence is not inappropriate given the nature of the offense and his character.
1. (1) Cause No. 37C01-I701-F6-000080—a Class A misdemeanor; (2) Cause No. 37C01-1708-F6-000781—two Counts of Level 6 felonies, domestic battery and criminal confinement, and two Counts of Class A misdemeanors, invasion of privacy, and interference with the reporting of a crime; (3) Cause No. 37C01-I708-F6-000801—two Counts of Level 6 felonies domestic battery and battery resulting in moderate bodily injury; and (4) Cause No. 37C01-1709-CM-000887—two Counts of Class A misdemeanors invasion of privacy.
2. In the above section, it was noted that the trial court informed Griffith at his sentencing hearing that he had not lost all of his appellate rights. However, it should be pointed out that this statement was made after the court had already accepted Griffith's guilty plea and he had received a plea bargain. While it could be interpreted that Griffith had the right to appeal his sentence, the timing of the court's statement may have had no effect on the outcome. This is consistent with our supreme court holding in Creech, which found that a defendant's right to appeal was not impacted by a similar statement made after the defendant had already received the benefit of his plea bargain. See Creech, 887 N.E.2d at 77. The same is true in the present case.
 Altice, C. J. and Pyle, J. concur
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Docket No: Court of Appeals Case No. 22A-CR-1293
Decided: May 18, 2023
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana.
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