DEATON v. STATE (2023)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Dennis R. Deaton (Deaton), brings an interlocutory appeal to the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence discovered in his vehicle during an inventory search conducted after his vehicle was impounded.

[2] We affirm.

ISSUES

[3] Deaton presents this court with two issues on appeal, which we restate as:

(1) Whether the inventory search of Deaton's vehicle and personal belongings after officers impounded his vehicle was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and

(2) Whether the inventory search of Deaton's vehicle and personal belongings after officers impounded his vehicle was unreasonable and violated Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] In the early evening of January 8, 2022, Warsaw Police Officer Kevin Kyle (Officer Kyle) was on patrol when he passed 317 West Smith Street in Warsaw, Indiana. Officer Kyle had been informed of active drug dealing activity at that particular location within the past day. While driving past, Officer Kyle noticed a white Jeep parked on the road in front of the residence which had not been there on his previous drive-by. He ran the license plate on the Jeep, which returned as being registered to a silver Dodge Durango. The officer parked in the vicinity to watch the Jeep, which drove away a short time later.

[5] While following the Jeep, the officer noticed that the driver, who was the sole occupant of the car and who was later identified as Deaton, did not wear a seatbelt and failed to signal a turn at one point. Based on the improper registration, the unsignaled turn, and the lack of seatbelt, Officer Kyle initiated a traffic stop. The Jeep stopped in the parking lot of a former Marsh grocery store. Deaton informed Officer Kyle that he had recently purchased the Jeep and gave him a bill of sale for the car. When the officer inquired about the registration returning to a Dodge Durango, Deaton responded that the Dodge Durango “was in a garage in Sydney and that he had intended to put the plate back on that truck after a period of use on the Jeep.” (Transcript Vol. II, p. 8).

[6] Because Deaton was operating a vehicle on a public roadway with a false or fictitious license plate in violation of both statute and the Warsaw Police Department impoundment policy (Policy), Officer Kyle impounded Deaton's Jeep. Pursuant to this Policy, after impounding the vehicle,

[a]n inventory may extend to all areas of the vehicle in which personal property or hazardous materials may reasonably be found, including but not limited to the passenger compartment, trunk, and glove or storage compartment.

All closed containers found within the vehicle may be opened for purposes of the inventory. Closed or locked containers shall not be forced open but shall be logged on the impound report as such. If a key or lock combination is available, locked containers may be opened and inventoried.

(State's Exh. 1). Prior to Officer Kyle commencing the inventory, another officer arrived on the scene to provide backup. Officer Kyle removed Deaton from the vehicle and Deaton confirmed that everything in the Jeep belonged to him. Officer Kyle worked “systematically around the vehicle ․ beginning with the drivers’ side and then work[ed] in a counter-clockwise motion all the way around the vehicle.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 11). He took a “mental note of all items in the vehicle,” while his “body camera [was] recording.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 11). Subsequently, he documented all the items in the vehicle on the tow slip and provided it to the tow company. The tow slip reflected that Officer Kyle found a “keyring with numerous keys, lunch pail, Carhartt [coat], boots, and a change of clothes.” (State's Exh. 2). Prior to the Jeep being towed, Deaton asked Officer Kyle if he could take some items with him, which the officer permitted him to do. Officer Kyle handed Deaton the keys and work boots. He gave Deaton the Carhartt jacket after patting it down because he “didn't want to give him a Carhartt that had a gun in it and him turn around and shoot” the officers. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 16-17). Deaton also requested the lunch pail, so Officer Kyle took it from the rear passenger seat, and unzipped it to “take a quick peak [sic] inside to make sure again there wasn't a gun in there that [the officer] was giving him or a bomb that was going to go off or anything like that would be of grave danger to” the officers. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 18). Inside, Officer Kyle found a bag with a large amount of crystal methamphetamine.

[7] Officer Kyle placed Deaton under arrest. After he was placed under arrest, Deaton admitted that he had marijuana in his pocket, which the officer located after a search of Deaton's pocket. In a WD-40 can, which Deaton had been holding during the inventory search of the vehicle but then had placed on the ground after his arrest, Officer Kyle found a hidden compartment screwed in the bottom of the can, which contained methamphetamine, prescription pills, and cocaine.

[8] On January 13, 2022, the State filed an Information, charging Deaton with Level 2 felony dealing methamphetamine; Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine; Level 4 felony dealing cocaine; Level 6 felony possession of cocaine; Level 6 felony dealing a controlled substance; Level 6 felony possession of a syringe; Level 6 felony possession of a legend drug; Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana; Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia; Level 3 felony dealing cocaine; Level 5 felony possession of cocaine; Level 5 felony dealing a controlled substance; and Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana. On March 29, 2022, Deaton filed a motion to suppress alleging that the search of the Jeep was unconstitutional under the United States and Indiana Constitutions. On May 26, 2022, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Deaton's motion, which the trial court subsequently denied on June 1, 2022. On June 13, 2022, Deaton filed a motion to certify the Order for interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted the following day. This court accepted jurisdiction on August 19, 2022.

[9] Deaton now appeals the interlocutory Order. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard of Review

[10] “We review a trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to suppress deferentially, construing conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling, but we will also consider any substantial and uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant.” Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 365 (Ind. 2014) (citing Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 935 (Ind. 2006)). Nevertheless, we defer to the trial court's factual determinations unless they are clearly erroneous. Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 869 (Ind. 2009).

II. Fourth Amendment

[11] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects persons from unreasonable searches and seizures. Taylor v. State, 842 N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. 2006). The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect the legitimate expectations that private citizens possess in their persons, homes, and belongings. Id. Subject to certain well-established exceptions, a warrant is required to demonstrate that a search is reasonable. Whitley v. State, 47 N.E.3d 640, 645 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. The State must prove that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at the time of the search. Id.

[12] One such exception to a warrant requirement is a valid inventory search, which permits police to conduct a warrantless search of a lawfully impounded vehicle if the search is designed to produce an inventory of the vehicle's contents. Id. An inventory search is an exception because it serves an administrative, rather than an investigative, purpose. Wilford v. State, 50 N.E.3d 371, 374 (Ind. 2016). As such, the rationale for an inventory search is three-fold: (1) protection of private property in police custody; (2) protection of police against claims of lost or stolen property; and (3) protection of police from possible danger. Taylor, 842 N.E.2d at 330-31. In determining the propriety of an inventory search, the threshold question is the propriety of the decision to impound the vehicle, as it is the impoundment that gives rise to the need to conduct the inventory. Id. at 331; Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 431 (Ind. 1993). If the decision to impound was reasonable, then a court must consider whether the scope of the search itself was reasonable. Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 431. “As in all Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the test of constitutionality in inventory cases is reasonableness.” Id.

[13] Deaton first challenges the propriety of the impoundment. Impounding a vehicle is proper when authorized by statute or performed under the community-caretaking function of the police. Whitley, 47 N.E.3d at 645. The State argues the impoundment here was authorized by statute, and we agree.

[14] Indiana Code section 9-18.1-2-3(2) states that a car may not be operated on the highway unless it “displays proof of registration in accordance with this article.” Proof of registration includes a license plate, a registration decal or sticker issued by the BMV, a certificate of registration, or other indication of registration issued by the BMV. Ind. Code § 9-18.1-1-5. It is a Class C infraction to use or operate a vehicle on a highway if it displays “a license plate belonging to any other vehicle” or a “fictitious registration number.” See I.C. § 9-18.1-4-5. A law enforcement officer who “discovers a vehicle operated in violation of” these registration requirements is authorized to “take the vehicle into the officer's custody” and/or “cause the vehicle to be taken to and stored in a suitable place” until a proper registration and license plates for the vehicle are procured. See I.C. § 9-18.1-2-10.

[15] Here, Officer Kyle observed Deaton operating the Jeep on a public roadway. The license plate displayed on the Jeep was registered to a Dodge Durango. Therefore, Officer Kyle was authorized pursuant to Indiana Code section 9-18.1-2-10 to impound the Jeep as it displayed a license plate that was not properly registered to the vehicle. Because a statutory authorization to impound existed, the decision to impound was reasonable. See, e.g., Whitley, 47 N.E.3d at 645-46 (the decision to impound was authorized by statute and therefore reasonable where the vehicle lacked a license plate properly registered to it).

[16] Deaton's argument that he was operating the Jeep in accordance with Indiana Code section 9-18.1-2-8(2) is without merit. Under Indiana Code section 9-18.1-2-8(2), for not more than forty-five days after a person acquires a vehicle, he may display on the newly acquired vehicle a valid and unexpired license plate transferred “from another vehicle that the person dispose[d] of by sale or other means.” Officer Kyle testified that, when he inquired about the license plate on the Jeep being registered to a Dodge Durango, Deaton explained that the Dodge Durango “was in a garage in Sydney and that he had intended to put the plate back on that truck after a period of use on the Jeep.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 8). Accordingly, the State's evidence established that Deaton had not disposed of the Dodge Durango by sale or other means, nor did he intend to do so but instead clearly evinced an intent to continue using the Dodge Durango. Indiana Code section 9-18.1-2-8 allows a person to use an unexpired license plate for a short period of time when he has gotten rid of the vehicle to which that license plate was registered and has acquired a new vehicle instead; it is not an authorization to rotate one license plate among several different vehicles that the person possesses and uses. As such, the limited statutory exception to operate a vehicle with a license plate registered to another vehicle was not applicable here.

[17] Deaton's argument that the vehicle did not need to be impounded as the Jeep did not pose some threat or harm to the community or was not imperiled is likewise unavailing. An impoundment is proper when it is done pursuant to the routine community-caretaking function of the police or when it is authorized by statute. Taylor, 842 N.E.2d at 331. Deaton's claim refers to the standards imposed under the community-caretaking function and it is only necessary to determine whether impoundment was a permissible act of community caretaking when no statutory authorization exists for the impoundment. See, e.g., Wilford, 50 N.E.3d at 375 (turning to an assessment of the community-caretaking rationale “because we find no statute specifically authorizing this impoundment”). Thus, when we find statutory authorization for the impoundment of the vehicle, like here, we do not engage in any analysis under the community-caretaking function.

[18] But “[e]ven if there is a lawful custodial impoundment of the vehicle, the constitutional requirement of reasonableness requires that the inventory search itself must be conducted pursuant to standard police procedures.” Jackson v. State, 890 N.E.2d 11, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). This is “to ensure that the inventory is not a pretext ‘for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.’ ” Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 435 (quoting Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990)). “[T]o defeat a charge of pretext the State must establish the existence of sufficient regulations and that the search at issue was conducted in conformity with them.” Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 435. While evidence of written inventory procedures is not required, the State must present more than conclusory testimony from officers. Wilford, 50 N.E.3d at 376.

[19] The inventory search conducted by Officer Kyle was performed in accordance with the established and written department Policy, which was admitted during the evidentiary hearing. This Policy authorized officers to inventory “all areas of the vehicle in which personal property or hazardous materials may reasonably be found,” including “the passenger compartment[.]” (State's Exh. 1). The Policy further detailed the officers’ authorization to open all closed containers, including those which could be opened with a key, but prohibited them from forcing open locked containers, and required officers to complete and turn in the standard inventory report. During the suppression hearing, Officer Kyle related the Policy's requirements and testified that he looked through the car for items of value, enumerated them on the tow slip form, and also recorded the search with his body camera. He relayed that he completed the department's “towed vehicle & inventory receipt form” on which he listed the inventory as “keyring with numerous keys, lunch pail, Carhartt [coat], boots, and a change of clothes” and the reason for the impound as “false and fictitious registration.” (State's Exh. 2). Officer Kyle's testimony and the documentation entered into evidence by the State are sufficient to show that the inventory search conformed with departmental policies and was therefore reasonable.

[20] Deaton now contends that an inventory search is not necessary if the owner of the vehicle is available to take possession of the property inside the vehicle. He maintains that because he “was present and available to take his belongings and had asked to do so, [ ] there was no need to inventory them, and the officer's search of those belongings exceed[ed] the scope of a constitutional and valid inventory search.” (Appellant's Br. p. 15). In support of his position, Deaton references Bartruff v. State, 706 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), where this court held that the inventory search of the vehicle was not necessary because the owner of the car was present at the scene and capable of taking custody of the property within the vehicle. However, in Bartruff, the police inventory policy specifically provided that an inventory was not necessary if the owner was present and capable of taking custody of the property within the vehicle. Id. No such provision was present in the Policy before us. Rather, Officer Kyle followed the standard operating procedures in accordance with the Policy's impoundment and vehicle inventory guidelines. Because at the time Officer Kyle conducted the inventory search Deaton was not under arrest, Officer Kyle granted Deaton's request to take the keys, boots, jacket, and lunch pail home with him prior to the car being towed. Nothing in the Policy forbids an officer from inventorying items that the owner will take with him at the scene and the purpose of the inventory search—protection of private property in police custody and protection of police against claims of lost or stolen property—are still being served. See Taylor, 842 N.E.2d at 330-31.

[21] Deaton now asserts that Officer Kyle's inventory search of his jacket and lunch pail exceeded the administrative scope of the search and instead became a pretext for an investigative search. In support of his argument, he refers this court to Sams v. State, 71 N.E.3d 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). In Sams, when searching the defendant's truck which was being impounded, a police officer opened a crumpled McDonald's food sack and found methamphetamine. Id. at 375. Although the officer claimed that he opened the bag as part of an inventory search, the officer admitted that he was not going to document the contents of the bag and was looking inside because it seemed “suspicious.” Id. at 381-82. The court of appeals found that the opening of the bag was not justified as part of the inventory search because it did not serve any “of the administrative purposes of the inventory search.” Id. at 382. We concluded that the inventory regime in Sams was vague and did not sufficiently regulate inventory searches conducted under it, awarding the officers with an impermissible discretion by which the inventory search became a pretext for an illegal investigatory search. Id. at 379-80.

[22] We find Sams distinguishable from the facts before us. Officer Kyle did not act unreasonably by taking a quick look inside the lunch pail before handing it over. Unlike Sams, Officer Kyle was authorized by a detailed Policy to open up the lunch pail, which had already been noted as being in the vehicle on the “towed vehicle & inventory receipt form.” See Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 430 (An inventory search is “to produce an inventory of the vehicle's contents.”). Furthermore, rather than being pretextual, Officer Kyle's “quick pe[e]k” was in conformity with the rationale of an inventory search which allows an officer to search the vehicle to “protect[ ] from possible danger.” Taylor, 842 N.E.2d at 330-31; (Tr. Vol. II, p. 18). Just as it was reasonable to allow Deaton to take possession of personal property rather than keeping it in the car to be towed, it was reasonable for Officer Kyle to make sure that the property did not contain a weapon that could be used to harm the officers.

[23] Under the circumstances before us, the impound of Deaton's Jeep was authorized by statute, and the inventory of the vehicle was conducted in keeping with the Policy and did not exceed the scope of that search. Officer Kyle acted reasonably by allowing Deaton to remove his possessions from the vehicle prior to it being towed and he acted in conformance with the purpose of an administrative inventory search by ensuring that the lunch pail did not contain a weapon before giving it to Deaton. A proper, lawful inventory search does not defeat the validity of that search even if the officer had a suspicion that the defendant was engaged in narcotics activity. See Sams, 71 N.E.3d at 377 (when the impoundment of the car is proper and the search was reasonable, “we will not fault it because a searching officer wanted or expected to find evidence of a crime as he searched.”); Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 463 n.7 (an officer's suspicion that contraband may be present in the vehicle “is not automatically fatal to an [inventory] search” provided the impoundment is lawful and not merely a subterfuge for an investigation.). As the impoundment and the inventory search did not violate Deaton's Fourth Amendment rights, we affirm the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress on that ground.

III. Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution

[24] Deaton also contends that the inventory search was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, which provides, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated[.]” Although this language is virtually identical to its Fourth Amendment counterpart, our Indiana Supreme Court has independently interpreted and applied Section 11. Whitley, 47 N.E.3d at 648. Under Section 11, the State must show the inventory search was reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances. Lewis v. State, 755 N.E.2d 1116, 1127 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Thus, the validity of a search turns on an evaluation of the reasonableness of the officers’ conduct under the totality of the circumstances. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005). The reasonableness of a search depends on a balance of “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Id.

[25] It is questionable whether the Litchfield balancing test applies to an inventory search, as the very first factor—degree of suspicion—is not relevant to an inventory search. While an initial stop requires some degree of suspicion, an inventory search does not; rather an inventory search is conducted for the purposes of “(1) protection of private property in police custody; (2) protection of police against claims of lost or stolen property; and (3) protection of police from possible danger.” Ector v. State, 111 N.E.3d 1053, 1058 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. As the State points out, our supreme court has decided inventory search cases in the past without reference to the Litchfield factors. See, e.g., Wilford, 50 N.E.3d at 378; Taylor, 842 N.E.2d at 334 (holding unreasonableness of inventory search under Fourth Amendment analysis supported the conclusion that the requirements of Article 1, Section 11 were also violated). This court has also adjudicated the validity of an inventory search under Section 11 without applying the Litchfield factors. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 64 N.E.3d 903, 906-08 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016); Jackson v. State, 890 N.E.2d 11, 19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); Lewis, 755 N.E.2d at 1126-27; Cf. Smith v. State, 116 N.E.3d 1107, 1114 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (applying the Litchfield factors to an inventory search), trans. denied.

[26] Regardless, the inventory search at issue in this case was reasonable under the Litchfield analysis for the same reasons the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. That is, Officer Kyle had a high degree of suspicion to stop Deaton as he was driving the Jeep with license plates that belonged to a different car, in violation of I.C. § 9-18.1-4-5. The degree of intrusion was no more than was necessary to inventory the vehicle per the Policy, and Deaton was not under arrest and was free to leave. And finally, given the fact that a vehicle is not allowed to be driven on a public roadway without a lawful registration and the location of the vehicle on an abandoned parking lot, law enforcement had a significant need to secure the vehicle and its contents. Accordingly, the inventory search was reasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

CONCLUSION

[27] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the inventory search of Deaton's vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's denial of Deaton's motion to suppress.

[28] Affirmed.

Riley, Judge.

[29] Bailey, J. and Vaidik, J. concur