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IN RE: TS.J. and Tn.J., Children in Need of Services: J.K. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner.
 J.K. (“Mother”) is the biological mother of Ts.J. and Tn.J. (collectively, “the Children”). The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) became involved with the family after receiving reports of an altercation between the Children, Mother, and Mother's husband (“Stepfather”). On January 5, 2022, DCS filed petitions alleging that the Children were children in need of services (“CHINS”). The juvenile court subsequently found the Children to be CHINS. Mother appeals this determination. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
 Mother is the biological mother of the Children.1 Ts.J. was born on April 15, 2005, and Tn.J. was born on December 8, 2006. On September 21, 2021, DCS received a report of an altercation between the Children and Mother and Stepfather. The altercation “ultimately led to the [C]hildren seeking refuge at Jeffersonville High School and to DCS obtaining emergency custody of them.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 18, 22. At that time, the Children “reported being subjected to excessive and/or inappropriate discipline” by Mother and Stepfather such as “holding [them] down and shaving their heads, cutting the tongues out of their shoes, throwing away their clothes, and denying [them] basic necessities such as toiletries, as well as other verbal and emotional abuse.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 18, 22. The Children were returned to Mother's care after she and Stepfather entered into an Informal Adjustment Agreement (“the IA Agreement”) with DCS.
 On January 5, 2022, DCS filed petitions alleging that the Children were CHINS. In these petitions, DCS alleged that “[s]ince the signing of the [IA Agreement], DCS has received at least three new reports of abuse/neglect relating to the [C]hildren with similar allegations to those which led to the prior case.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 18, 22. Specifically, DCS alleged
k. On or about December 8, 2021, [Mother], in the presence of the homebased caseworker, verbally and emotionally abused the [C]hildren, by means of name-calling, telling the[m] to “get out,” breaking a phone and throwing a vape device at the service provider.
l. On or about December 29, 2021, [Mother] verbally and emotionally abused [Tn.J.], such that [Tn.J.] felt compelled to leave the house and call her CASA volunteer telling said volunteer that she could not stand being in the house anymore due to that and other instances of verbal/emotional abuse.
m. On or about January 3, 2022, [Mother] verbally and emotionally abused [Ts.J.] to the point that she felt she needed to leave the premises for her own safety, eventually going to Jeffersonville High School with her sibling and calling CASA and the police, and ultimately spending the night with [Stepfather's] mother.
n. On or about January 4, 2022, [Mother] sent text messages to DCS stating, among other things, that the [C]hildren could not return to her home as they were no longer welcome.
o. After DCS has requested an Emergency Custody Order based on the events of January 3rd and 4th, 2022, DCS took the [C]hildren to [Mother's] home to collect their things.
p. At the time of the removal, and in the presence of DCS and law enforcement, [Mother] was verbally and emotionally abusive to the [C]hildren, by, among other things, inappropriate name calling and refusing to allow the [C]hildren to take any items for which the [C]hildren had not paid with their own money, including their winter coats.
i. The foregoing acts and omissions have seriously endangered the [Children's] mental health.
j. For the forgoing reasons, the [Children are CHINS] and is unlikely to receive said services without the coercive intervention of the Court.
Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 18–19, 22–23.
 The juvenile court conducted a fact-finding hearing on February 17, 2022, at the conclusion of which it adjudicated the Children as CHINS. Following a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court ordered Mother to participate in various reunification services, including
d. Allow the Family Case Manager or other service providers to make announced or unannounced visits to your home, and permit entrance to the home to monitor progress toward compliance with any court order(s).
f. Sign any releases necessary for the Family Case Manager to monitor compliance with the terms of the court's order.
g. Maintain suitable, safe and stable housing with adequate bedding, functional utilities, adequate supplies of food and food preparation facilities. Keep the family residence in a manner that is structurally sound, sanitary, clean, free from clutter and safe for the children.
m. Complete a psychological evaluation(s) as referred and approved by DCS and successfully complete any recommendations that result from the evaluation(s).
n. Meet with medical/psychiatric personnel, as directed by the medical/psychiatric personnel and take all prescribed medications as in the doses and frequencies specified in the prescriptions.
o. Meet all personal medical and mental health needs in a timely and complete manner. This includes, but is not limited to, following all directions of the nurses/doctors, attending all appointments, and taking medications in the appropriate doses and frequencies specified in the prescriptions.
s. Provide children with a safe, secure and nurturing environment that is free from abuse and neglect and be an effective caregiver who possesses the necessary skills, knowledge and abilities to provide the children with this type of environment on a long-term basis to provide the children with permanency.
Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 10–11.
Discussion and Decision
 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in finding the Children to be CHINS. To adjudicate a child to be a CHINS, DCS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:
(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or
(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and
(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
(A) the child is not receiving; and
(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.
Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1.
 When reviewing a trial court's CHINS determination, we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Instead, we consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. When a trial court supplements a CHINS judgment with findings of fact and conclusions law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. We consider, first, whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the judgment. We will reverse a CHINS determination only if it was clearly erroneous. A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.
In re D.J. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577–78 (Ind. 2017) (internal citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).
I. The Juvenile Court's Factual Findings
 In concluding that the Children were CHINS, the juvenile court made numerous findings, only two of which are challenged by Mother. We accept the unchallenged findings as true. See Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992) (providing that unchallenged findings “must be accepted as correct”).
A. Mother's Failure to Adequately Address the Children's Mental-Health Needs
 The juvenile court found that “Children have mental health issues as detailed in the Life[S]pring records introduced by DCS which have been exacerbated and not properly addressed by the actions and inactions” of Mother. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 47. In challenging this finding, Mother claims that “finding that the [C]hildren have mental health issues that Mother is not addressing is clearly erroneous because it is not supported by any evidence.” Appellant's Br. p. 13. Mother asserts that
DCS offered no testimony or evidence that Mother was against the [C]hildren receiving mental health treatment or that she failed to obtain that treatment for them. There was no evidence that Mother failed to take the [C]hildren to appointments for counseling when they were under her care. Simply put, there was no evidence from which the court could infer that Mother has not “properly addressed” the [C]hildren's mental health issues[.]
Appellant's Br. pp. 14–15. Contrary to Mother's claim, however, the challenged finding is supported by sufficient evidence.
 Tn.J. has received treatment from LifeSpring for her mental-health issues since 2012. In February of 2017, Tn.J., who was ten years old at the time, received mental-health treatment after reporting that she was suffering from hallucinations and was exhibiting destructive, self-harming behavior, including banging her head on the wall. Tn.J. admitted that she had previously experienced suicidal thoughts when she thought “about [a past alleged] sexual molestation and kids being mean to her.” Ex. Vol. III p. 54. However, despite the fact that Tn.J.’s struggles with mental-health issues persisted, at some point, Tn.J. was discharged from treatment “due to [Mother's] request to terminat[e] services.” Ex. Vol. III p. 65. The records from LifeSpring indicate that Mother
has little or no understanding of [Tn.J.’s] current condition. [Mother] is unable to cope with [Tn.J.] given [her] status at the time, not because of the needs of [Tn.J.] but because [Mother] does not understand or accept the situation. The lack of knowledge places [Tn.J.] at risk of significant negative outcomes.
Ex. Vol. III p. 37. The records further indicate that Mother was unable to provide Tn.J. with “emotional or concrete support,” Ex. Vol. III p. 36, and “has notable problems managing the stress of [Tn.J.’s] needs. This stress interferes with [her] capacity to give care.” Ex. Vol. III p. 239.
 Ts.J. also has a history of mental-health issues. Ts.J. received treatment at LifeSpring in 2019 and 2021. In December of 2021, Ts.J. reported that she was suffering from high anxiety levels and that she had been “really depressed [in] the past couple of months.” Ex. Vol. III p. 227. Ts.J. indicated that she was not sleeping or eating well due to her high levels of anxiety. LifeSpring records indicate that Ts.J. had suffered verbal and emotional trauma from “both parents.” Ex. Vol. III p. 227.
 The LifeSpring records are sufficient to support the juvenile court's finding regarding the Children's mental-health issues. While Mother may be willing to obtain mental-health treatment for the Children, she was not adequately doing so at the time the CHINS proceedings were initiated. The evidence is sufficient to support the juvenile court's determination that the Children have mental-health needs that are not being met by Mother. Mother's claim to the contrary is effectively a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577–78.
B. Coercive Intervention Necessary
 Mother also claims that the juvenile court's “findings of fact do not indicate that Mother was unwilling to participate in services with DCS nor does it cite any reason why DCS’[s] coercive intervention would be required.” Appellant's Br. p. 15. The record supports the juvenile court's finding that DCS coercive intervention was necessary. Again, prior to the CHINS determination, the Children's mental-health needs were not being met by Mother. Mother also displayed a history of being emotionally and verbally abusive to the Children and refused to participate in visitation with the Children following their removal until the week before the fact-finding hearing. Even when she did visit with the Children, the visits did not go well, with Mother “blaming [the Children] for everything.” Tr. Vol. II p. 97. In addition, Mother had previously indicated that she did “not wish to participate in services and/or interventions intended to assist” the Children. Ex. Vol. III p. 239. We cannot say that the juvenile court erred in determining that coercive intervention was necessary.2 Mother's claim to the contrary again amounts to a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577–78.
II. The Dispositional Order
 Mother alternatively contends that the dispositional order inappropriately intrudes upon her privacy and would require her to take unwanted medication. Specifically, Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering her to allow DCS (1) to make unannounced visits to her home and (2) unlimited access to her entire medical history. Mother also argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering her to submit to a psychiatric evaluation by a DCS-approved provider and ordering her to take any prescribed medication.
 If the juvenile court determines that a parent, guardian, or custodian should participate in a program of care, treatment, or rehabilitation for the child, the court may order the parent, guardian, or custodian to do the following:
(1) Obtain assistance in fulfilling the obligations as a parent, guardian, or custodian.
(2) Provide specified care, treatment, or supervision for the child.
(3) Work with a person providing care, treatment, or rehabilitation for the child.
(4) Participate in a program operated by or through the department of correction.
(5) Participate in a mental health or addiction treatment program.
Ind. Code § 31-34-20-3(a). “Although the juvenile court has broad discretion in determining what programs and services in which a parent is required to participate, the requirements must relate to some behavior or circumstances that was revealed by the evidence.” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1258 (Ind. 2012) (internal quotation omitted).
A. Unannounced Visits to Mother's Home
 Mother objected to the juvenile court allowing DCS to make unannounced visits to her home “[j]ust in case there's something going on in my home personally, privately” noting that “[i]t would make things a little bit more easier [sic] for myself if it was scheduled if I knew somebody was coming to my home that way I would be home. I wouldn't have plans and I would be aware that somebody was coming to my home.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 125–26. Mother argues that the requirement that she allow unannounced visits to her home “is a severe imposition” because “it removes any expectation of privacy for the duration of the CHINS case. [Mother] must expect that no matter what she is reading, watching, eating, wearing, or doing, DCS could show up at any moment.” Appellant's Br. pp. 19–20. We agree with DCS, however, that such alleged invasion of privacy is warranted because “[i]f DCS is considering whether to put Children back in the home, it must determine whether the home is appropriate for Children. DCS cannot get an entirely accurate picture of the home when visits are announced because parents often ‘prepare’ for such visits.” Appellee's Br. p. 26. Simply stated, unannounced visits give DCS the best opportunity to make sure the reasons for State involvement are being addressed in a manner sufficient to allow for reunification.
B. Access to Medical Records
 Mother also objected to the juvenile court allowing DCS to access her medical records, arguing that “[t]here is no evidence that any medical issue of Mother's bears any relationship with her discipline of the [C]hildren.” Appellant's Br. p. 20. Contrary to Mother's claim, the CHINS determination is not based solely on Mother's allegedly inappropriate discipline of the Children. It is also based on allegations of verbal and emotional abuse perpetrated on the Children by Mother. Thus, Mother's mental health and her ability to refrain from said abuse and to understand the Children's needs were very much at issue in the underlying proceedings. We agree with the State that records relating to Mother's mental health and any health issues which may impede her ability to provide adequate care for the Children are relevant to the proceedings. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in ordering Mother to allow DCS access to these records.
C. Psychiatric Evaluation and Medication
 Mother last argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering her to submit to a psychiatric evaluation by a DCS-approved provider and to take all prescribed medications. Mother acknowledges that the juvenile court acted within its discretion in ordering her to submit to a psychiatric evaluation by a DCS-approved provider but argues that it was an abuse of discretion to
commit [her] to any course of treatment recommended by the providers to who Mother is referred by DCS without providing an opportunity for Mother to persuade the court of the possibility of an alternative course of treatment recommended by her treating physician. If her own treating physicians make recommendations that vary from those of DCS she should not be committed by dispositional order to follow the recommendations of DCS’[s] providers without an opportunity to be heard by the court. The court's order does not allow for this possibility and is therefore an abuse of discretion.
Appellant's Br. p. 22. As for medication, Mother stated “I refuse to be medicated. Medication is off the table. I've been medicated my entire life. I'm in a happy place in my life with my health. I refuse to be medicated.” Tr. Vol. II p. 136.
 It is clear that Mother is concerned that she will be required to take medications to which she objects. However, the juvenile court did not order Mother to take any medication and it is unknown whether any doctor or service provider will order her to do so in the future. While we understand Mother's desire to choose her own medical providers, it is important that DCS and the juvenile court have confidence that any recommended treatment will help to address the issues leading to State intervention. Thus, it is important to have an unbiased individual evaluate Mother to determine what treatment, if any, is necessary to help her to meet both her and the Children's needs. Mother will have the ability to communicate and explain her aversion to medication with the service provider before any such medication is prescribed. Again, the record demonstrates that Mother's mental health negatively affected her ability to provide adequate care for the Children. The juvenile court's order for psychiatric evaluation by a DCS-approved provider is therefore related to the underlying issues. As such, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering Mother to submit to an evaluation by a DCS-approved provider and to follow any recommended treatment plans, including taking any necessary prescribed medications.
 The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
1. The Children's biological father, F.J., does not participate in this appeal.
2. A CHINS determination is not “some sort of punishment for wrongdoing” and, contrary to Mother's claim, nothing in the record indicates that either DCS or the juvenile court used the underlying CHINS proceedings as such. Appellant's Br. p. 17.
Bradford, Chief Judge.
Bailey, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
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Docket No: Court of Appeals Case No. 22A-JC-1054
Decided: August 26, 2022
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana.
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