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C.T., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner.
 In September of 2019, C.T. was placed on probation following his admission to committing three delinquent acts and has admitted to three additional delinquent acts since then. In May of 2021, C.T. was placed in a Bridge Link program, but was transferred to Woodford Home (“Woodford”) soon thereafter. On May 29, 2021, C.T. assaulted one of his roommates, and the juvenile court held a detention hearing on June 1, after which it determined that there was probable cause to detain C.T.
 On June 22, 2021, the juvenile court held a modification hearing, at which it heard additional evidence and after which it found that C.T. had violated the terms of his probation and ordered him committed to the Department of Correction (“DOC”). C.T. filed a motion for relief from judgment, claiming that he had been denied due process and had received ineffective assistance of counsel. The juvenile court denied C.T.’s motion for relief from judgement. C.T. contends that the juvenile court erroneously determined that he had received the process due to him and had not received ineffective assistance of counsel. Because we disagree, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
 On September 3, 2019, C.T. was placed on formal probation supervision after admitting to committing what would be Class A misdemeanor domestic battery and two counts of Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief if committed by an adult. Since then, C.T. has also admitted to committing what would be Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief, Class B misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident, and Level 6 felony auto theft if committed by an adult, and his conduct, including illegal drug use, destruction of property at his father's home, violent behavior at his mother's home, and leaving home without permission, has resulted in seven disposition or modification hearings.
 In May of 2021, C.T. was placed in a Bridge Link program, but his illegal drug use, failure to attend educational programs, and unemployment caused his placement in Woodford on May 12, 2021. On May 29, 2021, the probation department was informed that C.T. had assaulted one of his roommates at Woodford and that the South Bend Police Department (“SBPD”) had been called. As it happens, the incident had been captured on video by C.T.’s other roommate.
 The juvenile court held a detention hearing on the matter on June 1, 2021, at which C.T. was represented by public defender Mark James, a public defender with broad experience in juvenile matters including detention, modification, and fact-finding hearings. James reviewed a probation-status report prepared on May 27, 2021, as well as the reports from the SBPD and Woodford; he recalled that he had “plenty of time to review [C.T.]’s record,” noting that he would have had at least half an hour to review material even if the hearing had been a last-minute scenario. Tr. Vol. II p. 50. After meeting with C.T. before the hearing, James knew that C.T. denied that he had assaulted the other resident, but also knew that Woodford would no longer accept him as a resident, so his primary focus was an alternative to detention for C.T. James had not seen the video of the attack prior to the hearing.
 At the detention hearing, the State summarized the basis for C.T.’s detention, and the juvenile court discussed C.T.’s position with counsel. James argued that the assault on the other resident was merely horseplay. After being placed under oath (along with all others witnesses present in the courtroom), C.T.’s father and mother addressed the juvenile court and agreed that C.T.’s assault was not a “real fight” and did not seem to all that different than C.T.’s wrestling with his nephews. Tr. Vol. II p. 7. C.T.’s therapist, however, also addressed the juvenile court and said that “I did see the video of what happened. One of the other kids had videoed it in the bedroom. And it was of [C.T.] pummeling this other kid who's laying in his bed. It was far from horseplay.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 8–9. The State and C.T. were offered the opportunity to cross-examine C.T.’s parents and his therapist, but they declined.
 Senior Coach Counselor Lonnie Jones had prepared the incident report at Woodford explaining the events that led to C.T.’s detention. Jones explained to the juvenile court that “we're not in the business to throw kids [․] to the curb” but that there were other young persons who had to be protected; while one such person had complained to staff about C.T., the complaints could not be resolved. Tr. Vol. II p. 9. Jones said that “[b]ased off the video” C.T.’s conduct did not appear to be horseplay but rather other conduct which “we just, we don't tolerate.” Tr. Vol. II p. 9. The juvenile court asked about the video of the beating, and Jones explained that one of C.T.’s roommates had taken it. C.T. declined invitations by the juvenile court to question Jones.
 When asked, the prosecutor and James told the juvenile court that neither of them had seen the video, although the State maintained that the police report provided to the juvenile court was sufficient justification for detention. The juvenile court observed, “So the roommate says, this is a violent assault. [․] Father says it's not; it was horseplay. Why should I believe one and not the other?” Tr. Vol. II p. 12. C.T.’s therapist told the juvenile court that she had the video on a telephone. The juvenile court expressed a willingness to watch the video, and C.T. objected on the basis that the video was hearsay. The juvenile court noted the preliminary nature of the hearing and told C.T.’s attorney, “I'll certainly give you a chance to present evidence or argument that the Court should disregard it, or find it inauthentic.” Tr. Vol. II p. 13.
 At that point attorney James argued that C.T.’s mother and father had testified to his employment, which contradicted the detention petition, and that C.T.’s father had also testified to his ability to provide C.T. with a residence. Because no charges had been filed against C.T., James argued, it would seem best that C.T. be placed in home detention. The juvenile court replied that it was concerned with that solution, because, “I don't want to overstate things, but you can't assault your way out of the placement.” Tr. Vol. II p. 15. The juvenile court said that its decision would depend on what was shown in the video: “If it's true that this is just mere horseplay [․], then he shouldn't be detained.” Tr. Vol. II p. 15. James replied that incident report mentioned that the other boy had only sustained “three superficial bruises” and that if C.T.’s “version or Dad's version is correct,” this did not sound like “anything aggravated.” Tr. Vol. II p. 15; Ex. 7. The juvenile court observed, “Well, at any rate, you need to be able to see [the video], and the State should probably be able to see it as well, so that they can make any argument or perhaps change their position[,]” and recessed so that C.T. and the State could review the video. Tr. Vol. II p. 15.
 When the detention hearing resumed, the State asked the juvenile court to watch the video. James said, “The videotape is about three seconds long, if I estimate correctly. I think the Court will see it starts in the middle of whatever was going on, and then I'll leave it at that.” Tr. Vol. II p. 16. The juvenile court secured its own copy of the video for the record from C.T.’s therapist's telephone and played it in court. The juvenile court then asked if there was anything else for it to consider, and James observed that neither the video nor the “one-sided” incident report from Woodford explained the interaction between C.T. and the other roommate before the video began, and that C.T. “would tell you that the young man in the video is a friend, that they engaged in behavior like this frequently, as young men, young boys do, see who's the tough guy.” Tr. Vol. II p. 17. James observed that “[w]hether that's appropriate behavior or not in a group home, that's the group home's rules, but it's not unusual for boys to engage in that kind of behavior.” Tr. Vol. II p. 17. The juvenile court heard further testimony from C.T.’s mother and father, who said that C.T.’s behavior had improved, he was doing well at work, and had had just been playing on the video.
 The juvenile court determined that there was probable cause to believe that C.T. had violated the terms of his placement, noting that “[i]t's hard to get the full context from the video, but from what I saw, it didn't look like horseplay to me. It looked like a pretty violent assault[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 21. The juvenile court observed that there might be possible alternative explanations for the conduct on the video, such as self-defense or unintended escalation of horseplay into a “real fight[,]” and scheduled C.T.’s case for a modification hearing on June 22, 2021. Tr. Vol. II p. 21.
 As it happened, the public-defender's office worked on a six-month rotation, and James knew that attorney Heidi Cintron would represent C.T. at the modification hearing. Cintron was also experienced in family law and representing juveniles and had access to all the documentation available to James. Cintron later testified that it was her usual practice to speak with former counsel when taking over a case, although she did not have a specific memory of communicating with James in this particular case. Cintron reviewed C.T.’s case documentation and the modification report. Cintron believed her focus was on placement for C.T. She met with C.T. prior to the hearing and knew that he did not believe he had violated the terms of his probation, although she did not have a copy of the video recording of the attack.
 At the modification hearing on June 22, 2021, the juvenile court announced the hearing and its purposes as follows:
Good morning. [All relevant cause numbers] are set for hearing on a petition for modification. [․ C.T.], the probation department has filed a petition alleging that you violated the terms of your probation or your release. You may dispute that you violated. If you do, the State of Indiana, the prosecutor, bears the burden of establishing that you did, in fact, violate probation as they allege. In their petition, the State has also made recommendations on what the Court should do, if it finds that you violated the terms of your probation. Even if you agree that you did, in fact, violate, you can still make your own proposal on what the Court should do in response to that.
Tr. Vol. II p. 25. The juvenile court also began by swearing in C.T.’s probation officer (“the PO”), C.T., and his parents as witnesses. Moreover, a modification report had been prepared by the probation department on June 16, 2021, which summarized C.T.’s history of involvement with the juvenile justice system and related family services and recommended that C.T. be committed to the DOC.
 The PO testified that there had been eight incident reports since C.T. had been detained:
[C.T.] has made threats to peers and threats to staff, and some of those threats have been extremely concerning. Specifically, [C.T.] was caught yelling at another resident through the window, stating quote, he would beat their a[**] and shoot them, and then made hand gestures as if he was pulling a trigger with a firearm. He also made threats to beat another resident's mother's a[**], and to beat that resident's a[**], stating, “You're dead, homies.” And then on June 9th, the threat got made to staff were that he would whoop that Mexican Garcia's (phonetic) a[**].
Tr. Vol. II p. 26. In addition, the PO noted that the last incident report had been made two days before the hearing and that the urine screen taken by C.T. when he was detained tested positive for marijuana use, indicating that he had used the drug while in placement at Woodford. Several prior drug screens administered to C.T. at various stages of his probation had also tested positive for marijuana use. The PO concluded that, given C.T.’s persistent refusal to abide by program rules, less-restrictive placements had failed. Because C.T.’s “delinquent behaviors place the safety of the community and his own safety [․] at risk” and because he required “a much higher level of structure and supervision than what can be provided in the community[,]” placement in the DOC was recommended. Tr. Vol. II p. 27.
 The State questioned the PO about C.T.’s prior participation in the Bridge Link program and whether that was available to him now, and the PO explained that the program had provided C.T. with its full gamut of services and that a repetition would be of no continued benefit to C.T. Cintron had no questions for the PO, but asked the juvenile court to consider several additional factors, as follows:
[C.T.] has talked to me. He did write a letter, but I'm going to -- I want to outline some things that [C.T.] thought was important. He's made improvements, though we've had struggles, we've definitely had major pitfalls, but we've gotten ourself [sic] up. And he is, according to [C.T.], he's not angry like he used to be. He did have a job at J&J Construction and they, according to [C.T.], are willing to take him back. He was a good employee. He did well there. And since he's been placed in custody, they are -- they have maintained contact and are willing to allow him to come back once this is resolved.
According to [C.T.], he hates what the drugs have done to him. He sees the problems, he sees how it has changed him, and how it has -- it modifies his way of thinking and his behaviors. [C.T.] wants the Court to know that -- again, he's made improvements, and the old him is definitely significantly different than the new him. He doesn't deny that there's improvements and things he needs to work on, but he's made progress. He wants the Court to take a note of that before making a decision today, in addition to the letter he has written to the Court, for the Court's consideration.
Tr. Vol. II pp. 29–30. The juvenile court asked the State about the letter, and the State had no objection to the juvenile court considering it. Cintron concluded by asking the juvenile court to consider a second placement in the Bridge Link program or group home.
 The juvenile court then heard testimony from C.T.’s mother and father, who also wanted the juvenile court to order a disposition other than commitment to the DOC. Neither the State nor Cintron had questions for C.T.’s parents. Cintron told the juvenile court that C.T. wished to speak. C.T. said that he regretted his prior bad behavior, promised to change his ways, and described the progress he believed he had made in reforming. He testified that Woodford had taken his behavior “out of context” because he and the boy he appeared to beat were actually friends. Tr. Vol. II p. 34. C.T. asked, “[I]f it was a real fight, wouldn't the police took me? Wouldn't I have punched in the face? Your Honor, I understand, I can see why it looks like it was a real fight. But, Your Honor, I promise on everything it was not a real fight.” Tr. Vol. II p. 34. C.T. asked for a less-restrictive placement, noting that he had not stolen a car for two years and that he hated drugs. Neither the State nor Cintron had further questions.
 The juvenile court observed that every less-restrictive option had been tried to induce C.T. to reform his behavior, and that none of them had worked: “These cases represent your fifth, seventh, eight, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth referrals to this Court, one of which I will disregard because it is the domestic relations case.” Tr. Vol. II p. 36. The juvenile court also noted, “I hear what you're saying about the incident at Woodford. I saw what I saw.” Tr. Vol. II p. 36. The juvenile court concluded that, “[e]verything has worked for some period of time, but frankly, nothing has worked for long enough that the community is safe[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 36. The juvenile court committed C.T. to the DOC.
 Although the juvenile court told C.T. he had a right to appeal its decision and offered to provide him with as much time as he needed to decide on an appeal, C.T. did not appeal the juvenile court's decision. Instead, C.T. filed a motion for relief from judgment under Trial Rule 60(B) on December 10, 2021. The juvenile court held a hearing on C.T.’s motion on January 26, 2022. At the Rule 60(B) hearing, James and Cintron testified about their representation. Cintron was confronted for the first time with the fact that the victim named in the police report turned out to be a forty-year-old adult who had been incarcerated when C.T. had beaten his roommate at Woodford. In view of that new information, Cintron testified that it would have been “prudent” to have asked for a fact-finding hearing in lieu of a modification hearing. Tr. Vol. II p. 62. The juvenile court denied C.T.’s motion for relief from judgment.
Discussion and Decision
 C.T. appeals from the juvenile court's denial of his motion for relief from judgment. Rulings on motions for relief from judgment are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re Paternity of P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d 737, 740–41 (Ind. 2010). An abuse of discretion occurs “only when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances” before the juvenile court. Shinnock v. State, 76 N.E.3d 841, 843 (Ind. 2017). Consequently “great deference” is given to the juvenile court's ruling. Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621, 628 (Ind. 2010). Conclusions about the impact of relevant law are reviewed de novo. In re S.H., 984 N.E.2d 630, 633 (Ind. 2013). This Court will affirm the juvenile court on any reasonable basis apparent in the record, even if that basis was not relied on by the parties or the juvenile court. Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 190 n.2 (Ind. 2021).
I. Due Process
 C.T. contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that he was given the procedural process due to him because the juvenile court allegedly did not require the presentation and opportunity to test evidence regarding its decision and because his attorneys did not advance a meaningful defense against the allegation. “The standard for determining what due process requires in a juvenile proceeding is ‘fundamental fairness,’ ” S.L.B. v. State, 434 N.E.2d 155, 156 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), namely, “the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Perdue v. Gargano, 964 N.E.2d 825, 832 (Ind. 2012) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970)). The Due Process Clause does not require any particular form of procedure but is satisfied when its basic goals are reasonably pursued. Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 332 (1993) (citing Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 451 (1992)).
 Also worth noting is that the Due Process Clause only applies to state actors: “While as a factual matter any person with sufficient physical power may deprive a person” of life, liberty or property, “only a State or a private person whose action ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself,’ may violate the Fourteenth Amendment's protections.” Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978) (quoting, in part, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974), and citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)). Publicly-funded defense counsel are not state actors who can violate the Fourteenth Amendment “when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).
 In the specific context of Indiana juvenile law, the appellate courts have identified several components of due process for modification of a juvenile's probation, namely, (1) the right to have competency determined if appropriate; (2) the right to adequate notice of the allegations; (3) the right to appointment of counsel; (4) the privilege against self-incrimination; (5) the right to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses; and (6) the right to “an evidentiary hearing before the juvenile court modifies disposition based on an alleged probation violation.” K.A. v. State, 938 N.E.2d 1272, 1274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied; accord J.H. v. State, 857 N.E.2d 429, 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (right to notice), trans. denied; C.S. v. State, 817 N.E.2d 1279, 1282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (right to cross-examine); In re Jennings, 176 Ind. App. 277, 279, 375 N.E.2d 258, 260 (1978) (right to counsel); cf. Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008) (enumerating due process guarantees in adult-probation hearings as “(a) written notice of the claimed violations of probation; (b) disclosure of the evidence [․] (c) an opportunity to be heard and present evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; and (e) a neutral and detached hearing body”).
 As an initial matter, C.T. seems to allege that certain actions or omissions by his attorneys denied him due process, namely that they failed to adequately prepare for the detention or modification hearings. Whatever these actions or omissions might have constituted, they did not amount to denials of due process, because his public defenders were not state actors. See, e.g., Polk Cnty., 454 U.S. at 325. As for C.T.’s allegations regarding actions by the juvenile court, C.T. argues that his attorneys did not have “discovery” in order to obtain the State's evidence with more time before his proceedings. The right to receive “pretrial discovery is not a part of the U.S. concept of due process.” Society of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 2000). It is an ability afforded counsel, to use as they may wish, but their choices and decisions regarding discovery are not due process violations. See Kindred v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1161, 1178 (Ind. 1989) (concluding that State's failure to disclose the statements until moments before trial was not a due process violation, absent some showing of “imbalance in the discovery procedure prescribed by the trial court”) (abrogated on other grounds by Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201, 1206 (Ind. 2007)); Blocker v. U.S. Bank, Etc., 993 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (concluding that an opposing party's failure to respond to discovery was not a due process violation, particularly when the complaining party had not tried to compel discovery under the Trial Rules). The record contains no indication that the juvenile court denied C.T. discovery or issued an unfair discovery order. Consequently, C.T. has failed to show a due process violation regarding discovery. C.T. also points to the fact that further evidence regarding the video was not presented to the juvenile court, namely, that the roommate who made the video was not called to testify. C.T., however, points to no ruling or order by the juvenile court that prevented him from presenting the roommate's testimony himself.
 Finally, C.T. argues that it was a due process violation for the juvenile court to consider evidence from the detention hearing at the later modification hearing. C.T. first argues that the rotation of his attorneys hindered their ability to collaborate in making a more effective challenge to the claim that he had violated his probation. The evidence most favorable to the judgment, however, indicates that C.T.’s attorneys consulted about the case and that both had full access to relevant case materials. Moreover, the rotation was due to a standard practice of the public defender's office and was not the result of any order or other action by the juvenile court.
 C.T.’s second argument regarding the evidence presented at each hearing is that the juvenile court erred when it found that evidence presented at the detention hearing was available to be considered as evidence at the modification hearing, apparently because the standard of proof in detention hearings is probable cause rather than a preponderance of the evidence, as it is in modification hearings. See J.P. v. State, 770 N.E.2d 365, 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that burden of proof for modification is preponderance of the evidence).
 As a general proposition, it is well-settled that trial courts may take notice of evidence presented at prior proceedings in the case and need not expressly state that fact on the record. See Vance v. State, 640 N.E.2d 51, 57 (Ind. 1994) (affirming incorporation by reference, in a later proceeding, of evidence presented at an earlier waiver hearing). As for C.T.’s specific complaint, we acknowledge that probable cause is a less stringent standard of proof than preponderance of the evidence. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983). That said, a difference in legal standards at two hearings has nothing to do with the inherent probative force or value of any particular evidence, as the same body of evidence can support both a finding of probable cause and proof by preponderance of the evidence. Put another way, finding that evidence supports a finding of probable cause does not mean that it automatically falls short of supporting a finding of proof by preponderance of the evidence.
 In any event, the record is clear that the juvenile court did not find that C.T. had violated his probation at the detention hearing and left that question open for the modification hearing. The juvenile court stated at the outset of the modification hearing that “the State of Indiana, the prosecutor, bears the burden of establishing that you [C.T.] did, in fact, violate probation as they allege.” Tr. Vol. II p. 25. This statement contradicts the notion that the juvenile court found that C.T. had violated the terms of his probation at the detention hearing and supports a conclusion that the trial court properly found he had done so by a preponderance of the evidence after the modification hearing. C.T. has failed to establish that he was denied the process due to him in this modification procedure.
II. Whether C.T. Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
 Our Supreme Court noted that the right to counsel in juvenile proceedings derives from due-process concerns rather than the specific guarantees of the Sixth Amendment incorporated through the Due Process Clause. A.M. v. State, 134 N.E.3d at 367–68 (Ind. 2019). Taking into account the different purposes of juvenile-justice and adult criminal systems, the A.M. Court explicitly rejected the use of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to gauge counsel's performance in dispositional hearings. A.M., 134 N.E.3d at 364-65. A.M. held that for ineffective-assistance claims in dispositional matters, the inquiry is “whether the lawyer's overall performance was so defective that the [․] court cannot say with confidence that the juvenile court imposed a disposition modification consistent with the best interests of the child.” Id. at 368 (quotation omitted).
 A.M. left open the question of whether the Strickland inquiry as applied in S.T. v. State, 764 N.E.2d 632, 635 (Ind. 2002) “might be appropriate for adjudicative phases of a juvenile proceeding.” A.M., 134 N.E.3d at 364 n.2.
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are evaluated under the two-part test articulated in Strickland[.] To prevail, [the appellant] must show: 1) that counsel's performance was deficient based on prevailing professional norms; and 2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Ward v. State, 969 N.E.2d 46, 51 (Ind. 2012) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052).
In analyzing whether counsel's performance was deficient, the Court first asks whether, “ ‘considering all the circumstances,’ counsel's actions were ‘reasonable [ ] under prevailing professional norms.’ ” [Wilkes v. State, 984 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ind. 2013)] (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052). Counsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is highly deferential. Id.
To demonstrate prejudice, “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052.
Weisheit v. State, 109 N.E.3d 978, 983–84 (Ind. 2018). We will assume, without deciding, that Strickland applies in this case, because C.T.’s claim fails under either standard.
 C.T. seems to argue that his counsels were ineffective for failing to sufficiently challenge the video and argue that he did not, in fact, batter his roommate. Specifically, C.T. argues that Cintron in particular was ineffective for failing to sufficiently contest that a probation violation actually occurred at the modification hearing, at which she had focused instead on the question of C.T.’s placement. Keeping in mind that C.T. had admitted to hitting his roommate; the juvenile court had already viewed the video and stated on the record that it depicted a “pretty violent assault[,]” Tr. Vol. II p. 21; and Woodford had already determined that it would not accept him back, this does not strike us as an unreasonable approach. C.T. was able, at both proceedings, to advance his claim that the activity depicted in the video was mere horseplay. The juvenile court, however, determined after reviewing the evidence that the activity depicted was not horseplay. C.T. does not explain what his counsels might have done that would have changed the result of the modification hearing. Under the circumstances, there is no reasonable probability that arguing more forcefully that the activity in the video was innocent or even inauthentic would have yielded a different result.
 C.T. also argues that the Cintron's failure to notice the erroneous identification of the victim in the SBPD report as an incarcerated, forty-year-old man and explore it further at the modification hearing amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. We are at something of a loss to understand how any of this could possibly have prejudiced C.T. or what Cintron could have done that might have helped him. While the name of C.T.’s victim was not divulged during the hearing, his name was not important; the salient fact was that C.T. had beaten his roommate at Woodford, something that was never in dispute. Under the A.M. standard, C.T. has failed to convince us that his “lawyer's overall performance was so defective that the [․] court cannot say with confidence that the juvenile court imposed a disposition modification consistent with the best interests of the child.” A.M., 134 N.E.3d at 368 (quotation omitted). Similarly, even assuming that the Strickland standard applies in this case, C.T. has failed to establish either deficient performance or resulting prejudice. The juvenile court committed no error in denying C.T.’s motion for relief from judgment.
 We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
Bradford, Chief Judge
Bailey, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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Docket No: Court of Appeals Case No. 22A-JV-609
Decided: August 23, 2022
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana.
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