IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: M.H. (Minor Child) (2022)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] The Lake Superior Court terminated A.T.’s (“Mother's”) parental rights to M.H., her three-year old child. Mother appeals and argues that DCS failed to present clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of her parental rights.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother gave birth to M.H. on February 26, 2019. Due to Mother's extensive history with the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) and her behavior in the hospital after M.H.’s birth, DCS removed M.H. from Mother's care two days after he was born.

[4] Mother suffers from mental health issues and limited cognitive functioning. Mother had three children before she became pregnant with M.H. Her parental rights to her two oldest children were involuntarily terminated. Mother voluntarily terminated her parental rights to her third child.

[5] While Mother was in the hospital after giving birth to M.H., she struggled to process information, tried to hide M.H. under her coat, and lied about her living arrangements. DCS was also aware of Mother's mental health diagnoses and that she had not been participating in mental health services or taking her medication as prescribed. In 2017, psychologist Dr. Cathleen Amador reported to DCS that Mother lacked the ability to parent her children without extensive support.¹ Appellant's App. p. 3. DCS removed M.H. because Mother was unable to care for him, was noncompliant with her mental health treatment, and because DCS had concerns for M.H.’s safety.

[6] DCS filed a petition alleging that M.H. was a Child In Need of Services (“CHINS”) on March 1, 2019. The trial court adjudicated M.H. to be a CHINS, and the court ordered Mother to participate in numerous services including parenting education, supervised visitation, therapy, medication management, and home-based casework. Mother consistently participated in supervised visitation with M.H. However, she was not consistent with therapy, she lacked a support system, she was unable to obtain stable housing, and she placed herself in unsafe situations with men that she had met online.² Therefore, on April 14, 2021, DCS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Mother's parental rights to M.H.

[7] In July 2021, DCS caseworkers noticed that Mother was making improvements in her ability to independently care for herself. Mother had also obtained employment and maintained “better focus on her case plan goals.” Id. at 33. Therefore, DCS requested a new psychological evaluation. The trial court granted the request, and Dr. Amador evaluated Mother for a second time on August 19, 2021.

[8] Dr. Amador concluded that Mother had demonstrated “meaningful improvement in her behavior and attitude [from her 2017 evaluation] and has several areas of independence.” Id. at 78. But she also found that Mother “continues to need substantial assistance in the more complex areas” and “has not been able to generalize her improved cooperation consistently” to most people. Id. For example, Dr. Amador found that Mother could adequately care for her child physically but was concerned that Mother could not provide a safe environment for her child. Id. at 77. Dr. Amador also expressed concern that Mother could not care for the child's special needs without assistance. Id. at 77-78.

[9] Dr. Amador found that Mother functions at a mild level of Intellectual Disability and persons who function at that level

usually can master basic household tasks, but would struggle with anything more complex, such as managing household finances, organizing appointments, medications and medical needs, prioritizing, and dealing with several problems at once. Parenting can be easily overwhelming. Making appropriate decisions is often problematic due to both limited understanding as well as poor judgment and insight.

Id. at 81. Ultimately, Dr. Amador concluded that Mother

Continues to need ongoing support in order to parent, however the important difference is that at this time she is willing to accept help, and her outbursts are reported to be under control. Currently, she no longer meets the criteria for Intermittent Explosive Disorder or any other psychiatric condition, as evidenced by her progress while not prescribed medication. That being said, at [this] time she is not yet ready to parent, because she needs to be able to work with all providers as well as maintain her behavioral gains.

Id. at 83. The doctor also noted Mother's other risk factors that should be considered, namely, “[m]aintain[ing] her personal safety for 6 months, including but not limited to refraining from meeting males[.]” Id.

[10] On December 9, 2021, the trial court held the fact-finding hearing on DCS's petition to terminate Mother's parental rights. The family case manager testified that Mother consistently attended supervised visitation and her biggest concern at those visits was Mother's inability to supervise her child “when there's other things going on.” Tr. p. 35. The case manager also was concerned that Mother did not live in a safe environment, which was a significant reason why her visits with her child remained supervised.

[11] The case manager testified that Mother was more cooperative with DCS during these proceedings as compared to earlier proceedings involving her three other children. Id. at 39. Mother consistently attended her therapy sessions until September 2021. Id. at 13, 41. A few weeks before the fact-finding hearing, Mother told the family case manager that she did not need therapy and did not have time to attend it. Id. at 43. Mother also failed to make significant progress in therapy and refused to take medication. Id. at 41. Mother's therapist noted Mother's previous diagnosis of bipolar depression and stated that consistent and continuing therapy is important for Mother. Id. at 15-16.

[12] Similarly, Mother was compliant with homebased case work, but she did not make significant progress in being able to live independently. In spring and summer 2021, Mother's home-based case worker attempted to wean Mother from the significant support she was providing to determine if Mother had progressed with her independent living skills. In response, Mother stopped going to therapy and did not provide necessary items for her child at visitations as instructed, such as diapers. Id. at 44-45. Mother's case manager does not believe that Mother has the independent means to care for herself.

[13] On the date of the fact-finding hearing, Mother rented a bedroom in a communal house. It is not an appropriate home for Mother's child because Mother does not know who lives there and has no control over who is allowed in the house. Prior to moving into that home, Mother's case manager told her that the communal house was not appropriate for visits or placement. Mother's case manager also observed that DCS has provided services to Mother for years and she has not been able to maintain a stable environment for herself and is unable to care for her children. Id. at 51. Moreover, M.H. has needs that require special attention, and he participates in speech and occupational therapy. The case manager did not believe that Mother would be able to appropriately manage M.H.’s needs or remember M.H.’s appointments. Id. at 54.

[14] Mother testified that she refused to take medication because she did not like how it made her feel. Id. at 65. She also admitted that she has never had any of her children in her care for any significant length of time. Id. at 65-66. Mother stated that she has the ability to care for M.H. because she is more mature now and can “do all this by [her]self.” Id. at 66.

[15] On January 5, 2022, the trial court issued its order terminating Mother's parental rights to M.H. The court noted Mother's extensive history with DCS, her mental health issues, that she stopped attending therapy and refused medication, her unstable housing, and the evidence that Mother is unable to independently care for herself or her child in support of its order terminating her parental rights.

[16] Mother now appeals.

Standard of Review

[17] Indiana appellate courts have long adhered to a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1230–31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In analyzing the trial court's decision, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the court's judgment. Id. In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

[18] To determine whether a termination decision is clearly erroneous, we apply a two-tiered standard of review to the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions of law. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings; and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. If the evidence and inferences support the court's termination decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. Finally, we will accept unchallenged factual findings as true. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 614 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

Discussion and Decision

[19] It is well-settled that the parent-child relationship is one of society's most cherished relationships. See, e.g., In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d 471, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Indiana law thus sets a high bar to sever that relationship by requiring DCS to prove four elements by clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2021). Only two of those elements are at issue in this case: (1) whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home will not be remedied, and (2) whether termination of parental rights was in the child's best interests.³ I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i), (C).

[20] Clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of the parent is wholly inadequate for the child's very survival. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 148 (Ind. 2005). It is instead sufficient to show that the child's emotional and physical development are put at risk by the parent's custody. Id. If the court finds the allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a).

[21] Mother argues that the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for the child's removal from her care and/or the reasons for continued placement outside her home had not been remedied is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to the child's removal and continued placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). First, “we must ascertain what conditions led to [his] placement and retention in foster care.” Id. Here, Mother's noncompliance with her mental health treatment, lack of stable housing, and inability to care for infant M.H. led to his removal from her home.

[22] Second, “we ‘determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.’ ” Id. (quoting In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1132, 1134 (Ind. 2010)). In this step, we observe that the trial court must judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions, and balancing a parent's recent improvements against “habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014) (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). In addition, a trial court may consider services offered by DCS and the parent's response to those services as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied. A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1157. “Where there are only temporary improvements and the pattern of conduct shows no overall progress, the court might reasonably find that under the circumstances, the problematic situation will not improve.” In re A.H., 832 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). DCS “is not required to provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it need only establish ‘that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change.’ ” A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1157 (quoting In re Kay L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)).

[23] Mother asserts that she has progressed with her mental health treatment, she has stable housing and employment, and is able to care for three-year old M.H.’s needs. Mother observes that she has completed most services including a parenting assessment, parenting classes and a psychological assessment. Mother also consistently attended visitation with M.H. Further, she observes that Dr. Amador concluded that Mother had improved since her 2017 psychological assessment and had rescinded her Intermittent Explosive Disorder diagnosis. Mother also claims that DCS had an obligation to provide her with services based on the findings in the 2021 psychological assessment.

[24] DCS does not dispute that Mother made some progress in this case. Most of Mother's progress consisted of her changed attitude toward her caseworkers and her participation in supervised visitation with M.H. Mother also obtained employment.

[25] However, despite years of services provided by DCS, Mother's family case manager, Dr. Amador, and her therapist all agreed that Mother is still unable to independently care for herself or for a child. Mother struggles with complex tasks and multi-tasking. During supervised visitations, Mother failed to supervise her child when distracted by other persons or when trying to converse with her case manager. Although Mother attended therapy and participated in home-based casework, she did not benefit from those services. And Mother stopped going to therapy in September 2021 and believes she no longer needs therapy. Mother has never been able to provide a safe, suitable home for her child, which is one of the reasons that she was unable to progress beyond supervised visitation. Mother had lived in her home for approximately six months before the fact-finding hearing, but it was not an appropriate or safe home for her child. Mother also makes poor choices with men that she meets through social media and continued using social media to meet men after she was drugged and held captive by a man she met online.

[26] For these reasons, we conclude that DCS presented clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for M.H.’s removal from Mother's care and/or the reasons for continued placement outside her home will not be remedied

[27] We now turn to Mother's claim that DCS did not prove that termination of her parental rights was in M.H.’s best interests. A court's consideration of whether termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests is “[p]erhaps the most difficult determination” a trial court must make in a termination proceeding. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 647 (Ind. 2014). When making this decision, the court must look beyond the factors identified by DCS and examine the totality of the evidence. In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. In doing so, the court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child. Id. at 1155. Central among these interests is a child's need for permanency. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009). Indeed, “children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648.

[28] Moreover, our court has often observed that “[a] parent's historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability and supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.” See, e.g., In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 221 (quoting Castro v. State Office of Family and Children, 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)), trans. denied. “In other words, ‘although parental rights have a constitutional dimension, the law allows for their termination when parties are unable or unwilling to meeting their responsibility as parents.’ ” Castro, 842 N.E.2d at 221 (quoting In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)).

[29] After receiving services from DCS for years, Mother is still unable to independently care for herself or M.H., and she does not have a safe, suitable home for raising a child. In addition to the evidence discussed above supporting the trial court's conclusion that the reasons that M.H. was removed from Mother's care will not be remedied, we also observe that three-year-old M.H. has never been placed in Mother's care. Moreover, M.H. has needs that require speech and occupational therapy. DCS presented evidence that it is unlikely that Mother is capable of adequately addressing those needs. M.H. has lived with the same foster parents consistently throughout these proceedings and requires stability.

[30] For these reasons, we conclude that DCS presented clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights is in M.H.’s best interests.

Conclusion

[31] Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's order terminating Mother's parental rights to M.H.

[32] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   M.H.’s father was not involved in caring for the child and voluntarily terminated his parental rights.

2.   For example, Mother met a man online who drugged her and forced her into prostitution until she was able to escape captivity. Yet, Mother continued to use social media to meet men.

3.   DCS must only prove one of the elements listed in Indiana Code subsection 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B); therefore, it is not necessary for our court to consider whether DCS presented clear and convincing evidence that continuation of the parental child relationship poses a threat to the child's well-being. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B).

Mathias, Judge.

Brown, J., and Molter, J., concur.