MONACO v. HECKATHORN II (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In this interlocutory appeal, Mark Monaco appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to transfer venue to Marion County in a civil action filed against him in Fulton County by Jerry D. Heckathorn, II and David Glickfield, Jr. Because Marion County is a county of preferred venue and Fulton County is not, the trial court erred in denying Monaco's motion. We therefore reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to grant Monaco's motion to transfer the case to Marion County.

[2] We reverse and remand.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] This case involves the sale of a 1952 Mickey Mantle rookie baseball card (the Card). Heckathorn, a resident of Fulton County, was the owner of the Card. He kept the Card in a secure location on his property.

[4] Glickfield, a longtime friend, knew Heckathorn owned the Card. Glickfield also knew that Monaco, an acquaintance, was looking for just such a card to complete his set. Glickfield inquired of Heckathorn about the possibility of selling the Card to Monaco. Heckathorn agreed and then entrusted the Card to Glickfield for the purpose of discussing and negotiating terms of the sale to Monaco. In exchange for Glickfield arranging the sale, Heckathorn agreed to sell Glickfield other baseball cards at a discounted price as commission.

[5] On June 15, 2025, Glickfield traveled to Monaco's home in Marion County to allow Monaco to inspect the Card and, if interested, negotiate a purchase price. That same day, Glickfield and Monaco reached an agreement, which was memorialized in a contract drafted by Monaco and signed by both men:

Appellant's Appendix at 21. Glickfield then conveyed the Card to Monaco in exchange for $45,000 worth of baseball cards owned by Monaco. Thereafter, Glickfield paid Heckathorn $45,000 in cash.

[6] Pursuant to the contract, Monaco had the Card professionally graded by Professional Sports Authenticator (PSA). PSA returned a grade of 2.5. Thus, Monaco owed an additional $35,000 for the Card.

[7] On July 11, 2025, Glickfield traveled to Monaco's home in Marion County to collect the remaining funds. Monaco wanted to renegotiate the contract, but Glickfield declined and requested either the $35,000 or the return of the Card in exchange for the $45,000 down payment. According to Glickfield, Monaco demanded that Glickfield leave and did not tender payment or return the Card.¹ Thereafter, Glickfield and Heckathorn attempted to communicate several times with Monaco seeking the balance due or return of the Card in exchange for the down payment.

[8] On July 25, 2025, Glickfield and Heckathorn filed suit against Monaco in the Fulton County Circuit Court. They alleged claims of breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion. On August 5, 2025, Monaco filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(3) and to transfer the action to Marion County because Fulton County did not qualify as a preferred venue under Ind. Trial Rule 75(A). Glickfield and Heckathorn filed a response, arguing that Fulton County qualified as a preferred venue under T.R. 75(A)(2) because the Card had been regularly kept with Heckathorn in Fulton County prior to being transported to Marion County by Glickfield to negotiate the sale.² Along with the response, Heckathorn filed an affidavit, which provided in part:

5. The sole purpose of the baseball card leaving my possession and leaving the geographic confines of Rochester, Fulton County, Indiana was to allow David Glickfield, Jr. to show it to Mark Monaco for the purpose of potentially selling the same;

6. But for Mark Monaco's request to examine the baseball card, the subject card would have never left the geographic confines of Rochester, Fulton County, Indiana and would likely be in possession of the Plaintiff, Jerry D. Heckathorn, II.

Appellant's Appendix at 32.

[9] Monaco filed a reply memorandum in support of his motion and an affidavit, averring that he negotiated solely with Glickfield for the purchase of the Card and that “Glickfield represented that he owned the Card, and would either sell it to me or keep the Card for himself.” Id. at 42. In his affidavit, Monaco referenced two exhibits that were screenshots of text message conversations between Monaco and Glickfield. Included within these is the following message from Glickfield:

i am telling u tho the mantle is going to be expensive. I am buying it no matter what. It is going to cost me quite a bit. But this is a once in a lifetime opportunity. If u dont want it, I will grade it and probably just put it away. That card is like gold.

Id. at 45 (verbatim). Glickfield also said, “Don't forget, I am paying big money to get this card myself.” Id. at 46.

[10] On September 9, 2025, the trial court held a brief hearing on the motion at which the parties presented only argument. The trial court took the matter under advisement and then issued its written order on September 30, finding that Fulton County is a preferred venue under T.R. 75(A)(2) and thus denying Monaco's motion to transfer the case to Marion County.

[11] Monaco brings an interlocutory appeal of that order as a matter of right, pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 14(A)(8). Additional information will be provided below as needed.

Standard of Review

[12] We generally review a trial court's order on a motion to transfer venue for an abuse of discretion. See Strozewski v. Strozewski, 36 N.E.3d 497, 499 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Because the trial court ruled on a paper record, however, our review is de novo. See Scribbles, LLC v. Wedgewood by Wedgewood, 101 N.E.3d 844, 846 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.

Discussion & Decision

[13] T.R. 75 governs venue and provides in part:

Any case may be venued, commenced and decided in any court in any county, except, that upon the filing of a pleading or a motion to dismiss allowed by Rule 12(B)(3), the court, from allegations of the complaint or after hearing evidence thereon or considering affidavits or documentary evidence filed with the motion or in opposition to it, shall order the case transferred to a county or court selected by the party first properly filing such motion or pleading if the court determines that the county or court where the action was filed does not meet preferred venue requirements or is not authorized to decide the case and that the court or county selected has preferred venue and is authorized to decide the case.

T.R. 75(A). It then sets out ten subsections with alternative criteria for establishing preferred venue, of which the following two are relevant here:

(1) the county where the greater percentage of individual defendants included in the complaint resides, or, if there is no such greater percentage, the place where any individual defendant so named resides; or

(2) the county where the land ․ is located or the chattels or some part thereof are regularly located or kept, if the complaint includes a claim for injuries thereto or relating to such land or such chattels, including without limitation claims for recovery of possession or for injuries, to establish use or control, to quiet title or determine any interest, to avoid or set aside conveyances, to foreclose liens, to partition and to assert any matters for which in rem relief is or would be proper;

Id.

[14] The rule generally places no priority among the subsections, and thus there can be multiple preferred venues in a given case. See Kem v. Spencer, 272 N.E.3d 560, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025); see also R & D Transp., Inc. v. A.H., 859 N.E.2d 332, 336 (Ind. 2006) (observing that subsection ten of the rule allows for the plaintiff's home county to be a preferred venue if the first nine subsections do not apply or if all the defendants are nonresidents). Further, “if a lawsuit is filed in a county that is a county of preferred venue, the case cannot be transferred to another county, even if that other county is also a county of preferred venue.” R & D Transp., 859 N.E.2d at 333.

[15] Monaco argues that the trial court erred when it found that Fulton County was a preferred venue under T.R. 75(A)(2). Glickfield and Heckathorn, on the other hand, argue that Fulton County is a preferred venue because it is where the Card was regularly kept prior to the transaction between Glickfield and Monaco in Marion County.

[16] The chattel ³ at issue in this case is the Card, and its nexus to the underlying action is clear. Glickfield and Heckathorn are seeking return of the Card or full payment under the contract for it. But where the Card was regularly kept prior to Glickfield's possession and transport of it to Marion County to negotiate and complete the sale is insignificant to the claims at hand.

[17] As our Supreme Court has explained, “the focus of T.R. 75(A)(2) is the location of the property or activity that gives rise to a claim.” R & D Transp., 859 N.E.2d at 334; see also Kem, 272 N.E.3d at 565 (“The actual location of the Policies, much like the [chattel] in R & D, played no role in [plaintiff's] claims; instead the important location where the activity arose leading to the claim was in Grant County.”); Bagsby v. Snedeker, 93 N.E.3d 1127, 1131-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (applying R & D outside the context of an automobile accident), trans. denied. In other words, “the significance of real or personal property's location [is] the most important factor” when considering T.R. 75(A)(2). R & D Transp., 859 N.E.2d at 335 (emphasis in original).

[18] Here, the claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion arise from the sale transaction, which occurred entirely in Marion County. That is, the activity that gave rise to the claims took place in Marion County: the card was taken there by Glickfield, who unbeknownst to Monaco was acting as a middleman for Heckathorn; after Monaco made a down payment, the Card was left with him to be professionally graded; and the alleged failure to pay the remaining balance occurred there. Fulton County's only connection to the suit is that Heckathorn, Glickfield's principal, regularly kept the card in Fulton County before the sale. That pre-sale storage location had no role in, and was entirely disconnected from, the transaction itself.

[19] For the reasons set out above, we hold that the trial court erred in concluding that Fulton County was a preferred venue under T.R. 75(A)(2). As there is no dispute that Marion County is a preferred venue under T.R. 75(A)(1), transfer should have been granted thereto as requested by Monaco.

[20] Reversed and remanded for entry of an order transferring the action to Marion County.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Monaco claims that he did provide the remaining payment in cash to Glickfield on this date.

2.   Glickfield is a resident of Grant County.

3.   “A chattel is defined as movable or transferable property; personal property; especially, a physical object capable of manual delivery and not the subject matter of real property.” Kem, 272 N.E.3d at 564 (cleaned up and internal quotations omitted).

Altice, Judge.

Brown, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.