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Robert L. RIVERS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff,
Case Summary and Issues
 Following a jury trial, Robert Rivers was convicted of battery resulting in bodily injury to a public safety official, a Level 5 felony, and domestic battery, a Level 6 felony. Rivers was sentenced to four years with one year executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) and three years suspended to probation. Rivers now appeals raising multiple issues for our review, which we restate as: (1) whether the trial court erred by granting the State's motion to amend the charging information; (2) whether Rivers received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) whether there was sufficient evidence to support Rivers’ conviction of battery resulting in bodily injury to a public safety official. Concluding that the trial court did not err in allowing the amendment, Rivers was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's performance, and the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
 On February 24, 2020, Rivers got into an altercation with his wife, Christina Rivers. Rivers tackled Christina to the ground and punched her multiple times in the face. When this occurred, multiple children under the age of sixteen were present in the home, one of whom called the police.
 Officer Eric Fields of the Portland Police Department was dispatched to Rivers’ home to respond to the domestic disturbance. When Officer Fields arrived, Rivers went outside while Christina remained inside with the children. Rivers had “blood on his hands[,]” “an odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from him[,]” and his “speech was slurred.” Transcript, Volume II at 33-34.
 Officer Fields attempted to handcuff Rivers, but Rivers pulled away and refused to put his hands behind his back. After being instructed to stop resisting, Rivers got on his knees and put his hands behind his head; however, he continued to pull away from Officer Fields and a second officer was required to assist in handcuffing him. Officer Fields searched Rivers and then, as he opened the back door of his patrol car to place Rivers inside, Rivers kicked him in the genitals and leg. See id. at 36-37. The officers then tackled Rivers to the ground.
 On March 6, 2020, the State charged Rivers with battery resulting in bodily injury to a public safety official, a Level 5 felony; domestic battery, a Level 6 felony; and resisting law enforcement, a Level 6 felony. Prior to trial, the State orally moved to amend the charging information for the domestic battery charge to add the language, “[Rivers] being at least 18 years of age[.]” Id. at 4. The trial court granted the amendment over Rivers’ timeliness objection. Rivers’ trial counsel did not request a continuance after the trial court granted the amendment.
 At trial, Christina testified that she witnessed Rivers’ arrest. Christina stated that Rivers “got down on his knees willingly” and that officers “slid [Rivers’ face] across the sidewalk ․ and then placed [him] into the vehicle.” Id. at 22. Rivers also testified at trial and claimed to have neither hit nor kicked Officer Fields. However, the jury found Rivers guilty on all counts. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court entered judgment of conviction only on battery resulting in injury to a public safety official and domestic battery and sentenced Rivers to four years with one year executed in the DOC and three years suspended to probation. Rivers now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
I. Motion to Amend Charging Information
 Rivers argues the trial court erred when it allowed the State to amend the charging information for his domestic battery charge. However, Rivers has forfeited this argument. If a defendant believes that an amendment to the charging information is prejudicial, he must request a continuance to further evaluate and prepare his case in light of the amendment. Wright v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1098, 1104 (Ind. 1997). Failing to request a continuance results in waiver of the issue on appeal. Haymaker v. State, 667 N.E.2d 1113, 1114 (Ind. 1996).
 Waiver notwithstanding, Rivers would not prevail. “A charging information may be amended at various stages of a prosecution, depending on whether the amendment is to the form or to the substance of the original information.” Erkins v. State, 13 N.E.3d 400, 405 (Ind. 2014) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 967 (2015). Whether an amendment to a charging information is a matter of substance or form is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id.
 Under Indiana Code section 35-34-1-5(c), a charging information may be amended at any time “in respect to any defect, imperfection, or omission in form which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant.”1 A defendant's substantial rights “include a right to sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the charge; and, if the amendment does not affect any particular defense or change the positions of either of the parties, it does not violate these rights.” Erkins, 13 N.E.3d at 405 (citation omitted). Ultimately, the question is whether the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to prepare for and defend against the charges. Id. at 405-06. “An amendment is one of form and not substance if a defense under the original information would be equally available after the amendment and the accused's evidence would apply equally to the information in either form.” Bennett v. State, 5 N.E.3d 498, 514 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted), trans. denied.
 Here, the State moved to include the phrase “being at least 18 years of age” to describe Rivers in the charging information for the domestic battery charge. Tr., Vol. II at 4. Rivers was charged with domestic battery under Indiana Code section 35-42-2-1.3(b)(2), which states the offense is a Level 6 felony when
[t]he person who committed the offense is at least eighteen (18) years of age and committed the offense against a family or household member in the physical presence of a child less than sixteen (16) years of age, knowing that the child was present and might be able to see or hear the offense.
The State's original charge alleged:
Rivers did knowingly or intentionally touch Christina Rivers, a family or household member in a rude, insolent, or angry manner ․ and [Rivers] committed said offense in the presence of a child less than 16 years of age, knowing that the child was present and might be able to see or hear the offense[.]
Appellant's Appendix, Volume 2 at 16.
 The State's original charge includes all the elements of domestic battery committed in the presence of a child less than sixteen years old except the requirement that the perpetrator be over the age of eighteen. However, Rivers’ age was never in question, and he makes no indication that his defense included an assertion that he was not eighteen.2 Thus, the change did not surprise Rivers with “a new factual allegation that he was unprepared to counter[.]” Haak v. State, 695 N.E.2d 944, 952 (Ind. 1998). Nor did the amendment cause Rivers to “lose any defenses or affect the application of his evidence to the crimes charged[.]” Id. Therefore, the amendment was not one of substance, and it could be made at any time. Ind. Code § 35-34-1-5(c). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in allowing the State to make the requested amendment to the charging information.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
 Rivers argues that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel because trial counsel failed to request a continuance after the State's motion to amend the charging information was granted. To establish a violation of the right to effective assistance of counsel a defendant must prove two components: (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant to the extent that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Jewell v. State, 887 N.E.2d 939, 941 (Ind. 2008). Isolated poor strategy, bad tactics, a mistake, carelessness, or inexperience do not necessarily amount to ineffective counsel unless, taken as a whole, the defense was inadequate. Carr v. State, 728 N.E.2d 125, 131 (Ind. 2000).
 Here, trial counsel's failure to request a continuance resulted in the waiver of any appellate challenge to the State's amendment to the charging information. See supra at ¶ 7; see also Appellant's Brief at 10 (acknowledging failure will likely result in State alleging waiver). Rivers argues this constituted defective performance and we should therefore not find waiver and instead address his claim that the allegedly untimely amendment “dramatically changed his position ․ and had a dramatic effect upon the conviction entered against [him].” Appellant's Brief at 9. However, as we addressed above, the State's amendment was not one of substance and could be made at any time. Further, Rivers has not shown how a continuance would have changed the outcome of the trial. Therefore, we conclude that Rivers was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to request a continuance. Accordingly, he was not denied effective assistance of counsel.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
 Our standard of reviewing claims of sufficiency of the evidence is well settled. We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Boggs v. State, 928 N.E.2d 855, 864 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. We neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id. We consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the verdict, and we will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable trier of fact could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict, and a conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence alone. Id.
 Rivers argues that insufficient evidence exists to support his conviction for battery resulting in bodily injury to a public safety official. To convict Rivers of this charge, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Rivers knowingly or intentionally touched Officer Fields “in a rude, insolent, or angry manner[.]”3 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1). “Evidence of touching, however slight, is sufficient to support a conviction for battery.” Wolf v. State, 76 N.E.3d 911, 915 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citation omitted).
 Rivers contends that Christina's testimony “verifies Rivers’ claim that he did not kick or hit Fields [and] demonstrates that if Fields were kicked it was not a knowing or intentional act by Rivers.” Appellant's Br. at 10. With this argument, Rivers asks us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses, which we will not do. Boggs, 928 N.E.2d at 864.
 Further, given Officer Fields’ testimony, a reasonable trier of fact could determine that Rivers knowingly or intentionally touched Officers Fields in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. See Toney v. State, 715 N.E.2d 367, 369 (Ind. 1999) (“[T]he uncorroborated testimony of one witness may be sufficient by itself to sustain a conviction on appeal.”). We conclude the State's evidence was sufficient to convict Rivers of battery resulting in bodily injury to a public safety official.
 We conclude the trial court did not err by granting the State's motion to amend the charging information at trial, Rivers was not denied effective assistance of counsel, and the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Accordingly, we affirm.
1. Similarly, under Indiana Code section 35-34-1-5(a)(9), a charging information “may be amended on motion by the prosecuting attorney at any time because of any immaterial defect, including ․ any other defect which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant.”
2. Rivers was thirty-two years old at the time of the offense.
3. The offense is a Level 5 felony when the offense results in the bodily injury of “[a] public safety official while the official is engaged in the official's official duties.” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(g)(5)(A). Rivers does not challenge that Officer Fields was a public safety official engaged in his official duties.
Riley, J., and Molter, J., concur.
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Docket No: Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-CR-1414
Decided: February 22, 2022
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana.
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