GRIFFIE v. STATE (2021)

[1] Appellant Michael Anthony Griffie appeals from his conviction for possession of a narcotic drug, a Level 5 felony,¹ following a bench trial. Griffie argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence he claims was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. Concluding there was no constitutional violation to cause the admission of the evidence to be error, we affirm the court's judgment.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 14, 2019, Detectives John Wallace and Garland Cooper with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) were in plain clothes and an unmarked vehicle sitting at a red light at an intersection. At that time, they observed in a nearby parking lot a vehicle parked far from the entrance to the business even though there were closer parking spaces available. The officers observed two males inside the vehicle talking with a female that was standing outside the vehicle on the driver's side. As the officers continued to watch, they observed the driver of the vehicle exchange something with the female. The detectives believed they had observed a narcotics transaction.

[3] A marked police vehicle drove by as this event unfolded, and Detective Wallace recognized Officer Brent McDonald as the officer who had driven by and called him to ask him to stop the vehicle. In response to Detective Wallace's request, Officer McDonald located the vehicle and followed it. As the vehicle passed through an intersection, the driver braked suddenly and abruptly turned into a gas station, activating the turn signal in the middle of the turn. Officer McDonald followed the vehicle and initiated a traffic stop. The detectives in their unmarked car pulled into the gas station as well.

[4] Officer McDonald approached the vehicle and asked the occupants for identification. The driver, identified as Griffie, told the officer his license was suspended. When Officer McDonald returned to his vehicle with the individuals’ information, Detective Wallace observed Griffie watch Officer McDonald in his mirror and reach down below the door frame in his waist or lap area. Griffie continued to watch Officer McDonald as he placed in his mouth a square piece of folded-up paper the size of a quarter, drank from a water bottle, and attempted to swallow the paper. Detective Wallace then advised Officer McDonald what he had observed. The officers returned to the vehicle and asked both individuals to exit the car. Griffie and his passenger were seated on the ground behind their vehicle.

[5] At that time, Detective Wallace detected the odor of burnt marijuana coming from inside the vehicle, and he and Detective Cooper began a search of the vehicle. They found a digital scale on the driver's floorboard, pills inside a folded piece of paper in the glove box, and a large amount of baggies in the trunk.

[6] In the meantime, the officers were informed that the passenger had an outstanding warrant. Detective Cooper then performed a search of the passenger, including removing the passenger's shoes and socks. As Griffie watched the search of his passenger, he began kicking his feet back and forth and eventually was able to remove his shoes and socks. As he did so, Detective Cooper saw a small piece of paper fall out. Detective Cooper retrieved the paper package and opened it. It contained a “brownish solid like substance” that the officers believed was heroin, which testing later confirmed. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 134. In addition, testing revealed that the pills found in the glove box were Buprenorphine, a schedule III controlled substance.

[7] Based upon this incident, the State charged Griffie with possession of a narcotic drug, a Level 5 felony; possession of a controlled substance, a Level 6 felony;² and driving while suspended, a Class A misdemeanor.³ Prior to trial, Griffie moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, but the court denied his motion. At a bench trial, Griffie objected to the admission of the same evidence, namely the pills and the heroin, but the court admitted the evidence over his objection. Griffie was found guilty of possession of a narcotic drug and driving while suspended and was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of two years. He now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Griffie contends the trial court erred by admitting evidence that was obtained as a result of the traffic stop, asserting that “[t]he issue is whether the stop was valid because Mr. Griffie did not have time to signal for two hundred feet before he turned” into the gas station.⁴ Appellant's Br. p. 14. However, as we discuss below, the traffic stop was otherwise supported by the officers’ reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

[9] The trial court's ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Cherry v. State, 57 N.E.3d 867, 875 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. Yet, when a defendant's challenge to the admission of evidence implicates the constitutionality of the search or seizure of the evidence, it raises a question of law, which we review de novo. Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40-41 (Ind. 2014).

[10] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. The safeguards of the Fourth Amendment extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest. Porter v. State, 985 N.E.2d 348, 353 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). A traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and, accordingly, the police must possess at least a reasonable suspicion that a traffic law has been violated or that other criminal activity is taking place. Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 869 (Ind. 2009). Such reasonable suspicion must encompass more than hunches or unparticularized suspicions; that is, an officer must be able to point to specific facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Denton v. State, 805 N.E.2d 852, 855 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.

[11] At the hearing on Griffie's motion to suppress, Detective Wallace testified that the area where this incident occurred is an area of focus for narcotics. At trial, he testified that, as he sat at a stop light, his attention was drawn to the grocery store parking lot where a vehicle was in a parking spot that was “kind of out in the open” and “wasn't close to the door” even though there were plenty of spots closer to the entrance. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 98. He observed two males inside the vehicle talking with a female who was standing right outside the driver's door. As the detective continued to observe the three individuals, the driver of the vehicle exchanged something with the female, and then, as a marked police car drove by, the three individuals “froze in their tracks” until it was out of sight. Id. at 99. He then called Officer McDonald, the officer that had driven by in the marked car, and explained what he and Detective Cooper had observed so that the officer could stop the vehicle. Detective Wallace further testified that, through his experience, he is aware that parking lots are commonly used as locations for hand-to-hand narcotics transactions. Detective Cooper gave a similar account of the incident.

[12] Therefore, when Officer McDonald conducted the traffic stop, he possessed a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity had just taken place. Terry does not require absolute certainty of illegal activity but rather reasonable suspicion. On these facts, we find that standard was satisfied. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in overruling Griffie's objection to the admission of evidence based upon the Fourth Amendment.

[13] Concluding there was no Fourth Amendment violation, we now turn to the separate argument under the Indiana Constitution. Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures, and, although its text mirrors the Fourth Amendment, we interpret it separately and independently. Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 368 (Ind. 2014). When a section 11 claim is raised, the State must show the police conduct was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Farris v. State, 144 N.E.3d 814, 820 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. In our evaluation of the reasonableness of the conduct, we generally consider three factors: 1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred; 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities; and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs. Id.

[14] Here, Officer McDonald had reasonable suspicion of drug activity based upon the observations of the detectives. Further, the initial intrusion – a Terry stop – was relatively minor. The stop escalated only when Griffie told Officer McDonald his license was suspended. It was further escalated when Griffie attempted to covertly swallow a packet and then even further when Detective Wallace smelled burnt marijuana inside the vehicle. Finally, law enforcement has a legitimate and compelling interest in eradicating from our streets drugs and those who deal them. The totality of these circumstances indicates the traffic stop did not violate Griffie's rights under article 1, section 11, and, therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence seized as a result of the stop.

Conclusion

[15] We cannot say the trial court erred in the admission of evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop.

[16] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6 (2014).

2.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-7 (2014).

3.   Ind. Code § 9-24-19-2 (2016).

4.   See Ind. Code § 9-21-8-25 (1991) (a signal of intention to turn shall be given continuously during not less than the last 200 feet traveled by a vehicle before turning).

Baker, Senior Judge.

Bradford, C.J., and Crone, J., concur.