C.S., Appellant v. Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development, Appellee (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] C.S. appeals the decision of the Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development (“the Review Board”) that he is not entitled to unemployment insurance benefits because he was discharged by MapleTronics Computers, Inc. (“Employer”) for just cause. C.S. raises two issues on appeal, but we address only the dispositive, restated issue of whether the Review Board's decision must be reversed because it is not supported by substantial evidence.

[2] We reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Employer provides information technology (“IT”) support for approximately 120 different companies. On the evening of August 21, 2025, one such company, Oaklawn, was experiencing issues with its network switch. The switch “was going down every two to six hours[,]” Tr. at 12, causing the company to “lose connectivity to all their phones[,]” id. at 20. C.S., a Service Team Lead who had been employed by Employer since March 2010, first worked on Oaklawn's switch problem remotely from his home from “roughly 6:00-8:00” p.m. that day. Id. at 19. Then, just after 9:00 p.m., C.S. drove to Oaklawn's business premises to work on the switch problem “on site.” Id. Within approximately five minutes of his arrival, C.S. was able to get the switch working. However, he “still needed to wait [for] two to six hours to see if [the switch] was going to go back down.” Id. C.S. could remotely monitor whether that happened, as he would receive an alert on his cell phone if the switch “went down” again. Id. at 21. C.S. never received such an alert.

[4] C.S. left the Oaklawn premises at around 9:08 p.m. At approximately 11:24 p.m., C.S. was arrested and taken to jail. C.S. was at the jail “for a couple hours” and then “bonded [him]self out.” Id. at 20. C.S. arrived back at his home at approximately 3:00 a.m. on August 22, at which point he remotely checked Oaklawn's switch and saw that it was still operational.

[5] When C.S. awoke at 6:45 a.m., he checked Oaklawn's switch again and saw that it was still working. C.S. then sent a message to his supervisor, Vice President of Service Delivery Craig Joachim, which stated, in full:

Yo, I'm going to work from home and try to take a nap or 2 today in between making sure Oaklawn is good. I didn't get home til [sic] after 3 am this morning. I think/hope I got it taken care of but just need to wait and see if the switches continue to drop.

Ex. at 40. At approximately 7:35 a.m., C.S. sent a message to “his team” to cancel a previously scheduled 8:00 a.m. team meeting. Tr. at 9. In the message, C.S. indicated that he had to cancel the meeting because he was “up most of the night working on that switch.” Id. at 21.

[6] That same day, Employer discharged C.S. for violating the Employer's policy regarding honesty; specifically, for telling his team that he was canceling the morning meeting because he had been working on the Oaklawn switch problem “most of the night,” id. at 14, and failing to “disclose” that he had not been working for Employer from the time he was arrested until the time he bonded out of jail that night, Appellee's App. at 12.¹ C.S. then applied for unemployment benefits but was denied on the ground that he was discharged for just cause. C.S. appealed that decision, and an appeal hearing was conducted before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on December 16, 2025.

[7] At the hearing before the ALJ, Employer offered and had admitted into evidence Exhibit B11, its policy regarding “honesty,” which states, in relevant part:

What MapleTronics Expects From You

MapleTronics expects each Teammate to be a High Impact Teammate. The following list from our culture guide defines what we see as the nine behaviors and skills of a High Impact Teammate at MapleTronics Computers. A High Impact Teammate will demonstrate:

***

8. Honesty – Is known for candor and directness. Quick to admit mistakes and incorporate feedback․.

Ex. at 41 (emphases in original). Employer also offered and had admitted Exhibit B12, which is C.S.’s signed acknowledgement that he had received the Employer's policy, and Exhibit B10, which was a printed copy of C.S.’s August 22 message to Employer, and a copy of a media post from “bustednewspaper.com,” reporting that C.S. had been arrested on August 21, 2025. Ex. at 40. There was no copy of C.S.’s August 22 message to his team admitted into evidence.²

[8] Employer's representative, Rich Troyer, testified that C.S. “implied” in his message to Employer that he had been “working the entire time” on the Oaklawn problem until 3:00 in the morning. Tr. at 18. Troyer stated that C.S. “implicitly” told his team that he was at Oaklawn working for six hours when he told them he was “working on the switch most of the night.” Id. Troyer testified, “When we questioned [C.S.] about it, he continued to say he was working on that all evening.” Id. at 9. Troyer further stated, “[i]f it was me that had to wake up at 3:00 a.m. in the morning, I would have taken a nap, so I could still have my team meeting.” Id. at 18. Troyer also testified that he was “not qualified” to dispute—and, therefore, “believe[d]”— C.S.’s contention that his constant presence on site at Oaklawn for the entire six-hour period was not necessary to monitor the problem. Id. C.S. testified that he “was not working [while he was] waiting for that ․ six hours to” pass before remotely checking Oaklawn's switch to ensure that it was still operational at approximately 3:00 a.m. on August 22. Id. at 20.

[9] On December 17, the ALJ issued his decision reversing the denial of unemployment benefits to C.S. The basis for reversal was that “Employer's policy regarding honesty does not define prohibited behavior in a manner specific enough to be uniformly enforced and is therefore not a rule.” Appellee's App. at 7. Employer appealed the ALJ decision to the Review Board on the ground that C.S. violated the Employer's policy on honesty when C.S. told his team that he was “up most of the night working on the Oaklawn switch.” Appellant's App. at 10. The Review Board heard no additional evidence in its review of the ALJ decision.

[10] On January 2, 2026, the Review Board reversed the ALJ decision on the ground that Employer had discharged C.S. for just cause because C.S. lied when he said he had been working most of the night on the Oaklawn switch. The Review Board did not mention Employer's “policy” regarding honesty but cited McHugh v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 842 N.E.2d 436 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), as authority for an employee's general “duty of honesty ․ that is reasonably owed to an employer.” Appellant's App. at 7. In reaching the conclusion that C.S. had been dishonest with Employer, the Review Board found that C.S. “sent a message to the Employer that [C.S.] needed to cancel a previously scheduled meeting at 8:00 a.m. with his team, because he was tired from being up all night monitoring the switch” and then “relayed the same message to his team.” Id. The Review Board further found that, while he was in jail that night, C.S. “was unable to actively monitor the switch because he did not have access to the switch log”; therefore, he “was not working” during that time period. Id. The Review Board determined that C.S. “intentionally misrepresented to the Employer the amount of time spent working on August 21, 2025, and August 22, 2025.” Id. It further found that “a reasonable employee would expect discharge for similar conduct.” Id. at 8. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[11] C.S. challenges the Review Board's decision that he is not qualified for unemployment compensation because he was discharged for just cause. Indiana's Unemployment Compensation Act (“UCA”), Indiana Code Article 22-4, was enacted to “provide for payment of benefits to persons unemployed through no fault of their own.” Ind. Code § 22-4-1-1. We construe the provisions of the UCA “liberally to favor the unemployed and promote the Act's humanitarian purpose.” Chrysler Grp., LLC v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 960 N.E.2d 118, 126 (Ind. 2012).

[12] To be eligible for unemployment benefits, an individual must meet the requirements set forth in Ind. Code Chapter 22-4-14-1 and must not be disqualified by any of the various exceptions provided in Chapter 22-4-15-1. Two such exceptions applicable here are where an employee knowingly violates a rule or a duty owed to the employer. See I.C. § 22-4-15-1(d)(2), (d)(8). Under either of those circumstances, there is “just cause” to discharge the employee, and the employee will not be eligible for unemployment compensation. Id.

[13] On review of a Review Board's decision, courts “make a two-part inquiry into (1) “the sufficiency of the facts found to sustain the decision” and (2) “the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of fact.” J.M. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 975 N.E.2d 1283, 1286 (Ind. 2012), citing I.C. § 22-4-17-12(f). Pursuant to this standard, (1) the Review Board's findings of basic fact are reviewed for substantial evidence; (2) its findings of ultimate fact— mixed questions of law and fact—are reviewed for reasonableness; and (3) its legal propositions are reviewed de novo. Chrysler Grp., 960 N.E.2d at 122.

[14] Under the “substantial evidence” test used to review the Board's findings of basic fact, the Board's findings are

conclusive and binding unless they meet certain exceptions, including but not limited to

(1) The evidence on which the Review Board based its findings was devoid of probative value;

(2) The quantum of legitimate evidence was so proportionately meager as to lead to the conviction that the finding does not rest upon a rational basis;

(3) The result of the hearing before the Review Board was substantially influenced by improper considerations;

(4) There was not substantial evidence supporting the findings of the Review Board;

(5) The order of the Review Board, its judgment or finding, is fraudulent, unreasonable or arbitrary.

J.M., 975 N.E.2d at 1288.

[15] When we review the Board's findings of basic fact under the “substantial evidence” standard, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses; rather, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the Review Board's findings. Id. at 1286. Moreover, we are limited to reviewing the employer's stated reason for discharging the employee. P.K.E. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 942 N.E.2d 125, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. We will reverse the decision if there is no substantial evidence to support the Review Board's findings or the logic of the Board's inferences is faulty. E.g., Chrysler Grp., 960 N.E.2d at 123. In addition, we may reverse a Board's decision if it “ignore[d] competent evidence.” Salin Bank & Trust Co. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 698 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).

[16] Here, the Review Board's finding of ultimate fact was that C.S. was discharged for just cause because he violated the “duty of honesty” that he owed Employer by “intentionally misrepresent[ing] to the Employer the amount of time spent working on August 21, 2025, and August 22, 2025.” Appellant's App. at 7 (citing McHugh, 842 N.E.2d 436, for the proposition that “[t]he duty of honesty is a duty that is reasonably owed to an employer”). That finding of ultimate fact was based on the Review Board's finding of basic fact that C.S. “sent a message to the Employer that [C.S.] needed to cancel a previously scheduled meeting at 8:00 a.m. with his team, because he was tired from being up all night monitoring [Oaklawn's] switch.” Appellant's App. at 7. However, there is no evidence to support that basic fact finding.

[17] The evidence of what C.S. said to the Employer (i.e., his supervisor)³ is in Employer's Exhibit B10, where C.S. said only:

Yo, I'm going to work from home and try to take a nap or 2 today in between making sure Oaklawn is good. I didn't get home til [sic] after 3 am this morning. I think/hope I got it taken care of but just need to wait and see if the switches continue to drop. Ex. at 40. As Employer admitted at the ALJ hearing, that is not a statement by C.S. that he worked on the Oaklawn switch continuously until 3:00 in the morning. Rather, Employer admitted that it believed C.S. “implied” in that statement that he had worked all night. Tr. at 18.

[18] In addition, there is no substantial evidence that C.S.’s alleged violation of the duty of honesty was knowing. It is not enough that an Employee knew about the rule or duty he allegedly violated; he must also have known that his conduct was a violation of the rule or duty. See, e.g., S.S. LLC v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 953 N.E.2d 597, 602 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (noting Indiana Code Section 22-4-15-1(d)(2) “requires a ‘knowing violation’ of a rule rather than merely a violation of a known rule”). C.S. could not reasonably be expected to know that Employer would consider the statement “I didn't get home til after 3 am this morning” to imply that he worked on the switch continuously until 3 in the morning. Cf. Russell v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Emp. & Training Serv., 586 N.E.2d 942, 949 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (finding an employee knowingly violated a rule where the rule's language and meaning were clear and employee admitted violating it).

[19] Moreover, it was not reasonable for Employer to think C.S. intended such an implication. Employer's representative admitted that he “believe[d]” C.S.’s contention that the Oaklawn job did not require a constant on-site presence during the six-hour waiting period. Tr. at 18. Employer's representative also admitted that, under similar circumstances, he would have “taken a nap” until 3:00 am so that he was rested enough for the morning meeting. Id. If Employer's own representative would not have continuously worked on the switch but napped until it was time to check it, it is unreasonable for Employer to infer from C.S.’s vague comment about when he got home that C.S. intended to imply he had worked continuously until he got home.

Conclusion

[20] There is not substantial evidence to support the Review Board's basic fact finding that C.S. told Employer that he “needed to cancel a previously scheduled meeting ․ because he was tired from being up all night monitoring the switch.” Appellant's App. at 7. Moreover, the logic of its inference that C.S. “intentionally misrepresented to the Employer the amount of time spent working” merely by stating he “didn't get home til after 3 am this morning” is faulty.⁴ See, e.g., Chrysler Grp., 960 N.E.2d at 123. Therefore, we reverse.

[21] Reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Initially, Employer stated that it discharged C.S. because he allegedly lied about going to Oaklawn that evening. However, after checking video recordings from Oaklawn, Employer verified that C.S. did go to Oaklawn at around 9:00 p.m. that evening. Employer then told C.S. he was discharged for lying about how long he had worked that evening.

2.   C.S. filed with the ALJ his exhibits, including an alleged copy of the message to his team on August 22, but C.S. did not introduce his exhibits into evidence; therefore, they are not part of the record. See Tr. at 5 (ALJ informing the parties that “[a]ny proposed exhibits are not part of the record unless and until they are offered into evidence and accepted into evidence during the hearing”).

3.   What C.S. said to his team is not relevant, as he was discharged only for being dishonest with his Employer. See P.K.E., 942 N.E.2d at 131 (noting we are limited to reviewing the employer's stated reason for discharging the employee). However, even considering the paltry evidence of what C.S. said to the team, those statements were also not dishonest, as he merely said he had been “up most of the night working on that switch.” Tr. at 21. Again, Employer admits that is not an explicit statement that C.S. worked on the Oaklawn switch “all night” or until 3:00 in the morning. Id. at 18. Rather, Employer alleged C.S.’s statement “implicitly” told his team that he had worked for six hours the night before. Id.

4.   Because we conclude the Review Board's basic fact finding was not supported by substantial evidence, and because the Review Board did not base its decision on the Employer's rule but on the common law “duty of basic honesty and truthfulness,” McHugh, 842 N.E.2d at 442, we do not address C.S.’s contention that Employer's rule regarding honesty was not specific, reasonable, or uniformly enforced.

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.