IN RE: A.G. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] I.G. (“Mother”) appeals the Allen Superior Court's order modifying custody of her minor child A.G. (“Child”), who is a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). Mother presents one issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted sole legal and physical custody of Child to A.P. (“Father”).

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother and Father are the parents of Child, who was born February 28, 2018. In November 2022, Child and his five siblings were living with Mother when Mother stabbed Child's older sister T.G. five times. Mother did not seek medical treatment for T.G., who was ultimately taken to the hospital by her grandmother. The State charged Mother with Level 3 felony aggravated battery and Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent under Case No. 02D05-2211-F3-100 (“F3-100”). And the Department of Child Services removed Child and his siblings from Mother's custody. In February 2023, the trial court found that Child was a CHINS. In March, Father filed a petition to establish his paternity over Child.

[4] After Child's removal from Mother's care, DCS placed Child with a family member and, in January 2024, Mother, without DCS's permission, removed Child from that family member's care and “secreted his whereabouts from the Court and the DCS.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 155. Mother also removed Child's siblings from their placements without permission. Child was missing from his authorized placement until August 2024, when U.S. Marshals apprehended Mother. At that time, DCS placed Child with Father, whose paternity was established by court order a few months later. The paternity court did not resolve issues of custody or visitation because of the pending CHINS proceeding.

[5] In the criminal case regarding the stabbing incident in November 2022, Mother ultimately pleaded guilty to Level 5 felony domestic battery. Pursuant to Mother's plea agreement, the trial court sentenced her to four years and 183 days, with 183 days executed and four years suspended to probation. Mother was incarcerated from August 2024 until April 2025, when she began probation. Upon her release, Mother finally began participating in services that had been ordered for reunification with Child, including domestic violence counseling, home-based services, and supervised visits with Child.

[6] Meanwhile, Father actively participated in ordered services, and Child thrived in Father's care. Accordingly, in July 2025, DCS filed a motion for permanency in which it requested that the court grant custody of Child to Father. Following a hearing on that motion, the trial court found and concluded in relevant part as follows:

The mother, [I.G.], has not had significant contact with the child in at least a year. As a result, the professionals who are working with the family are recommending that she be granted therapeutically supervised parenting time. [Mother] has previously absconded with the child and secreted his whereabouts from the father, [A.P.], the DCS and the Court from January of 2024 until August of 2024 when she was apprehended by U.S. Marshalls [sic]. She was aware of the issuance/existence of the order directing that the child be placed in kinship care and that she be granted supervised parenting time, yet she absconded with the child and did not reveal his whereabouts to the Respondent or the Court. While the child was in her care, he did not attend school and was behind in school when he was located by the authorities. [Mother] committed an act of battery to the child's sibling and was sentenced to time in jail for the offense. It is not clear whether or what services she participated in while incarcerated to address the mental health or other issues that led to this act of violence against her own child. The DCS case manager, CASA and the visitation supervisor recommend that the mother be granted supervised parenting time with the child.

Based upon a review and consideration of the testimony and evidence presented at trial, the Court finds that unsupervised parenting time between the mother and child, [A.G.], might endanger the child's physical health and well-being or significantly impair the child's emotional development.

Id. at 167-68. Thus, the court granted Father sole legal and physical custody of Child, with Mother exercising supervised visitation. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Father sole legal and physical custody of Child. Our standard of review is well settled:

The trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions thereon supporting its order. Pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), we will not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Steele-Giri v. Steele (In re Marriage of Steele-Giri), 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016). Where, as here,

a trial court enters findings sua sponte, the appellate court reviews issues covered by the findings with a two-tiered standard of review that asks whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment. Any issue not covered by the findings is reviewed under the general judgment standard, meaning a reviewing court should affirm based on any legal theory supported by the evidence.

Id. at 123-24 (citation omitted).

Moreover,

there is a well-established preference in Indiana for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters. Appellate courts are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence. On appeal it is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal. Appellate judges are not to reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and the evidence should be viewed most favorably to the judgment.

Id. at 124 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Payes v. Rivas, 270 N.E.3d 1, 6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).

[8] In its motion for permanency, DCS asked the trial court to modify the custody and parenting time orders entered by the paternity court.¹ The paternity court, however, had deferred issues of custody and parenting time in light of the pending CHINS proceeding. Prior to the paternity order, Mother had sole legal custody of Child and Father acquiesced to Mother's physical custody of Child. Thus, the trial court's order here was a modification of custody. See, e.g., id. at 6-7 (observing that father's petition for paternity requesting custody of child was really a petition to modify custody where mother had sole legal custody of child born out of wedlock under Ind. Code § 31-14-13-1 and father acquiesced to her physical custody of child).

[9] The modification statute requires the party requesting modification to prove that 1) modification is in the child's best interests and 2) there has been a substantial change in one or more of the factors enumerated in Indiana Code section 31-14-13-2.² See id. at 7. Those factors are as follows:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child's parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child's parents;

(B) the child's siblings; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest.

(5) The child's adjustment to home, school, and community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.

(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall consider the factors described in section 2.5(b) of this chapter.

I.C. § 31-14-13-2.

[10] Here, the trial court found that, after Child was removed from Mother's care in November 2022, Mother had removed Child from his relative placement without permission and had “secreted his whereabouts from the Court and the DCS” for several months until U.S. Marshals apprehended her. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 155. And Mother was then incarcerated for several months because of her violent attack on Child's sibling. As a result of her actions, Mother did not participate in court-ordered reunification services until April 2025, and she has not progressed beyond supervised visits with Child.

[11] Meanwhile, DCS presented evidence that Father has been compliant with services and has provided a safe and stable home for Child. The CASA, Brooke Neuhaus, testified that she recommended that the court grant Father custody of Child with Mother continuing to have supervised visits. Mother's arguments on appeal are merely a request that we reweigh the evidence. DCS presented ample evidence that modification of custody is in Child's best interests and that there has been a substantial change in circumstances.

[12] For all these reasons, we affirm the trial court's grant of sole legal and physical custody over Child to Father.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   As we explained in In re T.W., 276 N.E.3d 107, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026):Indiana Code section 31-30-1-13(b) provides for “concurrent jurisdiction” between two courts having jurisdiction of the same child. I.C. § 31-30-1-13(b). As relevant here, the statute provides that a court having jurisdiction over a “child who is the subject of a child in need of services proceeding” has “concurrent jurisdiction” with “a court having jurisdiction under IC 31-14 for the purpose of establishing or modifying paternity, custody, parenting time, or child support of the child.” Id.

2.   In her Summary of the Argument, Mother asserts that the trial court “did not determine that there had been a substantial change” in one of the relevant statutory factors. Appellant's Br. p. 7. Indeed, the trial court's order does not include the words “substantial” or “change.” But Mother does not address that issue in the Argument section of her brief. Accordingly, she has waived that purported issue for our review. In any event, the trial court's findings clearly show changes in circumstances to support the change in custody, such as Mother's unlawful conduct since Child was born, Father's recent ability to provide Child with a stable home, and Child's improved health and education since being removed from Mother's care.

Mathias, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.