IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.G. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.G., Mother, and M.L., Father, and M.D.L, Child,

[1] M.L. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order terminating his parental rights to M.D.L. (“Child”),¹ challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born in December 2021 to J.G. (“Mother”) and Father, whose paternity was established by affidavit. Father lived with the family for approximately six months after Child's birth, from January 2022 through June 2022. As of January 2023, Child was living in Elkhart County with Mother, Mother's friend, and two maternal half-siblings. On January 12, 2023, law enforcement responded to a report of a disturbance at the family home, where they found methamphetamine. On January 27, 2023, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging Child was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) due to neglect. Child was removed from the home and placed with Mother's cousin, Tammy Smith (“Relative Placement”).

[3] An evidentiary hearing was held as to Father on May 8, 2023. Meanwhile, Child was appointed a Court Appointed Special Advocate (“the CASA”). Father did not personally attend the evidentiary hearing. After the presentation of evidence, the CHINS court adjudicated Child a CHINS and scheduled a dispositional hearing. Father did not personally attend the dispositional hearing, which was held on June 8, 2023. The CHINS court entered a dispositional order requiring Father to complete several types of assessments—a substance abuse assessment, a clinical assessment, a psychological parenting assessment, an addiction assessment, and a domestic violence assessment—and ordered that Father follow recommendations associated with each assessment. See Ex. Vol. VI pp. 127–28. The court also ordered Father to submit to random drug screens, pay child support, and participate in supervised visits with Child.

[4] At a progress hearing in January 2024, there was testimony that Father sought supervised visits with Child near the end of November 2023. At that time, DCS had difficulty “re-refer[ring] [Father] for visitations to begin again.” Tr. Vol. II p. 88. Eventually, Father attended “a couple” of supervised visits. Tr. Vol. III p. 78. He also participated in two drug screens, the first of which was on January 24, 2024. Prior to that point, Father did not want to participate in screens because he was “still using.” Id. at 81. The first screen tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and cocaine. On February 29, 2024, Father participated in his second drug screen. That screen was negative. At some point, referrals were put in place for Father to receive substance abuse treatment. However, on March 14, 2024, Father was arrested. He faced multiple criminal cases, as he was charged with robbery in Indiana and was being held on robbery charges from Michigan. Id. at 77; Ex. Vol. VI p. 194. By that point, Father had not engaged in the referred substance abuse treatment.

[5] On April 24, 2025, DCS filed a petition to terminate parental rights (“TPR”) under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c). At that point, Father was still incarcerated. DCS alleged that, among other things, (1) there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside Father's home would not be remedied and (2) the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being, safety, physical health, or life. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2. p. 37. From jail, Father participated in approximately four supervised phone visits, which generally went well. Father was also permitted to call Child at Relative Placement's home, which he did “pretty much weekly.” Tr. Vol. III p. 84. Outside of the communications from jail, over the course of the CHINS case, Father had participated in “maybe about five or six” supervised visits. Id. at 83. Father's last in-person contact with Child was in March 2024, before his arrest.

[6] The TPR fact-finding hearing was held on October 10, 2025, at which point Father remained incarcerated. At the outset of the hearing, Father's counsel requested a continuance, noting that Father had a criminal trial scheduled for January 3, 2026, “[w]hich would possibly allow him to either come up with some resolution or have a trial and possibly earn a release.” Tr. Vol. II p. 200. DCS objected to Father's request for a continuance, which the court denied “given the amount of time that has passed” since Child's removal, adding, “[T]he Court does believe that is too long of a time for [Child] to wait for permanency.” Id. at 201. The court then admitted exhibits, including records of the CHINS proceedings, noting that it “w[ould] only base its decision on admissible evidence” and “w[ould] not base its decision on any hearsay that may be contained in some of those documents or filings.” Id. at 202.

[7] At the hearing, the family case manager (“the FCM”) opined that Father had not made an effort to comply with the dispositional order and had not made meaningful progress toward addressing issues with substance abuse. The FCM noted that, although she “think[s] [Child] knows [Father's] voice,” she did not think Child was bonded to Father in that Child “hasn't seen him in person for so long ․” Tr. Vol. III p. 86. The FCM opined that Child needed permanency, later stating:

[Father] has been incarcerated for quite a while throughout this entire case, and even during the time that he wasn't incarcerated, he wasn't participating in any services. He was still in active addiction.

Id. at 109. The FCM acknowledged that, since she began working on the case in late 2023, Father had maintained regular contact with her. However, the FCM noted that Father was unable to participate in referred services while incarcerated and that Father had been incarcerated for approximately eighteen months as of the hearing. Regarding Father's incarceration, Father presented evidence that he completed a range of coursework offered at the jail, including courses related to substance abuse, parenting skills, and domestic violence.

[8] The CASA testified that Child was doing well in Relative Placement's care and testified in favor of adoption. The CASA referred to Child's need for permanency, noting: “I really support permanency and ․ we're approaching three years so, I think it's time.” Id. at 140. Relative Placement also testified that Child would benefit from permanency and that termination was in Child's best interests. She acknowledged that Child had some kind of bond with Father but thought “if [Father] would have stayed out [of jail] a little bit longer and got that bond like [Father and Child] were getting, then [Child] would actually know him.” Id. at 153. Relative Placement said that Child referred to Father as Dad or Daddy while they were on the phone but suspected he was “just saying [D]addy because ․ [there was] another man on the other end of th[e] phone,” and did not call anyone else Daddy because he did not know anyone else. Id.

[9] The TPR court took the matter under advisement, and on November 26, 2025, entered a written order terminating Father's parental rights. The TPR court specifically found that Father “did not complete the assessments” and “was incarcerated in March of 2024.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 27. It also found that, “[d]espite having periods of time after the filing of the CHINS petition when ․ [Father] w[as] not incarcerated, [he] did not fully engage in any services to assist with reunification.” Id. at 28. The court added that Child “needs permanency,” “[b]oth parents present both a historical inability to provide for [Child] and a current inability,” “[the] CASA believes that termination would be in the best interest of [Child], as does the [FCM],” and “[C]hild needs regular schedules and structure” that Father cannot provide. Id

[10] The TPR court concluded that a continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being and that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal would not be remedied. The court further concluded that DCS had a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child, which was adoption, and that termination of the parent-child relationship was in Child's best interests. Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the decision to terminate his parental rights. Although the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of a parent to establish a home and raise a child, the law allows for termination of parental rights based on a parent's inability or unwillingness to meet parental responsibilities. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005); In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Parental rights are subordinated to the child's interests in resolving a termination petition. In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parent, but instead to protect the child. D.P., 994 N.E.2d at 1231.

[12] As our Supreme Court has observed, “[d]ecisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts ․” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment, without reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility. Id. at 642. Moreover, we apply a two-tiered standard of review, setting aside the termination decision only if it is clearly erroneous: first, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and then whether the findings support the judgment. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). The judgment will be set aside only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. If the evidence and reasonable inferences support the decision, we must affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[13] Before parental rights may be terminated, the petitioner must allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c). As to subsection (d), in the present case, DCS alleged:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d); see Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 37. DCS must prove its allegations by clear and convincing evidence. See I.C. § 31-34-12-2. If the trial court finds those allegations are true, it “shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a). Furthermore, because subsection (d) is written in the disjunctive, we need find only one of the alleged circumstances established by clear and convincing evidence. A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158 n.6.

I. Likelihood of Changed Conditions

[14] Father claims DCS failed to present sufficient evidence under subsection (d)(3) that the conditions resulting in Child's removal or ongoing placement outside the home would not be remedied. In making a determination under subsection (d)(3), the court must “judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” In re W.M.L., 82 N.E.3d 361, 367 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Those patterns may include a “prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and a lack of adequate housing and employment.” Id. The court may also consider “services offered to the parent by DCS and the parent's response to those services as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied.” Id. We entrust this delicate balance to the trial court, “which has [the] discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643.

[15] Here, Child was removed in January 2023 due to issues in Mother's home related to substance abuse. The dispositional order, effective June 2023, required Father to complete multiple assessments and participate in drug screens and supervised visits. By March 2024—nine months after the order was issued—Father had not completed a single required assessment. He did not submit to a drug screen until January 2024, testing positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and cocaine. He declined to participate in earlier screening because he was “still using.” Tr. Vol. III p. 81. During those nine months, he attended only “a couple” of supervised visits with Child. Id. at 78. He was arrested in March 2024 before engaging in referred substance abuse services.

[16] Father points to a single negative drug screen in February 2024 as evidence of his improvement. Father also refers to his completion of coursework in jail, arguing that he “should be able to implement what [he] learned” upon his release. Appellant's Br. p. 14. We note, however, that the pertinent inquiry is not whether Father made some effort, but whether the totality of the evidence, including his habitual patterns of conduct, established a reasonable probability that the conditions underlying Child's removal or ongoing placement outside the home would not be remedied. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. The trial court gave greater weight to Father's lack of compliance with the dispositional order in the nine months he was free to pursue services—before incarceration foreclosed that option. That was the court's prerogative. See id.

[17] Father also points out that DCS was unable to arrange supervised visits when he sought them in November 2023. See Appellant's Reply Br. p. 8. At a January 2024 progress hearing, there was indeed evidence that Father wanted to visit Child at the end of November 2023, and DCS had difficulty re-referring Father for supervised visits. However, the dispositional order was issued in June 2023 and expressly required Father to participate in supervised visits, but Father did not seek visitation with Child for five months. Father's failure to submit to drug screens, engage with the court-ordered assessments, or seek visitation during that period was not attributable to any limitation in DCS's ability to provide Father with referrals. And the trial court was entitled to weigh Father's late, partial engagement against the pattern of non-compliance that preceded those late efforts. See E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643.

[18] At times, Father compares his situation to two cases in which this court reversed termination orders involving incarcerated parents: In re M.W., 943 N.E.2d 848 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied, and Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 841 N.E.2d 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. These cases are distinguishable. In both cases, the parent was scheduled to be released shortly after the fact-finding hearing. See M.W., 943 N.E.2d at 855; Rowlett, 841 N.E.2d at 622. Here, however, Father did not have a known release date. He was incarcerated on a robbery charge in Indiana and held in connection with a robbery charge from Michigan. Tr. Vol. III p. 77; Ex. Vol. VI p. 194. As Father's counsel asserted in seeking a continuance, a criminal trial was not scheduled until January 2026, which was three months after the fact-finding hearing. Moreover, he faced a substantial sentence if he were convicted in that, at a minimum, robbery is punishable as a Level 5 felony offense in Indiana. See I.C. §§ 35-42-5-1 (specifying that robbery is a Level 5 felony that can be elevated all the way up to a Level 1 felony); 35-50-2-6(b) (setting forth a Level 5 felony sentencing range of one to six years, with an advisory sentence of three years).

[19] Father also invokes In re T.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), for the proposition that a court must consider a parent's current fitness rather than focusing solely on past non-compliance. That is an accurate statement of the law, and the trial court followed it. The record reflects that the court heard evidence about Father's efforts in the months prior to his arrest along with evidence of Father's participation in jail-based programming and phone calls to Child from jail—and the court considered this evidence against the totality of the evidence. In light of Father's pattern of non-compliance, the court was not required to await Father's release—whenever that might come—to conclude that the pertinent conditions were not reasonably likely to be remedied.

[20] We conclude that clear and convincing evidence supported the conclusion under subsection (d)(3) that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside Father's home will not be remedied.²

II. Best Interests

[21] Father also argues that DCS failed to present clear and convincing evidence that termination was in Child's best interests. In making a best interests determination, the trial court must look at the totality of the evidence and subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. dismissed. A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable, stable home environment along with the parent's current inability to do so supports a finding that termination is in the child's best interests. A.P., 981 N.E.2d at 82. Testimony of service providers, in addition to evidence that changed conditions are unlikely, is sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. A court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating parental rights. K.E. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 649 (Ind. 2015).

[22] The totality of the evidence reveals that, at the time of the termination hearing, Father had not demonstrated any meaningful capacity to safely and consistently parent Child. Over nearly three years of CHINS proceedings, Father attended “maybe about five or six” in-person supervised visits with Child—“a couple” before he was arrested and approximately four supervised phone visits from jail. Tr. Vol. III pp. 78, 83. He never progressed past supervised visitation. He never completed the assessments ordered in the dispositional decree. He was in active addiction for the majority of the time he was not incarcerated, and he remained incarcerated at the time of the hearing with no known release date.

[23] Father asserts that Child referred to him as Daddy. But there was conflicting evidence regarding a parent-child bond. Relative Placement, who cared for Child throughout the case, testified that Child referred to Father as Dad or Daddy on calls but suspected Child was “just saying [D]addy because ․ [there was] another man on the other end of th[e] phone ․” Id. at 153. Child had not seen Father in person since March 2025, for approximately seven months. The FCM testified that, given how long it had been since in-person contact, Child was not bonded to Father in any meaningful sense. As of the hearing, Child was almost four years old and had spent nearly all his life apart from Father.

[24] Father invokes In re G.Y., in which our Supreme Court reversed the termination of a mother's parental rights where she was incarcerated, had a demonstrated bond with her child, had actively completed programming while imprisoned, and—critically—had a release date the Court characterized as imminent. 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1262–65 (Ind. 2009). Here, Father's release date was entirely unknown, with a criminal trial not scheduled until January 2026 and no certainty of outcome. Furthermore, in G.Y., it was evident there was a parent-child bond, and there was no evidence that permanency through adoption would be beneficial for the child. Id. at 1265. Here, however, multiple witnesses testified that Child did not have a significant bond with Father, which is consistent with the limited presence Father has had in Child's life. Furthermore, Child was doing well in Relative Placement's care, and the FCM, the CASA, and Relative Placement each testified that termination and the permanency it would bring were in Child's best interests. That testimony, combined with the evidence that the conditions resulting in removal were unlikely to be remedied, is sufficient. See A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1005.

[25] We conclude that clear and convincing evidence supported the TPR court's conclusion that terminating parental rights was in Child's best interests.

Conclusion

[26] Sufficient evidence supported the trial court's order terminating Father's parental rights.

[27] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court also terminated the parental rights of J.G.—Child's biological mother—as to Child and two maternal half-siblings. Mother initially filed a Notice of Appeal, but subsequently filed a motion to dismiss her appeal, which has been granted by separate order.

2.   Father also challenges the trial court's alternative finding under subsection (d) that there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being, safety, physical health, or life. However, having identified sufficient evidence supporting the finding related to the likelihood of changed conditions, and due to the disjunctive nature of the statute, we do not address the trial court's additional finding under subsection (d).

Foley, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Altice, J., concur.