IN RE: the Matter of K.V. and Q.H. (Minor Children) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] E.V. (“Mother”) and J.V. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the trial court's adjudication of two of their minor children as Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”). We affirm.

Issues

[2] Parents raise four issues, which we revise and restate as the following three issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred when it admitted child hearsay evaluation reports and forensic interviews as evidence.

2. Whether certain findings of fact are supported by the evidence.

3. Whether the court clearly erred when it adjudicated the children to be CHINS.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Parents have a blended family with five minor children. Mother is the mother to D.H., R.H., Q.H., and E.H. and the stepmother to K.V. (collectively, “the Children”). Father is the father to K.V. and stepfather to Mother's other four children. The family shared a house with Mother's parents.

[4] In 2020, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that Q.H. was engaging in inappropriate behavior with his siblings. During that assessment, three of the children completed forensic interviews. The claim was ultimately unsubstantiated. DCS again assessed the family in 2023 after it received a report of abuse and neglect. Following that assessment, on November 7, Parents agreed to implement a safety plan. The plan stated that, because of Q.H. “doing inappropriate things to his sibling[,]” the children could not be alone unsupervised, they could not be yelled at, and Q.H. was to attend therapy. Ex. Vol. 2 at 193. Those claims were also ultimately unsubstantiated.

[5] On October 9, 2024, DCS received another report alleging that Q.H. had engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior with K.V. and D.H. Specifically, the report stated that Q.H. had been “making sexual advances and touching” K.V. and D.H. “under their clothes for quite some time now” and that Parents “were informed of this when it first started happening” but that “it's still happening and has gotten worse.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 187.

[6] DCS Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Juliane Beebe assessed the Children. When she visited the home, the Children were upstairs unsupervised. The only adult in the home was the Children's grandmother, who “does not have the ability health wise to get up the stairs.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 62. FCM Beebe requested a court order to conduct forensic interviews of the Children. The court granted the request as to K.V. and D.H. K.V. and D.H. submitted to the forensic interviews on November 26. K.V. also took a letter with her that she had written outlining Q.H.’s actions. Based on statements made in the interviews, DCS removed K.V. and Q.H. from the home. K.V. was placed with her mother, and Q.H. was placed with his paternal grandparents. DCS then filed petitions alleging that the Children were CHINS.

[7] In December, DCS filed a petition to introduce K.V.’s and D.H.’s forensic interviews into evidence. The petition also requested permission to admit statements that D.H., Q.H., and R.H. had made in their 2020 forensic interviews. Following a hearing at which a licensed clinical psychologist testified that participation by D.H., R.H., and Q.H. in the proceeding “created a substantial likelihood of emotional or mental harm to each of them,” the court found those children to be unavailable as witnesses. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 88. The court also found that “the time, content, and circumstances” of the interviews “provide[d] sufficient indications of reliability” and that the statements “concerned an act that is a material element in determining whether” a child is a CHINS. Id. at 89. Accordingly, the court granted DCS's motion to admit the forensic interviews as evidence at a fact-finding hearing on the CHINS petitions.

[8] The court then held a multiday fact-finding hearing, during which K.V. testified that Q.H. had touched her inappropriately at least three times. DCS also had admitted the forensic interviews and child hearsay evaluations reports. Following the hearing, the court entered the following findings of fact:

21. The Court finds [K.V.] to be a credible witness. In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered:

a. [K.V.’s] demeanor while testifying, noting the clear contrast between her composed answers to general questions and the visible emotional distress and physical signs of anxiety, including nail biting, when discussing [Q.H.];

b. The specificity and coherence of her recollection;

c. Her written letter to Kids Talk (Petitioner's Exhibit 3), which serves as a prior consistent statement;

d. Her recorded forensic interview at Kids Talk (Petitioner's Exhibit 2), likewise a prior consistent statement, and the reliable and professional circumstances under which it occurred; and

e. [Court Appointed Special Advocate “(CASA”)] Wendy Rice's testimony that [K.V.’s] account of the events has not wavered and remain largely unchanged.

22. Based on [K.V.’s] credible testimony, the Court finds that [Q.H.] inappropriately touched and molested [K.V.] more than one time.

a. [K.V.] testified, and this Court finds, that during one incident [Q.H.] touched [K.V.] on her chest area and vagina area with her clothes on. They were in [K.V.’s] bedroom and it was light out. [Q.H.] came in, pushed [K.V.] on her bed, and started touching her chest, putting his hands under her shirt. [K.V.] told him to get off but he didn't listen and started putting his hands down her pants. [K.V.] told him to stop.

b. There was another time, when [K.V.] shared a room with [D.H.], that [Q.H.] “trapped” [K.V.] in a closet, and put his hands where her vagina was.

c. There was another incident, perhaps the first incident, when [Q.H.] started kissing her, when [K.V.] thinks she was in 4th grade.

d. After one of the incidents [K.V.] told her father, [Father]. As a result, [Q.H.] was grounded and had to write sentences. DCS was involved and [K.V.] and [Q.H.] were placed in counseling.

23. [K.V.] has exhibited certain concerning behaviors, including aggression, dishonesty with her parents, vaping, unauthorized use of her mother's vehicle, associating with peers her father disapproved of, and an attitude in Court when talking about her father. However, the Court acknowledges that such actions may be consistent with emotional or behavioral responses to sexual molestation or advances. Therefore, the Court does not view these behaviors as diminishing [K.V.’s] credibility regarding her reported sexual interactions with [Q.H.].

24. After a prior incident in 2023 when DCS became involved, [Parents] signed a safety plan to put [Q.H.] into therapy and not allow [Q.H.] to be alone with [K.V.] or [D.H.] (Petitioner's Exhibit 4).

25. [K.V.] was touched by [Q.H.] after the safety plan was put into place.

26. Despite a safety plan, [Parents] did not or were unable to ensure [K.V.’s] and [Q.H.’s] safety.

27. The children were not properly supervised. When FCM Beebe went to the home during the assessment, the only adult was [Mother's] mother, who was bedridden and not capable of supervising the children.

28. [Father] degraded [K.V.’s] mother to [K.V.] on multiple occasions, threatened to throw [K.V.] out of the home, and used derogatory language.

29. Due to his actions, the Court suspended visitation between [Father] and [K.V.] on April 23, 2025.

30. After the initiation of this CHINS case, [E.H.], also living in the [Parents’] home, disclosed that [Q.H.] inappropriately touched her.

31. [K.V.] remains out of her father's home, and, after having lived with her mother for several months, now resides with her paternal grandmother.

32. [Father] was convicted of Sexual Misconduct with a Minor, and his family has been involved in several DCS investigations since 2020, including one involving inappropriate touching of a child(ren) other than [K.V.].

33. [Father] has a poor understanding of, or inability to recognize and maintain, appropriate sexual boundaries among minors.

34. [Parents] do not believe that [K.V.] was touched as she disclosed. They maintain [K.V.] fabricated her allegation, motivated by a desire to live with her mother.

35. The DCS investigation and resulting CHINS case has resulted in great strain on this family and damaged familial relationships. [Parents] hold [K.V.] responsible for this.

36. Although the [Parents] intend to maintain [K.V.’s] involvement in therapy, the Court has serious concerns that the therapeutic focus would not effectively address the trauma resulting from the sexual encounter. Given the [P]arents’ continued denial of the incident(s), their perspectives would likely compromise their capacity to support or engage with the treatment recommendations necessary for [K.V.’s] recovery.

37. [Parents] are unwilling or unable to address the serious safety issues and concerns in the home without Court intervention.

38. FCM [Danielle] Baldwin, on behalf of the Department, believes that court intervention is necessary to protect the children.

39. CASA for [K.V.], Wendy Rice, opines that [K.V.] needs individual and family therapy, both with Mother and Father, and with her siblings that live with Father. CASA Rice believes that more intensive, wrap-around services are needed for [K.V.] and the family.

40. [Q.H.] was returned to the home of his mother and stepfather, [Parents], in August 2025, after the final fact-finding hearing.

41. CASA for [Q.H.], Randy Aukerman, opines that [Q.H.] continues to need both individual and family therapy, which he is currently receiving. CASA Aukerman further believes that [Mother] would maintain these therapeutic services even if the Department were no longer involved. The Court, however, remains concerned that absent the guidance and oversight of the Court and the Department, the emphasis of such therapy could become centered on managing feelings related to alleged false accusations, rather than confronting and resolving the underlying concerns surrounding inappropriate sexual behavior.

42. [Parents] are unable to provide a safe and stable home free from abuse and/or neglect.

43. [Q.H.’s] physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of [Parents] to supply him with the necessary supervision.

44. [Q.H.] needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that he is not receiving and is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the Court.

45. [K.V.’s] physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of [Parents] to supply her with the necessary supervision.

46. [K.V.] was the victim of a sex offense.

47. [K.V.] needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that she is not receiving and is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the Court.

48. The family is not financially unable to provide their children with proper and necessary supervision.

49. Regarding [D.H.], [R.H.], and [E.H.], the Court finds that [Parents] were not providing the necessary supervision. However, the Department failed to present evidence that each of them were in need of care, treatment, or rehabilitation that they were not receiving, and was unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the Court.

Id. at 90-94.

[9] Based on those findings, the court concluded that DCS had met its burden to establish “that the physical or mental condition” of the Children “is seriously impaired or seriously endangered by the parent's actions or inactions to provide supervision[.]” Id. at 95. The court also concluded that DCS met its burden to show that K.V. “was a victim of a sex offense.” Id. And the court concluded that the “coercive court intervention is necessary to ensure” that K.V. and Q.H. receive necessary care, treatment[,] and rehabilitation.” Id. However, the court determined that DCS had failed to establish that court intervention was necessary to ensure that D.H., R.H., and E.H. received the necessary care. Accordingly, the court adjudicated K.V. and Q.H. as CHINS but dismissed the petitions as to the other children. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[10] Parents appeal the court's order adjudicating the Children to be CHINS.¹ As our Supreme Court has stated:

When reviewing a trial court's CHINS determination, we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1286 (Ind. 2014). “Instead, we consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and [the] reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.” Id. at 1287 (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). When a trial court supplements a CHINS judgment with findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. We consider, first, “whether the evidence supports the findings” and, second, “whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. (citation omitted). We will reverse a CHINS determination only if it was clearly erroneous. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012). A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or “if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997) (citation omitted).

Gr.J. v. Ind. Dep't. of Child Servs. (In re D.J.), 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017) (alterations in original).

Issue One: Admission of Evidence

[11] Parents first contend that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted certain evidence. As this Court has stated:

We review a trial court's admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. See In re Des.B, 2 N.E.3d 828, 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). This court will reverse only where the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. It is well-established that errors in the admission of evidence are to be disregarded as harmless error unless they affect the substantial rights of a party. Id.

S.T. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re L.T.), 145 N.E.3d 864, 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[12] Parents contend that the court abused its discretion when it admitted the child hearsay evaluation reports because those reports “were never intended to substantiate abuse or neglect.” Appellants’ Br. at 15. Parents also assert that the court abused its discretion when it admitted the forensic interviews of the Children because “the evidence fails to establish the reliability” of those interviews. Id. at 16.

[13] However, we need not decide whether the court erred when it admitted that evidence because any such error was harmless. First, it is clear that the court did not rely on the forensic interviews or child hearsay evaluations for D.H., R.H., Q.H., or E.H. Indeed, the court does not mention the interviews or evaluations for any of those children in its findings of fact or conclusions thereon.² As such, those interviews and evaluations had no bearing on the court's determination and were therefore harmless.

[14] As for K.V., the court mentioned her forensic interview in its findings but only in the context of finding K.V. to be a credible witness. Specifically, the court cited five reasons why K.V. was credible, and, as the fourth item, noted that her forensic interview was “a prior consistent statement[.]” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 90. Beyond the interview, the court also found her testimony to be credible based on her demeanor, her coherence, a letter that also served as a prior consistent statement, and the CASA's testimony that K.V.’s account of the events had not wavered. Thus, even if the court had not admitted K.V.’s forensic interview, it is clear that the court would have nonetheless found K.V. to be credible.

[15] Further, and importantly, K.V. testified to the offenses at the fact-finding hearing and was subject to extensive cross-examination. She testified that Q.H. had touched her on at least three occasions. As noted above, the court was able to hear her testimony and analyze her demeanor to determine that her testimony was credible. Stated differently, based on the trial court's minimal reliance on K.V.’s forensic interview, we can say with confidence that the probable impact of that evidence was sufficiently minor such that any error in its admission was harmless.

Issue Two: Findings of Fact

[16] In this case, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon following the fact-finding hearing. Thus, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re Des. B., 2 N.E.3d 828, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We consider first whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the judgment. Id. We may not set aside the findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. Findings are clearly erroneous when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference, and a judgment is clearly erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal standard. Id. We give due regard to the trial court's ability to assess witness credibility and do not reweigh the evidence; we instead consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the judgment. Id. We defer substantially to findings of fact but not to conclusions of law. Id. And we accept unchallenged findings as true. Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[17] On appeal, Parents challenge several of the court's findings of fact. Specifically, they contend that findings 16, 18, 20-23, 26-27, 30, 32-33, 36-37, and 41-42 are unsupported by the evidence.³

[18] Findings 16, 18, and 20 are all related to the court's decision to admit the forensic interviews. But, as discussed above, any error in the admission in those interviews was harmless. Finding 21 is the court's determination that K.V. was a credible witness, and we give due regard to that determination. See In re Des. B., 2 N.E.3d at 836. In Finding 22, the court found that Q.H. had “inappropriately touched and molested [K.V.] more than one time.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 90. That finding is fully supported by K.V.’s own testimony. Indeed, K.V. testified that Q.H. touched her chest “under [her] shirt” on one occasion; that he “trap[ped her] in a closet” and put his hand “where [her] vagina was” on another occasion, and that he “just started kissing” her on yet another occasion. Tr. Vol. 1 at 177, 183, 186. The testimony supports the court's Finding 22.

[19] In Finding 23, the court listed concerning behaviors by K.V. but stated that those actions “may be consistent with emotional or behavioral responses to sexual molestation or advances.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 91. Parents contend that the finding is “speculative.” Appellants’ Br. at 18. However, the court did not find that her behavior was actually caused by Q.H.’s actions; it was merely an explanation as to why the court did not find the behaviors to diminish her credibility.

[20] Parents also challenge Findings 26 and 27, in which the court found that, “[d]espite a safety plan, [Parents] did not or were unable to ensure” K.V.’s and Q.H.’s safety and that the Children “were not properly supervised.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 91-92. But the evidence shows that, when FCM Beebe arrived at Parents’ house, the Children were unsupervised upstairs, and the only adult in the home was unable to climb the stairs. Further, as the court found and Parents do not challenge, K.V. “was touched by Q.H. after the safety plan was put into place.” Id.at 91. Given that Parents did not comply with the safety plan and that K.V. was touched despite the safety plan, Findings 26 and 27 are supported by the record.

[21] In Finding 30, the court found that E.H. disclosed that Q.H. had touched her. That finding is supported by Mother's own testimony, in which she stated that E.H. stated that Q.H. “had done something to her[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 184. In Findings 32 and 33, the court found that Father had been convicted of sexual misconduct with a minor and that he had a poor understanding of appropriate sexual boundaries. But Father admitted that he had the prior conviction from 2020, which supports Finding 32. And the fact that Father was convicted of an offense that involved “the inappropriate touching of a child(ren)” supports Finding 33.

[22] In Finding 36, the court notes its “serious concerns” that any continued therapy for K.V. would not address the trauma she sustained because of the Parents’ “continued denial” of the incidents. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 92-93. And in Finding 41, the court found that, without court coercion, the emphasis of Q.H.’s therapy “could become centered on managing feelings related to alleged false accusations rather than confronting and resolving the underlying concerns[.]” Id. Given that both Parents testified that they did not believe K.V., the court's findings are supported by the evidence.

[23] In Findings 37 and 42, the court found that Parents are unable or unwilling to address the safety issues in their home and that they are unable to provide a safe and stable home free from abuse or neglect. Again, despite the safety plan, Children were upstairs unsupervised, and Q.H. touched K.V. at least one time after the imposition of the safety plan. Those findings are supported by the evidence.

[24] The court's findings of fact are supported by the evidence. Parents’ arguments on appeal are simply requests for this Court to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do.

Issue Three: CHINS Adjudication

[25] Finally, Parents contend that the court erred when it adjudicated K.V. and Q.H. as CHINS. DCS alleged, and the trial court found, that the Children were CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1, which provides that a child is a child in need of services if, before the child becomes eighteen years of age: (1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision; and (2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that: (A) the child is not receiving; and (B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.⁴

[26] Our Supreme Court has interpreted that statute to require “three basic elements: that the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child's needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. “A CHINS adjudication focuses on the condition of the child.” N.L. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re N.E.), 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010). And, when determining whether a child is a CHINS under Section 31-34-1-1, the juvenile court “should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290.

[27] Parents do not specifically raise any argument regarding serious endangerment or that K.V.’s or Q.H.’s needs are unmet. Rather, Parents assert that the court erroneously found them to be CHINS despite the “inconsistency” that resulted when the court did not find the other children to be CHINS. Parents maintain that “the findings regarding supervision, parental conduct, and the home environment were identical for all children” and, as such, the court's findings that three of the Children were not CHINS must apply to K.V. and Q.H. Appellants’ Br. at 25.

[28] But contrary to Parents’ assertions, the evidence shows that the home environment was not the same for all of the Children. Indeed, the evidence demonstrates that Q.H. had had inappropriate contact with K.V. The interaction between those two children set them apart from the rest. It was therefore reasonable for the court to treat Q.H. and K.V. differently from the other three and to find them to be CHINS even though the remaining children are not.

[29] Parents also contend that the court erred when it concluded that the coercive intervention of the court was needed to ensure that K.V. and Q.H. received services. They assert that they “proactively placed both K.V. and Q.H. in therapy after the initial incident, implemented a safety plan, and maintained adult supervision in the home.” Id. at 27.

[30] But as discussed above, Parents have not complied with the safety plan. Despite the requirement that the Children be supervised, they have been alone upstairs, and the only adult in the home was physically incapable of climbing the stairs to check on the Children. Further, at least one of the incidents between Q.H. and K.V. occurred after the safety plan had been implemented, and Q.H. touched K.V. at least twice after starting therapy. Stated differently, even with therapy and a safety plan in place, Parents have been unable to provide Q.H. and K.V. with a home free from abuse. Further, Parents were adamant in their disbelief of K.V., which supports a reasonable inference that Parents would not get the appropriate help to address K.V.’s trauma or Q.H.’s behaviors on their own. The trial court's findings support its conclusion that the coercive intervention of the court is needed.

Conclusion

[31] Any error in the admission of the child hearsay evaluation reports or forensic interviews was harmless. In addition, the court's findings of fact are supported by the evidence. And the findings support the court's conclusions that K.V. and Q.H. are CHINS. We therefore affirm the trial court.

[32] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   DCS contends that “Parents’ arguments are unsupported by citations to relevant legal authority and are therefore waived because they lack cogency.” Appellee's Br. at 15. Specifically, the State alleges that eleven out of the thirteen cases cited by Parents “do not support the propositions Parents present.” Id. at 16. Parents acknowledge “that the opening brief contained inaccurate descriptions of the procedural posture or outcome of certain cited cases” but that “those citation errors did not change the statutory question presented or the recorded facts on which Appellants rely.” Reply Br. at 5. Despite the errors in Parents’ citations, we will nonetheless consider the merits of their arguments.

2.   To the extent that the court's finding that E.H. “disclosed that [Q.H.] inappropriately touched her” is a reference to E.H.’s forensic interview, we note that the court did not make any determination as to E.H.’s credibility and that the court ultimately did not find her to be a CHINS. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 92.

3.   Parents also challenge Findings 43-46 and 49, but those findings relate to whether the Children are seriously impaired or seriously endangered and whether they need care, treatment, or rehabilitation that they are unlikely to receive without the coercive intervention of the court. Those findings will be addressed in Issue Three below.

4.   The trial court also adjudicated K.V. a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-3, which provides that a child is a CHINS if she is a victim of certain sex offenses and needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that she has not received and is unlikely to receive without the coercive intervention of the court. Parents challenge that adjudication, arguing that Q.H.’s actions, “while inappropriate, do[ ] not establish the criminal intent required for a sex offense[.]” Appellants’ Br. at 24. Because we affirm the court's adjudication of K.V. as a CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1, we need not address Parents’ argument on this issue.

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.