B.G., Appellant-Defendant, vs. STATE OF INDIANA (2004)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

B.G. was convicted after a bench trial of battery resulting in bodily injury, a Class A misdemeanor, and battery, a Class B misdemeanor. He now appeals his convictions. We affirm.

Issue

B.G. raises two issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain B.G.’s convictions.

Facts and Procedural History

The facts most favorable to the convictions show that on July 11, 2003, B.G. was a passenger in a car driven by Kimberly Smith. B.G. saw his wife, Danielle, sitting on a park bench, watching several children. One of the children was Smith's son, M.S.¹ Seeing M.S., Smith parked her vehicle. B.G. exited the vehicle and approached the park bench, grabbed M.S., and began walking back toward the car. Danielle attempted to regain custody of M.S., but B.G. was able to put M.S. in the front passenger seat of the car, while he sat down in the back passenger seat of the car. In an effort to stop Smith from driving off with M.S., Danielle ran to the driver's side door, which was open, and reached inside to grab the keys. At that point, B.G. reached from the back seat and grabbed Danielle to pull her away from the ignition. As a result, Danielle suffered injuries to her shoulder and arms.

The State subsequently charged B.G. with two counts of battery as Class A misdemeanors. After a bench trial, the trial court found B.G. guilty of battery as a Class A misdemeanor because B.G. had inflicted bodily injury on Danielle. With respect to M.S., the trial court found B.G. guilty of the lesser-included offense of battery as a Class B misdemeanor.² B.G. now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

B.G. contends the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his convictions. More specifically, B.G. contends he never physically touched Danielle and thus could not have committed battery, and he had legal authority to touch M.S. because he was acting as an agent of Smith, who was M.S.’s mother. We disagree.

I. Standard of Review

Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims is well settled. We will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Green v. State, 808 N.E.2d 137, 138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Instead, we consider the evidence and reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Id. If there is probative evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm the conviction. Id. Circumstantial evidence alone may support a conviction. Id.

II. Sufficient Evidence of Battery

Indiana Code section 35-42-2-1 provides, “A person who knowingly or intentionally touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner commits battery, a Class B misdemeanor.” The offense is elevated to a Class A misdemeanor if the battery results in bodily injury to another person. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(1)(A).

A. Battery on Danielle

B.G. argues that he did not touch Danielle in any way during the incident. However, the State presented sufficient evidence that B.G. intentionally touched Danielle in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. Danielle testified that when she was attempting to take the car keys from the ignition so that Smith could not drive away with M.S., B.G. reached from the back seat and grabbed Danielle to pull her away from the ignition. Danielle testified that, as a result, she suffered bruising on her shoulder and arms. B.G.’s argument asks that we reweigh the evidence and rejudge the credibility of the witnesses, an invitation we must decline.

B. Battery on M.S.

B.G. does not dispute that he intentionally touched M.S. in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. Instead, B.G. contends under Indiana Code section 35-41-3-1, he had legal authority to do so. Indiana Code section 35-41-3-1 states, “A person is justified in engaging in conduct otherwise prohibited if he has legal authority to do so.” “This statute has been interpreted to permit a parent to engage in reasonable discipline of her child, even if such conduct would otherwise constitute battery.” Johnson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 255, 257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (emphasis added).

B.G. does not contend the defense is available to him because he is a parent of M.S. Instead, B.G. argues that because Smith, M.S.’s mother, told B.G. to physically take M.S. from Danielle, B.G. was acting as an agent for Smith and thus had the legal authority to do so.

We considered a similar contention in Townsend v. State, 616 N.E.2d 47 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 632 N.E.2d 727 (Ind. 1994). In Townsend, the defendant was charged with battery after he hit his girlfriend's daughter. Because the defendant occasionally stayed at his girlfriend's house, he argued that he had legal authority to discipline her children because he was acting in loco parentis. Id. at 48. We stated that a person stands “in loco parentis” when that person assumes legal obligations of a parent without adoption. We held merely staying at a girlfriend's house occasionally does not place one in loco parentis. Id. at 50.

Similarly, B.G. failed to present any evidence to show that he had assumed any legal obligations for M.S. Therefore, he did not have legal authority to commit battery on M.S.

Conclusion

The State presented sufficient evidence to support B.G.’s convictions for battery. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's convictions.

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   M.S. was raised by and living with Teresa Crouch-Allard, Smith's stepmother. It is unclear from the record why M.S. was living with Crouch-Allard, and not Smith.

2.   The trial court found that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that B.G.’s grabbing of M.S., and not a later struggle over M.S. between Danielle and Smith, actually caused M.S.’s injuries.

ROBB, Judge