LEWIS v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Jermard J. Lewis was convicted of murder and sentenced to 65 years. He now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter and, in the alternative, that his sentence is inappropriate. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the morning of December 7, 2023, Lewis and his girlfriend went to Kroger on Bluffton Road in Fort Wayne. While they were shopping, a store employee named Jamari was paged over the store's intercom. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 127. Lewis, because of his similar first name, believed he was being paged, so he went to the front of the store and approached long-time employee Perla Nieto about the announcement. Lewis “frequented” this store and recognized Nieto, whom he thought was “nice.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 29. Lewis was upset and became argumentative and threatening. Nieto was “confused” and “baffled” as to why Lewis was so upset. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 136. Nieto was “very apologetic” to Lewis, but he still didn't calm down. Id. Nieto requested help from a store manager. When assistant manager Alec Houser approached, Nieto was “frightened” and “anxious” due to Lewis's threats. Id. at 126.

[3] Houser tried to explain to Lewis that it was a store employee being paged, not him, but Lewis continued to be aggressive. Lewis threatened Houser's and Nieto's lives and said, “I know people, I can make stuff happen.” Id. at 128. At 10:30 a.m., Houser escorted Lewis and his girlfriend out of the store. On his way out the door, Lewis exclaimed, “I'm gonna come back and kill you.” Id. at 197. Another store employee had called 911 but told the dispatcher to disregard the call when Lewis left.

[4] Lewis and his girlfriend drove home, and Lewis changed his clothes. At 11:05 a.m., Lewis returned to Kroger and parked his car in a way that would allow him to leave quickly. Armed with a knife from his car, he walked into the store, headed straight for Nieto, who was standing near the busy checkout lines, grabbed her from behind, said, “[Y]ou f**king b**ch,” and stabbed her in the neck and face area several times. Id. at 179. The incident was captured on the store's camera system. See Ex. 8 (Incident-Victim). As Lewis stabbed Nieto, he said, “[D]on't you ever say my F'ing name again.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 202. After stabbing Nieto, Lewis ran out of the store.

[5] Nieto died, having suffered “six (6) sharp force injuries ․ to her head.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 15. Lewis was taken into custody later that day, and the knife he used to stab Nieto was found on his person. Police then interviewed Lewis, and he said he was “pissed” about the interaction with Nieto and Houser and took his girlfriend home so that he could “recollect his thoughts.” Ex. 71 at 7:09-7:44. He then went back to Kroger and “immediately” stabbed Nieto, who didn't see him coming. Id. at 7:52. When asked how many times he stabbed Nieto, Lewis said he didn't know because he “didn't care.” Id. at 8:04.

[6] The State charged Lewis with murder. Lewis filed a notice of insanity defense and asked the trial court to have him evaluated for competency to stand trial. The court appointed a psychologist and psychiatrist to evaluate Lewis for competency and insanity, and they both found him competent to stand trial and not insane at the time of the stabbing. Based on those evaluations, Lewis withdrew his insanity defense. A jury trial was held in September 2025. Lewis testified in his own defense. Contrary to his earlier statement to police and the video footage, Lewis claimed that when he went back to Kroger, he put his hand on Nieto's shoulder to get her attention but she “swung” at him, “slapped” him, “elbowed” him, and tried to “bite” him. Tr. Vol. 3 p. 36. At that point, he stabbed her. When asked how many times he stabbed Nieto, Lewis responded, “Enough not to care.” Id. at 46. Lewis explained that he felt “disrespected” because Houser told him he could finish grocery shopping but Nieto told him to leave, and he didn't see why he had to listen to Nieto because she was “not above the manager.” Id. at 32, 37-38.

[7] At the close of the evidence, Lewis asked for a voluntary-manslaughter jury instruction. The trial court acknowledged that voluntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of murder but found that there was no serious evidentiary dispute as to sudden heat, so it declined to give the instruction. The jury found Lewis guilty of murder.

[8] At sentencing, evidence was presented about Lewis's criminal history and his attempts at rehabilitation. That is, he has convictions for misdemeanor battery (2015), misdemeanor conversion (2015), and felony battery to a public-safety officer (2017). In addition, Lewis has had his probation revoked and served time in both jail and prison. Defense counsel acknowledged that Lewis was found competent and sane but noted that the psychiatrist's report diagnosed him with antisocial personality disorder with narcissistic traits.

[9] The trial court found Lewis's mental-health issues to be mitigating but didn't “weigh it terribly heavily,” as Lewis had “consistently denied any mental health concerns,” and the court didn't see any “nexus” between his mental-health issues and the stabbing. Id. at 89-90. The court found the following aggravators: (1) Lewis's criminal history, including his failed attempts at rehabilitation; (2) the escalating severity of his crimes; (3) the nature and circumstances of this crime, including Lewis's “shocking” statements that he didn't care how many times he stabbed Nieto; and (4) the “extraordinary” impact of this crime on Nieto's family, friends, coworkers, and community. Id. at 90. The court noted that maximum sentences are reserved for the worst offenders but found that condition satisfied here: “I've been on the Bench almost thirty (30) years, and you are one of the worst, having committed one of the worst offenses in this community.” Id. at 91. The court sentenced Lewis to the maximum term of 65 years.

[10] Lewis now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. The trial court did not err in declining to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter

[11] Lewis contends that the trial court erred in declining to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. An instruction on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of murder is warranted only if the evidence reflects a serious evidentiary dispute regarding the presence of sudden heat. Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 486 (Ind. 2015), reh'g denied. “Sudden heat occurs when a defendant is provoked by anger, rage, resentment, or terror, to a degree sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary person, prevent deliberation and premeditation, and render the defendant incapable of cool reflection.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Anger alone is not sufficient to support an instruction on sudden heat.” Suprenant v. State, 925 N.E.2d 1280, 1282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. Where a trial court rejects a voluntary-manslaughter instruction based on a lack of evidence of sudden heat, we review the court's decision for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1283.

[12] There was no serious evidentiary dispute regarding whether Lewis acted under sudden heat. The evidence established that Lewis was irrationally upset because he thought his name had been called over the store's intercom. He first approached and threatened Nieto, and when she summoned Houser, Lewis continued to be argumentative and threatened Houser and Nieto before being asked to leave the store, vowing to come back and kill them. Lewis then left the store, went home to “recollect his thoughts,” and changed his clothes. About 35 minutes later and armed with a knife from his car, Lewis returned to the store and “immediately” stabbed Nieto. That sequence reflects deliberation and premeditation—the very things sudden heat must prevent. Sudden heat renders a defendant “incapable of cool reflection.” But that deliberate course of conduct shows that Lewis was fully capable of cool reflection and negates any inference that he killed Nieto in sudden heat. At most, the evidence showed that Lewis was angry over a perceived slight, and anger alone will not support a sudden-heat instruction. See id. at 1282. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter.

II. Lewis has failed to persuade us that his maximum sentence is inappropriate

[13] Lewis argues that if we affirm his conviction, we should revise his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that an appellate court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The court's role under Rule 7(B) is to “leaven the outliers,” and “we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019). “Whether a sentence is inappropriate ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other factors that come to light in a given case.” Thompson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 383, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008)). Because we generally defer to the judgment of trial courts in sentencing matters, defendants must persuade us that their sentences are inappropriate. Schaaf v. State, 54 N.E.3d 1041, 1044-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)

[14] The sentencing range for murder is 45 to 65 years, with an advisory sentence of 55 years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a). Here, the trial court sentenced Lewis to the maximum term.

[15] Lewis doesn't dispute the brutal nature of the offense. Nor could he. He stabbed Nieto multiple times in the head in a busy Kroger store because he became irrationally upset when he thought his name had been called over the intercom and felt disrespected by how he had been treated. The nature of the offense alone supports the maximum sentence.

[16] Lewis's character also supports the maximum sentence. At the time of sentencing, Lewis had one felony conviction and two misdemeanor convictions, had violated his probation, and had served time in both jail and prison. As the State acknowledged at sentencing, his criminal history is “not huge.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 86. But, as the trial court noted, his crimes had been escalating in severity. Perhaps most telling is Lewis's callousness, claiming more than once that he didn't know how many times he stabbed Nieto because he didn't care. And while Lewis has some mental-health issues, he was found both competent and sane.

[17] Lewis has not shown that his sentence is an outlier in need of revision.

[18] Affirmed.

Vaidik, Judge.

Altice, J., and Foley, J., concur.