IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationships of L.R. and E.S. (Minor Children) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] D.R. (Mother) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to two of her minor children, E.S. and L.R. [collectively, the Children], arguing the trial court's termination orders were clearly erroneous. Finding no clear error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother has three children: K.S. (born May 2017), E.S. (born January 2022), and L.R. (born July 2024). K.S. was born to Mother and E.P. (Father E.P.), and E.S. and L.R. were born to Mother and D.S. (Father D.S.).

[3] In October 2023, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) received a report that K.S. and E.S. were being neglected while in the care of Mother and Father D.S. According to that report, Mother and Father D.S. did not have stable housing and Father D.S. had recently suffered a drug overdose. While investigating, a DCS family case manager (FCM) spoke with Father D.S.’s mother, who indicated that Father D.S. was a heroin and methamphetamine user who had a history of domestic violence against her and Mother. When the FCM met with Mother and Father D.S., Mother explained they had been evicted from their apartment and did not know where they would be sleeping that night. Both Mother and Father D.S. admitted to drug use, with Mother saying she recently smoked THC and Father D.S. saying he regularly consumed alcohol and illegal substances including methamphetamine. E.S. was filthy and had a sagging diaper, and Mother told the FCM that E.S. had not eaten for nearly six hours.¹ Moreover, Mother did not have any childcare supplies with her, including anything for E.S. to drink from.

[4] DCS removed E.S. from Mother and Father D.S.’s care on an emergency basis,² placed her with her maternal grandmother, and on October 17, 2023, filed petitions alleging K.S. and E.S. were children in need of services (CHINS). The trial court adjudicated E.S. a CHINS on October 31 ³ and later issued a dispositional order approving reunification as the plan for permanency. That order required Mother to, among other things, cooperate and maintain contact with the FCM, participate in any services recommended by the FCM or other service providers, maintain stable housing that could provide for E.S.’s basic needs, secure and maintain stable income, not consume alcohol or illegal substances, submit to random drug screens, complete a substance abuse assessment and participate in any recommended treatment, complete all recommended services following a domestic violence assessment, attend all scheduled visits with E.S., and participate in a Parent Aide Program. Father D.S. was ordered to comply with similar requirements.

[5] Though E.S. was initially placed in relative care, she was moved to a foster placement in December based on allegations that her kinship placement was unsafe. Early in the case, Mother participated in supervised visits with E.S. However, E.S. showed severe emotional distress when taken to visit Mother. Initially, E.S. was picked up by a visit supervisor to be transported to the visitation facility, and she would cry, scream, and hit her head on the walls and floor when the visit supervisor arrived. E.S.’s foster parents then began taking E.S. to the visits, but E.S.’s behavior did not change. When the foster parents tried to take E.S. to visits without telling her where they were going, E.S. started having severe emotional outbursts any time she left the house. Because E.S. was unable to visit Mother without these distressing behaviors, the court ordered that the visits be put on hold.

[6] Mother gave birth to L.R. in July 2024, and DCS immediately removed her from Mother's care, placed her in the same foster placement as E.S., and filed a petition alleging she was a CHINS. L.R. was adjudicated a CHINS later that month, and the trial court approved a concurrent permanency plan of reunification and adoption. Thereafter, E.S.’s permanency plan was changed to reunification with a concurrent plan of adoption.

[7] In July 2025, DCS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate Mother and Father D.S.’s parental rights to the Children. The trial court held a combined fact-finding hearing on the termination petitions on October 6 and November 17, 2025.⁴ DCS's first witness was FCM Emily Simmons, who was assigned to E.S.’s case in October 2023. She explained that at the start of the CHINS cases, DCS had the following concerns:

[T]here was domestic violence between [Mother] and [Father D.S.] Both had talked to me about those issues. [Father D.S.] had admitted to using meth and snorting an unknown pill that he thought ․ was a pain pill ․, and he was struggling with alcohol. [Mother] ․ had smoked THC a couple weeks prior to when [DCS] was involved․ The family did not have stable income or housing.

Transcript Vol. 2 at 58. According to Simmons, while Mother participated in services “for the most part,” she did have “some noncompliance.” Id. at 61, 71. For example, before Mother's visits with E.S. were suspended, Mother sometimes cancelled them. Mother also did not fully participate in her individual therapy, as she “would go when she felt like she needed to go, instead of going ․ on a weekly basis ․” Id. at 61.

[8] Simmons struggled to get Mother to communicate her needs. Mother did benefit some from the help of a parent aide—an individual assigned to Mother to help her advocate for her needs, build a stable schedule around employment and childcare, and find transportation. However, Simmons believed Mother's relationship with her first parent aide was strained due to the parent aide's frustration that Mother “wouldn't put in the effort needed[.]” Id. at 72. As a result, Simmons had to request that Mother be assigned a new parent aide.

[9] Simmons was also concerned about Mother's on-again, off-again relationship with Father D.S. given the couple's history of domestic violence. Father D.S. told Simmons “that he would beat” Mother and had “beat her really bad” on one occasion. Id. at 84. Mother also reported to Simmons that her relationship with Father D.S. was “toxic[,]” and he had been “very aggressive towards her[.]” Id. At one point, Father D.S. expressed to Simmons that Mother “was being intimate with men with the children in the same room or in the bed.” Id. at 87. And on another occasion, Father D.S. sent a text to Simmons accusing Mother of “ruin[ing] [his] life and [E.S.’s]” and said, “I been dealing with her for 8 years she needs help.” Exhibits Vol. 9 at 152 [sic throughout].

[10] As for DCS's decision to remove L.R. from Mother's care shortly after her birth, Simmons explained that when she went to see Mother at the hospital, she met a man who claimed to be supporting Mother. Simmons asked him if he was willing to complete a drug screen, and he said no and left. Mother told Simmons that she did not have much of a support system, which made Simmons concerned “for the safety of [Mother] and the baby.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 66.

[11] DCS next called E.S.’s therapist to testify. She explained that she specialized in treating children under five, and she started working with E.S. in May 2024. E.S. struggled to acclimate to her weekly therapy sessions and took a long time to build a rapport with the therapist. E.S. also demonstrated signs of severe trauma. At first, she didn't want to be separated from her foster parents, and even after she felt safe without them in the room, she would ask her therapist to lock the door during sessions. On several occasions, the therapist observed E.S. having episodes of “depersonalization and derealization” during which E.S. would “almost go[ ] into another place[,]” close her eyes, scream, and cry. Id. at 108.

[12] Through play therapy, E.S. indicated she had been exposed to domestic violence. For example, while playing with male and female figurines, E.S. pretended that the male figure was abusing and beating the female. In another instance, E.S. had a strong negative reaction to a plastic knife in the therapist's kitchenette, suggesting to the therapist that E.S. had either been “injured or cut in some way, or [had] witnessed” someone be injured with a knife. Id. at 124. E.S.’s foster parents reported that she had difficulty going to the bathroom, having her diaper changed, and bathing, and she engaged in sexualized behaviors including masturbation. Her therapist believed this indicated E.S. had experienced “sexual abuse and/or exposure to sexual behavior ․” Id. at 122. E.S.’s therapist diagnosed her with severe reactive attachment disorder (RAD), “a very complicated trauma disorder for children” that she described as “the most severe trauma diagnosis for a child.” Id. at 105. RAD is characterized by “[e]xtreme [emotional] highs and lows[,] ․ [i]nability to be comforted at times[,]” and “[d]issociation ․” Id.

[13] During her therapy sessions, E.S. called her foster parents “Mom and Dad” and only referred to her “old mommy” one time when expressing appreciation for the care she was being provided by her foster parents. Id. at 124. E.S. has a strong bond with her foster parents, and her therapist described having the following concerns if E.S. was removed from their care:

[O]ne of my concerns is her safety. Her level of safety that she currently has and what she knows as her constant and consistent life․ [W]e have just now started sessions progressing in autonomy, identity, who she is, as well as processing ․ the trauma as well ․

․ I'm concerned that ․ would change.

Id. at 130.

[14] DCS's next witness was Father D.S. He admitted to having “a history of conviction[s] for violent offenses[,]” including convictions in January 2019 for battery resulting in bodily injury and domestic battery against his step-father; three convictions in October 2019 for domestic battery against Mother, one of which was for acts committed in the presence of a child; and an August 2021 conviction for domestic battery against his mother. Id. at 158. However, Father D.S. claimed these convictions were based on a “[h]istory of lies” (not a history of violence) because he had merely “pled guilty to hurry up and get out” of jail. Id.

[15] Father D.S. also claimed he lied about Mother in the text messages he sent to FCM Simmons. He claimed he disparaged Mother in those messages because he was “jealous and just talking crap[,]” and he had sent them because Mother “just ma[de] [him] mad[.]” Id. at 165-66. Father D.S. further denied being in a romantic relationship with Mother but claimed he had seen her “[t]he other day,” meaning just a few days before the termination hearing. Id. at 170. When Father D.S.’s attorney cross-examined him, he clarified the nature of his relationship with Mother as follows:

Q ․ You and [Mother] have a child together, correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So do you still talk to her?

A Yes.

Q Do you still see her on occasion?

A Yeah.

Q Even though you're not romantically together.

A Yeah. We're not together or none of that.

Q Okay. But you – would you consider yourselves friends?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Do you help each other out?

A Yeah.

Id. at 178.

[16] After Father D.S., DCS called Mother. Early in her testimony, Mother gave conflicting information about where she was living. Though she claimed to be renting an apartment, she had recently listed her mother's address on her driver's license and said she was receiving mail at both addresses. Mother further testified that she was employed full time at a nursing home, and she relied on that income to pay the rent and electric bill at her apartment. However, Mother said she has had trouble paying the electric bill and the electricity had been disconnected in August 2025. Thereafter, Mother claimed she entered into a payment plan with the electric company and stayed current on her payments.

[17] When asked about her participation in services, Mother claimed that she participated in individual counseling but stopped going after the therapist “didn't recommend it anymore.” Id. at 196. However, DCS offered a copy of Mother's therapy records which told a different story. The progress notes for Mother's final therapy session on July 8, 2025, indicate that Mother was supposed to “continue attending therapy sessions” and that she was scheduled for another session on July 28. Ex. Vol. 10 at 30. Mother failed to attend any further sessions and was discharged by her therapist in October for non-participation. Mother also unilaterally stopped engaging with the parent aide, claiming that after securing an apartment in March 2024, she had “everything that [she] need[ed.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 219.

[18] When asked whether she was “a victim of domestic violence[,]” Mother initially said, “No[,]” but then admitted that Father D.S. had committed domestic violence against her “[b]ack in 2018, but not since then.” Id. at 198. Mother not only agreed with Father D.S. that “[t]he criminal charges ․ he pled guilty to were false” but said that she fabricated the allegations that led to those charges because she “didn't want anything to do with him.” Id. at 199.

[19] DCS then asked Mother about her drug use, and she claimed that while she used marijuana in the past, she stopped in October 2023 when the CHINS cases were initiated. Records from the company through which Mother had been drug tested were admitted into evidence. They showed that Mother tested positive for THC twice and unprescribed tramadol once during the CHINS cases, and she was non-compliant with drug testing in the months before the termination hearing. From February to October 2025, Mother failed to call-in to the testing center forty-four times. Moreover, on fourteen occasions Mother's drug tests came back as “[a]bnormal” because her urine sample was too diluted to render a conclusive negative result. Ex. Vol. 11 at 82. Even so, Mother claimed she had been sober since October 2023 and did not “struggle with sobriety.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 219.

[20] After Mother, DCS called Trula Jackson, the Children's court-appointed special advocate (CASA). Jackson was assigned to the Children's cases in February 2024 and had seen Mother interact with the Children during several visits. She testified that L.R. was not bonded with Mother, largely because Mother “ha[dn't] been consistent with visitations[.]” Id. at 225. During one monitored visit in January 2025, Jackson went inside Mother's apartment, found it to be “extremely cold,” and saw that the thermostat indicated the apartment was only forty-two degrees. Id. at 226. Mother and L.R.’s maternal grandmother both wore heavy coats, and L.R. was wrapped in blankets. When Jackson asked Mother why it was so cold inside, Mother indicated that a window was open and she would shut it. Although Mother gave no good reason why the window was open, when she closed it Jackson “could smell a faint smell of marijuana.” Id. at 227. Jackson immediately ended the visit, and Mother's visits with L.R. were thereafter changed from monitored to supervised.

[21] Jackson testified that she did not believe Mother lived in the apartment. The apartment was sparsely furnished and, despite having “a lot of trash in the dining area,” did not appear to be lived in. Id. at 229. During the January 2025 visit, Jackson found nothing in the refrigerator except rotten food. When Jackson visited sometime later, Mother had stocked the refrigerator with “a couple new items ․,” but she hadn't acquired any more furniture. Id. at 230. Jackson further explained that she had passed the apartment building on several occasions, and each time she could tell the lights were off and it appeared no one was inside.

[22] Jackson also said she believed Mother and Father D.S. were still romantically involved. She explained that in August 2025, she saw Mother and Father D.S. driving together near Mother's parents’ house. In October, she saw Mother and Father D.S. shopping at a grocery store together, and pictures Jackson had taken of them there were admitted into evidence. Jackson explained that she was concerned about Mother and Father D.S. continuing to be romantically involved, given their history of domestic violence and inability to provide a safe home for the Children. The potential for domestic violence particularly concerned Jackson because Mother told her she was afraid of Father D.S. and had even requested separate Child and Family Team Meetings (CFTMs) and court dates because she was afraid to attend them at the same time as Father D.S.

[23] At the end of Jackson's direct examination, she testified it was in both Children's best interests for Mother's parental rights to be terminated and for the Children to remain in their foster placement. She said E.S. was bonded with her foster parents, “calls them Mom and Dad[,]” and “is happy” and “thriving.” Id. at 236. She further explained that L.R. was bonded with E.S., and both Children “are loved by the family they're in.” Id. at 238.

[24] DCS's last witness was Jackline Medegwa Woodard, who took over as the Children's FCM in January 2025. She testified that Mother had failed to complete an abuse accountability and awareness program recommended by her predecessor, FCM Simmons. Moreover, when Woodard became the new FCM, Mother had missed sixteen drug screens since October 2024. As noted above, when Mother started testing again, her test results were inconclusive because her urine was diluted. As FCM Woodard explained, “[S]ometimes, if there is a dilute[d] screen, it means somebody is doing something to change the outcome of the results.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 3.

[25] FCM Woodard tried to visit Mother's apartment in August and October 2025, but Mother was not home either time. She testified that she did not know if Mother lived in the apartment, saying, “I've never been in it, so I don't know.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 250. FCM Woodard also corroborated Jackson's account that Mother told DCS she was afraid of Father D.S., explaining,

On several occasions, [Mother] did not want to have the same hearing as [Father D.S.], even including CFTMs. She did not want to have the same time CFTMs because she was afraid, and she said she was scared for her life because of past violence with [Father D.S.]

Tr. Vol. 3 at 8. Toward the end of her testimony, FCM Woodard recommended that Mother's parental rights to the Children be terminated.

[26] After FCM Woodard's testimony, DCS rested its case, and both Mother and Father D.S. rested without presenting evidence. Following the hearing, on January 21, 2026, the trial court issued two detailed orders terminating Mother and Father D.S.’s parental rights to the Children.⁵ Mother now appeals.⁶

Discussion and Decision

[27] Parents have a fundamental liberty interest “in the care, custody, and control” of their children. In re Z.B., 108 N.E.3d 895, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)), trans. denied. Given the importance placed on the parent-child relationship, the involuntary termination of parental rights is subject to a high bar. Id. Nonetheless, “a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination.” In re K.T., 137 N.E.3d 317, 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[28] To involuntarily terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS must allege and prove that termination is in the child's best interest, there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child, and as alleged here, one of the following is true:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c), (d)(2-4) (2025) (as amended July 1, 2025). DCS must prove these elements “upon clear and convincing evidence.” Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2 (2025).

[29] If the trial court finds DCS's allegations are true, it must order the termination of the parent-child relationship and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a), (c) (2025) (amended 2026). On appeal, we owe the trial court significant deference given its “unique position to assess the evidence,” and we review its findings and its judgment only for clear error. K.T., 137 N.E.3d at 326. When reviewing for clear error under Trial Rule 52(A), we determine “whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.” Z.B., 108 N.E.3d at 900. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. Lastly, we accept any unchallenged findings of fact as true. Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

1. Whether the Evidence Supports the Challenged Findings

[30] Mother challenges several of the trial court's findings of fact, arguing they are not supported by the evidence. First, Mother challenges the following:

Both Father [D.S.] and Mother testified that they were no longer in a relationship. CASA ․ Trula Jackson[ ] testified that she personally observed Mother and Father [D.S.] in Mother's vehicle sometime in August 2025 as well as shopping together at a local store on or about October 27, 2025, and took ․ photograph[s] of them together. CASA Jackson testified that, based upon her observations, she believed the two were still in a relationship.

Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 65, 112 (footnotes omitted). Mother misconstrues this finding and claims the court found that she and Father “D.S. were still in a relationship.” Appellant's Brief at 13. But the challenged finding is merely an accurate recounting of Father D.S.’s, Mother's, and Jackson's testimonies. Though Mother questions the basis for Jackson's belief and points to other evidence suggesting that she and Father D.S. are no longer in a relationship, she curiously does not challenge the court's finding that neither she nor Father D.S. were telling the truth in their testimony:

The Court finds neither Mother [n]or Father [D.S.]’s testimony to be credible, due to the inconsistencies between their testimony, other witnesses [sic] testimony and admitted exhibits, their alleged inability to recall or remember certain facts or events, and that both testified they have “lied” to courts in the past.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 66, 114. To the extent Mother asks us to second guess the trial court's credibility determination, that is merely an impermissible request to reweigh the evidence.

[31] Next, Mother challenges the court's finding that

[f]rom July 1, 2024 through [A]ugust 5, 2025, Mother completed 57 drug screens. Between February 2025 and August 2025, Mother missed calling forty-four (44) times and missed four (4) drug screens. Between July 1, 2024 to August 2025, Mother tested positive for THC twice and once for tramadol, and did not have a prescription for same. The last eight (8) screens before the trial herein were designated by the lab company ․ as “unacceptable analytical results”.

Id. at 66, 113. Mother claims this finding is not supported by the evidence in part because she “completed a substantial number of screens w[ith] the majority being negative for all substances.” Appellant's Br. at 13-14. She concedes that she had positive screens in November 2024 and February 2025 but highlights the fact that “she had no other positive screens after February 5, 2025.” Id. at 14. What she fails to explain, however, is how the court's finding is erroneous given that it accurately reflects the records from the drug testing company. Mother may have completed a substantial number of clean drug tests during the CHINS proceedings. But she also tested positive for substances three times, failed to call the testing center forty-four times, and had a significant number of diluted urine samples in the months before the termination hearing, just as the court found in its orders.

[32] Mother next challenges the finding that “as recent as August 2025, [she] had a disconnect notice for the electricity” at her apartment. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 66, 113. However, this challenge is difficult to square with the fact that a copy of the August 2025 “disconnect notice” was admitted into evidence at the termination hearing. Ex. Vol. 9 at 207. Mother, in fact, testified that her electricity had been shut off at that time. Clearly, the court's finding recognizing that fact was supported by the evidence.

[33] Relatedly, Mother challenges the court's finding that she was unable “to provide a safe home, appropriate care[,] and supervision for” the Children. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 67, 115. She points to her own testimony that she secured an apartment and stable income, and when addressing the August 2025 disconnect notice argues that she has taken “appropriate measures to ensure that her electricity stayed on ․” Appellant's Br. at 14. Critically, however, Mother has failed to challenge several of the court's related findings which led it to conclude that Mother's apartment is unsafe for the Children. In one such unchallenged finding, the court found:

Mother testified that ․ she obtained a two (2) bedroom apartment and that she had obtained employment ․ Mother and [L.R.]’s visits were ultimately moved to her apartment, where she had a pa[c]k & play and a twin bed available. CASA Jackson testified that she was present at a particular visit between Mother and [L.R.] in January 2025, when [L.R.] would have been around 6 months of age, at Mother's apartment, and when she entered the apartment, she noticed both Mother and maternal grandmother present with coats on, the apartment window being open, a couple blankets wrapped around [L.R.] and the thermostat registering 42 degrees. CASA contacted the FCM and the visit was terminated, as it was determined there was no electricity in the apartment.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 66, 113. Nor does Mother challenge the following:

CASA also testified that she found rotted food in the refrigerator, the apartment to be sparsely furnished, trash in the dining area, and a faint smell of marijuana. CASA testified she did not believe Mother was actually living in the apartment, during that time.

Id. These unchallenged findings of fact—which accurately reflect evidence presented at the termination hearing—are sufficient to support the court's related finding that Mother was unable to provide sufficient housing for the Children.

[34] In short, all the findings challenged by Mother are supported by the evidence, and most if not all of Mother's qualms with the challenged findings are requests to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.⁷

2. Whether the Findings Support the Judgment

[35] Mother next argues the trial court's findings do not support its judgment. She concedes, however, that many of the court's conclusions of law are supported by its findings. Specifically, Mother concedes that adoption by the Children's foster parents is a satisfactory plan for their care and treatment under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(2). She also concedes, as relevant here, that the Children had been removed from her care for at least fifteen of the twenty-two months preceding the termination hearing, thus satisfying subsection (d)(2)(A). Accordingly, we focus the remainder of our analysis on (1) whether Mother was able to remedy the conditions that resulted in the removal of the Children from her care under subsection (d)(2)(B),⁸ and (2) whether termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Children's best interests.⁹

2.1. Remediation of Circumstances that Led to the Children's Removal

[36] Mother claims she “has ․ taken appropriate steps to remedy the conditions that le[d] to the removal” of the Children from her care, Appellant's Br. at 17, and likens her case to In re Ma.J., where this Court found DCS failed to prove “that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal ․ will not be remedied[,]” 972 N.E.2d 394, 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). But at issue in Ma.J. was the subsection of the termination statute requiring DCS to prove “there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal ․ will not be remedied.” I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3) (emphasis added).¹⁰ Under that subsection, the Ma.J. court found that while the mother had slipped up by receiving a new driving while suspended charge in the months before the termination hearing, her “progress ha[d not] been inconsistent or last-minute.” 972 N.E.2d at 404.

[37] Here, however, given Mother's concession that the Children had been removed from her care for at least fifteen of the twenty-two months before the termination hearing, DCS was not required to proceed under subsection (d)(3). Instead, it was sufficient to prove that Mother “ha[d] been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the [Children] being placed in care outside the parent's home.” I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(2)(B) (emphasis added). This is because subsection (d) of the termination statute is written in the disjunctive, meaning “the court is required to find that only one prong of [the] subsection ․ has been established by clear and convincing evidence.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. dismissed. And the trial court's findings support its conclusion that Mother “has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the [Children] being placed in care outside [her] home.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 70, 118.

[38] Indeed, while Mother focuses her arguments on progress she claims to have made to secure safe housing and stable employment, the trial court found (and Mother does not challenge) that housing instability was only one of three reasons for the Children's removal: “The reasons for the initial case were: domestic violence, homelessness, and substance abuse[ ] by both parents.” Id. at 62, 143. As DCS correctly argues, “[w]hile Mother ha[s] greater housing stability and more stable income than she did when E.S. was removed, she ․ consistently demonstrated little to no progress or even regression in remedying other conditions.” Appellee's Br. at 30.

[39] Starting with Mother's drug use, the court found that though Mother participated in “substance use ․ treatment from approximately March 2025 through July 2025[,]” she then “dropped out of treatment.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 65, 146. Thereafter, Mother was non-compliant with her drug screens, as she “missed calling forty-four ․ times and missed four ․ drug screens.” Id. at 66, 147. Particularly troubling was the fact that “[t]he last eight ․ screens before the trial herein were designated by the lab company ․ as ‘unacceptable analytical results’ ” because Mother's urine sample was diluted. Id. As FCM Woodard explained, the fact that Mother's sample was diluted could suggest that she was attempting to manipulate the results. We find these circumstances akin to In re A.D.S., where a panel affirmed a termination order after finding, in part, that though the mother “ha[d] tested negative on recent drug screens, she ha[d] also missed several recent drug screens, including a screen the week prior to the termination hearing, and she tested positive for cocaine four times during the pendency of th[e] case.” 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Like the mother in A.D.S., Mother tested positive for THC twice and tramadol once, missed numerous drug screens, and diluted her urine samples in the months before the termination hearing. We therefore cannot say the trial court erred in concluding that Mother had not remedied her substance abuse.

[40] Nor did the trial court err in reasoning that Mother had not remedied the risk of domestic violence in her home given her continued relationship with Father D.S. Despite Mother's and Father D.S.’s claims that they are no longer romantically involved, Father D.S. testified that he and Mother remain friends and see each other with some regularity. Given Father D.S.’s history of domestic violence against his mother, stepfather, and Mother, together with his failure to engage in services to curb his violent behavior, it's clear that their relationship poses a significant risk of domestic violence in Mother's home.

[41] The present circumstances are similar to In re E.M., where our Supreme Court affirmed a termination order where the children suffered post-traumatic stress disorder after witnessing domestic violence, the father who perpetrated that violence showed apathy toward services and hostility toward service providers, and he minimized his domestic violence and shifted the blame when he testified at the termination hearing. 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). Likewise, E.S. was so traumatized by the violence she witnessed in Mother and Father D.S.’s care that she suffers from RAD, which her therapist described as the most severe trauma diagnosis a child under five can receive. Moreover, both Mother and Father D.S. minimized Father D.S.’s acts of violence, as they each testified at the termination hearing that Father D.S.’s litany of domestic violence convictions were based on false allegations. That Mother was willing to downplay Father D.S.’s history of violence even after expressing to DCS throughout these proceedings that she feared for her life shows that she does not take her obligation to provide a home for the Children that is free from domestic violence seriously.

[42] For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's conclusion that Mother failed to remedy the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal.¹¹

2.2. Best Interests of the Children

[43] Finally, Mother contends “that termination is not in the Children's best interest ․” Appellant's Br. at 21. “In determining what is in the best interests of the child[ren], the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence.” A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224. This determination requires the trial court to “subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child[ren] involved.” Id. “Central among these interests is children's need for permanency” because “children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” In re Ma.H, 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019) (quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648), cert. denied. Under this principle, “[t]he trial court need not wait until the child[ren are] irreversibly harmed such that [their] physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224.

[44] In A.D.S., the panel affirmed a trial court's conclusion that termination was in the children's best interest when the children's FCM and guardian ad litem “both supported termination of [the m]other's parental rights and supported adoption by the [c]hildren's current caregivers.” 987 N.E.2d at 1159. Additionally, the mother had failed to remedy her “issues with substance abuse and domestic violence” that “pose[d] a risk to the safety of the [c]hildren ․” Id. Though these considerations alone supported the trial court's best interest analysis, the panel further noted that

the [c]hildren have suffered from a lack of permanency and ․ have improved while residing with their current, pre-adoptive caregivers ․ The [c]hildren have bonded and attached with their caregivers and termination, allowing for a subsequent adoption, would provide them with the opportunity to be adopted into a safe, stable, consistent and permanent environment where all their needs will continue to be met, and where they can grow.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

[45] Likewise, in the present case, FCM Woodard and CASA Jackson supported termination of Mother's parental rights and adoption by the Children's foster parents, with whom the Children had lived for the pendency of this case and shared a bond. See In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1047-48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (“[T]he testimony of the case worker, guardian ad litem, or a CASA regarding the children's best interests supports a finding that termination is in the children's best interests[.]”) (citing Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied), trans. denied. Moreover, E.S.’s therapist supported keeping E.S. in her current placement and testified that placing her back in Mother's care risked her physical safety and mental health.

[46] In light of these considerations, the totality of the evidence supports the trial court's determination that termination of Mother's parental rights is in the Children's best interest.

Conclusion

[47] For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[48] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   K.S. was not with Mother and Father D.S. during this meeting. DCS later located him at Father E.P.’s home in Kentucky.

2.   K.S. remained in Father E.P.’s care.

3.   K.S. was also adjudicated a CHINS, but his case was later dismissed after DCS determined Father E.P. was adequately providing for his needs.

4.   Before the termination hearing, Father D.S. consented to the termination of his rights to E.S., but not L.R.

5.   Many of the findings of fact in those orders are identical, including the findings relevant to this appeal.

6.   Father D.S. did not participate in this appeal.

7.   Mother purports to challenge the trial court's finding that herpattern of engaging in relationships that are violent and abusive, failure to address her mental health and substance use issues, and instability to provide a safe and appropriate home indicates that maintaining a parent-child relationship with [the Children] is not in [their] best interests ․ Mother's lack of addressing these issues shows Mother's lack of insight into how her behaviors pose a threat to the safety and wellbeing of her [Children].Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 68, 116; see Appellant's Br. at 17. However, she fails to expand on the conclusory assertion that “there is insufficient evidence to support” the finding. Appellant's Br. at 17.

8.   Mother does not contend that DCS failed to take “reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the [Children's] family under IC 31-34-21-5.5[.]” I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(2)(B).

9.   It's unclear whether Mother is challenging the trial court's conclusion that termination of her parental rights was in the Children's best interest under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(3). At one point in her argument, “Mother concedes ․ that termination is in the best interest of the Children ․” Appellant's Br. at 12. Later, however, Mother asks us to “find that termination is not in the Children's best interest ․” Id. at 21. We decline to find that Mother waived her challenge to the court's best interests determination in light of the fundamental nature of the rights involved.

10.   When Ma.J. was decided, this provision was codified as Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i) (2011).

11.   Because DCS carried its burden to prove the circumstances supporting termination under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d)(2), we need not address Mother's challenge to the trial court's conclusion under subsection (d)(4) that there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Children's well-being, safety, physical health, or lives. See A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 220.

DeBoer, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.