Brock A. Watson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Brock A. Watson appeals, following a jury trial, his convictions for Level 3 felony armed robbery and Level 5 felony criminal recklessness. He raises several issues that we restate as:

1. Did the trial court err when it denied Watson's motion to dismiss the amended charging information for armed robbery, which asserted that the information failed to identify the property alleged to have been taken with sufficient specificity?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied Watson's motion to continue that he made after the State filed a use immunity agreement with the alleged victim at the conclusion of the second day of trial?

3. Did the State present sufficient evidence to convict Watson?

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In the early morning hours of September 8, 2022, Tanner Little sent a Facebook message to Michael Vannatter asking to buy marijuana from him.¹ About an hour later, Little arrived at Vannatter's Muncie home and brought with him another man, later identified as Watson, who Vannatter did not know. When Little and Watson came inside, Vannatter was in the living room, along with his wife and their baby.² Vannatter picked up a jar of marijuana from the floor and removed a portion for Little, who was buying a gram for ten dollars. Vannatter weighed and bagged it and handed it to Little. Little was going to pay with a twenty-dollar bill, and Vannatter stepped away five or six feet to his wallet to get change, with his back turned to the men. During that time, Vannatter heard the “click” of a gun being cocked. Transcript Vol. 3 at 55. When Vannatter turned around, Little had left, and he saw Watson pointing a Colt 1911 handgun at him. Vannatter backed away with his hands up, saying, “you don't want to do this.” Id. at 82, 83. Watson walked toward the jar of marijuana, while pointing the gun “back and forth” between Vannatter and his wife, then “picked up the jar of weed, ran out.” Id. at 54.

[4] Vannatter grabbed his shotgun and ran out on the porch “to make sure [Watson] was actually gone.” Id. at 58. Vannatter saw Watson attempting unsuccessfully to get into the van they had arrived in. Watson took off running, and the van followed. While Vannatter was still on his porch, Watson fired his pistol in Vannatter's direction; the bullet went past Vannatter's porch swing and “hit a stud.” Id. at 60. Either from his porch or yard, Vannatter aimed at Watson and shot one round from his shotgun, which was loaded with birdshot. Vannatter chased Watson on foot when he heard “another shot ring up” towards him, and in response Vannatter shot a second round. Id. at 61. Watson ultimately got into the van with Little and fled the scene. A neighbor called 911, and Vannatter walked back to his house and waited outside for Muncie police to arrive.

[5] Vannatter spoke to officers at the scene, explaining that it was a drug deal that went wrong and that he was robbed. He told them that he had been shot at, returned fire, and chased the individuals. Police recovered three casings in the area: a shotgun shell, which was in the road about two houses away, and two .45-caliber handgun casings. Police also obtained and reviewed footage from Vannatter's exterior surveillance cameras,³ showing Watson and Little arriving and leaving. Vannatter was transported to the police station and provided a statement to detectives. Based on their investigation, police developed Watson as the suspect involved in the shooting. Relevant to this appeal, Vannatter's interview included the following exchange:

Detective: All right. So do you finally get to your gun and he grabs the jar and gets out of the house. Then what happened?

Vannatter: Well, he doesn't grab the jar on the way out and ran. And I secured it and next I go to my gun.

Transcript Vol. 3 at 106-07 (verbatim from transcript, emphasis added).

[6] A few days later, on September 11, 2022, a Muncie Police Department officer was dispatched to an address for a reported overdose of an individual – determined at the scene to be Watson – who had suffered an injury from shotgun pellets to his face several days prior but never sought treatment. A search warrant was obtained for Watson's residence, and police found a t-shirt with red stains and a handgun inside a locked safe in another resident's bedroom, which was later found to match the handgun shell casings from the scene. Watson was transported for medical treatment and later transferred to a hospital in Indianapolis. He was arrested a few days after being discharged.

[7] Police interviewed Watson, who stated that Little – not he – took Vannatter's jar of marijuana. He denied having a gun during the incident but eventually admitted that he had one with him and that it belonged to a friend he was living with. While he initially denied that he fired the gun, he later admitted doing so after he was shot at and hit. Watson further claimed that he only fired the gun in the air and not in anyone's direction. Watson stated that he did not seek medical treatment after the incident because he was scared and that he discarded the gun in a bush after the shooting, believing his friend later retrieved it.

[8] Watson and Vannatter were both charged with offenses for their conduct. On September 26, 2022, the State charged Watson with Level 3 felony armed robbery (Count I), Level 5 felony criminal recklessness (Count II), and Class A misdemeanor theft (Count III). The State alleged the following, in relevant part, as to armed robbery:

[O]n or about September 8, 2022 in Delaware County, State of Indiana, Brock A Watson did knowingly take property, from Michael Vannatter or the presence of Michael Vannatter, by using force or by threatening the use of force, while Brock A Watson was armed with a deadly weapon[.]

Appendix Vol. II at 38 (emphasis added). The trial court set the omnibus date for December 5, 2022.

[9] On March 3, 2025, Watson filed a motion to dismiss Count I, arguing that the charging information did not state the offense with sufficient certainty. On April 3, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the motion, at which the State identified the property taken as being “a jar of weed” and agreed to amend the charging information. Transcript Vol. 2 at 7. The ensuing court order stated that the parties agreed that the filing of the amended count “will [ ] make the Defendant's motion moot.” Appendix Vol. II at 168. On April 21, the State amended Count I to allege that Watson “did knowingly take property, to wit: a jar of green mossy substance” from Vannatter. Id. at 171.

[10] In March 2025, Watson filed a notice of self-defense and a notice of deposition of Vannatter. According to Watson, the deposition did not occur due to Vannatter's expected assertion of Fifth Amendment rights.

[11] In May 2025, the State filed a witness and exhibit list for the upcoming trial on June 2, 2025, identifying individuals that the State “anticipate[d] calling in its case in chief[.]” Id. at 180. Vannatter was among the witnesses listed. The State also issued subpoenas to appear for trial, and Vannatter was served on May 27.

[12] On May 28, 2025, Watson filed another motion to dismiss Count I, alleging that the amended information still did not state the offense with sufficient specificity. Watson asserted that the amended charge was “equally as vague as the original charges filed” and affected Watson's “ability to prepare an adequate defense.” Id. at 205, 209. The State responded that the motion was not timely, as it was filed well past the omnibus date, and that the substance of the motion was “patently absurd,” as the amended charge sufficiently apprised Watson of the allegations and allowed him to prepare a defense. Id. at 221. Following a hearing the next day, the trial court denied Watson's motion.

[13] The three-day jury trial commenced on June 2, 2025. Before selection of the jury, the trial court addressed the parties’ respective motions in limine. The State's motion asserted that the State had “potential witnesses” with “unrelated, pending and/or past criminal matters” and that evidence of such should be excluded. Id. at 183. Watson responded that the State was seeking to exclude reference to pending criminal charges against one of its witnesses who “has a clear motive to curry favor with the State” and that Watson “intend[ed] to explore the witness's bias and motive to testify favorably to the State, stemming from pending criminal charges that are directly related to the facts of this case.” Id. at 226, 228. At the hearing, the State clarified that its motion pertained to the alleged victim – that is, Vannatter – who had two pending criminal matters, one related and one not, and that its motion was geared toward exclusion of the unrelated case. The court ordered that Watson would be “allowed to reference the alleged victim's open and pending criminal case” that related to the current case. Transcript Vol. 3 at 23.

[14] As to his motion in limine, Watson requested exclusion of certain matters pertaining to “the alleged victim,” such as vouching for him, the extent of his culpability, or how this case has affected his life. Appendix Vol. II at 203. Those requests were granted.

[15] The State's evidence during the first two days of trial included the testimony of various officers and portions of police body camera video from the scene, including Vannatter's statements to officers that a marijuana drug deal “went wrong” and that he was robbed at gunpoint. Transcript Vol. 2 at 114. The State also submitted surveillance footage from the exterior of Vannatter's home, showing Watson and Little arriving and leaving. While the two are seen walking in together, they left separately; Little casually walked out first, pausing for some seconds on or around the porch, before Watson burst through the door and ran off the porch with Little, out of the camera's view. Watson's interview with detectives was also published for the jury.

[16] Following the conclusion of the second day of trial, the State filed, at 4:36 p.m., a use immunity agreement (the Immunity Agreement), which provided that Vannatter agreed to be available and testify in Watson's trial and, in exchange for his truthful testimony, the State would not use Vannatter's testimony against him in pending criminal proceedings. The State notified Watson about the agreement and sent a copy to him.

[17] The next morning, Watson's counsel informed the court that he had just learned of the Immunity Agreement the prior afternoon and “vehemently” objected to the State's use of it and to allowing Vannatter to testify. Transcript Vol. 3 at 27. Watson argued that the lack of notice violated his due process rights to a fair trial and raised confrontation clause issues. Watson asserted that the situation deprived him of the ability to depose Vannatter and “the opportunity to investigate the scope of the criminal conduct at issue [and] examine prior inconsistent statements.” Id. at 29. Acknowledging that he “knew” Vannatter was going to be called as a witness, Watson's counsel argued that Vannatter “didn't have immunity until this morning or yesterday. So obviously these questions are going to be totally different.” Id. at 33-34. Watson asked the court to exclude Vannatter's testimony.

[18] The State responded that Vannatter had been listed on the State's witness list for years and that it was the State's right to pursue and use an immunity agreement, including the ability to make “spur of the moment” decisions about offering immunity, even while the person is on the witness stand. Id. at 31. The State also reported to the court that it had provided Watson with all Vannatter's previous statements and that “[d]iscovery [has] long been complete in regards to ․ the statements this victim gave. There's no surprises here.” Id. As to timing, the State advised that Vannatter and his attorney had signed the Immunity Agreement on Monday June 2, and the State signed and filed it the next afternoon, notifying Watson.

[19] In response to Watson's suggestion that the State may have purposely withheld the Immunity Agreement, the State maintained that “[i]t was a game time decision that the State made in the middle of this trial,” which the State argued it was allowed to do. Id. Watson requested that, if the court were to allow Vannatter to testify, then Watson receive a “brief continuance” to allow time to depose Vannatter and obtain “all immunity agreement details, all statements made, any documentation that reflected any promise, inducements or expectations” Id. at 29-30.

[20] After receiving argument from the parties, the trial court ruled that the Immunity Agreement would be admissible as an exhibit and the State could call Vannatter as a witness, and it denied Watson's request for a continuance but noted it would give Watson “leeway” for vigorous cross-examination. Id. at 35. At Watson's request, the trial court also agreed to modify its general credibility instruction – which stated that, in evaluating a witness's credibility, the jurors could consider “any interest, bias or prejudice” – to read “any agreements, interest, bias, or prejudice.” Id. at 41 (emphasis added).

[21] During Vannatter's testimony, Watson cross-examined him on, among other things, the Immunity Agreement, potential bias, and his version of events on the night in question, including asking why he fired his shotgun at Watson and chased him. Watson asked Vannatter about dealing drugs and leaving a loaded shotgun sitting in the home unsecured. Vannatter was also questioned about a discrepancy between his testimony at trial and his prior statements to law enforcement. Specifically, he was asked about telling the detectives in the interview that Watson did not leave with the jar and that he (Vannatter) had secured it before getting his gun. When Vannatter testified that he did not remember making that statement, Watson was granted permission to play a clip of Vannatter's interview for the jury,⁴ specifically Vannatter's statement to the detective that “Well, he doesn't grab the jar on the way out and ran. And I secured it and next I go to my gun.” Id. at 107 (emphasis added). Vannatter then reaffirmed that he did not remember making that statement and did not know whether that statement was the truth or a lie.

[22] Watson testified in his defense, largely stating that which he had told detectives – denying that he left the home with a jar of marijuana, describing that he did not shoot his gun until after Vannatter had shot at him, and maintaining that he shot into the air as he was running away from Vannatter, in fear for his life. Watson testified that the reason he was carrying a handgun while at Vannatter's home was because he had it earlier in the evening for protection. Watson said that it was when Little exited the home that Vannatter told Watson, “I'm getting my gun. This shit is weird.” Id. at 138, 140. Watson testified that he then heard Vannatter loading or cocking a gun in the other room, so he ran out of the house while reaching for his handgun. Watson testified that Vannatter fired the shotgun at him six to eight times. As a result of being shot, Watson lost vision in one eye.

[23] The jury found Watson guilty as charged. On June 26, 2025, the trial court held a sentencing hearing, at which time it imposed fourteen years executed on the robbery conviction and a consecutive four years executed on the criminal recklessness conviction for an aggregate sentence of eighteen years in the Indiana Department of Correction. The trial court vacated the theft conviction. Watson now appeals.

Discussion & Decision

1. Motion to Dismiss

[24] Watson argues that the trial court erred by denying his May 2025 motion to dismiss, which asserted that the amended charge for armed robbery did not identify the property alleged to have been taken with adequate certainty and “denied [him] the opportunity to anticipate the State's proof and prepare a defense[.]” Appellant's Brief at 21. We review a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss for an abuse of discretion. Lebo v. State, 977 N.E.2d 1031, 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). We will reverse only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. To the extent the motion turns on a pure question of law, we review that question of law de novo. Anderson v. State, 243 N.E.3d 389, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied.

[25] The State initially argues that the motion was untimely under Ind. Code § 35-34-1-4(b)⁵ and that Watson therefore waived his challenge to the claimed lack of adequate specificity of the charging information. See Cockrell v. State, 743 N.E.2d 799, 803 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that failure to challenge charging information no later than twenty days before omnibus date generally results in waiver of the issue on appeal). The State maintains that, to avoid waiver, Watson needed to demonstrate fundamental error, which he failed to do. Watson, in turn, notes that even though his first motion to dismiss was filed well after the omnibus date, in March 2025, the State never objected on timeliness grounds and, rather, agreed to amend its information; thus, Watson asserts, the State cannot now claim that he waived his challenge to the charging information. Watson's position overlooks that the relevant motion to dismiss is his second one, filed five days prior to trial, and that the State did assert, among other things, that the motion was untimely under I.C. § 35-34-1-4(b) and should be stricken. Under these circumstances, the State has not waived its argument, and we agree that Watson's motion to dismiss the amended charging information was untimely.

[26] Regardless, Watson has not established that the trial court erred in denying his motion. “The purpose of the charging instrument is to provide a defendant with notice of the crime of which he is charged so that he is able to prepare a defense.” Hayden v. State, 19 N.E.3d 831, 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. A charging instrument must set forth, among other things, the nature and elements of the offense charged in plain and concise language without unnecessary repetition. I.C. § 35-34-1-2(a); State v. Laker, 939 N.E.2d 1111, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. The indictment or information also must contain “a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” I.C. § 35-34-1-2(d); Lebo, 977 N.E.2d at 1038.

[27] The State's amendment to Count I, alleging that the property taken by Watson from Vannatter was “a jar of green mossy substance” was sufficiently descriptive for Watson to understand the nature of the charges against him and prepare a defense. Appendix Vol. II at 171. Indeed, the State clarified at the hearing on Watson's first motion that the specific property at issue was “a jar of weed.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 7. The State's amended description of the property taken as a jar of green mossy substance, rather than marijuana, did not mislead Watson nor prevent him from preparing his defense. We further observe that, a week after the State filed the amended charge, the trial court held an initial hearing and advised Watson of the amended charge and Watson indicated his understanding of the charge and penalties. Appendix Vol. II at 173.

[28] Further, to the extent that Watson suggests that the jury did not understand what property was allegedly stolen, we are unpersuaded. In its opening statement, the State noted that “the jar of green mossy substance” alleged as stolen from Vannatter was “most likely weed.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 69. Then, throughout trial, many references were made by various witnesses to a jar of weed or jar of marijuana being taken from Vannatter during the drug deal. And in closing, the State argued that the State had proven “that [Watson] took the property, a glass jar of mossy green substance․ the State never hid from you that this was most likely a jar of weed.” Transcript Vol. 3 at 176. We are confident that the jury knew and understood that the green mossy substance alleged in Count I was referring to Vannatter's jar of marijuana. On the record before us, Watson has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Watson's motion to dismiss.

2. Motion to Continue

[29] Watson argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to continue that he sought during trial “after the State produced its key witness ․ under a newly granted immunity agreement” filed at 4:36 p.m. the prior afternoon. Appellant's Brief at 21. Under Ind. Code § 35-36-7-1, a defendant is statutorily entitled to a continuance under certain circumstances not applicable here.⁶ Rulings on non-statutory motions for continuance lie within the wide discretion of the trial court. Gibson v. State, 43 N.E.3d 231, 236 (Ind. 2015). We will only find an abuse of that discretion where a defendant was prejudiced as a result of not getting a continuance. Id. To demonstrate such prejudice, “a party must make a ‘specific showing as to how the additional time requested would have aided counsel.’ ” Id. (quoting Carter v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1254, 1261 (Ind. 1997)).

[30] Ind. Code § 35-37-3-3 governs witness immunity and provides that “[u]pon the request of the prosecuting attorney, the court shall grant use immunity to a witness.” Notably, the statute does not impose any requirement that the State provide prior notice to the defendant before seeking use immunity for a witness nor does Watson direct us to any. As our courts have observed, “ ‘[t]he granting of immunity is somewhat analogous to plea-bargaining in that the State must often use such means with reluctant, but essential witnesses.’ ” Crafton v. State, 450 N.E.2d 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (quoting Walters v. State, 394 N.E.2d 154, 157 (Ind. 1979)).

[31] Watson argues that “[b]y allowing a use immunity deal to be brokered between the State and [ ] Vannatter, at the eleventh hour,” Watson “was deprived of formulating a defense whether to impeach or otherwise discredit the State's victim and proceed forward unprepared for [ ] Vannatter's testimony.” Appellant's Brief at 24. Watson maintains that this late disclosure “compell[ed] counsel to maneuver in a factual vacuum.” Id. On the record before us, we disagree with these contentions.

[32] Vannatter was named in the charging information as the alleged victim, and his account of being robbed at gunpoint was included in the probable cause affidavit. In police body cam video from the scene, played by the State during trial, Vannatter told police about what had occurred. Vannatter's name had been on the State's witness lists for years, and he was served with a subpoena shortly before trial.

[33] We also observe that both the State's and Watson's respective motions in limine requested exclusion of matters pertaining to Vannatter. The State sought exclusion of Vannatter's unrelated criminal matters, while Watson requested that the State be precluded from referring to or asking about certain matters involving “the alleged victim.” Appendix Vol. II at 203. At the hearing, the State acknowledged that, “should the victim take the stand,” Watson will “want to explore bias,” which the State agreed was “fair for impeachment purposes,” and Watson indicated that such would be his intention. Transcript Vol. 2 at 22. In sum, both parties expressed positions that recognized the possibility, if not the likelihood, that Vannatter would testify at trial.

[34] In response to Watson's opposition to Vannatter testifying under the Immunity Agreement, the State represented to the trial court, and Watson did not argue otherwise, that the State had already “given all statements ․ by this victim over to Defense” in discovery. Transcript Vol. 3 at 31. Watson thoroughly cross-examined Vannatter, explored potential bias, and impeached him with his prior statement to detectives that “he” – an apparent reference to Watson – “doesn't grab the jar on the way out.” Id. at 107. Prior to trial, Watson had downloaded this specific clip from Vannatter's police interview onto a thumb drive, evidently in preparation for cross-examination of Vannatter at trial.

[35] We conclude that Watson has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced as a result of not receiving a continuance. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Watson's motion.

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[36] Watson asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to convict him on each count.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (internal brackets, citations, emphasis, and quotations omitted).

[37] A person commits Level 3 felony armed robbery when he knowingly takes property from another person or another person's presence by using force or threatening the use of force while armed with a deadly weapon. I.C. § 35-42-5-1(a)(2). Here, Watson was charged with knowingly taking a jar of green mossy substance from Vannatter or Vannatter's presence by using force or threatening the use of force while armed with a deadly weapon.

[38] Watson asserts that “the State wholly failed to establish that any property was taken,” pointing to evidence that officers could not discern from the surveillance video if either Watson or Little was holding a jar when they left the residence, that Vannatter did not disclose at the scene that he was robbed of a jar of marijuana, and that, in his police interview, Vannatter indicated that Watson did “not grab the jar on the way out.” Appellant's Brief at 26. He also notes that “[n]o direct evidence was presented regarding the recovery of the jar on [ ] Watson's person or within his property,” which he claims “creates doubt as to whether a theft even occurred.” Id. at 29. Watson reasons that, without proof of theft, there can be no robbery. And as to the armed element, Watson claims that “there was no direct evidence regarding [ ] Watson brandishing a firearm.” Id. Thus, he argues, his conviction for armed robbery must be reversed.

[39] These arguments ignore Vannatter's trial testimony that Watson pointed a Colt 1911 handgun at him as well as at his wife, picked up the jar of marijuana, and ran out of the house. They also ignore Vannatter's statements to police at the scene, recorded on body cameras and played for the jury, that it was a drug deal that went wrong and that he was robbed. The State presented sufficient evidence to convict Watson of armed robbery.⁷

[40] For Level 5 criminal recklessness, the State was required to prove that Watson knowingly or recklessly created a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person by shooting a firearm into an inhabited dwelling or other building or place where people are likely to gather. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2; Appendix Vol. II at 39. As Watson acknowledges, Vannatter testified that Watson ran out of the house and then turned back toward the residence and fired his gun toward Vannatter, who was standing on his front porch, and that Vannatter returned fire in Watson's direction. Watson's argument for reversal appears to be that because no shell casings were recovered inside the residence, “[a] reasonable conclusion can be made that the shots were exchanged outside of the residence, in the street and [that] ․ Watson did not shoot a firearm in a building, as he was charged.” Appellant's Brief at 32.

[41] Watson's arguments are unpersuasive. The jury heard Vannatter's trial testimony that Watson shot at him while he was on his porch, which included his recollection that a bullet passed his porch swing and “hit a stud.” Transcript Vol. 3 at 60. In addition, the jury saw surveillance video of Vannatter exiting his house in a rush while carrying a shotgun and looking around into the dark when there is a sudden blast of some sort, causing debris and dust to fall in front of the camera's view. From this, the jury could reasonably infer that Watson fired his weapon in the direction of Vannatter's house, where Watson knew at least one other adult and a child were present.

[42] Watson also argues the State failed to negate his self-defense claim, pointing out that, by all accounts, he was running away as Vannatter left his property with a loaded shotgun to chase him. He contends that “[t]he minute [Vannatter] stepped foot off his property, Vannatter became the aggressor justifying [ ] Watson to use reasonable force” to protect himself. Appellant's Brief at 34. When considering whether sufficient evidence rebuts a self-defense claim, this court uses the same standard as for any sufficiency of the evidence claim. Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ind. 2002). We will only reverse a conviction if no reasonable person could say that the State negated the defendant's self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[43] In Indiana, a person is justified in using deadly force against another person if he “reasonably believes that that force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c). A person is not justified in using deadly force if, among other things, he is the initial aggressor, is committing a crime, or is escaping after committing a crime. I.C. § 35-41-3-2(g); Doroszko v. State, 154 N.E.3d 874, 876 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“In general, a person may not claim self-defense when committing a crime.”), trans. denied. When a claim of self-defense is raised and finds support in the evidence, the State has the burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements. Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 800. The State may satisfy its burden by either rebutting the defense directly or relying on the sufficiency of evidence in its case-in-chief. Pinkston v. State, 821 N.E.2d 830, 842 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.

[44] In this case, the State presented evidence that Watson fired at Vannatter while fleeing the area after robbing Vannatter at gunpoint. That is, Watson was the initial aggressor who was escaping after committing crimes. Evidence in the State's case-in-chief was sufficient to negate Watson's claim of self-defense.

[45] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Vannatter had met Little on one prior occasion.

2.   One or two other children were asleep in a bedroom.

3.   Vannatter did not have inside surveillance cameras.

4.   Watson's counsel explained that he had downloaded the twenty-second clip to a thumb drive “from the discovery” that the State had produced to Watson. Transcript Vol. 3 at 105. The clip was not offered as an exhibit.

5.   This statute requires that a motion to dismiss be made no later than twenty days prior to the omnibus date if the defendant is charged with a felony; the omnibus date in this case was in December 2022.

6.   Watson does not argue that he was entitled to a continuance by statute pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-36-7-1.

7.   Watson also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to theft. Appellant's Brief at 29 (“Therefore, both the Theft and the Armed Robbery convictions must be reversed.”) The trial court, however, vacated the theft conviction and did not enter a sentence thereon.

Altice, Judge.

Brown, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.