Jesse Brown, Appellant-Respondent v. Blanche Brown, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jesse Brown (“Husband”) appeals the trial court's division of property following the dissolution of his marriage to Blanche Brown (“Wife”). Husband raises five issues for our review. We consolidate, reorder, and restate the issues as:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that Husband failed to rebut the statutory presumption in favor of an equal division of marital assets; and

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by effectuating an equal division of the marital estate.

We affirm the trial court's conclusion that Husband failed to rebut the statutory presumption in favor of an equal division of the marital estate, but we reverse the trial court's division of the marital estate because of internal inconsistencies in the trial court's order. We remand with instructions for the trial court to recalculate its division of the marital estate and enter a new final order.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Husband established an IRA (“Everwise IRA”) in 2001. Husband and Wife married on January 1, 2011. The Everwise IRA was worth approximately $108,000 at the time of the marriage. Husband never added Wife's name to the Everwise IRA, nor did he make any contributions to the Everwise IRA during the marriage. He also did not make any withdrawals from the Everwise IRA during the marriage. The Everwise IRA appreciated during the marriage as the result of market growth. Both Husband and Wife worked during the marriage. Wife earned approximately $43,000 a year, and Husband earned over $80,000 a year.

[3] Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on October 25, 2024. The trial court held the final dissolution hearing on May 21, 2025. Husband was sixty years old at the time of the final hearing and employed as a construction supervisor. At that time, the Everwise IRA was worth $336,522.14. Wife asked the trial court to equally divide the marital estate, and to effectuate that division, Wife proposed that the trial court order Husband to make an equalization payment of $341,880. Husband asked the trial court to award the entirety of the Everwise IRA to him. As a result, Husband proposed that he receive approximately 69% of the marital estate.

[4] The trial court entered its decree of dissolution of marriage on June 20, 2025. The trial court found that Husband had not rebutted the presumption in favor of an equal division of the marital estate, and it ordered that the estate be equally divided. The trial court decreed that “[t]o effectuate an equal split of the marital estate, Wife is entitled to an equalization payment in the amount of $327,587.52 which is outlined herein [sic] this Order.” (App. Vol. II at 18.¹ ) The trial court awarded the marital residence to Husband. The trial court concluded the couple's net equity in the marital residence was $270,445.45, and the trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife $135,222.73 within ninety days of the trial court's order, either through obtaining a home equity line of credit or refinancing the house. The trial court ruled that two of Husband's bank accounts, worth $106,130.52 combined, should be transferred to Wife. The trial court also ordered that Wife receive $114,261.07 from the Everwise IRA and directed that Husband retain the remainder from the Everwise IRA.²

Discussion and Decision

[5] Husband challenges the trial court's division of the marital estate. We review a trial court's division of marital assets for an abuse of discretion. Roetter v. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d 221, 225 (Ind. 2022). “A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision stands clearly against the logic and effect of the facts or reasonable inferences, if it misinterprets the law, or if it overlooks evidence of applicable statutory factors.” Id. The trial court's entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law also impacts our standard of review. Ashworth v. Ehrgott, 982 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). We “shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Ind. T.R. 52(A). “A finding is clearly erroneous if there are no facts in the record to support it, either directly or by inference.” Eisenhut v. Eisenhut, 994 N.E.2d 274, 276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “A judgment is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence supporting the findings, when the findings fail to support the judgment, or when the trial court ‘applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.’ ” In re Paternity of M.R.A., 41 N.E.3d 287, 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting K.I. ex rel. J.I. v. J.H., 903 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 2009)). We review the trial court's conclusions of law de novo. In re Moeder, 27 N.E.3d 1089, 1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. When, as here, the trial court entered findings and conclusions sua sponte, “the specific findings control our review and the judgment only as to the issues those specific findings cover. Where there are no specific findings, a general judgment standard applies, and we may affirm on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” Erie Ins. Exch. v. Sams, 20 N.E.3d 182, 187 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (internal citation omitted), trans. denied.

1. Equal Division of Marital Assets

[6] Husband asserts the trial court clearly erred by concluding that he failed to rebut the statutory presumption of an equal division of the marital estate. He argues the entire value of the Everwise IRA should have been awarded to him, resulting in him receiving approximately 69% of the marital estate. The division of marital property is a two-step process. Smith v. Smith, 136 N.E.3d 275, 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). “First, the trial court must ascertain what property is to be included in the marital estate; second, the trial court must fashion a just and reasonable division of the marital estate.” Id. “It is well-settled that in a dissolution action, all marital property goes into the marital pot for division, whether it was owned by either spouse before the marriage, acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before the final separation of the parties, or acquired by their joint efforts.” Alifimoff v. Stuart, 192 N.E.3d 987, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). We presume “that a dissolution court correctly followed the law and made all the proper considerations in crafting its property distribution[.]” Wilson v. Wilson, 732 N.E.2d 841, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. This presumption “is one of the strongest presumptions applicable to our consideration on appeal.” Id. The “trial court's discretion in dividing property in a dissolution is to be reviewed by considering the division as a whole, not item by item.” Fobar v. Vonderahe, 771 N.E.2d 57, 58 (Ind. 2002).

[7] Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5 states:

The court shall presume that an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable. However, this presumption may be rebutted by a party who presents relevant evidence, including evidence concerning the following factors, that an equal division would not be just and reasonable:

(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property, regardless of whether the contribution was income producing.

(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each spouse:

(A) before the marriage; or

(B) through inheritance or gift.

(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the disposition of the property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to dwell in the family residence for such periods as the court considers just to the spouse having custody of any children.

(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or dissipation of their property.

(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:

(A) a final division of property; and

(B) a final determination of the property rights of the parties.

The trial court need not make findings on these statutory factors when it chooses not to deviate from the presumption favoring an equal division of the marital estate. See Hyde v. Hyde, 751 N.E.2d 761, 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“We note initially that the trial court was not required to make specific findings on the statutory factors listed in I.C. § 31-15-7-5 because it decided not to deviate from the presumption of equal property division.”). However, the trial court must enter findings when it chooses to unequally divide the marital estate. See In re Marriage of Coyle, 671 N.E.2d 938, 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (“The trial court ordered that John receive 63% and Anita 37% of the total marital estate valued at $501,720.00. Consequently, the court was required to enter findings explaining why it awarded an unequal division of property.”).

[8] In general, the trial court “may not rely on just one of the factors listed in Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5 in determining that an unequal division would be warranted[.]” Helm v. Helm, 873 N.E.2d 83, 90 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The trial court “must consider the factors ‘in conjunction with relevant evidence regarding other statutorily prescribed factors, and with any evidence demonstrating additional reasons that an unequal distribution would be just and reasonable.’ ” Id. (quoting Eye v. Eye, 849 N.E.2d 698, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). Nonetheless, a trial court is not “required to explicitly address all statutory factors in all cases. It follows that a trial court would not be required, for example, to consider findings regarding statutory factors not implicated by the evidence.” Id. A trial court's exclusion of a statutory factor in its written findings does not necessarily mean the trial court failed to consider it. Id. “No one factor listed in Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5 is entitled to special weight over any other.” In re Marriage of Marek, 47 N.E.3d 1283, 1292 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.

[9] In rejecting Husband's request for an unequal division of the marital estate, the trial court found:

10. It is undisputed that Husband has a greater earning capacity than Wife and does, in fact, makes [sic] twice as much as Wife annually. Testimony was provided at the hearing of Husband historically earning close to $89,000 annually with Wife only earning $43,000 annually. While all factors must be considered together, this factor alone strongly suggests that Wife, not Husband, would be better suited to request a deviation from an equal division of the marital estate due to the parties’ income disparity.

11. Likewise, the Court may consider the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the disposition of the property is to become effective. Given the vast difference in the earning abilities of the parties, awarding Husband such a large portion of the marital estate would not effectuate Indiana Code § 31-15-7-5’s underlying purpose of “promot[ing] a just and reasonable distribution of marital assets upon the dissolution of a marriage.” Doyle v. Doyle, 756 N.E.2d 576 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).

12. Moreover, Husband has an IRA that the parties agree has a current value of $336,522.14. At the time of filing, such IRA was valued at $353,046.90. Husband testified that he is aware that the purpose of such account is for investment purposes and that such account has tripled in size since the date of marriage. In spite of this, Husband is proposing to deviate from the presumed 50/50 split to provide him with sixty-nine percent (69%) of the marital estate. The Court finds that the entire value of this account shall be included in the asset consideration of the marital estate and is subject to division in accordance with Indiana's “one-pot” theory. Goodman [v. Goodman, 94 N.E.3d 733, 742 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied]. Thus, the entirety of Husband's IRA account is also subject to the presumption of an equal division as further outlined in the Retirement Accounts subsection.

13. The Court finds that Husband has failed to meet his burden of proving that an equal division is not reasonable in the present case pursuant to the factors in Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5. Husband did not provide any additional testimony or evidence to support any other factors within Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5 to persuade the Court to deviate from an equal division.

14. Therefore, the Court denies Husband's request to deviate from an equal division of the marital estate.

15. To effectuate an equal split of the marital estate, Wife is entitled to an equalization payment in the amount of $327,587.52 which is outlined herein [sic] this Order.

(App. Vol. II at 18.)

[10] Husband focuses on the trial court's finding regarding his greater earning capacity as compared to Wife and contends the trial court's “analysis improperly focused on a single factor rather than considering all factors ‘in conjunction[.]’ ” (Appellant's Br. at 13) (quoting Helm, 873 N.E.2d at 90). He contends the trial court “gave insufficient weight” to his acquisition of the Everwise IRA before the marriage, his decision not to contribute or withdraw from the Everwise IRA during the marriage, his economic circumstances given his advanced age and the seasonal nature of his employment, and his conduct during the marriage in paying household expenses and financially assisting Wife's children and grandchild. (Id.) However, while the trial court found that Husband's greater earning capacity cut against his request for a greater share of the marital estate, the trial court also noted “all factors must be considered together[.]” (App. Vol. II at 18.) This indicates the trial court did not focus only on the parties’ respective earning abilities, and in fact the trial court discussed other factors listed in Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5 in its order. In its specific discussion of the parties’ retirement accounts, the trial court noted the Everwise IRA “was an asset prior to the marriage and ․ no contributions were made during the marriage[.]” (Id. at 21.) It considered the value of the asset when Husband brought it into the marriage and divided the asset so that Wife only received half of the value that the asset appreciated during the marriage. Thus, the trial court was aware that Husband brought the asset into the marriage and that the asset's large increase in value during the marriage was solely the result of passive market growth, but the trial court still concluded Husband failed to rebut the statutory presumption in favor of an equal division of marital assets. While Husband disagrees with the trial court's weighing of the factors, we cannot reweigh the evidence on appeal. See, e.g., Morey v. Morey, 49 N.E.3d 1065, 1070 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (holding trial court's conclusion that an equal division of the marital estate was just and reasonable was supported by the evidence and rejecting husband's argument as an impermissible request to reweigh the evidence). We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion or clearly err in finding that Husband failed to rebut the statutory presumption in favor of an equal division of the marital estate. See, e.g., Wanner v. Hutchcroft, 888 N.E.2d 260, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding husband failed to overcome strong presumption that trial court considered and complied with statutory factors in concluding marital estate should be equally divided).

2. Effectuating Equal Division

[11] Husband also contends the trial court abused its discretion in effectuating an equal division of the marital estate because the trial court ordered Husband to transfer to Wife assets worth more than the ordered equalization payment.³ The trial court ordered Husband to transfer to Wife bank accounts worth $106,130.52; $135,222.73, representing Wife's share of the couple's equity in the marital residence; and $114,261.07, from the Everwise IRA. Those transfers equal $355,614.32, which is $28,026.80 more than the $327,587.52 ordered equalization payment.

[12] Wife asserts the deviation between the value of the ordered equalization payment and the ordered transfers is not substantial because the $28,026.80 overpayment represents only about two percent of the marital estate. Wife relies on our Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Kirkman v. Kirkman, where the Court explained: “While we agree that the statutory presumption must be followed absent evidence that an equal division would not be just and reasonable, express trial court findings will not be compelled for insubstantial deviations from precise mathematical equality.” 555 N.E.2d 1293, 1294 (Ind. 1990). In Kirkman, our Supreme Court declined to remand the case for more specific findings by the trial court to justify an unequal distribution of the marital estate because the distribution outlined by the trial court did not substantially deviate from an equal division. Id. However, in the instant case, the trial court explicitly found that the parties should equally divide the marital estate but gave Husband contradictory instructions regarding how to achieve that equal distribution. The trial court did not make an explicit finding regarding the net value of the marital estate, and the parties dispute the estate's net value. (See Ex. Vol. 1 at 4 (Wife's net valuation of marital estate is $901,688.69) & 149 (Husband's net valuation of marital estate is $849,186.61).) Therefore, we hold the trial court abused its discretion in effectuating an equal division of the marital estate because one part of the decree indicates that equal division can be achieved through a $327,587.52 equalization payment and the mechanics of the decree indicate that an equal division can be accomplished through Husband transferring $355,614.32 in assets to Wife. We remand with instructions for the trial court to recalculate its division of the marital estate and enter a new final order.⁴ See, e.g., Kinder v. Kinder, 265 N.E.3d 550, 559 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (holding inconsistencies in trial court's order rendered its division of assets an abuse of discretion and remanding for recalculation of the division of assets).

Conclusion

[13] The trial court did not abuse its discretion or clearly err in finding that Husband failed to rebut the statutory presumption in favor of an equal division of the marital estate. However, it was clear error and an abuse of discretion for the trial court to order Husband to make an equalization payment of $327,587.52 while also ordering Husband to transfer $355,614.32 in assets to Wife. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

[14] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Our citation to the page number in the appendix references the page number in the pdf version of the appendix rather than the page number listed on the bottom of the page because the first page of the appendix was not numbered. See Ind. Appellate Rule 51(C) (“All pages of the Appendix volume, including the front page ․, shall be consecutively numbered at the bottom starting with numeral one on each volume's front page.”).

2.   Husband filed a motion to reconsider on July 22, 2025, and the trial court denied the motion. Husband then filed a motion to clarify, and the trial court denied that motion. On September 8, 2025, Husband filed a motion for relief from judgment, and the trial court issued an order summarily denying Husband's motion for relief from judgment on September 12, 2025.Husband filed his notice of appeal on September 25, 2025, and Wife filed a motion to dismiss Husband's appeal. On November 21, 2025, we issued an order denying the motion to dismiss. We found that Husband timely initiated his appeal following the September 12, 2025, order denying his motion for relief from judgment. In addition, we found that while Husband did not timely initiate his appeal following the trial court's June 20, 2025, decree of dissolution, “pursuant to Appellate Rule 1,” we granted Husband “permission to appeal the June 20, 2025 order and any orders issued thereafter up to and including the September 12, 2025 order.” Brown v. Brown, 25A-DC-2392, Order Denying Motion to Dismiss (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2025 ) (mem.).

3.   Husband also asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion for relief from judgment premised on this same discrepancy. Because we gave Husband permission to directly challenge the divorce decree in our November 21, 2025, order denying Wife's motion to dismiss, we address the issue in the context of the divorce decree only.

4.   Husband also seeks credit for an alleged unauthorized withdrawal by Wife and costs incurred after the divorce decree was entered. Husband first raised the issue of the alleged withdrawal and costs in a post-decree motion, but the trial court did not hear evidence on the issue. We cannot assess whether Husband deserves credit for the alleged unauthorized withdrawal and costs because it is not our role to decide factual issues or weigh evidence on appeal. See O'Connell v. O'Connell, 889 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“We will not reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility.”). Therefore, we do not decide whether Husband should be credited, but the trial court may consider the issue on remand.

May, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Felix, J., concur.