Anthony Wayne Stout, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Anthony W. Stout appeals his convictions and sentence on five counts of Promotion of Human Sexual Trafficking, Level 4 felonies, and one count of Attempted Promotion of Human Sexual Trafficking, a Level 4 felony. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Stout raises the following restated issues on appeal.

I. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Stout's motion to sever certain charges and hold separate trials for each of the five victims.

II. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to prove his Promotion of Human Sexual Trafficking and Attempted Promotion of Human Sexual Trafficking convictions beyond a reasonable doubt.1

III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Stout became a licensed bail agent in August 2020 ² and was hired by America Bonding Company. To become a bail agent, Stout was required to take a twelve-hour class and pass a test administered by the Indiana Department of Insurance to ensure he understood Indiana bail laws, regulations, and rules. He was also required to attend continuing education courses. As a bail agent, Stout was required by law to collect the full bond premiums up front before bonding a person out of jail. See Ind. Code § 27-10-4-5. Bail agents do “not really have any authority” to revoke a bond once it is posted. Tr. v. 2 at 73; see also I.C. § 35-33-8-5 (regarding required process for a court's revocation of bail).

R.M., October 2021 – March 2022

[4] In October 2021, eighteen-year-old R.M. was arrested in Marion County. R.M. had only completed the eleventh grade and had been living in hotels due to her lack of income. Her bond for her criminal charges was $40,000 surety, which meant she could pay a $4,000 partial payment of the bond to be released from jail pending resolution of her criminal case. However, neither R.M. nor her family could afford to pay the $4,000 bond.

[5] R.M. saw contact information for Stout posted on a wall of the Marion County Jail, and she called him for assistance in paying her bond. Stout asked R.M. for her Facebook information, and, after seeing her photos on Facebook, he told R.M. to “call him Poppy and say sexual things to him.” Tr. v. 2 at 135. He also “talk[ed] about [them] having sex when [she] came home.” Id. at 136. Although it made her “nervous” and “uncomfortable,” R.M. began engaging Stout in the sexual conversations because she thought it would “help [her] bond out” of jail. Id. at 135, 136. Stout, who paid for the jail phone calls, became “angry” if R.M. did not call him multiple times each day. Id. at 139. Stout also told R.M. that he had the power to place her in segregation or suicide watch while she was in jail and to revoke her probation when she was released. R.M. believed Stout had that power because she previously had seen a female inmate placed in segregation after speaking to Stout on the phone from jail.

[6] R.M. did not bond out of jail but was placed on probation in March 2022, after she pleaded guilty to the criminal charge. She was required to stay in contact with probation as part of her home detention but soon realized her cell phone was still at the police station. Because R.M. had no other way to get to the police station, she contacted Stout on March 29 to ask for a ride. Stout picked up R.M., and, on the way to the police station, he touched her leg and “kept asking to have sex.” Id. at 155. When R.M. refused, Stout became angry and yelled and “cuss[ed]” at her. Id. R.M. exited the vehicle and walked the rest of the way to the station.

[7] Stout contacted R.M. “later that day” and threatened to “call [her] house arrest officer and get [her] violated, send [her] back to jail” because she would not “have sex with him.” Id. at 156. Stout also called R.M.’s boyfriend and threatened to get both him and R.M. “sen[t] ․ back to jail” because R.M. was “supposed to have sex with him.” Id. at 157. Stout also texted that R.M.’s “karma is coming today.” Id. at 159. Later that day, R.M. reported Stout's behavior to the police, after which Stout stopped contacting R.M.

I.W., January 2023 – August 2023

[8] In January 2023, I.W. was arrested in Marion County and was required to pay $2,500 on her bond to be released from jail pending resolution of her criminal case. I.W. had never been in jail before, did not know anything about “how the bonding or bail system worked[,]” and did not have money or anyone else who could pay the bond. Tr. v. 3 at 60. Fellow inmates gave her Stout's phone number, and she contacted him in February because she believed he would pay her bond if she agreed to a “payment plan.” Id. at 61. After Stout viewed I.W.’s picture on Facebook, he became “way more flirtatious” with her. Id. at 63. I.W. decided to flirt back with Stout because she believed it would “help [her] get out of jail.” Id. Stout told I.W. he would bond her out if she paid him $500 and gave him “sexual favors” and the rest of the bond amount after she was released. Id. at 63-64. I.W. paid Stout $500. However, she was never bonded out of jail; rather, she pleaded guilty and was moved to prison that August.

[9] Between February and August, I.W. frequently spoke with Stout on the jail phone, and Stout paid for those calls. I.W. continued to speak to him “in a sexual way” in order to get him to follow through with his promise to pay her bond. Id. at 78. She “just tried to do literally whatever [she] needed to do, agree with the conversations, engage a bit, hoping it resulted in [her] getting out of jail.” Id. at 74. I.W. felt like she had to “engage sexually with” Stout to get him to agree to a payment plan for her bond and keep accepting her calls from jail. Id. at 116. Stout told I.W. he could place her on lockdown or suicide watch while she was in jail, and I.W. believed Stout had that power and understood his statement as a threat. Stout also told I.W. that he had previously had another female inmate “beat up” while in jail. Id. at 130. I.W. was “fearful” of Stout because she “knew he had connections in jail,․ knew he had put other women in lock[down, and] knew he had other women beat up” while in jail. Id. at 128-29. She also believed that Stout was able to revoke probations.

P.H., March 2023 – July 2023

[10] In March 2023, P.H. was in a relationship with Zachary Asher, who had been arrested in Marion County. Asher had an $80,000 surety bond, which required paying $8,000, plus a $1,500 cash bond, to secure his release pending resolution of his criminal case. P.H. had only $4,000 to put toward Asher's bond, and a friend referred P.H. to Stout for help. P.H. was under the impression that Stout was the only bail agent who would pay a bond and then accept payments, rather than requiring full payment up front. P.H. called Stout, and he told her he could “make a deal” with her. Id. at 243. P.H. informed Stout that Asher is her “caretaker” because he was “providing for” her and her three-year-old child and was the only adult who was able to assist P.H. when she had seizures. Id. at 243.

[11] P.H. took out a loan of $4,000, sent it to Stout, and asked about making partial payments on the rest of the bond amount. Stout texted P.H. to send him her address and a picture of herself. After she did so, he told her to send a “sexier picture” of herself. Id. at 246; Ex. v. I at 230. After P.H. sent Stout a picture of herself partially nude, Stout texted her to show “all of it.” Ex. v. I at 231. P.H. then asked Stout, “1st are you really going to get [Asher] home[,]” and Stout replied, “my word is bond.” Id. at 232. P.H. then sent Stout a photo of herself nude. Stout then texted P.H. that he would “give [her] a massage” when they met to sign the bond paperwork for Asher. Tr. v. 3 at 249. P.H. agreed to a back massage because she was “feeling pretty desperate” to get Asher home. Id. Stout began pressuring P.H. for money and asking about oral and anal sex. P.H. agreed to sexual activity “after [they] sign[ed]” the bond paperwork. Tr. v. 4 at 3. P.H. “felt like [she] had to do what [she] had to do” and that her only choice was to comply with Stout's requests. Id.

[12] Stout subsequently sent an Uber to pick up P.H. and bring her to Stout's home to sign the bond paperwork for Asher. When P.H. entered Stout's house, he told her that the bond paperwork could wait and she needed to perform oral sex on him. P.H. did not want to do that but felt she had to so that Stout would pay the bond. P.H. performed oral sex on Stout and then began to cry and ask again whether Stout was “really going to [pay Asher's] bond.” Id. at 13. Stout replied again, “My word is my bond.” Id. at 14. Stout then took P.H to his bedroom and had sex with her. After the sex, Stout had P.H. sign bond paperwork for both Asher and one of P.H.’s friends who had also been arrested.

[13] On April 2, P.H. repeatedly contacted Stout to ask why Asher was still in jail. Stout responded that he was “working on it” and asked P.H. if she had enjoyed having sex with him. Id. at 18. P.H. told Stout that she did enjoy it to keep Stout happy so he would pay Asher's bond. P.H. believed that Stout could keep Asher in jail or revoke his bond if she did not continue sending sexually charged messages to Stout. P.H. agreed to pay Stout $200 from each of her pay checks to repay the remaining amount of the bond.

[14] Stout posted Asher's bond, but at some point, Asher was arrested and jailed again for an independent reason. P.H. made payments to Stout to reimburse him for the bond amount he already had posted for Asher. Stout told P.H. that he would revoke Asher's bond if P.H. missed any payments. Even though Asher was in jail again, P.H. believed that Stout still could revoke Asher's bond and thereby cause Asher to be incarcerated for longer. When P.H. asked Stout if she could delay a payment and if he could pay Asher's new bond, Stout responded that he “need[ed] another session.” Id. at 33. P.H. responded, “I'm sorry. I can't do that for help again. I just can't bring myself to do that.” Id. at 34. P.H. was delayed in making her payments to Stout, and Stout again threatened to revoke Asher's bond. P.H. sent Stout pictures of herself naked to keep the bond revocation from happening.

[15] P.H. was depressed and desperate because she had no money to pay her bills, having given all her funds to Stout as payments for Asher's bond. Stout resumed pressuring P.H. for nude photos and sex acts, and he threatened to show Asher an alleged video of P.H. having sex with Stout. P.H. continued to make payments to Stout for a period of time but eventually stopped complying with Stout's demands and spoke to the police about Stout's actions.

S.M., May 2023 – June 2023

[16] S.M. was incarcerated in the Marion County Jail in May 2023. She had a $30,000 surety bond, which meant she could pay a $3,000 cash partial payment to be released from jail pending resolution of her criminal case. S.M. had only $2,500 available on her credit card. S.M. was “desperate” to be released from jail but did not understand the bond process. Tr. v. 2 at 211. She had heard from other inmates about Stout as a bail agent. S.M. called Stout and “knew” she needed to speak suggestively to him to get her bond posted “sooner.” Id. at 210. S.M. “knew” she had to “spice up the conversation” with Stout in order for him to pay her bond without requiring collateral. Id. at 211. S.M. told Stout, “I'll do whatever you need me to, sir, on top of the bail.” Id. at 210. However, S.M. had no intention of actually having sexual contact with Stout.

[17] After viewing S.M.’s photos on Facebook, Stout began discussing sex with S.M. and agreed to post her bond if she paid him $2,500 and paid the rest to him later. Stout told her not to tell anyone about their arrangement of partial payment or else he would revoke her bond and “choke the shit out of [her].” Id. at 218-19. S.M. believed that Stout had the power to revoke her bond after it was posted.

[18] On May 16, 2023, Stout posted bond for S.M. Stout told S.M. that, upon her release from jail, she was required to report to Stout to “sign the bond paperwork[.]” Tr. v. 3 at 41. S.M. went to Stout's residence to do so. Stout told her they “would get to it” but first he wanted her to “give [him] what [she] promised” or he would “throw [her] ass back in jail[.]” Tr. v. 2 at 222. Because she believed Stout would revoke her bond if she did not engage in sex acts with him, S.M. engaged in oral, anal, and “unprotected” vaginal sex with Stout. Id. at 223. S.M. then left without signing the bond paperwork.

[19] The next day, Stout called S.M. and told her to come back to his house again to sign the paperwork. When S.M. arrived at Stout's house, she saw Stout and three of his “biker brothers.” Id. at 226. Stout told S.M. she had to have “unprotected” sex with his friends to “work off a debt in the amount of 30- or 40,000[.]” Id. at 227. S.M. did so because she felt like she had no choice. S.M. then left Stout's residence. However, Stout later went to the hotel where S.M. was staying and had “sexual contact” with her. Id. at 228. S.M. allowed the contact because she believed that she owed Stout a “large amount of money and that [she] would be put back in jail” if she did not “comply.” Id.

[20] S.M. subsequently “fled” to a different hotel without giving Stout her new address because, at that point, she “knew something wasn't right” about the situation with Stout. Id. at 229. She reported Stout to the police and informed Stout that she had done so. S.M. then started receiving threatening phone calls from blocked and/or untraceable phone numbers.

J.N., May 2023 – August 2023

[21] On May 2, 2023, when J.N. was twenty-two years old, she was arrested in Marion County. J.N., who has a ninth-grade education, had never been arrested before and was unfamiliar with the “criminal system in general.” Tr. v. 3 at 149. J.N. had three young children and, at the time of her arrest, she was working at Amazon but was on maternity leave that was to expire on June 2. J.N. feared she would lose her job at Amazon if she was not released from jail by the end of her maternity leave. J.N.’s bond was $40,000 surety, so she could be released from jail if she paid a $4,000 bond. Neither J.N. nor her family or friends had the money to pay the bond.

[22] A fellow jail inmate gave J.N. Stout's phone number, and J.N. called Stout to try to get her bond posted. Stout looked at J.N.’s photographs on her Facebook page and told her she was pretty and that he would help her. J.N. told Stout, “If you come get me out, you can have it” because she believed Stout would “get [her] out” of jail if she talked about “doing sexual things with him[.]” Id. at 158, 159. Stout told J.N. that, if she did not pay him back for the bond, he could revoke her bond and “get sanctions so [she] never can get bonded out again.” Id. at 156-61. J.N. believed Stout had the power to carry out that threat.

[23] On May 30, Stout posted J.N.’s bond. J.N. asked Stout to pick her up from jail when she was released the next day because she had no one else to do so. Stout picked up J.N. and took her to a hotel that he had paid for. J.N. had paid Stout $200 toward the bond, but Stout told J.N. that, if she had sex with him, she would not have to pay him for the remainder. Stout then touched J.N.’s breast, and she informed him she “didn't like it.” Id. at 165. J.N. remained at the first hotel for three days and then Stout moved her to another hotel, the Red Roof Inn. Stout subsequently bought dinner for J.N. and her mother, who was a drug addict, and then the three of them went to Stout's house. J.N.’s mother fell asleep on the couch, and Stout began rubbing J.N.’s breasts and requesting oral sex. Eventually, J.N. complied with the request because she did not want to make Stout “mad.” Id. at 169. Stout then took J.N. back to her hotel where she stayed “for at least a year.” Id. at 170. Stout had paid for the first three days of the hotel, and J.N. paid for it thereafter.

[24] Stout threatened “more than once” to revoke J.N.’s bond, and she believed he had the authority to do so. Id. at 175. J.N. continued to maintain contact with Stout “over Facebook,” send him pictures of herself naked as he requested, and talk to him “sexually” so that he would not revoke her bond. Id. Stout also told J.N. that he could “make [her] disappear,” and she believed him. Id. at 191. While she was staying at the Red Roof Inn, J.N. twice had sex with Stout even though she did not want to do so; she acquiesced to the sex because she was “scared ․ of what [Stout] might do” if she refused. Id. at 173. Eventually, the police contacted J.N. about Stout, and she informed them of his actions toward her, including the “sexual encounters[.]” Id. at 192.

[25] Around June 2023, the Marion County police and the FBI began an investigation of Stout after receiving information that he was using his authority as a bail agent to extort sex acts from female jail inmates and women who were not in jail but wanted to bond someone else out of jail. Ultimately, the State charged Stout with numerous crimes related to R.M., I.W., P.H., S.M., J.N., and other persons,³ including multiple counts of Promotion of Human Sexual Trafficking, Level 4 felonies, and Intimidation, as Level 6 felonies.

[26] On June 10, 2025, Stout moved for severance of the counts and separate trials for each victim. Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court found that the charges constituted parts of a single plan or scheme; therefore, Stout was not entitled to severance as of right. The trial court further found that Stout was not entitled to discretionary severance because the jury would be instructed to consider “each charge on its own merit” and would be “able to distinguish every separate offense[.]” Tr. v. 2 at 11. The court denied the motion to sever and denied it again when Stout renewed it before the trial began.

[27] Stout's jury trial was conducted on August 4 and August 11 through 15 of 2025. In addition to the victims’ testimonies as outlined above, the State offered into evidence and had admitted exhibits relating to the victims’ bail documentation and their jail phone calls, text messages, and Facebook messages with Stout. Stout also testified on his own behalf. He admitted that he knew the victims were desperate to get out of jail and that he had had sexual conversations with them while they were in jail. He admitted he does not have the authority to put an inmate in lockdown, segregation, or suicide watch and does not have the authority to revoke a bond without a court order. He admitted that he told the victims he could revoke their bonds or their boyfriends’ bonds and wanted them to “think” that he had that authority. Tr. v. 4 at 222. And he admitted he used his own money to post some of the victims’ bonds without obtaining the full bond premium when he knew that was illegal.

[28] The jury found Stout guilty of one count of Level 6 felony Intimidation of R.M.; one count of Level 4 felony attempted Promotion of Human Sexual Trafficking and one count of Level 6 felony Intimidation related to I.W.; one count of Level 4 felony Promotion of Human Sexual Trafficking and one count of Level 6 felony Intimidation related to P.H.; one count of Level 4 felony Promotion of Human Sexual Trafficking and one count of Level 6 felony Intimidation related to S.M.; and three counts of Level 4 felony Promotion of Human Sexual Trafficking and one count of Level 6 felony Intimidation related to J.N.⁴ Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Stout to nine years on each of the four Promotion of Human Sexual Trafficking convictions and on the attempted Promotion of Human Sexual Trafficking conviction. The court sentenced him to two years on four of the Intimidation convictions and one year on the remaining Intimidation conviction.⁵ The court ordered one Intimidation sentence to run consecutively to three of the Promotion of Human Sexual Trafficking convictions and the one attempted Trafficking conviction. The remainder of the convictions were to run concurrently. Thus, the court sentenced Stout to an aggregate term of thirty-eight years executed. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Severance

[29] Stout appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to sever certain counts and conduct separate trials regarding each of the five victims. Indiana Code Section 35-34-1-9(a) allows the State to join two or more offenses in the same information, with each offense stated in a separate count, when the offenses: “(1) are of the same or similar character, even if not part of a single scheme or plan; or (2) are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.” However, when the offenses are joined together “solely on the ground that they are of the same or similar character, the defendant shall have a right to a severance of the offenses.” I.C. § 35-34-1-11(a). In all other cases, the court shall grant a motion for severance

whenever the court determines that severance is appropriate to promote a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense considering:

(1) the number of offenses charged;

(2) the complexity of the evidence to be offered; and

(3) whether the trier of fact will be able to distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently as to each offense.

Id. We review appeals involving severance as of right de novo. Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1264 (Ind. 2015). “But where the offenses have been joined because the defendant's underlying acts are connected together, we review the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion.” Id. (citation modified). The defendant must also show that, “given what actually occurred at trial, the denial [of the motion for severance] was prejudicial.” Garrett v. State, 273 N.E.3d 122, 128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[30] Stout first argues that the court was required to sever the offenses because they were joined “solely on the ground that they are of the same or similar character[.]” I.C. § 35-34-1-11(a).

In determining whether joined offenses are connected by the defendant's “underlying acts” and are not merely of the “same or similar character,” “we ask whether the operative facts establish a pattern of activity beyond mere satisfaction of the statutory elements.” Pierce, 29 N.E.3d at 1264, 1266. A defendant's “modus operandi” and “motive” are relevant to determining whether charges are connected by the defendant's underlying acts and are not merely similar in character based on the statutory elements. Id. at 1266.

Van Hawk v. State, 275 N.E.3d 954, 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026), trans. denied. “It is well-settled that a common modus operandi and motive can sufficiently link crimes committed on different victims.” Pierce, 29 N.E.3d at 1266; see also, e.g., Thompson v. State, 966 N.E.2d 112, 118 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citation modified) (noting a single scheme or plan may be shown where the “offenses are connected by a distinctive nature, have a common modus operandi, and a common motive”), trans. denied.

[31] The statutory elements for Promotion of Human Sexual Trafficking are, in relevant part, “knowingly or intentionally using force, threat of force, coercion, or fraud to recruit, entice, harbor, or transport an individual with the intent of causing the individual to ․ (3) participate in sexual conduct[.]” I.C. § 35-42-3.5-1.1. Attempted Promotion of Human Sexual Trafficking involves engaging “in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime.” I.C. § 35-41-5-1. The statutory elements for Intimidation include, in relevant part, threatening to “commit a forcible felony” with the intent that the threatened person will “engage in conduct against the other person's will[.]” I.C. § 35-45-2-1(a), (b)(1)(A).

[32] Severance was not required in Stout's case because, in addition to being of the same or similar character based on the statutory elements, the offenses also are based on “a series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.” I.C. § 35-34-1-9(a). In the case of each victim, Stout had the same modus operandi and motive. That is, he used his position as a bail agent to threaten and/or coerce desperate young women unfamiliar with the criminal justice system to engage in sexual conduct with him. See, e.g., Ennik v. State, 40 N.E.3d 868, 876 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citation modified) (noting offenses can be linked and charges can be joined by a defendant's efforts to take advantage of his special relationship with the victims), trans. denied. Stout accepted jail phone calls at his expense and then obtained photographs of the victims. After viewing the photos, Stout began engaging in sexual conversations with the victims, each of whom he knew to be desperate to get out of jail or get a loved one out of jail but unable to afford the bond without his help. He then illegally bonded them or their loved one out of jail with his own money before they had paid him the full bond premium, thus establishing a monetary debt to him. He demanded sexual conversations, nude photographs, and sexual favors as payment for the monetary debts. If the victims hesitated to meet his demands while they were in jail, he regularly threatened to place the victims in lockdown, segregation, or suicide watch, even though he had no such power. When the victims were not in jail and hesitated to meet his demands, he threatened to revoke the bond he had paid and send them or their loved one back to jail. His motive related to each victim was to entice her to participate in sexual conduct with him. In short, severance was not required because the operative facts establish “a pattern of activity beyond mere satisfaction of the statutory elements” of Promotion of Human Sexual Trafficking and Intimidation. Pierce, 29 N.E.3d at 1266.

[33] In the alternative, Stout contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to sever the charges. When severance is not required as of right, the court may, in its discretion, sever charges where it finds severance necessary “to promote a fair determination of a defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense.” I.C. § 35-34-1-11(a). In making such a determination, the trial court must consider “the number of offenses charged, the complexity of the evidence to be offered, and whether the trier of fact will be able to distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently as to each offense.” Id. (numbering omitted). Thus, we have determined that there was no abuse of discretion in the denial of a motion for severance where there were multiple charges and victims, but the evidence was “straightforward” and the “evidence as to each victim [was] easily distinguishable.” Vasquez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 623, 631 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. See also, e.g., Piercefield v. State, 877 N.E.2d 1213, 1218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (upholding denial of a motion to sever multiple charges involving multiple victims where the evidence was not complex and consisted primarily of victims’ testimonies and each victim underwent direct and cross-examination), trans. denied. Moreover,

[w]here severance is not mandated by [statute], we will only reverse the judgment and order new, separate trials if the defendant can show that in light of what actually occurred at trial, the denial of a separate trial subjected him to such prejudice that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant his motion for severance.

Oswalt v. State, 995 N.E.2d 685, 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citation modified), vacated in part on other grounds at 1 N.E.3d 150 (Ind. 2014).

[34] Here, the jury was clearly able to distinguish the evidence and apply the law to each offense. R.M., S.M., I.W., J.N., and P.H. all testified, and each charge was linked to a particular victim with a particular set of events, so the jury would have no trouble setting them apart. And, while there were multiple exhibits and testimony from multiple witnesses, Stout has not identified anything particularly complex about that evidence. See, e.g., Garrett, 273 N.E.3d at 128 (finding no abuse of discretion in denying a motion to sever where there were twenty-one offenses, thirty-nine witnesses, and over 500 exhibits, but the evidence was not “particularly complex” and “each incident occurred at a discrete time and place”). Furthermore, the jury acquitted Stout of five charges, so the jurors clearly were able to follow the evidence, the instructions,⁶ and the law to decide whether Stout committed each of the charged crimes. See, e.g., Philson v. State, 899 N.E.2d 14, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (finding it “apparent” that the jury could “compartmentalize the evidence regarding each victim” because the jury acquitted the defendant on the charges pertaining to one of the victims), trans. denied.

[35] The trial court did not err when it denied Stout's motion to sever certain charges and hold separate trials for each of the five victims.

Sufficiency

[36] Stout challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for Promotion of Human Sexual Trafficking and attempting the same. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal conviction,

we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. We only consider the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence. A conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is the job of the fact-finder to determine whether the evidence in a particular case sufficiently proves each element of an offense, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the [fact-finder's] ruling.

Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066-67 (Ind. 2015) (citation modified).

[37] To support Stout's convictions related to Promotion of Human Sexual Trafficking, the State was required to prove that (1) Stout (2) knowingly or intentionally (3) used force, threat of force, coercion, or fraud (4) to recruit, entice, harbor, or transport (5) I.W., P.H., S.M., and J.N. (6) with the intent of causing them to participate in sexual conduct. See I.C. § 35-42-3.5-1.1(3). Stout's only argument is that there is insufficient evidence to show he used “coercion” on the victims. Appellant's Br. at 19. “[F]orce, threat of force, coercion, or fraud” are defined by statute to include:

(1) causing or threatening to cause physical harm to a human trafficking victim;

(2) physically restraining or threatening to physically restrain a human trafficking victim;

(3) abusing or threatening to abuse the law or legal process to further the act of human trafficking;

I.C. § 35-42-3.5-0.5(b)(1)-(3).

[38] Stout admits that he “ma[d]e threats” to the victims and “abuse[d] his power as a bondsman” in relation to them. Appellant's Br. at 19. At the same time, he asserts that he did not “coerce” the victims because they “willingly” engaged in sexual interactions with him. Id.⁷ However, the evidence shows each of the victims engaged in the sexual conduct only because they believed they had to do so in order for them or a loved one to be released and/or remain released from jail. That is, each of them testified that they did not want to engage in the sexual conduct but that Stout threatened to abuse the legal bonding process by refusing to provide bond and/or revoking bond if they did not engage with him sexually. Each victim further testified that Stout threatened “to abuse the law” by placing them in lockdown, segregation, or suicide watch if they did not engage with him sexually; that is, he threatened further “physical restraint” by abuse of the law. I.C. § I.C. § 35-42-3.5-0.5(b)(2), (3). The victims’ assertions were corroborated by the admitted exhibits consisting of transcripts of their phone and text conversations with Stout and by Stout's own admissions. That is clear and sufficient evidence that the victims did not “willingly” engage in the sexual conduct but were coerced into doing so by Stout's threats to abuse the law and legal process. Id. Stout's contentions to the contrary are simply requests that we reweigh the evidence and judge witness credibility, which we may not do.

[39] The State presented sufficient evidence to support Stout's convictions related to Promotion of Human Sexual Trafficking.

Sentence

[40] Sentencing decisions lie within the sound discretion of the trial court. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted), trans. denied. A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing if it does any of the following:

(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any[ ]—but the record does not support the reasons;” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration; or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”

Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-491 (Ind.), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)).

[41] Stout's sentences for four of his Level 4 felonies and one of his Level 6 felonies ran consecutively, while the remaining sentences all ran concurrently, resulting in an aggregate sentence of thirty-eight years. Stout's only challenge to his sentence is his contention that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed the thirty-six-year consecutive sentence for the four Level 4 felonies because they all arose out of a single “episode of criminal conduct[.]”⁸ I.C. § 35-50-1-2(d) (2025). The legislature has placed limits on the aggregate sentence a trial court may impose for nonviolent felony convictions that arise out of an episode of criminal conduct. I.C. § 35-50-1-2(c), (d). Stout contends that the total of his consecutive terms of imprisonment for the four Level 4 felonies may not exceed fifteen years. I.C. § 35-50-1-2(d)(6).

[42] An episode of criminal conduct “means offenses or a connected series of offenses that are closely related in time, place, and circumstance.” I.C. § 35-50-1-2(b). The determination of whether multiple offenses constitute an episode of criminal conduct is “a fact-intensive inquiry,” Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1144 (Ind. 2022), in which

[w]e balance the following non-exclusive factors: (1) the time span over which the offenses occurred and the time between the offenses, with extra weight given when the offenses are simultaneous or contemporaneous; (2) whether the offenses occurred at separate locations, and if so, the distance between them; (3) whether the offenses each stand alone, that is to say, can be described without reference to one another; and (4) whether the offenses are united by a common scheme or purpose beyond the mere desire to commit multiple crimes. No one factor is determinative, although the first two are the most important.

Walden v. State, 259 N.E.3d 318, 326 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).⁹

[43] Here, the four Level 4 felonies related to Promotion of Human Sexual Trafficking were separate and distinct crimes committed over a period of months at different times, against different victims, and in different locations. Although Stout may have communicated with some of the victims during the same time period, none of the crimes took place contemporaneously, much less simultaneously; rather, each crime was separated by months or days at the least. Moreover, each offense “stand[s] alone”; that is, the offenses can be (and were) described without reference to one another. Walden, 259 N.E.3d at 326; see also, e.g., Harris v. State, 749 N.E.2d 57, 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (finding no single episode of criminal conduct where the defendant committed two distinct acts of molestation of two different girls on the same evening and in the same apartment where there was “no other connection between the events such that a complete account of one cannot be given without referring to the details of the other”), trans. denied.

[44] Because Stout's crimes were not part of a single episode of criminal conduct, he has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the thirty-six-year consecutive sentences.

Conclusion

[45] Stout was not entitled to a severance of the charges as a matter of right, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Stout's motion to sever the charges. In addition, the State presented sufficient evidence to support Stout's convictions related to Promotion of Human Sexual Trafficking. And the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed the thirty-six-year consecutive sentences for four of the convictions related to Promotion of Human Sexual Trafficking, as they were not part of a single episode of criminal conduct.

[46] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Initially, Stout also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his five Level 6 felony Intimidation convictions; however, in his Reply Brief, Stout withdraws those challenges.

2.   Although Stout testified he had been a bail agent since “August of ’22[,]” Tr. v. 4 at 149-50, his notarized “Sub-Agent's Agreement[,]” in which he was hired to work as a bail agent for America Bonding Company, states that it was signed on August 14, 2020, Ex. v. I at 69.

3.   The charges related to other persons were eventually dismissed and are not at issue in this appeal.

4.   The jury also found Stout guilty of two counts of Failure to Collect Full Bail as Level 6 felonies, but those convictions and the sentence therefor are not challenged in this appeal.

5.   The court also imposed two-year concurrent sentences on each of the two Failure to Collect Full Bail convictions.

6.   Stout asserts in passing that the jury could not understand the charges because the jury instructions did not adequately define the terms used. However, Stout did not object to the jury instructions in the trial court, and he has not alleged fundamental error; therefore, he has waived the issue on appeal. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 188 N.E.3d 871, 874 (Ind. 2022) (“Where ․ a defendant fails to object to an instruction, he waives appellate review” unless he alleges and shows fundamental error).

7.   Stout also asserts that “there can be no coercion” in this case because the victims gained or potentially gained some benefit from their sexual behavior toward him. Appellant's Br. at 19. However, he cites no legal authority in support of that proposition, and we find none.

8.   Stout does not argue that the Level 6 felony Intimidation conviction for which he received a consecutive sentence—which occurred in 2022 against R.M.—was included as part of the episode of criminal conduct.

9.   We note that we do not “conflate the ‘episode of criminal conduct’ analysis for sentencing defendants with the ‘single scheme or plan’ analysis for charging them.” State v. Dixon, 924 N.E.2d 1270, 1273 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citation modified), trans denied. That is, “the fact that the State sought to join the charges for trial does not prove that the [Defendant's] criminal actions arose out of a single episode of criminal conduct.” Sloan v. State, 11 N.E.3d 969, 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.