Angela Panozzo Mccormick, as Trustee of the Angela L. Mccormick Revocable Trust, Appellant-Defendant v. HILL CREST HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] For almost a decade, Eldonna Risner, Angela Panozzo McCormick, and the Hill Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. (the HOA), have been involved in litigation regarding a parcel of real property abutting Bass Lake in Starke County.¹ In 2022, the parties participated in mediation and ultimately signed two documents purporting to resolve the litigation. Thereafter, Risner and McCormick refused to act in accordance with the documents. The HOA filed a motion to enforce, arguing the documents were a settlement agreement and requesting the court enforce them as such. The court granted the motion to enforce. In doing so, the court indicated it would later issue a judgment awarding the HOA ownership of the property. Before the court could issue that judgment, Risner and McCormick initiated this appeal, challenging the court's granting of the motion to enforce.

[2] We sua sponte conclude that the court's order was not a final appealable judgment. Thus, we dismiss this appeal without prejudice and remand for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Risner and McCormick own lakefront property in the Hillcrest Addition subdivision in Starke County. Between Risner's and McCormick's properties is a parcel of real property of unclear ownership (the Property). Prior to 2014, various neighbors in the subdivision utilized the Property to access the lake. In 2014, one of the neighbors filed a complaint for quiet title, naming Risner and McCormick as defendants. A few years later, both the HOA and Starke County intervened in the suit.

[4] In 2022, Risner, McCormick, and the HOA participated in mediation. At the conclusion of mediation, the parties signed two documents “intended as a full and complete settlement” of the case. App. Vol. VI p. 129. As laid out in the documents, the HOA would receive “transfer of fee simple title and ownership of [the Property]” subject to a list of terms and conditions outlined in the documents. Id. Those terms and conditions were to be “memorialized in Restrictive Covenants to be finalized and recorded against the [Property.]” Id. at 131.

[5] However, following execution of these documents, the parties were unable to finalize the restrictive covenants, and thus no transfer of ownership occurred. In 2025, the HOA filed a motion to enforce settlement agreement. Along with the motion, the HOA filed a proposed judgment, declaring the HOA to be “the owner of [the Property] ․ subject to certain covenants[.]” Id. at 56.

[6] The trial court granted the HOA's motion to enforce settlement agreement but did not enter judgment. In its order granting the motion, the court indicated it would enter the HOA's proposed judgment after thirty days if there was no objection by Starke County. The court also ordered the parties to file a typed version of the documents to attach to the judgment. A few weeks later—before the court entered the judgment—Risner and McCormick initiated this appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[7] In their joint notice of appeal, Risner and McCormick allege they are appealing the trial court's order granting the motion to enforce settlement agreement under Indiana Appellate Rules 2(H) and 9(I). In other words, they purport to be appealing from a final judgment. A final judgment “disposes of all issues as to all parties thereby ending the particular case” and “leaves nothing for future determination.” Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 451 (Ind. 2003); see also Ind. Appellate Rule 2(H) (A final judgment “disposes of all claims as to all parties[.]”). “A disposition of all claims requires more than the entry of a ruling on a motion without entry of judgment.” Id.

[8] Whether an order is a final judgment governs the appellate court's subject matter jurisdiction. Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 757 (Ind. 2014). The lack of appellate subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, and where the parties do not raise the issue, this court may consider it sua sponte. Indy Auto Man, LLC v. Keown & Kratz, LLC, 84 N.E.3d 718, 719-20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

[9] Here, the court's order granting the motion to enforce did not end this case. It expressly called for a future judgment, which the court would only enter if the County—a party to the case who was not part of the settlement agreement—did not object. The order also required the parties to provide a typed version of terms to attach to the judgment. As such, the order did not dispose of all issues as to all parties and explicitly left a determination for the future. See Georgos, 790 N.E.2d at 452 (holding trial court's order granting a motion to enforce settlement agreement was not a final judgment). Nor did the order constitute a “final judgment” under the other provisions of Appellate Rule 2(H).

[10] As the trial court's order was not final, Risner and McCormick cannot appeal unless the order is an appealable interlocutory order. Under Appellate Rule 5, this court has jurisdiction over appeals of interlocutory orders under Appellate Rule 14. “An interlocutory order is one made before a final hearing on the merits and requires something to be done or observed but does not determine the entire controversy.” Bacon v. Bacon, 877 N.E.2d 801, 804 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). A party may appeal certain interlocutory orders as a matter of right. Ind. Appellate Rule 14(A). All other interlocutory orders require trial court certification to authorize the appeal and acceptance by the Court of Appeals. App. R. 14(B).

[11] Inarguably, Risner and McCormick did not secure our jurisdiction under Appellate Rule 14(B). We therefore consider whether the order might be appealable as a matter of right under Appellate Rule 14(A), which provides:

Appeals from the following interlocutory orders are taken as a matter of right by filing a Notice of Appeal with the Clerk within thirty (30) days after the notation of the interlocutory order in the Chronological Case Summary:

(1) For the payment of money;

(2) To compel the execution of any document;

(3) To compel the delivery or assignment of any securities, evidence of debt, documents or things in action;

(4) For the sale or delivery of the possession of real property;

(5) Granting or refusing to grant, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve a preliminary injunction;

(6) Appointing or refusing to appoint a receiver, or revoking or refusing to revoke the appointment of a receiver;

(7) For a writ of habeas corpus not otherwise authorized to be taken directly to the Supreme Court;

(8) Transferring or refusing to transfer a case under Trial Rule 75; and

(9) Issued by an Administrative Agency that by statute is expressly required to be appealed as a mandatory interlocutory appeal.

[12] We cannot say any of the provisions under Appellate Rule 14(A) are applicable here. The court's order on its face does not require, for example, the payment of money.² See Vonderheide v. Weisman-Vonderheide, 279 N.E.3d 375, 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (“To secure our jurisdiction under [Rule 14A(1)], the interlocutory order must import a surrender of money akin to a final judgment, and that surrender must be at a time prior to the entry of final judgment to justify our prompt review.”). And while the proposed judgment may eventually require the execution of a document or the delivery of real property, that judgment has not yet been entered.

[13] Because the trial court's order was neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order, we conclude this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Risner's and McCormick's appeal. “When there is a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court is without jurisdiction to do anything in the case except to enter an order of dismissal.” Ind. Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin. v. Legacy Healthcare, Inc., 756 N.E.2d 567, 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We therefore dismiss this appeal without prejudice.

[14] Dismissed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   McCormick is a party as Trustee of the Angela L. McCormick Revocable Trust.

2.   We note that the HOA and McCormick executed a separate agreement in which the HOA would pay McCormick $30,000. In its order granting the motion to enforce, the trial court found this agreement to be enforceable as well. But that agreement is not the subject of either party's appeal.

Scheele, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.