THOMAS II v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After James William Thomas II pleaded guilty to one count each of Level 1 felony child molesting ¹ and Level 4 felony child seduction,² the trial court imposed an aggregate thirty-two year sentence. On appeal, Thomas contends his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2024, then-seventeen-year-old Victim reported that he had been sexually molested by his mother's long-time, live-in boyfriend, Thomas. After an investigation, the State charged Thomas with one count of Level 1 felony child molesting, alleging that between March 1, 2019, and November 26, 2020, when Thomas was at least twenty-one years old, he did knowingly or intentionally perform or submit to sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct with Victim, a child under fourteen years old, “to-wit: 13 years of age.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 16. The State also charged Thomas with one count of Level 4 felony child seduction, alleging that between November 27, 2020, and November 26, 2023, when Thomas was at least eighteen years old and the “guardian, ․ custodian or step-parent” of Victim, he engaged in sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct with Victim, a child between fourteen and sixteen years old. Id. at 17. Pursuant to a plea agreement under which his sentence was to be determined by the trial court, Thomas admitted to the factual basis of the charges.

[3] At a sentencing hearing, Victim testified Thomas had molested him “almost every day for years” beginning when he was twelve years old. Tr. Vol. 2 at 24. As a result, Victim did not feel safe at home and contemplated suicide. He described how Thomas used manipulative tactics to perpetuate the abuse, such as threatening to take away privileges and forcing Victim to burn his high school sports awards when Victim asked Thomas to stop. The abuse finally ended when Victim left home to live with extended family.

[4] Two of Thomas’ family members testified on his behalf, describing Thomas’ difficult upbringing and own history of being a victim of sexual abuse. Thomas made a statement taking responsibility for his actions.

[5] The trial court found Thomas’ acceptance of responsibility was a mitigating circumstance. As to the child molesting offense only, the court found Thomas’ violation of the position of trust he held with respect to Victim was a “highly aggravating” factor. Id. at 35. The court was particularly concerned Thomas took away things that mattered to Victim with “intent to inflict emotional pain on top of everything else.” Id. The trial court sentenced Thomas to thirty-two years for child molesting, with thirty years executed and two years suspended to probation, and seven years executed for child seduction. The court ordered Thomas’ sentences served concurrently for an aggregate sentence of thirty-two years.

Thomas’ sentence is not inappropriate.

[6] Thomas asks us to revise his sentence. The Indiana Constitution authorizes this Court to review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision as provided by rule. Ind. Const. art. 7, § 6. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The principal role of appellate review is to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived correct sentence in each case. Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 288 (Ind. 2022). Therefore, “we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019) (per curiam).

[7] “[S]entencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). The two prongs of 7(B) review are “separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conner v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). “[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127.

[8] The question “is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” Helsley v. State, 43 N.E.3d 225, 228 (Ind. 2015) (quoting King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)) (emphasis omitted). Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us a revised sentence is warranted. Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 698 (Ind. 2024).

[9] At the time of Thomas’ offenses, the sentencing range for Level 1 felony child molesting, as charged, was between twenty and forty years, with an advisory sentence of thirty years. I.C. § 35-50-2-4(b) (2014). The sentencing range for a Level 4 felony is two to twelve years, with an advisory sentence of six years. I.C. 35-50-2-5.5 (2014). Therefore, the trial court imposed only slightly above advisory sentences on each offense and ran them concurrently.

[10] As to the nature of the offenses, Thomas was in a long-term relationship with Victim's mother, with whom Thomas shared a child (Victim's half-sister). As a parental figure, Thomas was in a position of trust with respect to Victim. The evidence about Thomas’ specific acts is not extensive, but the record shows he subjected Victim to frequent, repeated sexual molestation throughout Victim's teenage years. To perpetuate the abuse, Thomas threatened Victim with the loss of family relationships and activities Victim enjoyed. Victim did not feel safe at home. The molestations only stopped after Victim left to live with other family, which he did after Thomas forced him to burn in a backyard firepit all record of his high school sports accomplishments and memorabilia, leaving Victim to believe he had “nothing to lose now.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 25. Victim suffered in fear for years and contemplated suicide. The offenses were committed over a long period of time, inflicted substantial emotional harm, and were a terrible abuse of Thomas’ position of trust to Victim. Nothing about them suggests a slightly above average sentence was remotely inappropriate.

[11] As to his character, Thomas notes he took responsibility for his actions, has a good work history, and himself was the victim of sexual abuse. At the same time, the presentence investigation report shows Thomas had several prior interactions with the criminal justice system, including one juvenile delinquency case and six misdemeanor convictions. The trial court did not consider Thomas’ prior criminal history aggravating, but even a minor criminal record reflects poorly on a defendant's character. Cramer, 240 N.E.3d at 700. In his statement at sentencing, Victim described Thomas as a “master manipulator” and detailed how he used Victim's interests and family relationships as leverage to facilitate the offenses. Tr. Vol. 2 at 25. Having reviewed the record before us, we discern no evidence of “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character” to persuade us Thomas’ sentence was inappropriate, especially considering the nature of the offenses. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[12] On balance, Thomas’ aggregate thirty-two year sentence for these offenses was not inappropriate.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1) (2015).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-4-7(m) & (q)(4) (2019).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.