Eldamar J. Seals, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Eldamar J. Seals appeals after a bench trial from his conviction of Level 6 felony strangulation and Class B misdemeanor battery, which he committed against his girlfriend's eighteen-year-old daughter. He claims that the State's evidence is insufficient to overcome his claim of self-defense. And he asks us to extend the spoliation doctrine to the facts of this case. We conclude that the State's evidence is sufficient to support Seals’ conviction and we decline to extend the spoliation doctrine here. Therefore, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In June of 2025, eighteen-year-old Alexis Wells lived with her mother, Allison Wells, and two of Alexis’ siblings. Thirty-nine-year-old Seals, who was dating Alexis’ mother, lived in the house as well. Alexis worked at Lowe's from 7:00 p.m. until 5:30 a.m.

[3] On June 8, 2025 at around 9:00 a.m., Alexis’ mother came into her room and argued with her about a family pet that was missing. Her mother believed that she had caused one of the two pet frogs to be missing from the tank in the downstairs game room. Between eleven o'clock and noon that same day, Alexis came downstairs from her bedroom to talk with her mother about the accusation involving the missing frog.

[4] When she approached her mother's bedroom door Alexis saw that Seals was also in the room. She tried to have a conversation with her mother, but Seals inserted himself in the conversation. He “laughed or [said] something” that made Alexis “defensive” because he routinely interjected his own commentary into their conversations. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 14-15. Alexis said something that made Seals defensive. He got up from the bed, walked toward her, and talked over what she was saying. Seals came over to where Alexis was standing, pushed her face, and slammed the bedroom door shut.

[5] In response, Alexis yelled and banged on the closed door for approximately fifteen seconds, “[b]ecause he put his hands on [her].” Id. at 36. After Seals reopened the door, he yelled at her as he walked toward her, forcing her to back up against a wall. Seals was so close to Alexis that they were almost touching noses. Alexis “didn't want to push him away because he seem[ed] really aggressive.” Id. at 17. But since they were nose-to-nose, Alexis “kind of push[ed] his face a little bit.” Id. Seals “[got] angry and chok[ed] her.” Id. Seals applied pressure to Alexis’ neck with both hands for several seconds, dragged her from one area of the house to another, and pushed her to the ground.

[6] Alexis’ sisters heard the argument and a “thud.” Id. at 86. Alexis’ eleven-year-old sister Amiyah saw Seals’ hand on Alexis’ neck and was afraid for her. Amiyah retreated upstairs because she “didn't want to be involved in the fight.” Id. But she grabbed a box cutter that Alexis used for work and tossed it downstairs so Alexis could protect herself. Alexis did not request the box cutter, and she did not touch it. Instead, Seals grabbed it and tossed it into another room.

[7] After the incident, Alexis ran upstairs and called her boyfriend, her father Andre Wells, and 911. Amiyah observed red marks on Alexis’ neck. And her sister, Anaiyah, who was also upstairs, observed red marks on Alexis’ neck. Those marks had not been there before Alexis went downstairs.

[8] Alexis testified at trial that there were cameras in the home that “should have” captured the incident while it was taking place. Id. at 51. However, she “was told” that “the camera doesn't work like that” or “didn't catch it.” Id. And anything captured on the camera would have gone to an app on her mother's phone. She stated that she “might have” mentioned the cameras to the police at some point but that she would have told them that her mother had access to any recordings. Id. at 59. And she told the officers about the cameras in relation to the argument she and her mother had about the frog. Id. Alexis had asked her mother if the camera had captured her “messing with the frog.” Id. at 52. Her mother responded that the camera did not record her interacting with the missing frog. Id.

[9] Officer Clayton Combs arrived about five minutes after Alexis called 911. Alexis’ father arrived shortly after that with his son. Seals had already left the house when the officers arrived. Officer Combs took statements from Alexis and her two sisters. He did not notice any cameras in the home and to his knowledge no one ever informed him that there were cameras in the home. He testified that if he was aware of any cameras that may have recorded the incident, he would have asked for the recording.

[10] After the police left, Alexis’ fourteen-year-old brother took the security cameras from the home. Alexis did not instruct her brother to remove them, but speculated that he removed them out of spite regarding a separate incident between him and their mother. Later, Alexis’ father found small security cameras in his car. Although he did not see his son take the cameras, he assumed that he had done so. Alexis’ father told her brother to return the cameras to Alexis’ mother.

[11] On June 16, 2025, the State charged Seals with Level 6 felony strangulation, Class B misdemeanor battery, and Class B misdemeanor battery by bodily waste. Seals waived his right to a jury trial and was tried in a bench trial on October 20, 2025. The parties submitted written arguments after the bench trial. Seals argued that the court should infer that the cameras had evidence that would “have been unfavorable” to the “party [that] conceal[ed] or destroy[ed] the cameras.” Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 162. The court found Seals guilty of Level 6 felony strangulation and Class B misdemeanor battery. Seals now appeals his convictions.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence—Rebuttal of Self-Defense Claim

[12] Seals does not dispute or challenge the State's evidence that he committed the criminal offenses of strangulation and battery. Instead, he argues that the State's evidence was insufficient to rebut his claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. He contends that it was Alexis, not him, who initiated the final physical exchange. See Appellant's Br. p. 11. He asserts that his removal of the box cutter was an “act of disarmament ․ consistent with a person attempting to de-escalate, not one seeking violence.” Id. And he points us to the fact that he walked away after “he took hold of her neck and brought her to the ground” as evidence of a proportionate response. Id. at 12.

[13] “A valid claim of self-defense is legal justification for an otherwise criminal act.” Wallace v. State, 725 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind. 2000). To prevail on such a claim, “the defendant must show that he: (1) was in a place where he had a right to be; (2) did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the violence [in other words, was without fault]; and (3) had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm.” Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Ind. 2002). “When a claim of self-defense is raised and finds support in the evidence, the State has the burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements.” Id. “If a defendant is convicted despite his claim of self-defense, [the appellate court] will reverse only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 800-01. “In any event, a mutual combatant, whether or not the initial aggressor, must declare an armistice before he or she may claim self-defense.” Id. at 801.

[14] And regarding the use of force, our Supreme Court recently reemphasized that “[t]he statutory trigger is generally ‘the imminent use of unlawful force.’ ” Turner v. State, 253 N.E.3d 526, 535 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c) (2024)). “A defendant generally may use force only when necessary for protection.” Id. And the right to self-defense “ceases to exist once a danger has passed.” See Hileman v. State, 224 N.E.3d 321, 328 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Plus, “the force must be proportional to the threat” because only reasonable force may be used in defense. Turner, 253 N.E.3d at 535; I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c).

[15] Turning now to the facts of the present case, we observe that there is no dispute that Seals was in a place where he had a right to be. But the parties’ arguments diverge when it comes to the second factor, who was the initial aggressor. Seals offers that we should see his interaction with Alexis in two distinct segments: (1) the encounter up until he slammed the bedroom door; and (2) when Alexis pushed his face away after he had forced her to back up against the wall. See Appellant's Br. pp. 11-12. The State urges that this was one continuous confrontation throughout which Seals remained the aggressor. See Appellee's Br. pp. 10-12.

[16] We agree with the State; this was one continuous confrontation during which Seals was the aggressor. Seals is thirty-nine years old and around six feet and one inch in height. At five feet and three inches, Alexis is the eighteen-year-old daughter of Seals’ girlfriend. Alexis came downstairs to have a conversation with her mother about the accusations surrounding the missing frog. Seals inserted himself in the conversation, became defensive after hearing what Alexis said, walked up to her, and pushed her in the face before slamming the door shut. Alexis continued to bang on the bedroom door for the next fifteen seconds before Seals reopened the door and forced Alexis against the wall while yelling at her. Alexis pushed Seals’ face away from hers after which Seals grabbed Alexis by the throat and dragged her into the next room, throwing her to the ground. Amiyah saw Alexis push Seals’ face away from hers and Seals grab Alexis by the throat. So she threw a box cutter down to help her sister defend herself. But Seals grabbed the box cutter and tossed it into another room.

[17] Although the record does not support the premise, assuming for the sake of argument that Alexis threatened Seals, “[a] self-defense justification cannot be based on a mere verbal threat because ‘oftentimes combatants make threats of violence which are never carried out.’ ” Turner, 253 N.E.3d at 541 (quoting Henson v. State, 786 N.E.2d 274, 278 (Ind. 2003)). And Seals’ response was not proportionate. Alexis pushed Seals’ face away from hers and he grabbed her throat, choking her and dragging her into the next room before throwing her to the ground. Simply put, there is no evidence in the record to support that Seals faced the imminent use of unlawful force. See I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c). The State sufficiently rebutted Seals’ claim on this ground.

[18] Nevertheless, we examine the next factor, reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. Seals contends that his response was objectively reasonable given the introduction of the box cutter into the fray. See Appellant's Br. pp. 12-13. However, the record does not support his argument.

[19] It is not objectively reasonable to argue Seals felt that he was in fear of death or great bodily harm given his initial aggression, the height difference, and his ultimate control and disposal of the box cutter. Alexis did not request the weapon and did not touch it. The evidence reflects that Alexis’ behavior was consistent. She tried to communicate with her mother and then tried to communicate with Seals. She banged on the door to continue the conversation with her mother and/or Seals. When Seals backed her against the wall, she pushed his face away to “make distance between [their] faces.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 17. He responded by grabbing her by the throat, choking her, and dragging her into another room. Seals’ response clearly was disproportionate given the situation here.

[20] We conclude that the State has sufficiently rebutted two of the three elements in the self-defense analysis. The State needed to rebut only one of those elements to defeat Seals’ self-defense claim. And we will not reassess the credibility of witnesses. The trial court did not err.

II. Spoliation Claim

[21] Seals argues that the trial court erred by failing to apply an inverse inference based on Indiana's spoliation doctrine. He claims that “[a] functioning security camera positioned to capture the alleged strangulation was removed from the scene by members of the Wells family immediately after the incident, concealed from investigating officers, and never produced.” Appellant's Br. p. 9. He notes that “intentional suppression of evidence gives rise to an inference that it was unfavorable to those responsible.” Id. (citing Cahoon v. Cummings, 734 N.E.2d 535, 545 (Ind. 2000)). He argues that we “should extend Indiana's spoliation doctrine to witnesses who are functionally aligned with the prosecution and deliberately suppress material evidence—and hold that the resulting negative inference applies here to the testimony of every member of the Wells family who took the stand.” Id. at 10.

[22] “Spoliation of evidence is ‘the intentional destruction, mutilation, alteration, or concealment of evidence.’ ” Glotzbach v. Froman, 854 N.E.2d 337, 338 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Cahoon, 734 N.E.2d at 545 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1409 (7th ed.1999))). The exclusive possession of facts or evidence by a party, coupled with the suppression of the facts or evidence by that party, may result in an inference that the production of the evidence would be against the interest of the party which suppresses it. Cahoon, 734 N.E.2d at 545. “If spoliation by a party to a lawsuit is proved, rules of evidence permit the jury to infer that the missing evidence was unfavorable to that party.” Glotzbach, 854 N.E.2d at 338.

[23] We first note that there is no evidence in the record to suggest that any evidence was destroyed. Seals points to evidence that Alexis’ brother took security cameras from his mother's residence to suggest the destruction of evidence. However, the record establishes that the recordings, to the extent any recordings pertinent to this case existed, were maintained on an app of Alexis’ mother's phone. Thus, the removal of the security cameras is evidence only of the fact that Alexis’ brother took them, not that the recordings, to the extent any exist, were destroyed.

[24] Seals offers Allison Wells’ deposition testimony (Defendant's Exhibit B) in support of his argument. In her deposition, Allison testified that the recordings made by those cameras were contained on an SD card in the cameras. Appellant's Br. p. 8; Exhibit Vol. IV, p. 5 (Defendant's Exhibit B). Thus, the defense was aware of Allison's contention that there was an SD card that might contain recordings of the altercation and that the State did not possess that evidence. Seals did not call Allison to testify at trial that the SD cards from the cameras were missing or about the contents of the SD cards. Nevertheless, there was no evidence to contradict Alexis’ testimony that the recordings were maintained on an app on her mother's phone. And the defense did not pursue the evidence or produce it.

[25] Given that Seals’ spoliation argument fails here, we decline his invitation to extend the spoliation doctrine to non-parties, namely, Alexis’ family members.

Conclusion

[26] The State sufficiently rebutted Seals’ self-defense claim. And he does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that he committed the criminal offenses of which he was convicted. His spoliation claim fails because the record does not support or suggest that evidence was destroyed or was ever in the State's possession. And we decline Seals’ invitation to extend the parameters of the spoliation doctrine. Therefore, we affirm the trial court in all respects.

[27] Affirmed.

Crone, Senior Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.