Bryan Scott Miller, Appellant-Respondent v. Haley Renee Miller, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Bryan S. Miller (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order modifying his child support obligation for the two children he shares with his ex-wife Haley R. Miller (“Mother”).¹ Father raises one issue, which we expand and restate as: (1) Did the trial court clearly err in finding Father was voluntarily underemployed? and (2) Did the trial court clearly err in imputing a certain amount of weekly income to Father? We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father and Mother's marriage was dissolved in 2018. Father and Mother initially shared physical and legal custody of their two children (“Children”). In 2022, the trial court granted Mother sole legal custody of Children; shared physical custody was left unchanged.

[3] Over the next two years, Father and Mother struggled to maintain an amicable relationship. In July 2024, Mother petitioned to modify custody, parenting time, and child support. Mother additionally filed multiple petitions to show cause, asking the trial court to find Father in contempt for alleged violations of court orders.

[4] The trial court began a hearing on Mother's outstanding petitions in January 2025. Mother testified she did not work because she took care of her ailing grandmother, and she relied on her husband to cover household expenses.

[5] At the continued hearing in May, Father testified he had worked in construction all his life and owned his own business for the past six years. He relied on subcontractors to find workers. According to Father, he earned between $400–$600 per week, but claimed his income varied. When asked why he did not work additional hours, Father testified the need to drive Children to and from school and to their various appointments was an obstacle. At the end of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement.

[6] In an order issued the following month, the trial court awarded Mother primary physical custody and Father parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. As for child support, the court found, in relevant part:

25. Turning to the issue of child support, Mother testified that, while she was previously employed, she no longer works, as she is the primary caregiver to an ailing family member.

26. Father testified that he owns his own business, works the hours that he wants, and earns “about” $400.00 per week in gross income. Father testified that he could work more hours, but chooses not to.

27. Father stated that he works in contracting/concrete, and has many years of experience in the field.

28. Father provided no testimony or evidence to show why he would choose to earn what is essentially minimum wage, when he has a family to support and also has the opportunity to work more hours.

29. The Court does not find Father's testimony to be credible in regard to his income. The Court determines that, given Father's industry, ownership of his own business, and extensive experience, he is capable of earning substantially more than the income claimed. The Court therefore imputes annual income of $60,000.00 to Father, for a weekly income of $1,153.85.

30. Based on the modification in parenting time and the updated income information provided, the Court finds that a support modification is appropriate.

31. The Court orders a weekly support obligation in the amount of $222.00 for Father[.]

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 66–67.

Standard of Review

[7] We first note Mother has not filed an appellate brief. When an appellee has not filed a brief, “we need not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the appellee's behalf.” Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006). “[W]e will reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error.” Id. Prima facie error is error “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. (citation omitted). If an appellant is unable to meet this burden, we will affirm. Id.

[8] “A trial court's calculation of child support is presumptively valid.” Young v. Young, 891 N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (Ind. 2008). “We will reverse a trial court's decision in child support matters only if it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Id. The trial court in this case entered specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon to support its judgment. We will “not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). That is, we will not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of the witness for ourselves, and we will view the evidence most favorably to the judgment. Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011).

[9] Where, as here, the trial court enters findings sua sponte, this Court reviews issues covered by the findings by determining first whether the evidence supports the findings and, if so, whether the findings support the judgment. Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016). A factual finding is clearly erroneous if the record contains no facts or inferences to support it. Johnson v. Johnson, 999 N.E.2d 56, 59 (Ind. 2013). And a judgment is clearly erroneous when it relies on an improper legal standard. Id.

[10] A general judgment standard applies to issues on which the trial court made no findings. Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123–24; see also T.R. 52(D). “We will affirm a judgment where we find substantial supporting evidence, unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Miller v. Lucas, 264 N.E.3d 651, 655 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).

The trial court did not clearly err in finding Father was voluntarily underemployed.

[11] Father initially challenges the trial court's determination he was voluntarily underemployed, arguing the court did not examine whether his “reduced hours were justified[.]” Appellant's Br. at 11.

[12] The Indiana Child Support Guidelines (“the Guidelines”) provide,

If a court finds a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed without just cause, child support shall be calculated based on a determination of potential income.

Ind. Child Support Guideline 3(A)(3) (2020). “One purpose of potential income is to discourage a parent from taking a lower paying job to avoid the payment of significant support.” Child Supp. G. 3(A) Cmt. § 2(c) (2024). “However, attributing potential income that results in an unrealistic child support obligation may cause the accumulation of an excessive arrearage, and be contrary to the best interests” of the child. Id. The Guidelines do not require or induce a parent to make career choices strictly based upon potential paychecks, nor do the Guidelines require a parent to work to their full economic potential. Miller v. Miller, 72 N.E.3d 952, 955 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

[13] “When a parent has some history of working and is capable of entering the work force, but without just cause voluntarily fails or refuses to work or to be employed in a capacity in keeping with his or her capabilities, such a parent's potential income shall be included in the gross income of that parent.” Child. Supp. G. 3(A) Cmt. § 2(c)(2). “Discretion must be exercised on an individual case basis to determine whether under the circumstances there is just cause to contribute potential income to a particular unemployed or underemployed parent.” Id.

[14] Here, Father set his own schedule but testified he was unable to work additional hours because he took Children to and from school and other appointments. Yet, Father also testified his wife took Children to school on some occasions. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 160, 164. On appeal, Father argues his testimony “directly established a legitimate logistical barrier affecting [his] ability to maintain full-time employment.” Appellant's Br. at 11. But the trial court was not convinced, and found he had the opportunity to “work more hours.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 66. In short, Father's argument invites us to reassess his credibility, which we cannot do. See Best, 941 N.E.2d at 502. The trial court did not clearly err in finding Father underemployed without just cause.

The trial court clearly erred in imputing Father's potential income without considering the enumerated factors.

[15] Father next argues the trial court erred by (1) finding he worked in a specialized trade of contracting/concrete; and (2) imputing an annual income without evidence of the required factors. We address each claim in turn.

[16] We will reverse a trial court's determination regarding imputation of income only for an abuse of discretion. In re C.B., 112 N.E.3d 746, 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. The parent arguing for the imputation of income bears the burden of persuasion. See Stanke v. Schmitt, 273 N.E.3d 89, 98 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).

[17] “A determination of potential income shall be made by determining employment potential and probable earnings level based on the obligor's employment and earnings history, occupational qualifications, educational attainment, literacy, age, health, criminal record or other employment barriers, prevailing job opportunities, and earnings levels in the community.” Child Supp. G. 3(A)(3).

[18] Father's employment. The trial court found Father “works in contracting/concrete, and has many years of experience in the field.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 66. Father testified he worked in construction and had done so “all [his] life pretty much.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 162. He further testified he owned his own business for the past six years and relied on subcontractors to find workers. Father's testimony supports the conclusion he used contractors and had years of experience in construction as a general matter. Any reference to “concrete” in the trial court's order was immaterial. Based on the record before us, the trial court's finding was not clearly erroneous.

[19] Father's imputed income. Father testified he earned around $600 a week, which was about $200 more than the weekly income reported. See id. at 161. Mother provided no evidence regarding Father's potential income. After considering Father's years of experience and qualifications as a business owner, the trial court imputed an “annual income of $60,000.00 ․ for a weekly income of $1,153.85.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 67. Before this Court, Father argues the trial court also had to consider evidence about prevailing job opportunities and earnings levels in the community, and he asks us to remand with instructions for the court to do so. See Appellant's Br. at 13–14. We agree with Father.

[20] In Walters v. Walters, a panel of this Court similarly considered a claim from a father who argued the trial court erred in imputing a certain amount of weekly income. 186 N.E.3d 1186, 1188 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). On appeal, the father argued the trial court's imputation contravened the Guidelines because the trial court failed to consider evidence regarding prevailing job opportunities and earnings levels in the community. Id. at 1193. In addition, the mother had not cited any evidence in her briefing from the record discussing those two factors. The panel agreed with the father and remanded with instructions for the trial court to hear additional evidence on all enumerated factors in the Guidelines. Id. at 1193.

[21] In this case, the trial court considered Father's work history and qualifications but did not hear evidence about all the factors in the Guidelines. Mother presented no evidence regarding Father's potential income in the proceedings below, and as observed above, she did not file an appellate brief. Like the panel in Walters, we hold the trial court's order to be clearly erroneous and remand for additional evidence to be presented on the enumerated factors.

Conclusion

[22] The trial court's determination Father was voluntarily underemployed was not clearly erroneous. However, we remand for the trial court to consider all factors in the Guidelines.

[23] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother has changed her name to Haley R. Ireland.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.