Shane K. Garrett, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Shane Garrett appeals his conviction for child solicitation, a Level 4 felony. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Garrett raises three issues on appeal, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when denying Garrett's tendered jury instruction.

II. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Garrett's conviction for child solicitation.

III. Whether Garrett's sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.

Facts

[3] ElizXbeth Productions (“ElizXbeth”) is a content creation company managed by Courtney Engelke and Christopher LaCrosse. ElizXbeth creates videos confronting child predators. ElizXbeth uses photos of Engelke, who is an adult, to create decoy online profiles and to pose as minors on dating and social media apps. ElizXbeth, operating the decoy profiles, waits for an adult to engage a decoy in sexual conversation, agrees to meet with the adult, records that meeting, and posts the video online of ElizXbeth depicting the confrontation with the alleged child predator. At the time of Garrett's trial, ElizXbeth had conducted 113 of these operations.

[4] On August 11, 2025, Garrett, a thirty-five-year-old man living in Decatur, Indiana, messaged an ElizXbeth decoy named “Krystena;” ElizXbeth operated this profile on MeetMe, an online dating app. Garrett and “Krystena” communicated via MeetMe and text messages.

[5] In a text message sent on August 11, 2025, “Krystena” informed Garrett that she was fourteen years old. Garrett responded, “Omg[.] I'd be allll over that․omg[.] Whoa u r[.] U the feds[?]” Tr. Vol. II p. 230; Ex. Vol. V pp. 14-15 (emojis omitted). “Krystena” denied that she was a law enforcement officer. Garrett told “Krystena” to prove that she was not law enforcement. “Krystena” asked how to prove it, and Garrett said, “Idk but I don't want [to be] in trouble u r cute tho.” Ex. Vol. V pp. 14-15. “Krystena” told Garrett that MeetMe banned her for being underage, and Garrett asked, “How they know[?] It said u were 19.” Id. at 16.

[6] Garrett asked if “Krystena” was “allowed to f**k around.” Id. at 22. Garrett asked if “Krystena's” mother was single and suggested that “Krystena” set Garrett up with her mother so he and “Krystena” could have sex more frequently. Garrett also texted, “I would love to have a kid with you[.] I bet they would be so beautiful.” Id. at 39.

[7] Throughout their communications, and after “Krystena” indicated she was fourteen, Garrett sent various sexual messages to “Krystena.”¹ Garrett asked “Krystena” to send him multiple pictures of herself, Garrett asked to see her “booty” twice, and Garrett sent “Krystena” a photo of his penis. Id. at 26, 30.

[8] Garrett first brought up meeting “Krystena” by texting: “I'd come see you if I could[.] I'd sneak in and f**k you so good i swear[,]” and “[I] Wish I could come [over] now[.]” Id. at 26-27. Garrett and “Krystena” arranged to meet at “Krystena's” house in Bluffton—an Airbnb rented by ElizXbeth—on August 12, 2025. After they began texting, Garrett planned to meet “Krystena” the very next day. When “Krystena” and Garrett discussed meeting, Garrett asked, “How I know this isn't a set up[?] :( I just have to be sure baby[.]” Id. at 27-28. Garrett texted, “I'm putting gas in and coming but this better be real :([.]” Id. at 60.

[9] When Garrett arrived at the Airbnb, Engelke and LaCrosse from ElizXbeth ² and two volunteers from Predator Catchers, Inc. (“PCI”),³ Eric Schmutte and Daniel Owens, confronted Garrett and recorded the encounter. Garrett was visibly upset, stating, “People do this s**t, right here. Set people up. Bring people to a house for fourteen year—.” State's Ex. 3 at 00:05:04. Garrett stopped before finishing the thought.

[10] After the confrontation, Garrett left the house and ran. LaCrosse and Owens pursued Garrett, and Schmutte instructed a team member at PCI to call the police. LaCrosse and Owens did not catch Garrett. Sergeant Ethan Daggett of the Bluffton Police Department arrived, and ElizXbeth provided him with copies of Garrett and “Krystena's” conversations. That night, ElizXbeth and PCI sent Sergeant Daggett videos of the confrontation via email.

[11] ElizXbeth and PCI did not contact law enforcement about their “catch” until after Garrett arrived at the house. ElizXbeth and PCI asked Sergeant Daggett if they could go to Hardee's, where Garrett had left his car, to continue filming Garrett, and Sergeant Daggett did not stop or discourage them. Sergeant Daggett testified that he did not have knowledge of contact between ElizXbeth and the Bluffton Police Department prior to the catch.

[12] On August 18, 2025, the State charged Garrett with child solicitation, a Level 4 felony. At Garrett's jury trial in November 2025, Engelke testified that ElizXbeth's decoys neither initiate contact, nor initiate plans to meet. LaCrosse testified that ElizXbeth had not been trained by law enforcement, and they had not contacted the Bluffton Police Department until after the “catch.” LaCrosse testified that ElizXbeth sometimes chooses to work in cities where it has had “good experience in communicating with law enforcement,” which includes Bluffton. Tr. Vol. III p. 107. Independent of this investigation, ElizXbeth previously gave information to the Bluffton Police Department on a different catch in December 2023.

[13] Schmutte, additionally, testified that PCI usually does not notify the police before a catch and that PCI did not notify the Bluffton Police Department prior to the meet-up with Garrett. Schmutte testified that most police departments do not want notification before PCI meets a potential predator, but that PCI will contact police departments if they want advance notification. Independent of this investigation, PCI worked with the Bluffton Police Department on two catches—one before August 12, 2025, and one subsequent catch.

[14] At the conclusion of evidence, Garrett requested a jury instruction on the defense of entrapment. The trial court found insufficient evidence presented that ElizXbeth and PCI were agents of law enforcement and, thus, denied the requested jury instruction. On November 20, 2025, the jury found Garrett guilty of child solicitation, a Level 4 felony. At sentencing, the trial court considered Garrett's lengthy criminal history, which included a juvenile adjudication for child molesting. On December 17, 2025, the trial court sentenced Garrett to ten years in the Department of Correction. Garrett now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Garrett's tendered jury instruction.

[15] Garrett argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for a jury instruction on the defense of entrapment. “We review a trial court's refusal to give a requested jury instruction for an abuse of discretion.” Clark v. State, 209 N.E.3d 444, 447 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Hernandez v. State, 45 N.E.3d 373, 376 (Ind. 2015)), trans. denied. “[W]e consider: (1) whether the instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there is evidence in the record to support the giving of the instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the tendered instruction is covered by other instructions which are given.” Salinas v. State, 257 N.E.3d 17, 31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (internal quotations omitted). Reversal is required “ ‘only if the appellant demonstrates that the instruction error prejudices his substantial rights.’ ” Hernandez, 45 N.E.3d at 376 (quoting Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621, 636 (Ind. 2010)).

[16] “A criminal defendant is entitled to have a jury instruction on ‘any theory or defense which has some foundation in the evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Toops v. State, 643 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)). “A trial court may refuse a jury instruction only when ‘[n]one of the facts’ in the record would support the legal theory offered in the instruction.” Clark, 209 N.E.3d at 448 (citing Humphrey v. Tuck, 151 N.E.3d 1203, 1207 (Ind. 2020)) (quotation marks omitted). We consider whether there is evidence to support each element of the defense. See Hernandez, 45 N.E.3d at 378.

[17] The defense of entrapment is defined by Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-9(a), which provides:

It is a defense that:

(1) the prohibited conduct of the person was the product of a law enforcement officer, or his agent, using persuasion or other means likely to cause the person to engage in the conduct; and

(2) the person was not predisposed to commit the offense.

(Emphasis added).

[18] Garrett argues that ElizXbeth and PCI acted as agents of law enforcement. “An agency relationship may be actual, implied, or apparent.” Clark, 209 N.E.3d at 448. “[A]pparent agency does not depend on the principal's express or implied authorization for the agent to act on the principal's behalf; rather, apparent agency exists when ‘a principal's manifestations induce a third party to reasonably believe there is a principal-agent relationship.’ ” Id. (quoting Arrendale v. Am. Imaging & MRI, LLC, 183 N.E.3d 1064, 1068 (Ind. 2022)); see also Pepkowski v. Life of Ind. Ins. Co., 535 N.E.2d 1164, 1167 (Ind. 1989) (“It is essential that there be some form of communication, direct or indirect, by the principal, which instills a reasonable belief in the mind of the third party.”). “[T]he placing of the agent in a position to perform acts or make representations which appear reasonable to a third person is a sufficient manifestation to endow the agent with apparent authority.” Clark, 209 N.E.3d at 448 (quoting Gallant Ins. Co. v. Isaac, 751 N.E.2d 672, 677 (Ind. 2001)).

[19] We find that the record does not support an apparent agency relationship between either ElizXbeth or PCI and law enforcement. In Clark, this Court held that a private predator catcher organization ⁴ did not have an agency relationship with law enforcement when it: was separate from law enforcement; received no training, advice, or assistance from law enforcement; received all of its funding from private donations; and did not notify law enforcement until after it caught an alleged predator. 209 N.E.3d at 448-49. Similarly, here, ElizXbeth and PCI did not act alongside law enforcement; received no training, advice, or assistance from law enforcement; received their funding from private sources;⁵ and did not notify the Bluffton Police Department until they “caught” Garrett.

[20] Garrett argues that the Bluffton Police Department's failure to stop ElizXbeth and PCI created an implied agency relationship. Garrett relies on ElizXbeth's and PCI's past “catches” in Bluffton as proof of an agency relationship between the organizations and law enforcement. We considered this question in Clark and found that there is no agency relationship when law enforcement relies on predator catcher organizations, acting as members of the general public, for “tips.” Id. at 448-49. Here, ElizXbeth's and PCI's decision to operate in Bluffton because of positive past dealings is a strategic choice and not a manifestation of an agency relationship with law enforcement. Without further evidence that either ElizXbeth or PCI was acting at the direction of the Bluffton Police Department, we find that the prior contacts above do not create an implied agency relationship.

[21] Even if an apparent agency relationship existed, the evidence presented demonstrates that Garrett was predisposed to commit the offense. “The critical question regarding predisposition ‘is whether criminal intent [was] deliberately implanted in the mind of an innocent person[.]’ ” Clark, 209 N.E.3d at 449 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ferge v. State, 764 N.E.2d 268, 271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). In Cherry v. State, we found that there was evidence to indicate that Cherry was predisposed to commit child solicitation when Cherry initiated sexual conversation with the decoy he believed to be thirteen and expressed concern about getting caught by the police while still choosing to pursue the decoy. 254 N.E.3d 1100, 1110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[22] Like the defendant in Cherry, Garrett had sexual conversations with “Krystena” after discovering that “Krystena” was fourteen. Garrett made no effort to cut off contact with “Krystena” after learning her age. Garrett also recognized that meeting up with “Krystena” was illegal. Garrett texted: “U the feds[?]”; “I don't want [to be] in trouble”; “How I know this isn't a set up[?]”; and “this better be real :(.” Ex. Vol. V pp. 14-15, 27-28, 60. This hesitancy to meet up with “Krystena” was not hesitancy to commit the criminal act, but it was hesitancy about being caught. The evidence shows that Garrett pursued “Krystena,” even showing up at her “home,” despite knowing his conduct was illegal.

[23] We find that the evidence indicates that: (1) ElizXbeth and PCI were not apparent agents of law enforcement; and (2) Garrett was predisposed to commit child solicitation. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing the tendered jury instruction on the defense of entrapment.

II. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Garrett's conviction for child solicitation.

[24] Garrett argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Sufficiency of the evidence claims warrant a deferential standard of review in which we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024). A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if “there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In conducting this review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Id. We affirm the conviction “ ‘unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.’ ” Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).

[25] Garrett was convicted of child solicitation pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-42-4-6, which provides, in relevant part:

(a) As used in this section, “solicit” means to command, authorize, urge, incite, request, lure, entice, or advise an individual:

* * * * *

(4) by using a computer network (as defined in IC 35-43-2-3(a));

* * * * *

to perform an act described in subsection (b) or (c).

* * * * *

(c) A person at least twenty-one (21) years of age who knowingly or intentionally solicits a child at least fourteen (14) years of age but less than sixteen (16) years of age, or an individual the person believes to be a child at least fourteen (14) years of age but less than sixteen (16) years of age, to engage in sexual intercourse, other sexual conduct (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-221.5), or any fondling or touching intended to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older person, commits child solicitation, a Level 5 felony. However, the offense is a Level 4 felony if the person solicits the child or individual the person believes to be a child at least fourteen (14) but less than sixteen (16) years of age to engage in sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-221.5), and:

(1) commits the offense by using a computer network (as defined in IC 35-43-2-3(a)) and travels to meet the child or individual the person believes to be a child; or

* * * * *

(Emphasis added).

[26] Here, there is no dispute that Garrett solicited “Krystena” to engage in sexual intercourse, other sexual conduct, or touching intended to arouse or satisfy Garrett's or “Krystena's” sexual desires. Garrett, however, argues that the State failed to prove that Garrett believed “Krystena” was fourteen years of age and that the State failed to prove that Garrett used a computer network to solicit “Krystena.”

A. The State presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that Garrett believed “Krystena” was fourteen years of age.

[27] Garrett argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Garrett believed “Krystena” was fourteen years of age. Garrett directs us to evidence that: “Krystena's” MeetMe profile said she was nineteen; MeetMe is an adult website; “Krystena's” profile pictures demonstrate that “Krystena” could have been over sixteen years of age; and a text was “the only indicator” that “Krystena” was fourteen. Appellant's Br. p. 18. Garrett also argues that he believed “Krystena” was an adult but was participating in age-based sexual role play by claiming to be fourteen years old. We do not find Garrett's argument to be compelling.

[28] Garrett's messages to “Krystena,” which include a text asking about how MeetMe knew she was a minor, texts asking “Krystena” to arrange a meeting with “Krystena's” mother so Garrett and “Krystena” could have sex more frequently, and texts expressing concern about getting caught, demonstrate that Garrett believed he was arranging to meet a fourteen-year-old. Garrett is merely requesting that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. We, accordingly, find sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Garrett believed “Krystena” was fourteen years old.

B. The State presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that Garrett committed the offense by using a “computer network.”

[29] Garrett argues that the State failed to present evidence that Garrett committed the offense, as a Level 4 felony, by using a computer network as defined by Indiana Code Section 35-43-2-3. “Computer network” means “the interconnection of communication lines or wireless telecommunications with a computer or wireless telecommunication device through: (1) remote terminals; (2) a complex consisting of two (2) or more interconnected computers; or (3) a worldwide collection of interconnected networks operating as the Internet.” Ind. Code § 35-43-2-3(a).

[30] Garrett argues that the State was required to prove that Garrett's cellphone and “Krystena's” cellphone had a “complex interaction with cellular networks, towers, and computers” to meet the definition of a “computer network.” Appellant's Br. p. 21. Garrett also argues that the record is “void of any evidence describing the technology of this issue,” including “how these cellphones “operated to communicate with each other.” Id.

[31] We addressed this same argument in Cherry, 254 N.E.3d 1100. In Cherry, we found that sufficient evidence was provided for a reasonable jury to conclude that Cherry used a computer network to solicit a child by initiating contact with the decoy child via Tinder and continued to contact the decoy through texts and a phone call. Id. at 1107. Here, it is undisputed that Garrett initiated contact with “Krystena” via MeetMe, an online dating app, and maintained contact by texting with “Krystena.” Although Garrett's contact with “Krystena” did not include a phone call, unlike the solicitation in Cherry, we find that a reasonable jury could conclude that Garrett used a computer network by using MeetMe and text messaging.

III. Garrett's sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.

[32] Next, Garrett challenges his ten-year sentence as inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). The Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of sentences imposed by a trial court. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6). This authority, as implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), enables this Court to “revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Deference to the trial court's sentence should prevail unless “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense and the defendant's character.” Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant, however, need not show that both the nature of the offense and his or her character warrant revision; however, “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127 (citing Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)).

[33] Additionally, in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we are not limited to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found by the trial court. Oberhansley, 208 N.E.3d at 1271. “Our role is primarily to leaven the outliers and identify guiding principles for sentencers, rather than to achieve the perceived correct result in each case.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Ultimately, we rely on our collective judgment as to the balance of all the relevant considerations involved, which include the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

[34] “In considering the nature of the offense we recognize the advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for the crime committed.” Kelly v. State, 257 N.E.3d 782, 805 (Ind. 2025). In the case at hand, Garrett was convicted of a Level 4 felony. Indiana Code Section 35-50-2- 5.5 provides: “A person who commits a Level 4 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and twelve (12) years, with the advisory sentence being six (6) years.” The trial court sentenced Garrett to ten years.

Nature of the Offense

[35] Our analysis of the “nature of the offense” requires us to look at the extent, brutality, and heinousness of the offense. Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 5 (Ind. 2014)). We consider whether “compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as [being] accompanied by restraint, regard and lack of brutality)” exists. Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1093 (Ind. 2025).

[36] The legislature has determined the elements of the offense and the felony level. The offense itself already factors in the fact that a victim does not to need to actually exist—that a decoy may be the victim. Here, we find no evidence of restraint. Garrett, the day after contacting the decoy, drove to meet who he believed to be a fourteen-year-old-girl.

Character of the Offender

[37] Our analysis of the character of the offender involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse. See Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021); McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020). The significance of a criminal history in assessing a defendant's character and an appropriate sentence varies based on the “gravity, nature and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense.” McElfresh v. State, 51 N.E.3d 103, 112 (Ind. 2016). “Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.” Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[38] Garrett argues that the facts that he obtained his GED and has children should warrant a lesser sentence. But Garrett was thirty-five years old at the time of sentencing and had a lengthy criminal history,⁶ including a juvenile adjudication for child molesting. Further, Garrett exhibited a lack of remorse by maintaining that he was “duped” by ElizXbeth, rather than taking responsibility for his conduct. Appellant's Br. p. 29. Garrett argues that his lack of remorse is “understandable” because “Krystena” “la[id] a trap” for him. Id. But Garrett had the choice to cease engagement with the decoy after the decoy identified as a fourteen-year-old girl. He continued the pursuit and travelled to the purported home of a fourteen-year-old. This is exactly the criminal behavior the legislature sought to criminalize in order to protect real fourteen-year-old children.

[39] Given Garrett's criminal history and lack of remorse, we cannot find any basis to conclude that the ten-year sentence was inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm Garrett's sentence.

Conclusion

[40] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Garrett's tendered jury instruction. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Garrett's conviction for child solicitation. Garrett's sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. Accordingly, we affirm.

[41] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   These messages included: “Girl I'm 9 inches long and 4 inches around I doubt you could handle that”; “You can have me all you want tho[.] Can I have you[?]”; “I can just imagine you on top omg”; “I wanna eat you so bad”; “Grab them hips and pound you from behind mmmm”; “I'll blow ur mind baby”; “I'll make you c*m all over me if I can”; “I want you to ride my face too”; “I'll teach you baby[.] [I]mma teach you a lot [i]f you let me”; and “I would love to make love to you for hours.” Ex. Vol. V pp. 15, 29-32, 35, 38. Garrett also asked “Krystena” to be his “girl”; asked “Krystena” if she had used sex toys before; and referred to “Krystena” as “baby,” “babygirl,” “my love,” and “princess.” Id. at 23-24, 26, 28, 30, 39, 40-42, 44-46, 57-58.

2.   ElizXbeth was leading this operation, and PCI was assisting.

3.   PCI is an Indianapolis-based non-profit organization that uses decoys to confront and videotape potential predators; they then turn information of their encounters to the police. Schmutte serves as PCI's president.

4.   Clark concerns a catch done by PCI, one of the same predator catcher organizations in this case.

5.   ElizXbeth and PCI are privately funded by ad revenue on various social media platforms and video subscription services. This funding mechanism does not imply a relationship with law enforcement.

6.   Garrett's criminal history includes convictions for theft, disorderly conduct, driving while intoxicated, public intoxication, and possession of marijuana, paraphernalia, and a synthetic drug.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Bradford, J., and Felix, J., concur.