Shelby DeWeese, et al, Appellants-Plaintiffs v. MVAH LLC LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] In this dog bite case, Shelby DeWeese (“DeWeese”), as the next best friend of her daughter, Graylynn DeWeese, (“Graylynn”), appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of MVAH Partners, LLC, (“MVAH”). DeWeese argues that the trial court erred in granting MVAH's summary judgment motion. Concluding that the trial court did not err in granting MVAH's summary judgment motion, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court erred in granting MVAH's summary judgment motion.

Facts

[3] MVAH owns Jasper Lofts (“Jasper Lofts”), which is an apartment complex in Jasper, Indiana. On April 10, 2020, Destiny Lane (“Lane”) and Katelen Jacobson (“Jacobson”) signed a lease agreement (“the lease agreement”) to rent an apartment at Jasper Lofts. The lease agreement was scheduled to end on March 31, 2021. Pursuant to the terms of the lease agreement, Jasper Lofts leased to Lane and Jacobson a specific unit (“the unit”) to be occupied by Lane and Jacobson as a personal residence. In addition, the lease agreement permitted Jasper Lofts to enter the unit for limited purposes, such as making repairs or inspecting the unit. Further, pursuant to the terms of the lease agreement, such entry generally required advance written notice posted on the unit.

[4] The lease agreement further included a pet addendum (“the first pet addendum”), which provided, in relevant part, as follows:

LESSOR AND LESSEE AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

1. Permission to keep a pet is restricted to the particular pet described:

* * * * *

e. Pit Bulls, ․ full blood or mixed at any percentage, are PROHIBITED ․

* * * * *

i. Resident shall provide a letter or certificate from the attending veterinarian evidencing each pet/animal's required inoculations.

j. Lessor must approve each pet/animal as a condition of approval for Lessee to have pet/animal in the community. Lessee must provide a photograph of each pet/animal.

(App. Vol. 2 at 77) (emphasis in original). Lane also completed a form describing her pet as a four-month-old Shar Pei named Jax (“Jax”).¹

[5] On March 2, 2021, Lane signed a renewal addendum (“the renewal addendum”) to extend her lease for an additional year.² Further, the renewal addendum included a pet addendum (“the second pet addendum”), which included the language as set forth above in the first pet addendum. Lane also completed a form describing her pet as a four-year-old Black Lab named Mazikeen. Lane told DeWeese, who was Jasper Loft's community manager at that time, that Lane was not keeping Jax and that she had found a new home for him. DeWeese signed the renewal addendum and the second pet addendum. In addition, DeWeese performed a renewal inspection of the unit. During this inspection, DeWeese observed Mazikeen but did not observe Jax. Based on her observations and Lane's report that she had found a new home for Jax, DeWeese believed that Jax no longer lived in the unit.

[6] Three weeks later, on March 26, 2021, Lane was babysitting three-year-old Graylynn in the unit when Jax attacked the child. Graylynn suffered serious injuries to her face and head. After Jax had attacked Graylynn, a Jasper Police Department officer requested Jax's immunization records from Jax's veterinarian. Those records identified Jax as a pit bull mix.

[7] In March 2023, DeWeese, as Graylynn's next best friend, filed a negligence action against both Lane and MVAH. Regarding MVAH, the complaint specifically alleged that MVAH was negligent because it had violated its policy prohibiting residents from housing a vicious dog at Jasper Lofts by knowingly and willfully allowing Lane to keep a vicious dog at Jasper Lofts. The complaint further alleged that the negligence of MVAH in allowing Lane to keep a vicious dog in contravention of its policy had proximately caused physical injuries to Graylynn. In addition, the complaint included a count alleging that DeWeese had viewed the results of the attack, causing negligent infliction of emotional distress.

[8] Two years later, in April 2025, MVAH filed a motion for summary judgment. In its motion, MVAH argued that it “did not owe a duty of reasonable care to Plaintiffs pursuant to Indiana's dog bite jurisprudence because MVAH did not maintain control over the area where the dog bite occurred and Plaintiffs cannot establish MVAH had actual knowledge of the dog's dangerous propensities.” (App. Vol. 2 at 20).

[9] In support of its motion, MVAH designated excerpts from DeWeese's deposition. In those excerpts, DeWeese testified that in her role as an MVAH employee, she had seen Jax around children who lived in Jasper Lofts. According to DeWeese, she had never seen Jax act aggressively and had never received any complaints about him. DeWeese further testified that Graylynn had been around Jax in the past and that DeWeese had never seen Jax act aggressively towards the child. DeWeese specifically testified that Jax had never given her “any sort of slight inkling that would've ever made [her] think he would've hurt [Graylynn].” (App. Vol. 2 at 53). In addition, DeWeese testified that it was her understanding that at the time Jax attacked Graylynn, Lane had found a new home for Jax and that he was no longer living in the unit.

[10] At the end of April 2025, DeWeese filed an objection and response to MVAH's summary judgment motion, wherein DeWeese argued that “MVAH knew that [Jax] had vicious propensities.” (App. Vol. 2 at 96). In support of her objection and response, DeWeese designated excerpts from her deposition, the lease agreement, the first pet addendum, the renewal addendum, the second pet addendum, a Jasper Police Department report, and the veterinarian's report identifying Jax as a pit bull mix.

[11] In DeWeese's designated deposition excerpts, DeWeese testified that MVAH employees did not enter Jasper Lofts units without either giving the unit's resident prior notice or having the resident's permission. DeWeese further testified that Jax was “very wrinkly, very strong on the Shar Pei look.” (App. Vol. 2 at 120). DeWeese later testified that you could look at Jax and tell that he was a pit bull. Further, DeWeese testified that after Jax had attacked Graylynn, Jacobson had told her that Jax had previously “nipped” her younger sister. (App. Vol. 2 at 124).

[12] When asked why she believed that MVAH knew that Lane was housing a vicious dog, DeWeese responded as follows: “I don't know if it's so much the vicious dog as it is just the sheer negligence on the breed, because that's the number one on the pet addendum is no pit bull of any percentage is to be allowed.” (App. Vol. 2 at 126). Later in the deposition, MVAH's counsel stated that DeWeese had alleged in her complaint that MVAH had allowed Jax to live in Lane's unit in violation of MVAH's policy. MVAH's counsel asked DeWeese to what policy she was referring. DeWeese responded, “[t]hat pet addendum with that ․ description of breed restriction.” (App. Vol. 2 at 127). DeWeese acknowledged that this was the only policy to which she was referring.

[13] DeWeese also testified that “if you can look at a dog and tell [the pet addendum] is not accurate, there's that questioning that needs to be made.” (App. Vol. 2 at 127). When MVAH's counsel pointed out that as the community manager, DeWeese had the ability “to cite people for having dogs that ․ [she] believed didn't meet the rules and regulations[,]” DeWeese agreed and acknowledged that she could have cited Lane. (App. Vol. 2 at 127). However, DeWeese further explained that “it was to [her] knowledge that [Jax] was no longer going to be on the property.” (App. Vol. 2 at 127).

[14] The trial court held a summary judgment hearing in July 2025. At the hearing, MVAH argued that “Indiana law is clear that the duty of reasonable care imposed upon a landowner or a landlord that does not own the dog is measured [by] the landowner or landlord's control and possession of the property where the attack occurred and their actual knowledge of the dog's dangerous propensities.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 5). According to MVAH, it did not maintain control of the unit where the attack took place, and it did not have actual knowledge of Jax's dangerous propensities. On the other hand, DeWeese argued that the trial court should deny MVAH's summary judgment motion because “MVAH failed to follow its own compliance procedures allowing [Jax] to be housed on the premises.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 12).

[15] In July 2025, the trial court issued an order granting MVAH's summary judgment motion. The order expressly provided that it “dispose[d] of all claims against MVAH ․ [and] [was] a final appealable Order under Trial Rule[s] 54(B) and 56(C).” (App. Vol. 2 at 12-13). In August 2025, DeWeese filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied in September 2025.

[16] DeWeese now appeals.

Decision

[17] DeWeese appeals following the denial of her motion to correct error, which challenged the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of MVAH. In general, we review a ruling on a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion; however, if the motion presented a pure question of law, our review is de novo. City of Indianapolis v. Hicks, 932 N.E.2d 227, 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

[18] DeWeese argues that the trial court erred in granting MHAV's summary judgment motion. When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, our well-settled standard of review is the same as it is for the trial court. Goodwin v. Yeakle's Sports Bar and Grill, Inc., 62 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2016). Specifically, we must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of making a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Once the moving party has met these two requirements, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact by setting forth specifically designated facts. Id. In deciding whether summary judgment is proper, we consider only the evidence the parties specifically designated to the trial court. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C), (H). We construe all factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and resolve all doubts regarding the existence of a material issue against the moving party. Carson v. Palombo, 18 N.E.3d 1036, 1041 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “Summary judgment should be granted only if the evidence sanctioned by Indiana Trial Rule 56(C) shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party deserves judgment as a matter of law.” Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 386.

[19] “To prevail on a claim of negligence the plaintiff must show: (1) duty owed to plaintiff by defendant; (2) breach of duty by allowing conduct to fall below the applicable standard of care; and (3) compensable injury proximately caused by defendant's breach of duty.” Id. (cleaned up). Issues of duty are generally questions of law for the court to decide. Olds v. Noel, 857 N.E.2d 1041, 1043 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). “Summary judgment in a negligence case is particularly appropriate when the court determines that no duty exists because, absent a duty, there can be no breach, and therefore, no negligence.” Id. (cleaned up).

[20] Further, the law is well settled that, in a dog bite case, the duty of reasonable care imposed upon a landowner who did not own the dog is measured by the landowner's control or possession of the property and the landowner's actual knowledge that the dog had dangerous propensities. Buehler v. Bocanegra, 212 N.E.3d 227, 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. See also McCraney v. Gibson, 952 N.E.2d 284, 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. The absence of either component will result in a finding for the landowner. Buehler, 212 N.E.3d at 233.

[21] This Court has defined dangerous propensity as “a propensity or tendency of an animal to do any act which might endanger the safety of person or property in a given situation.” Id. (cleaned up). “It is the act of the animal and not in the state of mind of the animal from which the effects of a dangerous propensity must be determined.” Id. (cleaned up).

[22] Here, MVAH, through its designated evidence, made a prima facie showing that it had no actual knowledge that Jax was a dog with a dangerous propensity. Specifically, MVAH designated evidence that DeWeese, in her capacity as an MVAH employee, had never seen Jax act aggressively and had never received any complaints about him. In addition, MVAH designated evidence that Graylynn had been around Jax in the past and that DeWeese had never seen Jax act aggressively towards the child. Further, MVAH designated evidence that it had no knowledge that Jax lived in the unit with Lane at the time he attacked Graylynn. It was, therefore, incumbent upon DeWeese to come forward with designated evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact concerning MVAH's actual knowledge of Jax's dangerous propensity. DeWeese failed to do so. Because the material facts do not establish the second part of the two-part test for determining a landlord's liability for the acts of the tenant's dog, MVAH is entitled to summary judgment.³ See Buehler, 212 N.E.3d at 233 (affirming summary judgment for the landlord where there was no evidence in the record of the landlord's actual knowledge of the dog's violent propensity); McCraney, 952 N.E.2d at 289 (affirming summary judgment for the landlord where there was no evidence in the record of the landlord's actual knowledge of the dog's violent propensity). The trial court did not err in granting MVAH's summary judgment motion.⁴

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record also refers to Jax as Jaxon.

2.   Jacobson was not included on the renewal addendum.

3.   Because MVAH only needed to prove one part of the test, we need not address the first part of the test regarding whether MVAH retained control over the property. See Morehead v. Deitrich, 932 N.E.2d 1272, 1276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.

4.   We note that DeWeese attempts to make her case an exception to the well-established general rule that possession and control of the premises and knowledge of the dog's dangerous propensity determines a landowner's liability when a tenant is attacked by a dog. She specifically argues that the pet addendum imposed a separate assumed duty on MVAH. However, this Court has previously rejected, in dog bite cases concerning a landowner and a tenant, the tenant's attempt to impose a separate duty on the landlord based on the lease agreement. See Marchino as next friend of Marchino v. Stines, 182 N.E.3d 253, 256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022); Morehead, 932 N.E.2d at 1279. Indeed, in Morehead, we specifically stated as follows regarding the public policy of our decision: “We agree that society has an interest in preventing dog attacks against innocent parties, and therefore in keeping vicious dogs adequately confined. It would be unreasonable, however, to impose a duty on landlords to regulate tenants’ animals, where the owners clearly are in the best position to do so.” Id. at 1280.We further note that in her appellate brief, DeWeese twice argues that Jacobson was an MVAH employee. However, our review of the record reveals that at the summary judgment hearing, MVAH's counsel specifically told the trial court that Jacobson had “never been a[n] MVAH employee.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 8).

Pyle, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.