IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: B.G. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] R.G. (“Mother”) is the biological mother of B.G., D.G., and R.H. (collectively, “the Children”). I.H. (“Father”) is the biological Father of R.H.¹ The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) became involved with the Children in June of 2022, after an incident of domestic violence between Mother and Father. On June 20, 2022, DCS filed petitions alleging that the Children were children in need of services (“CHINS”). The Children were subsequently found to be CHINS and Mother was ordered to complete certain services. DCS eventually petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights to the Children after she had failed to successfully complete the court-ordered services and make meaningful progress toward reunification with the Children. Following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court entered a combined order granting DCS's termination petitions.² Mother challenges several of the juvenile court's findings of fact and contends that the remaining findings of fact are insufficient to sustain its order terminating her parental rights to the Children. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] DCS became involved with Mother in 2009, in a CHINS case involving two of Mother's other children—Br.G. (born in August of 2008) and J.G. (born in June of 2012)—that stemmed from domestic violence between Mother and Br.G.’s, father, Br.C.³ Over the course of fifteen years, Mother has been the subject of five DCS assessments for domestic violence with three different men.

[3] Regarding the Children, B.G. was born on September 7, 2009, D.G. was born on June 6, 2013, and R.H. was born on June 30, 2021. On June 14, 2022, Mother and Father were involved in an argument that resulted in a gun being discharged in the home and Father punching and choking Mother while the Children were present in the home. Mother was able to leave the home with B.G. and D.G., but Father refused to allow Mother to remove R.H. Mother “ma[de] her way to a fire station to report what had happened” and the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department requested the SWAT team, believing that Father was still armed and inside the residence with R.H. Ex. Vol. I p. 64. After the SWAT team gained entry, the team discovered that Father had left the home, leaving R.H. by herself without an adult caregiver.

[4] On June 20, 2022, DCS petitioned to have the Children adjudicated as CHINS, based on the domestic violence incident between Mother and Father. At the initial hearing held on June 21, 2022, the juvenile court ordered the Children to be removed from Mother's care, “due to allegations of abuse and/or neglect.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 140. D.G. and R.H. were placed in relative care. On August 11, 2022, D.G. and R.H. were found to be CHINS after Mother's admission that “there was a domestic violence incident in the home and therefore the [C]hildren [we]re in need of services and the coercive intervention of the court [wa]s necessary.” Ex. Vol. I p. 128. A dispositional order was entered on August 16, 2022, in which the juvenile court ordered Mother to participate in and follow all recommendations for home-based case management, home-based therapy, and domestic-violence services.

[5] B.G. was found to be CHINS on October 13, 2022, on the same admission that Mother had made as to D.G. and R.H. By this point, B.G. had been removed from Mother's care and placed in relative care. A dispositional order was entered on November 10, 2022, which ordered Mother to participate in and follow all recommendations for the same services as for D.G. and R.H., and to also participate in and follow all recommendations for family therapy and parent education.

[6] During the CHINS proceedings, several service providers were assigned to Mother's case. Mother completed domestic-violence education, participated in home-based casework, and had stable housing and employment. Mother participated in individual therapy and made progress. However, Mother also engaged in a pattern of “hiring and firing” her service providers. Tr. Vol. III p. 65. Whenever Mother disagreed with a provider, she insisted that a new provider be assigned to her case, which hindered Mother's progress toward reunification with the Children.

[7] As the CHINS proceedings progressed, Mother continued to have contact with Father. Mother's parenting time with R.H. had gone “back and forth” between “supervised and unsupervised” and then “went back to supervised because of [Father] being in [Mother's] home when he wasn't supposed to be.” Ex. Vol. I pp. 190, 191. Mother refused to participate in the criminal case that had resulted in DCS initiating the instant CHINS proceedings, which in turn resulted in the dismissal of both the criminal case and the order for protection in that case that had protected Mother from Father.

[8] While the CHINS proceedings were pending, Mother sent threatening emails to the DCS attorney and to R.H.’s foster placement (“B.R.”). Mother threatened to kill B.R., and Mother “show[ed] up” at B.R.’s place of employment.⁴ Ex. Vol. I p. 190. B.R. sought and obtained an order for protection against Mother.

[9] After B.G. and D.G. were removed from Mother's care, neither child wanted to reunify with Mother because Mother and Father had physically abused them, and the boys feared further abuse. D.G. was afraid of Mother and had stated that his fear level was “a 9.” Ex. Vol. I p. 183.

[10] Mother's visits with B.G. and D.G. started as therapeutic telephone calls in the summer of 2024. However, therapist Leah Nyirendah, who had facilitated the therapeutic calls between Mother and B.G. and D.G., recommended that the telephone calls stop because “it was negatively affecting the boys’ mental health.” Ex. Vol. I p. 224. When B.G. and D.G. struggled to engage with Mother during one telephone call, the call ended with Mother yelling at them, saying, “don't call me then if you're not going to talk to me[,]” before hanging up, which had traumatized them. Tr. Vol. III pp. 41–42. The therapeutic calls continued for three or four more months and then ended without progressing to video calls. When Nyirendah tried to schedule more calls, Mother told her to “lose [her phone] number” and not call again. Tr. Vol. III p. 43.

[11] The Children all participated in therapy due to the trauma they had experienced while in Mother's care. Amanda Horton began providing therapy for B.G. in July of 2023, when he was thirteen years old, to help him manage the anger he felt towards Mother because he believed she had changed after she became involved with Father.

[12] B.G. did well in therapy, and his behaviors improved when he did not have contact with Mother. Despite Horton spending “a lot of time trying to help [B.G.] mend his relationship with [Mother,]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 142, Horton did not believe that B.G. had reached a point where he would be able to talk to Mother in “a civilized manner and have a decent relationship” with her. Tr. Vol. III p. 20. B.G. “just did not want a relationship with” Mother. Tr. Vol. III p. 20. Horton closed out the therapy in November of 2024, after B.G.’s behaviors and emotions had stabilized. However, Horton did not recommend that B.G. reunify with Mother and Horton “did not and would not recommend” that B.G. and Mother engage in in-person parenting time. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 142.

[13] Home-based therapist Sarah Miller began working with D.G. in April of 2024, when he was eleven years old. D.G. exhibited anxiety, struggled with emotional regulation, had a “tendency to hurt himself[,]” and would pull his hair. Tr. Vol. II p. 236. D.G. was “pretty consistent” with not wanting “to go to visits” with Mother and was “pretty angry whenever [he] would talk about visits.” Tr. Vol. II p. 239. D.G. told Miller that Mother would hurt him, and D.G. spoke “a lot about the abuse and how he didn't want a relationship with her because she abused him” physically and mentally. Tr. Vol. II p. 247. D.G. also talked about wanting to be adopted and wanting to move forward with adoption.

[14] Miller successfully discharged D.G. in January of 2025, after he met his therapeutic goals, but she believed that D.G. would need ongoing therapy to continue processing his trauma. Miller opined that reunification with Mother would “set[ D.G.] back” both emotionally and behaviorally and that Mother was unable to meet D.G.’s long-term therapeutic needs. Tr. Vol. III p. 4.

[15] Nyirendah began providing therapy for R.H. in October of 2023, when she was around two years old. Nyirendah helped R.H. become more verbal and learn how to communicate “rather than just screaming, moaning, and screeching.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 142. R.H. “had a lot of outbursts and impulsivity[,]” exhibited concerning social skills, and had difficulty focusing. Tr. Vol. III p. 45. Nyirendah agreed that R.H. was modeling Mother's behavior.

[16] Nyirendah believed that R.H. would need ongoing therapy as she aged and that Mother would not be able to meet those needs. Mother had refused to participate in family therapy with R.H., telling Nyirendah that “she was ․ protecting her [own] mental health[.]” Ex. Vol. I p. 190. Eventually, the family therapy with R.H. was “closed out due to conflict with [M]other and [Mother's] refusal to work with certain providers.” Ex. Vol. I p. 224.

[17] At some point, apparently before December of 2023, Mother's visits with R.H. progressed to overnight visits in Mother's home. Sharada Day, Mother's former home-based case manager who had been assigned to work with the family from the beginning of the case, recalled that Mother's overnight visits stopped after a report was received that R.H. “had bruising on her.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 17.

[18] Stefanie Minnette—who served as the Children's guardian ad litem (“GAL”) from June of 2022 through August of 2024—reported, and later testified, that following R.H.’s first overnight visit with Mother, R.H. “had bruises” on her legs. Ex. Vol. I p. 183. However, the report was determined to be unsubstantiated, as what appeared to be bruising “ended up being eczema or something.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 17. After the incident, however, DCS required Mother to start over with her parenting-time process.

[19] Lastashia Flannery, a home-based caseworker and supervised visitation provider, supervised Mother's visits with R.H. beginning in December of 2023. Visits progressed from an office to the community to Mother's home. Flannery suggested and modeled ways to address R.H.’s concerning behaviors. However, Mother struggled to redirect R.H. and Mother told Flannery that she was tired and did not want to deal with R.H.’s behavior. When the visits took place in the community, Mother relied on her son J.G. to run after R.H.

[20] When in-home visits began in July of 2024, Flannery observed a decline in Mother's parenting abilities and a regression in R.H.’s behaviors. Flannery observed that Mother did not engage R.H. in activities and Mother and R.H. spent roughly six to nine hours a week watching television. After the “honeymoon stage” of the in-home visits ended, R.H. began “knocking stuff down,” ignoring directions, and “[s]creaming, yelling, crying, [and] throwing toys.” Tr. Vol. III pp. 119, 132, 133. She also hit and bit Mother. Flannery recommended family therapy, but Mother resisted and, after family therapy began, Mother kicked the therapist out of her home, and the therapist never returned.

[21] Flannery supervised the visits until September of 2024, when Mother sent an email to Flannery's director, threatening harm to Flannery over a scheduling conflict. When the referral closed, Flannery still had concerns about Mother's parenting skills and ability to manage R.H.’s behaviors.

[22] GAL Minnette believed that Mother had never developed a bond with the Children. She never recommended unsupervised visits, given Mother's lack of progress in remedying the reasons for DCS's involvement. She was concerned that continuing the parent-child relationship would harm the Children because of ongoing safety and stability concerns and the lack of bonding with the Children. At the end of her tenure, she recommended adoption for all three Children “due to the lack of progress in the case towards reunification.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 143. GAL Minnette stopped working with the family because “it was a very difficult case”; “on paper it looked like everything was good, but th[e] case wasn't moving forward,” and Mother “was difficult as well[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 245.

[23] GAL Rocky Harvey “took over” the family's case from GAL Minnette in July of 2024, to provide “a clean slate.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 145. GAL Harvey recommended family therapy that ultimately proved unsuccessful because Mother had refused to work with the family therapist. Given Mother's lack of progress toward reunification, GAL Harvey never recommended unsupervised or overnight parenting time with the Children.

[24] On March 21, 2024, the juvenile court ordered Mother to complete a psychological evaluation “after the progress towards permanency had stalled out[; after] she threatened the life of [R.H.’s] placement[;] and [after Mother's] behavior became generally concerning.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 142. However, Mother refused to participate in the DCS-recommended evaluation and never completed it. Instead, Mother completed an intake assessment at a facility of her own choosing, but she “did not follow through with the process.” Ex. Vol. I p. 224.

[25] On February 9, 2025, Father attempted to break into Mother's home. The incident resulted in an active warrant for Father's arrest and the issuance of a “civil protection order and [a] criminal no contact order” that prevented Father from contacting Mother. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 144. On February 28, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights to the Children.

[26] On March 6, 2025, the juvenile court modified the dispositional decree and again ordered Mother to complete a psychological evaluation. Daniel Westmoreland, Ph.D. (“Dr. Westmoreland”), a clinical psychologist, evaluated Mother on April 21, 2025, and diagnosed Mother “with adjustment disorder with disturbance of emotions and conduct.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 143. Although Mother had already been successfully discharged from home-based therapy, Dr. Westmoreland recommended that Mother continue with therapy to address her ongoing stress and to help address her emotional and behavioral responses, “including her communication issues with service providers.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 143. Dr. Westmoreland also “opined that [Mother] was not mentally capable of parenting [the Children] in her home at that time without further services.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 143.

[27] The juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing on August 11, 12, and 13, 2025.⁵ During the hearing, DCS presented multiple witnesses, and Mother testified.

[28] D.G. testified that he did not feel safe in Mother's home because “she used to hit me and my brothers,” often “out of nowhere.” Tr. Vol. II p. 24. He testified that when he was eight, Mother had hit him in the head with a metal bat, had not taken him to the hospital, and “didn't care about it.” Tr. Vol. II p. 38. D.G. had reported the bat incident to his foster father and to his therapist, Sarah Miller. D.G. also testified that Father had beaten him and his brothers for no reason and that Mother had not intervened. D.G. testified that he had seen both Mother and Father hit his siblings and had seen Father push one of his brothers down the stairs. D.G. and B.G. both testified that on one occasion, Father had crashed his car into Mother's vehicle while she was driving the Children, which had left the boys “feeling scared.” Tr. Vol. II p. 34. D.G. further testified that he remained unwilling to return to Mother's care even if she no longer had contact with Father because he believed that Mother “would still hit” him and his siblings. Tr. Vol. II p. 31.

[29] B.G. similarly testified that both Mother and Father had hit him, Mother would not tell Father to stop the abuse, and Mother sometimes hit B.G. with a belt and threw things at him and his siblings. He testified that he had seen Mother hit his siblings, including D.G. and R.H. On one occasion, Father had tripped B.G. while he had had a cast on his hand and wrist, and Mother had laughed. On another occasion, when B.G. had been using his school laptop when he was not supposed to, Father had hit B.G.’s cast, causing B.G. to cry. B.G. further testified that Mother had once chased him and D.G. with a baseball bat over misplaced marijuana that Mother had later found in her own pocket. B.G. was “concerned that if he return[ed] to [Mother's] home, she w[ould] laugh off the violence/excessive discipline he and his siblings experienced.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 141. B.G. testified that he did not believe D.G. or R.H. would be safe in Mother's care and that he did not want to return to Mother's care even if Mother was no longer with Father.

[30] R.H.’s behavioral consultant, Kathy Kiebel, had worked with R.H. since February of 2025, to address R.H.’s “problematic behaviors at home and in the school”; Kiebel had observed “exaggerated reactions and tantrums beyond [what would be expected in] a typical four-year old.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 141. Kiebel testified that she had wanted to observe and assess Mother with R.H. to address the child's behaviors during visits, but Mother declined, saying that “she didn't need any help.” Tr. Vol. II p. 114.

[31] Mother testified at the termination hearing and denied having had contact with Father. Mother also denied “whooping on [her] kids.” Tr. Vol. II p. 193. She did, however, admit to disciplining the Children by hitting them with her “hand or a belt[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 193. The juvenile court found that, during her testimony, Mother had “denied or downplayed many of the concerns raised by other witnesses, while claiming she ha[d] complete[d] services and [wa]s prepared to care for R.H.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 141.

[32] When the termination hearing took place, B.G. had not lived with Mother for three years. He had been placed with his paternal grandmother for over two years and was thriving in his placement. D.G. had been placed with L.A., his foster father, since December 14, 2023, where he thrived and was bonded with his foster father and the other foster children in the home. R.H. had been placed with B.R. since November of 2022, and she was thriving in her placement, as the structure there “fit[ ] her needs.” Tr. Vol. III p. 68.

[33] Horton, B.G.’s therapist, testified that continuing the parent-child relationship between B.G. and Mother would cause emotional harm to B.G. Horton told the juvenile court that forcing the relationship “would probably cause some emotional harm and probably some behavior issues as well.” Tr. Vol. III p. 24.

[34] GAL Harvey testified that continuing the parent-child relationship would be harmful to the Children based upon the lack of progress in the case over the last three years and the ongoing concerns regarding the Children's safety and stability. He recommended the permanency plan of adoption because the Children needed permanency and the case was no closer to reunification than it had been three years ago. GAL Harvey also supported the termination of Mother's parental rights as to the Children.

[35] Sierra Fegan, the DCS permanency family case manager (“FCM”) who began working with the family around July of 2024, also testified that continuing the parent-child relationship between Mother and the Children would be harmful to the Children. When Fegan was asked if she believed that giving Mother more time would help Mother to reunify with the Children, Fegan answered, “[n]o.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 50.

[36] DCS's plan for all three Children was adoption by their current placements. All of the Children's respective placements indicated that they were willing to adopt the Children and were all able to meet each child's long-term needs.

[37] On November 11, 2025, the juvenile court issued its order terminating Mother's parental rights to the Children. Relevant to Mother's appeal, the juvenile court found:

155. [The Children] have been removed from their parents since June 21, 2022, which is at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months.

156. While [Mother] has completed some services, she has not made meaningful progress towards reunifying with the [Children] over the three years of the CHINS cases.

157. Despite DCS’ reasonable efforts to reunify the family, [Mother] has failed to remedy the circumstances that resulted in [the Children] being placed in care outside the parent's home.

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159. There exists a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in [the Children's] removal or the reasons for placement outside of [Mother's] home will not be remedied.

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165. There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship of [the Children] and [Mother] poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the [Children].

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168. Termination of the parent-child relationship for each of the [Children] is in their best interest.

169. Termination would allow [the Children] to be adopted into a stable and permanent home where their needs will each be safely met.

170. There exists a satisfactory plan for the future care and treatment of the [Children], that being adoption.

171. Each of the [Children's] placement[s] is appropriate and the caregivers are able to meet their respective needs. There are no concerns for the [Children's] safety and well-being in their current placement[s].

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 146–47.

Discussion and Decision

[38] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be subordinated to the best interests of the child. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[39] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Term. of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id.

[40] In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court's findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

[41] In order to terminate a parent's parental rights to a child, DCS must prove that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child and that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)–(3). Of relevance to this case, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) further provides that DCS must also prove the existence of one or more of the following circumstances:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a [CHINS] or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite [DCS's] reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d). Mother does not argue on appeal that DCS failed to prove that it has a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the Children, with that plan being adoption. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support termination of his parental rights to the Children, Mother argues only that DCS failed to make adequate findings to prove Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1).

The Juvenile Court's Findings are Sufficient to Support its Conclusion that DCS Sufficiently Proved Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1)

[42] In this case, DCS alleged that termination of Mother's parental rights was warranted under subsections 31-35-2-4(d)(2), -4(d)(3), and -4(d)(4). Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) explicitly provides that DCS must prove “one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d)[.]” (Emphasis added). Thus, DCS was only required to prove one of the circumstances listed in subsection 31-35-2-4(d) in support of its petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to the Children. See generally In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (addressing the prior version of the statute and explaining that because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) had used the word “or” and had therefore been written in the disjunctive, the juvenile court had only been required to find that one prong of subsection (B) had been proven by clear and convincing evidence), trans. denied.

[43] Pursuant to subsection 31-35-2-4(d)(3), the juvenile court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's continued placement outside of Mother's home will not be remedied.

When determining whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In so doing, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the services offered through [DCS]. A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change. Additionally, [DCS] was not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it needed to establish only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change.

In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 18–19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied.

[44] With respect to the reasonable probability that the conditions for the Children's continued placement outside Mother's care would not be remedied, the juvenile court made numerous findings regarding Mother's failure to make progress towards reunification or remedy the factors leading to the Children's continued removal from her care. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court's order terminating Mother's parental rights to the Children, we address Mother's numerous specific challenges to the juvenile court's factual findings.

A. Findings Numbers 27–29

[45] Mother challenges the juvenile court's factual findings numbers twenty-seven, twenty-eight, and twenty-nine. The findings read as follows:

27. [Mother] has been physically abusive with [D.G.] and his brothers, including chasing him with a bat.

28. The [C]hildren were subjected to violence/excessive discipline at least two times every week, sometimes with a belt and other times [Mother] would throw items at the [C]hildren.

29. [Mother] allowed her partner, [Father] to physically abuse the [C]hildren.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 141.

[46] In challenging these findings, Mother asserts that the findings are clearly erroneous “insofar as they suggested [that Mother] was persistently physically abusive to her sons.” Appellant's Br. p. 31. Specifically, Mother takes issue with the parts of the findings that provide that Mother was “physically abusive” to the boys; that she “chas[ed] them with a bat”; that Mother would “throw items at the [C]hildren”; and that Mother had “allowed” Father to abuse the Children. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 141.

[47] Mother acknowledges that D.G. testified that Mother had chased him and his brother with a baseball bat. However, D.G. also testified that he had only told his foster placement and his therapist about the incident. Moreover, D.G. had answered, “[m]aybe[,]” when he was asked if telling individuals about the incident would further his goal of being adopted. Tr. Vol. II p. 38. In light of this testimony, Mother maintains that “[n]o reasonable court could have found, by clear and convincing evidence, that a fact is true when the testifying witness tells a new story at the termination hearing and acknowledges their own motive to testify untruthfully.” Appellant's Br. p. 31. Mother argues that “evidence that a parent has hit their child is not synonymous with evidence that the parent has ‘abused’ their child[,]” when, in this case, Mother had testified that she had hit the Children as a form of discipline. Appellant's Br. p. 31.

[48] In challenging these findings, Mother does not challenge the accuracy of the information included in the findings. Instead, Mother's arguments relating to these factual findings amount to nothing more than a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

B. Finding Number 112

[49] Mother next challenges the juvenile court's finding number 112, which reads as follows:

112. [R.H.’s] parenting time progressed to overnights with [Mother], but that ended after [Mother] allowed [Father] to be around [R.H.], against the Court's orders and [R.H.] was returned after an overnight of parenting time with bruises on her legs.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 144.

[50] Mother takes issue with the part of the finding that states that DCS had revoked R.G.’s overnight parenting time based upon R.H. having been “returned ․ with bruises on her legs,” and after “[Mother] had allowed Father to be around R.H., against the Court's orders.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 144. Indeed, the juvenile court was presented with conflicting testimony regarding the bruising. GAL Minnette testified that R.H. had returned from the overnight visit with bruises on her leg. Day, Mother's former home-based case manager, testified that the report of the bruising was determined to be unsubstantiated, as what had appeared to be bruising had “ended up being eczema or something.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 17.

[51] It is well-settled that “[a] finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879 (emphasis added). And while the juvenile court was presented with conflicting testimony regarding the bruising, the juvenile court, acting as the trier-of-fact, was in the best position to weigh the evidence. See Tharp v. State, 942 N.E.2d 814, 816 (Ind. 2011) (providing that the trier-of-fact is best positioned to judge the credibility of the witnesses, is free to discredit testimony, and weigh conflicting evidence). In doing so, the juvenile court gave more weight to GAL Minnette's testimony than to that of the home-based case manager. This was within the juvenile court's discretion. See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). Mother's argument on appeal amounts to nothing more than an invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

[52] As for the part of the finding stating that Mother had allowed Father to be around R.H., GAL Minnette testified that

there was a time when the [DCS] team was in agreement with [R.H.] doing supervised visits in the home, but we had to stop it because there were allegations of [Father] being in the home. Even [R.H.] reaching for daddy and calling for daddy while leaving the house. So it was an issue of us thinking that he was there and he wasn't supposed to be there.

Tr. Vol. III p. 213. Mother argues that the evidence presented on the matter was thin and that “it was unreasonable for the [juvenile] court to rely on uncritical testimony from an admittedly ignorant source over that from a witness with more information.” Appellant's Br. p. 32. However, Mother's argument effectively amounts to a request to reweigh the evidence, which, again, we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

C. Findings Numbers 156–161

[53] Findings numbers 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, and 161 read as follows:

156. While [Mother] has completed some services, she has not made meaningful progress towards reunifying with the [C]hildren over the three years of the CHINS cases.

157. Despite DCS’ reasonable efforts to reunify the family, [Mother] has failed to remedy the circumstances that resulted in [the Children] being placed in care outside the parent's home.

158. Despite DCS’ reasonable efforts to reunify the family, [Father] has failed to remedy the circumstances that resulted in [R.H.] being placed in care outside the parent's home.

159. There exists a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in [the Children's] removal or the reasons for placement outside of [Mother's] home will not be remedied.

160. [Mother] fails to recognize the [C]hildren's prior trauma and denies the abuse the [C]hildren have experienced.

161. [Mother] has had five assessments for domestic violence, with three different men.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 146.

[54] In challenging these factual findings, and the juvenile court's conclusion as well, Mother presents only a bald assertion that these findings and conclusion “were clearly erroneous,” but provides no further argument. Appellant's Br. p. 36. We also note that Finding number 158 addresses Father and that the rule of standing “bars litigants”—in this case, Mother—“from asserting the right or legal interests of others in order to obtain relief from injury themselves.” Campbell v. El Dee Apartments, 701 N.E.2d 616, 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). Nevertheless, because Mother also argues that the remaining findings do not support the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights to the Children, we address Mother's challenges to these six findings below.

D. Remaining Findings of Fact

[55] Mother contends that the Children were removed from her home “because her home was occupied by a domestic abuser and because [Mother] refused to exclude that abuser from [her] life.” Appellant's Br. p. 34. In challenging the remaining factual findings, Mother asserts that DCS failed to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that she had failed to remedy those reasons for the Children's removal. Mother also asserts that DCS had failed to “elicit[ ]” evidence that R.H. “was subject to the same dangers” that had led to the termination of Mother's parental rights to the boys. Appellant's Br. p. 35.

[56] In support of her arguments, Mother focuses our attention on the progress she believes she has made towards reunification with the Children. For instance, Mother contends that when the termination hearing took place, she had “maintained a safe home and had taken meaningful steps to exclude dangerous people from her life[,]” and she had “obtained a protective order against [Father] and had reported him to the police multiple times.” Appellant's Br. pp. 34–35. Mother emphasizes the juvenile court's Finding number eighty-two, where the juvenile court found that she had “completed the domestic violence education.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 143. And Mother maintains that certain service providers testified that she has a strong bond with R.H.

[57] While Mother is to be commended for maintaining housing and employment, for participating in and completing some of the court-ordered services, and for the progress she has made in addressing her domestic-violence and anger-management issues, the evidence presented supports the juvenile court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's continued placement outside of Mother's home would not be remedied.

[58] Evidence was presented that over the course of fifteen years, Mother has been the subject of five DCS assessments for domestic violence with three different men. The Children were removed from Mother's care, “due to allegations of abuse and/or neglect[,]” and the Children were adjudicated as CHINS due to the domestic violence incident that had occurred in the home. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 140. Both B.G. and D.G. testified in detail to the physical abuse they had suffered at the hands of Mother and Father, and neither child wanted to reunify with Mother because they feared further abuse. Both boys testified that they had witnessed Mother hit their siblings, including R.H. And B.G. was concerned that if he returned to Mother's care, she would not take seriously “the violence/excessive discipline he and his siblings experienced.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 141. D.G. and B.G. last had in-person visits with Mother in May of 2023.

[59] D.G.’s therapist testified that reunification with Mother would “set [D.G.] back” both emotionally and behaviorally and that Mother was unable to meet D.G.’s long-term therapeutic needs. Tr. Vol. III p. 4. B.G.’s therapist testified that continuing the parent-child relationship between Mother and B.G. would result in emotional harm to him. And both GAL Harvey and FCM Fegan testified that continuing the parent-child relationship between Mother and the Children would be harmful to the Children.

[60] The supervised visitation provider testified that when in-home visits took place between Mother and R.H., Mother resisted participating in family therapy and kicked the therapist out of her home. The provider also testified that R.H. experienced a regression with her concerning behaviors during in-home visits with Mother. GAL Minnette testified that while the DCS team had initially agreed to supervised in-home visits between Mother and R.H., the team stopped the visits after allegations emerged that Father was present in the home, which was evidenced by R.H. reaching and calling for Father as she left the house.

[61] Regarding Mother's ability to manage R.H.’s concerning behaviors—that included hitting and biting Mother—the supervised visitation provider testified that she had concerns. The service provider testified that Mother struggled to redirect R.H. when R.H. displayed the concerning behaviors, and that Mother had told the supervised visitation provider that she was tired and did not want to deal with R.H.’s behavior. Evidence was also presented that Mother had threatened harm to the service provider over a scheduling conflict. Additional evidence was presented that Mother had engaged in a pattern of “hiring and firing” her service providers. Tr. Vol. III p. 65. Indeed, whenever Mother disagreed with a provider, she demanded a replacement, which hindered her progress toward reunification with the Children.

[62] R.H.’s therapist testified that R.H. would need ongoing therapy as she aged and that Mother would not be able to meet her needs. Dr. Westmoreland evaluated Mother approximately four months before the termination hearing took place. He testified that at the time of the evaluation, Mother was not mentally capable of parenting the Children in her home without the benefit of additional services.

[63] Insofar as evidence suggests that Mother has the ability to succeed in reunifying with the Children, particularly with R.H., the evidence also suggests that Mother has repeatedly hindered her progress towards that goal—and in the three years since the CHINS case commenced, has not demonstrated an ability to consistently provide a safe, stable home for the Children. See In re Campbell, 534 N.E.2d 273, 275 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (noting an unwillingness to put a child “on a shelf” until parents are capable of providing appropriate care and that “[t]wo years without improvement [wa]s long enough”).

[64] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court's factual findings and the ultimate determination that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's continued placement outside of Mother's home would not be remedied. Mother's arguments to the contrary, including her challenges to the juvenile court's specific factual findings, amount to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, and this we may not do.⁶ See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

[65] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Br.C., the alleged father of B.G., consented to B.G.’s adoption, and the juvenile court dismissed him from the instant termination proceedings. The identity of D.G.’s father is unknown.

2.   Father, whose parental rights to R.H. were also terminated in this proceeding, does not participate in this appeal.

3.   Neither Br.G. nor J.G. is a party to this appeal; however, at some point in time, they were both involved with DCS and adjudicated CHINS. The CHINS cases for Br.G, and J.G. were closed out, with the children placed in the care of their respective fathers. Facts pertaining to Mother's other children are included where relevant to Mother's appeal.

4.   B.R. worked at the DCS central office as a clinical consultant but was not permitted to access Mother's and the Children's DCS records.

5.   Father failed to appear for the evidentiary hearing but was represented by counsel.

6.   Mother also argues that the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the Children's well-being. However, as DCS is required to prove only one of the factors alleged in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c), we need not address Mother's argument. See, e.g., In re J.S., 183 N.E.3d 362, 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (addressing prior version of the statute and noting that, regarding factors required to terminate parental rights, the statute is written in the disjunctive and, thus, DCS need prove only one of the enumerated elements therein), trans. denied.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J. and Felix, J., concur.