LAX v. STATE (2022)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Natisha V. Lax (Lax), appeals her conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2(a).

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE

[3] Lax presents this court with one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support her conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] In the evening hours of March 19, 2021, while driving westbound on 38th Street in Indianapolis, Indiana, Stephanie Henrique-Ramirez (Henrique-Ramirez) observed a black Impala stopped in the middle of two lanes. Henrique-Ramirez drove around the stopped vehicle and proceeded to the traffic light. While she was stopped by a red traffic light, the black Impala, driven by Lax, collided into the rear of her vehicle. Lax did not exit her car and Henrique-Ramirez contacted law enforcement.

[5] When Officer Robert Williams of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (Officer Williams) responded to the scene, both Henrique-Ramirez and Lax were still seated in their cars. Although Lax admitted to Officer Williams that she was the driver of the vehicle, when questioned about her account of the accident, Lax indicated that she did not know what happened or was non-responsive. She attempted to leave the scene several times and had to be restrained and placed in handcuffs. Because Officer Williams suspected that Lax was intoxicated, he requested a D.U.I. car for further investigation.

[6] Lieutenant Mark McCardia (Officer McCardia) responded to the call. After advising Lax of her Miranda rights, Officer McCardia asked her some preliminary questions. Although Lax was “very polite and friendly,” she had difficulty communicating, struggled to answer questions, stared off into space, and swayed back and forth. (Transcript Vol. II, p. 39). When asked for her license, Lax could not get it out of her pocket. Officer McCardia attempted to administer the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, but Lax had difficulty following instructions and keeping her head still. Lax was also unable to participate in the walk-and-turn test and the one-leg-stand tests. Even though Lax denied she was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, she admitted that she had taken her prescribed bipolar medications, Risperidone and Depakote. Lax consented to a blood draw and Officer McCardia accompanied her to Eskenazi Hospital.

[7] On March 20, 2021, the State filed an Information, charging Lax with operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, a Class A misdemeanor. On March 16, 2022, the trial court conducted a bench trial. During the proceedings, Dr. Shelia Arnold (Dr. Arnold), a forensic toxicologist from the Indiana Department of Toxicology, testified that Lax's blood tested positive for only Risperidone and Depakote—both of which were within therapeutic range. Dr. Arnold explained that even though the concentration of both medications was found to be within normal, prescribed amounts, both medications “interact with the central nervous system, [and have] the ability to cause impairment as a side effect.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 59). She opined that, based on “the concentrations and the drugs found, as well as the officer's observations and the video,” Lax was impaired on the day of the incident. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 59). Dr. Arnold added that both medications come with warning labels about driving because they can cause impaired judgment and thinking. In addition to the warning labels, a separate warning for Risperidone would have been given because of its potential to cause twitching and involuntary muscle reaction, like shifting from side to side, or a slowed ability to process information, such as delayed responses.

[8] Lax testified that she had been taking Risperidone and Depakote as prescribed to treat her bipolar disorder for the past five years. She explained that she felt fine on the night of the accident and was not drowsy or confused. In describing the accident, Lax claimed that her vehicle had stalled and stopped in the middle of the road, and, after getting the car started again, she hit another vehicle. She added that she was nervous and anxious due to a distrust of police.

[9] At the close of the evidence, the trial court found Lax guilty as charged. In rendering its guilty judgment, the trial court explained,

She's out of it. She is intoxicated on the side of the road there for sure. She is not - she's not having any sort of episode. She's not confused. She's not scared because of the cops or anything like that. She is intoxicated. Now it sounds like it's because of an adverse drug reaction that she's legally taking beyond - within her normal therapeutic ranges, but it is possible to be intoxicated in that situation. I have an officer with a lot of years of experience and a Ph.D. telling me she was intoxicated. So, I think we're kind of done there. She was intoxicated.

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 75). On March 23, 2022, the trial court sentenced Lax to 365 days of non-reporting probation. During the proceeding, the trial court noted, in pertinent part,

Plenty of people can drive unimpaired on meds but something can happen. And something happened here. I've heard what you've said. I heard your testimony, but I looked at the video and I listened to our - the expert and that's why I made my decision. But I have wondered about people like you for years because I don't think people in your situation should be sentenced to a lifetime of never driving. That's the real shame in all this that, you know, for years you were doing everything right. Something happened from a reaction standpoint is what I think and you became impaired.

I think that you had a drug interaction and I think that that drug interaction made you commit the crime of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated under the Indiana definition of intoxication. And you were dangerous because you crashed into someone.

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 84).

[10] Lax now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

[11] Lax contends that the State failed to establish sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support her conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts must only consider the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). It is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient. Id. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it “most favorably to the trial court's ruling.” Id. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 146-47 (quotation omitted). It is therefore not necessary that the evidence “overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Id. at 147 (quotation omitted). “[T]he evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the” judgment. Id. (quotation omitted).

[12] To support the conviction, the State was required to prove that Lax operated her vehicle while intoxicated in a manner that endangered a person. See I.C. § 9-30-5-2(a). Focusing solely on the ‘intoxicated’ prong of the statute, Lax argues that because she used her prescribed medication at therapeutic level and had never before experienced any symptoms of impairment, “her difficulty in answering questions and having involuntary movements [ ] may very well be from her [bipolar] diagnosis.” (Appellant's Br. p. 12).

[13] According to Indiana law, “intoxicated” is defined as being under the influence of:

(1) alcohol;

(2) a controlled substance (as defined in I.C. [ch.] 35-48-1);

(3) a drug other than alcohol or a controlled substance;

(4) a substance described in I.C. [§] 35-46-6-2 or I.C. [§] 35-46-6-3;

(5) a combination of substances described in subdivisions (1) through (4); or

(6) any other substance, not including food and food ingredients (as defined in I.C. [§] 6-2.5-1-20), tobacco (as defined in I.C. [§] 6-2.5-1-28), or a dietary supplement (as defined in I.C. [§] 6-2.5-1-16);

so that there is an impaired condition of thought and action and the loss of normal control of a person's faculties.

I.C. § 9-13-2-86 (emphasis added). Proof of intoxication does not require proof of blood alcohol content; it is sufficient to show that the defendant was impaired. Ballinger v. State, 717 N.E.2d 939, 943 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Evidence of impairment may include: “(1) the consumption of significant amounts of alcohol; (2) impaired attention and reflexes; (3) watery or bloodshot eyes; (4) the odor of alcohol on the breath; (5) unsteady balance; (6) failure of field sobriety tests; [and] (7) slurred speech.” Gatewood v. State, 921 N.E.2d 45, 48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Therefore, the issue on appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to prove that Lax had an impaired condition of thought and action and the loss of normal control of a person's faculties.

[14] Lax's blood tested positive for Risperidone and Depakote, both of which were prescribed to her and which were found to be within therapeutic levels. Risperidone and Depakote are central nervous depressants and have “the ability to cause impairment as a side effect.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 59). Officer McCardia testified that Lax had difficulty communicating, struggled when answering questions, stared off into space, swayed back and forth, and fumbled to get her license out of her pocket. The officer attempted to administer field sobriety tests but stopped when Lax was unable to physically perform them. Based on the officer's observations and Dr. Arnold's clarification that impairment is a noted side effect of a central nervous depressant, we conclude that the fact-finder could reasonably infer that on the date of the incident Lax was intoxicated, as defined by the statute. Lax's claim that her anxiety and stress of being around law enforcement was the source of the unusual behavior, is nothing more than a request to reweigh the evidence, which is not within our province on appeal. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146.

[15] Contending that “there is certainly sufficient evidence that if there was intoxication as a result of the medications, [Lax] was completely unaware of the side effects-especially after five years of usage with no incidents,” Lax is relying on the defense of involuntary intoxication in an attempt to defeat her conviction. (Appellant's Br. p. 13). “It is a defense [to intoxication] that the person who engaged in the prohibited conduct did so while he was intoxicated, only if the intoxication resulted from the introduction of a substance into his body: (1) without his consent; or (2) when he did not know that the substance might cause intoxication.” I.C. § 35-41-3-5. We find the defense here to be inapplicable. Lax voluntarily ingested her medications, which she had been taking for the past five years. Dr. Arnold advised the trial court that both medications come with warning labels about driving because they can cause impaired judgment and thinking, with an additional warning for Risperidone because of its potential to induce twitching, involuntary muscle reactions, and slowed information processes.

[16] While we are not unsympathetic to Lax's plight—taking her medications within prescribed therapeutic levels only to be found guilty of intoxication based on signs of impairment—and we recognize the trial court's sentiment that an adverse drug interaction occurred, under the current statutory scheme and the evidence before us, we cannot but affirm the trial court's judgment.

CONCLUSION

[17] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support Lax's conviction of operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, as a Class A misdemeanor.

[18] Affirmed.

Riley, Judge.

[19] May, J. and Tavitas, J. concur