N.B., Appellant-Respondent v. S.K., Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] N.B. appeals the trial court's grant of an order of protection filed by S.K., arguing the evidence is insufficient to support the order. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] N.B. and S.K. married in August 2023 and have one child together, J.B. (Child), born in 2024. S.K. also has two daughters from a prior relationship. In February 2025, S.K. filed for divorce, which was finalized in July.

[3] In October, S.K. filed a petition for a protection order. The court granted an ex parte order and set a hearing for November. At the hearing, S.K. testified as to incidents of emotional and physical abuse during the marriage. She stated, when she was pregnant, N.B. would “sit on top of [her] legs” so she “couldn't get up or leave[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 6. She further testified that N.B. was aware she had experienced domestic abuse in other relationships and would “taunt” her about it during arguments and stand in doorways “so [she] couldn't leave[.]” Id. at 7. According to S.K., the final incident of physical abuse occurred in February 2025, when, during an argument, N.B. pushed her down the stairs in front of her children.¹

[4] S.K. also testified that N.B. texted her about her daughters, “threaten[ing] to show up at public events of theirs [which] would be very upsetting to them.” Id. at 12. Finally, S.K. stated N.B. would “driv[e] by [her] house” and text her or “people who are at [her] house asking them what they're doing at [her] home[.]” Id. at 11.

[5] N.B. testified and denied any physical abuse. He acknowledged he had driven by S.K.’s house but stated he did so for legitimate reasons such as looking at homes for sale in the area. During his testimony, text messages between S.K. and N.B. were admitted. Most of the messages related to Child. The messages show that from July to September 2025, S.K. requested N.B. stop contacting her nineteen times, but he continued.

[6] After the hearing, the court issued an order of protection enjoining N.B. from contacting S.K. except for “as it relates to [Child] in regards to parenting time changes.” App. Vol. II pp. 8-9. The order also prohibits N.B. from going to S.K.’s residence and place of employment, as well as places frequented by S.K. and her household members. N.B. now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] We begin by noting that S.K. has not filed an appellee's brief. When an appellee fails to submit a brief, we do not undertake the burden of developing arguments for the appellee, and we apply a less stringent standard of review. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d 350, 351 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Thus, we may reverse if the appellant establishes prima facie error, which is error at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it. Id. at 351-52.

[8] N.B. asserts that his text messages were legitimate communications related to parenting Child and not the type of impermissible contact prohibited by Indiana's Civil Protection Order Act. He also argues that the communications did not indicate a present credible threat to S.K., and that there is no showing the communications caused S.K. emotional distress.

[9] In reviewing a trial court's judgment entering a protective order, “we apply a two-tiered standard of review—we consider whether the evidence supports the court's findings and, if so, whether those findings support the judgment.” S.D. v. G.D., 211 N.E.3d 494, 497 (Ind. 2023). “In deference to the trial court's proximity to the issues, we disturb the order only where there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the order.” J.T. v. A.H., 255 N.E.3d 512, 517 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing Fox v. Bonam, 45 N.E.3d 794, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)), trans. denied. “[W]e neither reweigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of witnesses, and we consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court's decision.” S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 497 (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court further explained:

Indeed, our trial courts are far better than appellate courts at weighing evidence and assessing witness credibility. And this is particularly true in protective order cases, where our trial judges see and hear the parties interact as they relay details about intensely personal, traumatic events. Our review of this evidence on appeal is far less clear from our vantage point in the far corner of the upper deck.

J.T., 255 N.E.3d at 517 (citing S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 497). In addition, the appellant must establish that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous, “meaning a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.” Id.

[10] The Indiana Civil Protection Order Act (CPOA) provides that “[a] person who is or has been subjected to harassment may file a petition for an order for protection against a person who has committed repeated acts of harassment against the petitioner.” Ind. Code § 34-26-5-2(b) (2021). The petitioner must establish harassment by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(h) (2024).

[11] Our legislature has defined “harassment” as “conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but is not limited to, repeated or continuing impermissible contact: (1) that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress; and (2) that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress.” Ind. Code § 34-6-2.1-80 (2025). Harassment “does not include statutorily or constitutionally protected activity[.]” Id. “Impermissible contact” includes but is not limited to (1) following or pursuing the victim; (2) communicating with the victim; and (3) posting on social media if the post is directed to the victim or refers directly or indirectly to the victim. Ind. Code § 35-45-10-3(a) (2022).

[12] Additionally, “[t]o justify the issuance of a protective order, the harassment must objectively include a present and credible threat.” J.T., 255 N.E.3d at 517 (citing S.H. v. D.W., 139 N.E.3d 214, 220 (Ind. 2020)). “A credible threat is plausible or believable.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

I. Impermissible Contact

[13] N.B. first argues his contact was not impermissible because it related to co-parenting Child. We disagree. While many of the communications N.B. sent to S.K. regarded co-parenting, others did not, particularly messages he sent after she requested he stop contacting her. For example, on August 19, 2025, N.B. became upset over S.K. cutting their son's hair. S.K. requested he stop contacting her unless it regarded parenting time. He thereafter texted her fifteen times in approximately twenty-four hours, despite her repeated requests for him to stop, including the following:

Looks like I'll need [attorney] on retainer

Once again let me know who to reach out too [sic] if you won't coparent and respond

Do you understand?

Do you have any questions?

Your passive behavior is crippling

You know exactly what I'm talking about. Look up

I pray God softens your heart

Ex. Vol. III pp. 56-58. On other occasions, N.B. texted S.K. regarding her daughters, including asking about their activities, suggesting he would attend these activities, and accusing her of “hid[ing] them from” him. Id. at 47.

[14] Furthermore, impermissible contact includes following or pursuing the victim. S.K. testified that N.B. would drive by her house and then communicate with her about who was there based on cars parked outside. This is supported by the text messages, and by N.B.’s own testimony. See id. at 68, 69.

[15] This is all sufficient evidence from which the trial court could find there was impermissible contact.

II. Credible Threat

[16] N.B. also argues the evidence does not support the trial court's finding that he was a credible threat to S.K. As it relates to the “credible threat” requirement, our Supreme Court has explained,

Ultimately, our trial courts must consider the evidence and determine whether the respondent's actions—viewed objectively at the time the petitioner seeks relief—provide reasonable grounds to believe the threat of violence persists. While lapses in time or intervening events may be probative of whether a threat persists, so too are a variety of other relevant circumstances, including the parties’ history and relationship, the respondent's past behavior, the nature of the respondent's actions, or the respondent's demeanor in court.

S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 499.

[17] S.K. testified as to several incidents of abuse during the marriage, including one in early 2025 that occurred in front of the children and prompted her to file for divorce. The parties’ communications after the divorce show continuing conflict between the two. Additionally, their involvement in each other's lives is likely to continue due to Child's young age. See S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 500 (finding ex-husband was a credible threat to his former wife in part due to their shared child's young age and the likely continued involvement they would have with each other). From this evidence, the court could reasonably conclude N.B. posed an objectively credible threat to S.K.

III. Emotional Distress

[18] Finally, N.B. argues the evidence does not support that a reasonable person would have felt emotional distress, nor that S.K. actually felt emotional distress. N.B. likens this case to L.O. v. D.O., 124 N.E.3d 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In that case, the trial court granted an order of protection to D.O. after she testified her former spouse, L.O., kept texting her after she requested he stop. Notably, D.O. testified specifically that she did not feel threatened by the contact and that L.O. had never physically harmed her. L.O. appealed and we reversed, finding insufficient evidence “to support a finding that the contacts would cause a reasonable person and in fact caused [the victim] to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened or to suffer emotional distress.” Id. at 1241.

[19] N.B. argues the same can be said here, namely that S.K. is characterizing “[c]o-parenting communication” as harassment. Appellant's Br. p. 17. We disagree. As noted above, N.B.’s contacts were not limited to co-parenting communication. Rather, during arguments he incessantly texted S.K. after being asked to stop. He also texted about her daughters and implied he would show up at their public events, which she found “threaten[ing.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 12. And his contact went beyond texting, as he drove by S.K.’s home and would contact her if he saw a third party's car present.

[20] And unlike in L.O., it is clear from the record that N.B.’s contacts actually caused S.K. emotional distress. S.K. testified that N.B. had abused her in the past, and that his current contacts made her feel harassed and stalked. When asked what had “happened that [made her] feel harassed and stalked[,]” she replied:

It's the abuse, it's the physical intimidation, it's the using social media to know my whereabouts from people we have in common and us[ing] that as a way to harass and attack me.

Driving past my house, driving – texting people who are there, constantly attacking me from anything he could think of[.]

Id. at 27. The record indicates S.K. was emotional while delivering this testimony. See id. (notation indicating S.K. was crying); see also App. Vol. II p. 13 (trial court noting S.K. “became upset during her testimony”). This is sufficient evidence from which the trial court could have found S.K. suffered emotional distress.

[21] Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court's determination that N.B. harassed S.K. was supported by the evidence and sufficient to support issuance of the protective order.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Criminal charges were later filed as a result of this incident. See Case No. 06C01-2604-F6-000754. The case is still pending.

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.