C.M.S., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE OF INDIANA (2000)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

C.M.S. (“C.S.”) appeals her conviction by a jury for possession of a controlled substance as a Class D felony.

We affirm.

ISSUES

1. Whether C.S. gave a valid waiver of her Miranda rights.

2. Whether the State established the corpus delicti of the offense.

3. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.

FACTS

The facts most favorable to the verdict reveal that C.S. and Terry Weishight (“Weishight”) lived together in Greenwood, Indiana. On February 7, 1998, Officer John Milton (“Officer Milton”) of the Greenwood Police Department was invited by Weishight to come to his home. When Officer Milton arrived, Weishight led him to a dresser in an upstairs bedroom. Weishight opened the dresser drawer and showed Officer Milton syringes and several vials of liquid labeled as morphine. Weishight stated that they belonged to C.S., who was a nurse at St. Vincent Hospital. C.S. was not at home and Officer Milton left without taking any of the items.

The next day, Officer Milton returned with Officer Brian Blackwell (“Officer Blackwell”). When Weishight opened the door, he pulled one of the vials out of his pocket and said that C.S. was upstairs sleeping. The officers were invited in and went upstairs. After they knocked on the bedroom door, C.S. told the officers they could enter. Officer Milton walked to the dresser and opened the drawer. Inside, were the same vials, minus the one Weishight took from his pocket.

Officer Milton read the Miranda warning to C.S., and, because he was not sure she understood, he read it two additional times. She stated, “Yes, I understand.” (R. 231). Officer Milton then asked her where the morphine came from. C.S. initially denied that the vials were hers, but later admitted that she obtained the vials from St. Vincent Hospital. C.S. was placed under arrest and charged with possession of a controlled substance.

On September 1, 1998, C.S. filed a Motion to Suppress Statement. A hearing was held on September 28, 1998. C.S. testified that she suffered from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and was prone to panic attacks. She also stated that she was under the influence of prescription medication. As a result, she said, she was in a state of shock and could not have given a voluntary waiver of her Fifth Amendment rights. At the hearing, Officers Milton and Blackwell stated that C.S. understood the Miranda warning and voluntarily gave a statement. When asked if C.S. appeared to be suffering from a panic attack, Officer Milton stated that she was not having trouble breathing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the motion under advisement. On March 12, 1999, the trial court denied C.S.'s motion to suppress, and a trial by jury was eventually scheduled for December 7, 1999.

At trial, Officers Milton and Blackwell testified that Weishight invited them to the house. Officer Milton testified that after C.S. waived her Miranda rights, “She admitted that yes it was her morphine, it was in her possession, that she had taken it from the hospital that she worked at, St. Vincent.” (R. 232). Officer Blackwell's testimony corroborated Officer Milton's testimony. Glen Maxwell (“Maxwell”), a forensic chemist, also testified that State's exhibit seven, an empty vial collected from the bedroom, contained morphine residue. Further, Weishight testified that C.S. told him that she obtained the morphine from St. Vincent Hospital so that she could kill herself and her child. At the conclusion of the trial, C.S. was convicted and judgment was entered.

DECISION

1. Waiver of Miranda Rights

C.S. argues that the trial court erred in admitting her custodial statement. She admits that Officer Milton advised her of the Miranda warning; however, because she had just woken up and was under the effects of prescription medication, she argues, that her waiver was not knowingly and voluntarily given.

The decision to admit a custodial statement is within the trial court's discretion. Horan v. State, 682 N.E.2d 502 (Ind. 1997). “However, that discretion is subject to the State proving 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was preceded by a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel.”' Id. at 509 (quoting Brewer v. State, 646 N.E.2d 1382, 1385 (Ind. 1995)). When reviewing the trial court's decision, we will examine the record for substantial, probative evidence of voluntariness, and we will not reweigh the evidence. Id.

In this case, the trial court ruled that although C.S. was the subject of custodial interrogation, she had knowingly and voluntarily given statements to the police. The evidence shows that Officer Milton testified that he read C.S. the Miranda warning three times because he was not sure she understood. After the third time, she said, “Yes, I understand.” (R. 23). Officer Blackwell corroborated his testimony and believed that she understood her Miranda rights. However, C.S. asks us to reconsider the evidence of her condition prior to the interrogation. We decline this invitation to reweigh the evidence and find no abuse of discretion.

2. Corpus Delicti

C.S. argues that the trial court erred in admitting her statements. Specifically, she argues that the State failed to establish the corpus delicti of the crime.

In order for a defendant's extrajudicial confession to be admitted at trial, the State must establish corpus delicti of the crime by independent evidence. Johnson v. State, 653 N.E.2d 478 (Ind. 1995). The purpose of this rule is to reduce the risk of convicting an innocent person who has confessed to a crime that did not occur, and to “'prevent coercive interrogation tactics, and encourage thorough criminal investigations.”' Id. at 479 (quoting Willoughby v. State, 552 N.E.2d 462, 466 (Ind. 1990). “To support the introduction of a defendant's confession into evidence, the corpus delicti of the crime must be established by independent evidence of (1) the occurrence of the specific kind of injury and (2) someone's criminal act as the cause of the injury.” Jones v. State, 701 N.E.2d 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). The State does not have to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt; however, the burden of proof is met if the evidence provides an inference that a crime was committed. Id. Circumstantial evidence is also sufficient to establish corpus delicti. Id. Additionally, the corpus delicti does not have to be proven before the admission of the confession as long as the totality of independent evidence presented at trial establishes it. Id. “Once properly admitted, a confession is direct evidence of guilt of the criminal activity admitted.” Id. at 866-867.

IND. CODE § 35-48-4-7(a) provides that a “person who, without a valid prescription or order of a practitioner acting in the course of his professional practice, knowingly or intentionally possesses a controlled substance (pure or adulterated) classified in schedule I, II, III, or IV, ․ commits possession of a controlled substance, a Class D felony.” Morphine is included in schedule II. IND. CODE § 35-48-2-6.

In this case, Weishight testified that he invited officers to his home and showed them a vial labeled morphine. Weishight also testified that C.S. had stated that she obtained the morphine from St. Vincent Hospital so that she could kill herself and her child. Officers Milton and Blackwell stated that they observed and collected the vials. Further, Maxwell testified that the residue in one of the vials was morphine. As a result, we find that the evidence creates an inference that the crime of possession of a controlled substance, the corpus delicti, was committed. Therefore, C.S.'s admission was properly admitted.

3. Sufficiency of Evidence

C.S. argues that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction.

In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we will affirm the conviction unless, considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the judgment, and neither reweighing the evidence nor judging the credibility of the witnesses, we conclude that no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Scruggs v. State, 49S00-9908-CR-457 (Ind. 2000).

As we mentioned above, a properly admitted confession is direct evidence of guilt. Jones, 701 N.E.2d 866. Because C.S.'s admission was properly admitted and there was independent corroborating testimony concerning her confession, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence to support her conviction. See Conner v. State, 580 N.E.2d 214 (Ind. 1991).

We affirm.

DARDEN, Judge

FRIEDLANDER, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.