Douglas A. Jones, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Douglas A. Jones was convicted of Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon;¹ Level 6 felony strangulation;² and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery.³ Jones argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights and the Indiana Rules of Evidence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Jones and Anna Dunne were in a dating relationship. Dunne purchased a mobile home, and she and Jones co-signed a lot rental at the Brookside Manor park in Goshen. Jones and Dunne lived at the mobile home and were engaged to be married in 2023. But the engagement didn't last. The relationship became emotionally abusive. By 2024, the couple had separated. Jones moved to Wisconsin.

[4] After some time, however, Jones and Dunne reconnected and continued “an on and off relationship[.]” Tr. Vol. 4 at 15. Although he no longer had keys to the property or clothing at the home, Jones would sometimes come down from Wisconsin and visit Dunne on the weekends.

[5] In late July 2024, Dunne's brother passed away, so she asked Jones to “come help [her] pack up [her] brother's things and he said yes.” Id. at 16. The two agreed to meet on August 9. Jones arrived in the afternoon. He picked up keys from Dunne's workplace, then drove to her home at Brookside Manor and waited for Dunne's shift to end. Dunne arrived at the mobile home some two hours later. Jones was outside with Dunne's two dogs, Angel and Boomer. Dunne greeted Jones and went inside to prepare dinner.

[6] About an hour later, while sitting on the porch swing with Jones, Dunne questioned why he placed Boomer on the leash. Jones became “really upset” during the conversation. Id. at 19. Dunne went inside and inadvertently locked the door. When Jones was unable to enter, he “was furious” because he thought Dunne deliberately locked him out. Id. at 20. Dunne let him in and she explained she had not locked the door on purpose. The two sat down at the table but kept arguing. Jones then “pushed [Dunne] so hard” the chair legs broke. Id. Dunne fell backwards. She was “really confused” about what happened and asked Jones to leave, but the two “started arguing again.” Id. Jones did not leave. When Jones went to the bedroom later, Dunne walked over to her neighbor's and told him she “might need help” before quickly returning home. Id. at 21.

[7] Things calmed down for a bit, but soon Jones and Dunne resumed arguing. During the disagreement, Jones grabbed Dunne and “started choking” her with one hand. Id. at 25. Following this latest attack, Dunne went to the bedroom to sleep. Jones went to bed next to her. While in bed, Dunne texted her sister, stating “[she] needed help, [and] that [Jones] tried to strangle [her].” Id. at 30. Dunne's sister called 9-1-1 around midnight and reported the incident.

[8] Officers Justin Yoder and Cameron Paulson of the Elkhart County Sheriff's Office were near Brookside Manor and responded to the emergency call. The officers arrived shortly after midnight. Both officers drove their vehicles with the sirens and emergency lights off, and they parked some distance from Dunne's mobile home. As the officers approached on foot, they noticed the home's interior lights were on and could hear loud music playing inside. They also observed a window with broken blinds. The two officers then stepped onto the property, which was “[f]our to six feet” from the public roadway. Tr. Vol. 3 at 34.

[9] Officer Yoder approached the front door, and Officer Paulson walked toward the back door near the window with broken blinds. Officer Paulson repeatedly knocked on the door, but no one answered. He heard Officer Yoder knocking while announcing himself as law enforcement. Through the window, Officer Paulson saw “two chairs were knocked over[.]” Id. at 35. He walked toward the room where the music was playing and knocked on the window from outside. Jones opened the back door a few moments later with a handgun in his hand.⁴ Officer Paulson drew his weapon and ordered Jones to put away the gun. Jones complied. After he confiscated the weapon, Officer Paulson asked Jones for permission to enter the home to look for Dunne. Jones consented, and the officer found Dunne in the bedroom where he verified her safety.

[10] The State charged Jones with Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon based on a previous conviction;⁵ Level 6 felony strangulation; Class A misdemeanor domestic battery; and Class A misdemeanor intimidation.⁶

[11] Jones filed a motion to suppress. He asked the trial court to exclude “all evidence seized in connection with this case” because law enforcement allegedly violated his Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 constitutional rights. Id. at 94. The State countered the officers acted in conformity with federal and state constitutional safeguards. Following a suppression hearing, the court denied Jones’ motion.

[12] The case proceeded to a bifurcated jury trial, where Dunne and Officers Yoder and Paulson testified to the above events.⁷ Officer Yoder testified about the unpredictable and dangerous nature of domestic violence calls, Tr. Vol. 3 at 106, and Officer Paulson described incidents involving strangulation as especially time sensitive, id. at 26, 28. Another officer—who eventually joined Yoder and Paulson at the mobile home—testified it was common for victims of domestic violence to have others contact law enforcement because “they're scared, [or] fearful of retaliation if they do contact the police.” Id. at 128.

[13] Dunne's neighbor, Robert Larkin, also testified. Larkin stated he saw Jones hit one of Dunne's dogs “on the end of the nose[.]” Id. at 178. Jones objected to the testimony, alleging it contained statements inadmissible as prior bad acts. The trial court overruled his objection. At the close of phase one, the jury found Jones guilty of strangulation, domestic battery, and possession of a firearm. At the end of phase two, the jury found Jones was a serious violent felon.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of evidence.

[14] First, Jones argues the trial court erred by admitting evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Second, he argues the court erroneously admitted testimonial evidence of a prior bad act in contravention of Evidence Rule 404. We address each claim below.

[15] We review a trial court's decision on the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Carr v. State, 274 N.E.3d 444, 452 (Ind. 2026). This Court will reverse only if the trial court's determination is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.” Brooks v. State, 250 N.E.3d 1119, 1125 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Where claims relating to the admission or exclusion of evidence implicate constitutional issues, we review those claims de novo. Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 189 (Ind. 2021).

A. Fourth Amendment

[16] According to Jones, “[a]fter leaving the public roadway, and entering [his] property ․ Officer Paulson invaded the very sanctity and privacy of [his] home, and curtilage, by placing himself approximately one to two feet from a side window and peering inside a window to the residence.” Appellant's Br. at 25. He therefore asks us to reverse the “trial court's determination to admit the evidence related to [his] possessing a firearm, as well as any evidence related to the battery and strangulation ․ discovered while at the residence[.]” Id. at 30.

[17] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]” “At the very core of that guarantee ․ stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Case v. Montana, 607 U.S. 107, 113 (2026) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “When the intrusion is into that most private place, ‘reasonableness’ usually means having a warrant.” Id. (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). Fourth Amendment protections extend to the space immediately surrounding a dwelling house, an area otherwise known as the curtilage. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987). “The protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment extends to the curtilage in order to protect personal and familial privacy in an area that is physically and psychologically linked to the intimacy of the home.” Trimble v. State, 842 N.E.2d 798, 802 (Ind. 2006).

[18] Yet, there are several exceptions to the general warrant requirement. The warrant requirement does not apply where the exigency of the situation makes the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Wahl v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1071, 1081 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied; see also Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403. “One exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403. To decide whether this “exigent-circumstances exception” applies, we look at the totality of the circumstances to determine “whether police ‘faced an emergency that justified acting without a warrant.’ ” Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at 190 (quoting Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013)). The State bears the burden of proving a warrantless search falls within an exception to the warrant requirement. Tumblin v. State, 736 N.E.2d 317, 320 (Ind. 2000).

[19] Here, Officers Yoder and Paulson answered an emergency call alleging Dunne had “been choked out” by her intimate partner at her mobile home. Tr. Vol. 3 at 31. Reports of strangulation are especially concerning for “[t]he health and welfare of the victim because [strangulation] could cause detrimental issues [to] the body.” Id. at 28. When the two officers reached Dunne's home around midnight, the interior lights were on, and they could hear loud music playing. Officer Yoder made his way to the front, while Officer Paulson covered the back. They knocked on the doors for several minutes, and Officer Yoder announced himself as law enforcement. No one answered.

[20] Under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing Dunne required immediate aid. See Case, 607 U.S. at 118. Through a window, Officer Paulson noticed furniture had been flipped. Officer Paulson then approached the window from which music emanated and knocked. Jones opened the back door shortly thereafter holding a firearm, and he consented to Officer Paulson's entry. Dunne was under the ongoing threat of serious bodily injury and the responding officers acted appropriately to verify her well-being.

[21] We hold no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.

B. Article 1, Section 11

[22] Jones next argues the warrantless search violated his rights protected under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. He maintains Officer Paulson's “actions were unreasonable when considered under the totality of the circumstance[s.]” Appellant's Br. at 31. Jones believes at the time of the search “there was nothing to suggest an issue involving an emergency or the potential for destruction of property, which would have invalidated the need for a warrant.” Id. at 32.

[23] Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution states, “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated[.]” Although Section 11 is worded nearly identically to its federal counterpart, “we interpret it independently and ask whether the State has shown that a particular search or seizure was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances.” Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at 191. The reasonableness of a search or seizure turns on a balance of three factors: (1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge a violation has occurred, (2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and (3) the extent of law-enforcement needs. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005).

1. Degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge

[24] When evaluating an officer's degree of suspicion, we look at all the information available to the officer at the time of the search or seizure. Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 18 (Ind. 2010).

[25] The record shows Officers Yoder and Paulson responded quickly to a reported act of domestic violence in the middle of the night. They took measures to maximize their safety and that of others as they reached Dunne's mobile home. The loud music and the fact interior lights were on indicated people were likely inside. The broken blinds indicated possible trouble. Dunne's sister contacted emergency services to report an incident of strangulation. The information available to the officers at the time of the search was that Dunne was in desperate need of help inside the mobile home. It was reasonable for the officers to suspect with a high degree of probability a violation had occurred. See id. at 18.

2. Degree of intrusion

[26] The degree of intrusion is considered from the defendant's point of view. Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 944 (Ind. 2020). In evaluating the degree of intrusion into the ordinary activities of a citizen, “we consider the intrusion into both the citizen's physical movements and the citizen's privacy.” Id. at 944. And by focusing on the degree of intrusion caused by the method of the search or seizure, we aim to underscore how officers conduct a search or seizure matters. Id. at 945.

[27] At the time of the search, Dunne had sought assistance from law enforcement through her sister. She and Jones were in bed with loud music playing. The manner in which Officers Yoder and Paulson knocked on the doors was no more intrusive than if it had been one of Dunne's neighbors asking that the music volume be lowered. After all, no more than six feet separated the curtilage from the public roadway. Officer Paulson only looked through the window when no one answered the door. The degree of intrusion here was low. See State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281, 1287 (Ind. 2010) (“Relevant considerations in evaluating reasonableness of a search under all the circumstances include the degree to which the search or seizure disrupts the suspect's normal activities, and those facts and observations that support the officer's decision to initiate the search or seizure.”).

3. Extent of law-enforcement needs

[28] Law-enforcement needs “exist not only when officers conduct investigations of wrongdoing but also when they provide emergency assistance or act to prevent some imminent harm.” Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 946. We look to the needs of the officers to act in a general way but also “to act in the particular way and at the particular time they did.” Id. at 947.

[29] Officers Yoder and Paulson testified reports of domestic violence are among the most frequent calls they respond to in their roles. Officer Yoder described these types of calls as “one of the most dangerous calls to go to.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 106. Officer Paulson stated domestic violence calls are particularly time sensitive. Both officers had their vehicles’ emergency lights and sirens off as they approached Dunne's home because of the volatile nature of these calls. Another officer testified victims of domestic violence frequently have family members contact police to avoid direct confrontation with their abusers. Officer Paulson specifically testified it was important to respond in this case “[f]or the health and welfare of the victim.” Id. at 32. In short, law-enforcement needs were high.

[30] All in all, the balance of the Litchfield factors weighs in the State's favor. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude there was no violation of Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.⁸

C. Evidence Rule 404

[31] Finally, Jones argues the trial court erred when it admitted Larkin's testimony that Jones had punched Dunne's dog. He specifically asserts the court's decision violated Evidence Rule 404(b) by allowing evidence of a prior bad act. Jones suggests the court's “determination to allow ․ irrelevant and inflammatory information to be presented in the case severely prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury[.]” Appellant's Br. at 34.

[32] Generally, “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)(1). However, this evidence may be admissible for other purposes, such as “proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Evid. R. 404(b)(2). Evidence Rule 404 aims to avoid the so-called forbidden inference, that is, “to prevent the jury from assessing a defendant's present guilt on the basis of his past propensities[.]” Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 218–19 (Ind. 1997).

[33] To evaluate the admissibility of evidence under 404(b), a trial court must “(1) determine that the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act and (2) balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 403.” Embry v. State, 923 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. Under Evidence Rule 403, a trial court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by, among other things, unfair prejudice.

[34] In the present case, Larkin testified he saw Dunne and Jones sitting on the porch swing on the afternoon of August 9. At some point Larkin witnessed Jones hit one of Dunne's dogs “on the end of the nose” and hard enough to cause the dog to “yelp.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 178. Larkin testified he saw Dunne enter her home with Jones following moments later.

[35] Larkin's testimony was probative of Jones’ volatile demeanor moments before Jones first attacked Dunne inside the mobile home. Cf. Swanson v. State, 666 N.E.2d 397, 398 (Ind. 1996) (describing the “paradigm” of inadmissible prior-bad-act evidence as “a crime committed on another day in another place, evidence whose only purpose is to prove the defendant is a person who commits crimes”). Jones’ aggression toward the dog was intertwined with his battery and strangulation of Dunne. As the State contends, Larkin's testimony helped to demonstrate how his anger “boiled over” into additional violence in the mobile home. Appellee's Br. at 23. As one of the officers testified, it is not uncommon for perpetrators of domestic violence to target their victims’ pets “as a means of instilling fear” or exerting control. Tr. Vol. 3 at 131. Larkin's account was therefore relevant to the issue of motive. Regarding Evidence Rule 403, nothing in the record suggests the trial court failed to carefully weigh the probative value of Larkin's testimony and the danger of unfair prejudice. The State further argues the testimony was not unduly graphic or gruesome, see Appellee's Br. at 23, and we are not persuaded Larkin's account unfairly prejudiced Jones before the jury. The trial court did not err in admitting this testimony.

Conclusion

[36] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of evidence.

[37] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c) (2023).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-2-9(c) (2020).

3.   I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1) (2021).

4.   The handgun belonged to Dunne.

5.   In 1993, Jones was convicted of second degree murder in the State of Michigan.

6.   The State subsequently dropped the intimidation charge. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 88 (amended information).

7.   Phase one of the trial dealt with the strangulation and domestic battery charges, and whether Jones knowingly possessed a firearm. Phase two focused on whether Jones was a serious violent felon.

8.   The State argues Jones lacks standing under the federal and Indiana Constitutions to challenge admission of the evidence presented against him at trial. See Appellee's Br. at 14–17. Jones co-signed the lot space at Brookside Manor and he visited during weekends. The State did not contest his standing under either Constitution in the proceedings below. At any rate, because we decide the search at issue was consistent with both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11, we need not address the standing question.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.