Caralisa Marie Staiger, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a guilty plea, Caralisa Marie Staiger appeals her sentence for operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent (“ACE”) to at least 0.15 gram of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, with a previous conviction, as a Level 6 felony. The only issue she raises is whether her sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of her offense and her character.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2006, Staiger was convicted of disorderly conduct, as a Class B misdemeanor. Staiger's first alcohol-related conviction was in October 2007, when she pleaded guilty to Class B misdemeanor public intoxication, and the trial court sentenced her to one year of non-reporting probation. As part of her sentence, the trial court ordered Staiger to complete a drug and alcohol abuse program. Within the first month of probation, Staiger violated the conditions of probation by drinking alcohol and engaging in criminal conduct. When Staiger admitted to the violation six months later, the trial court revoked Staiger's probation and ordered her to serve thirty days in jail. Staiger completed her sentence in May 2008.

[4] Staiger's first conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol was in May 2017. In that case, Staiger pleaded guilty to Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an ACE of at least 0.15 gram of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood. The trial court again sentenced her to one year of non-reporting probation and ordered her to complete a drug and alcohol abuse program. Staiger was successfully discharged from probation in May 2018.

[5] In May 2019, Staiger again was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. In September, Staiger pleaded guilty to operating a vehicle with an ACE of at least 0.15 gram of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, with a previous conviction, as a Level 6 felony.¹ The trial court sentenced her to 280 days of community corrections and 610 days of reporting to probation and again ordered her to complete a drug and alcohol abuse program. The next month, Staiger violated the conditions of community corrections, was removed from that placement, and was ordered to serve the previously suspended executed portion of her sentence in jail.

[6] Staiger completed her jail sentence in February 2021 and began her probation period. However, Staiger repeatedly violated the conditions of her probation; she tested positive for alcohol and failed to complete the court-ordered drug and alcohol abuse program. The probation department filed a petition to revoke her probation; however, while that petition was pending, Staiger was charged with the instant offense.

[7] On June 30, 2022, Staiger went to a meeting with her probation officer while intoxicated. As she drove home from the meeting, a police officer pulled her over. The officer noticed that Staiger's vehicle smelled of alcohol, that her eyes were bloodshot, and that her speech was slurred. The officer conducted three field sobriety tests, which Staiger failed. During the tests, the officer also noticed that Staiger's balance was poor. The officer asked Staiger if she would consent to a certified chemical test, but she refused. A subsequent chemical test of her blood revealed an alcohol concentration equivalent to 0.219 gram of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood.

[8] The State once again charged Staiger with operating a vehicle with an ACE of at least 0.15 gram of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, with a previous conviction, as a Level 6 felony (Count I), and also charged her with a second count of driving with an ACE of at least 0.15, as a Class A misdemeanor (Count II). In addition, the probation department amended its petition to revoke Staiger's probation to reflect the new criminal charge. While the case was pending, Staiger twice failed to appear in court, requiring the issuance of bench warrants.

[9] In April 2025, Staiger entered into a plea agreement under which she pleaded guilty to Count I and admitted to violating her probation, with sentencing left to the court's discretion, and the State agreed to dismiss Count II. On January 28, 2026, Staiger entered her guilty plea in open court. Immediately thereafter, the court held a sentencing hearing at which Staiger submitted two letters, one from the jail's Director of Programs, and one from herself. The Director's letter stated that Staiger had started participating in the jail's drug and alcohol abuse program and was moving “toward her desired goal of recovery.” Ex. at 3. In Staiger's letter, she stated that she was “confused” about why there had been bench warrants for her, id. at 4; she apologized for the “mistakes” she had made, id. at 5; and she stated that she “never plan[s] to drink again”, id.

[10] The trial court accepted the guilty plea and sentenced Staiger to eighteen months in jail, consecutive to 500 days in jail for her violation of probation. In making its sentencing decision, the court found four aggravating circumstances: (1) Staiger's criminal history “span[ning] twenty years,” App. at 171; (2) her violations of probation and community corrections placements; (3) the past failures of less restrictive placements to successfully address her alcohol abuse; (4) and her lack of “insight” into her behaviors that led to her involvement with “the criminal justice system[,]” Tr. at 17. The court found her acceptance of responsibility for her crime to be a mitigating factor. Staiger now appeals the eighteen-month sentence for her Level 6 felony conviction.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Staiger asks that we revise her sentence because it is inappropriate. Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution “authorize[ ] independent appellate review and revision of a sentence imposed by the trial court.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind.), clarified on reh'g 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). This appellate authority is implemented through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).² Id. As our Supreme Court recently explained,

Appellate Rule 7(B) serves “to leaven the outliers, rather than to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ sentence,” McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 566 (Ind. 2018), allowing revision of a sentence if the court finds the trial court's decision to be inappropriate in consideration of the nature of the offense and the offender's character, Inman v. State, 4 N.E.3d 190, 203 (Ind. 2014) (quoting App. R. 7(B)). “Ultimately, our constitutional authority to review and revise sentences boils down to our collective sense of what is appropriate,” Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 165 (Ind. 2017) (cleaned up), an act that is reserved for “exceptional” cases, Gibson v. State, 43 N.E.3d 231, 241 (Ind. 2015). It is up to the defendant to “persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence has met th[e] inappropriateness standard of review.” Childress [v. State], 848 N.E.2d [1073,] 1080 [(Ind. 2006)]. The trial court's sentence is afforded considerable deference and will stand unless [overcome by] “compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 698 (Ind. 2024).

[12] In considering the nature of the offense, “we first look at the advisory sentence for the crime.” Tillett v. State, 278 N.E.3d 359, 366 (Ind. 2026). “[T]he advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for the crime committed.” Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 2014). “When a sentence deviates from the advisory sentence, we consider whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense as committed by the defendant that distinguishes it from the typical offense accounted for by our legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366 (citation modified).

[13] For Staiger's Level 6 felony conviction, the sentencing range is between six months and two and one-half years of imprisonment, with an advisory sentence of one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b). Thus, Staiger's sentence of eighteen months is one full year less than the maximum sentence she could have received, but it is six months longer than the advisory sentence. However, that additional six months is appropriate given the nature of the offense: Staiger's ACE of 0.219 was well over the minimum ACE of 0.15 required by the statute, and, on her way back from meeting with her probation officer, she chose to drive while intoxicated despite being on probation for having committed the same offense in the recent past. She has not pointed to anything about the nature of the offense that suggests her sentence is inappropriate.

[14] Nor does Staiger's character warrant a sentence reduction.

Our analysis of the character of the offender involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including: the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse. Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021); McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020). The significance of a criminal history in assessing a defendant's character and an appropriate sentence varies based on the gravity, nature, proximity, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense. Sandleben v. State, 29 N.E.3d 126, 137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Bryant v. State, 841 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (Ind. 2006)), trans. denied. “Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.” Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Moss v. State, 13 N.E.3d 440, 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied).

Wilson v. State, 221 N.E.3d 667, 680 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

[15] Staiger has been convicted of five crimes, four of which involved the abuse of alcohol. Various courts have attempted to curb Staiger's abuse of alcohol and associated criminal behavior through multiple levels of increasingly restrictive intervention, such as non-reporting probation, reporting probation, community corrections, and incarceration. Further, courts have repeatedly ordered Staiger to complete alcohol abuse treatment. Yet, despite those attempts, Staiger has continued to engage in criminal behavior, most of which involved alcohol abuse. Staiger's actions demonstrate an unwillingness to change and a disdain for the authority of the courts, especially when considered alongside her repeated probation violations and failures to appear in court. See, e.g., Cannon v. State, 99 N.E.3d 274, 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (noting defendant's criminal “history, at the very least, indicates that he has serious issues with substance abuse that he has chosen not to address, despite his frequent contacts with the criminal justice system[.]”), trans. denied. Moreover, Staiger's repeated insistence on driving while under the influence of alcohol demonstrates a disregard for the safety of the community and others on the road. See Pedigo v. State, 146 N.E.3d 1002, 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citation modified) (noting the defendant's continued substance abuse showed his “lack of understanding” of the potential harmful impact and the devastating consequences of that use and “posed a danger to the community”), trans. denied. Staiger has failed to demonstrate that her sentence is inappropriate in light of her character.

[16] Staiger's sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of her offense and her character.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A person who operates a vehicle with an ACE of at least 0.15 gram of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood commits a Level 6 felony if the person has a previous conviction of operating while intoxicated that occurred within the prior seven (7) years. Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1(b) (2022); I.C. § 9-30-5-3(a)(1).

2.   Appellate Rule 7(B) provides, in full: “The Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.”

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.