IN RE: A.L. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judges Bailey and Brown concur.

[1] One August evening in 2025, two-year-old O.L. became unconscious in her parents’ car and could not be roused. After her parents called 911, O.L. was taken by ambulance to the hospital, where she tested positive for THC and was treated overnight for THC intoxication. The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) investigated, petitioned to have O.L. and her four older siblings declared children in need of services (CHINS), and ultimately prevailed after a contested fact-finding hearing. The juvenile court found, among other things, that the children's parents had lied under oath about the extent of their marijuana use and that the mother had failed to disclose O.L.’s THC intoxication to O.L.’s pediatrician during a follow-up examination after O.L.’s discharge from the hospital. Both parents appeal the CHINS adjudication. We affirm.

Facts

[2] Ka.L. (Mother) and Kr.L. (Father) (collectively, Parents) are married with five children (collectively, Children), who now range in age from almost 3 to 10 years old. The youngest child is O.L., born in July 2023. At the time of the CHINS finding, Father worked as a subcontractor and day trader. Mother homeschooled Children.

[3] The family lived in Ohio until mid-2024, when they sold their home, bought an RV, and moved to Indiana to be near family. They soon moved into a home owned by Mother's mother. The family had been covered by Medicaid in Ohio, but they did not apply for such insurance in Indiana. None of Children underwent routine pediatric examinations for about 11/212 years after the move.

[4] Father had suffered a traumatic brain injury in 2007 or 2008 and thereafter smoked marijuana to ease migraine headaches resulting from that injury. In 2010, Father was arrested in Indiana on marijuana possession charges, entered into a deferral agreement, and later violated its terms. A warrant for his arrest in that case was outstanding for 14 years before Father returned to Indiana, retained counsel, and resolved the case by serving 15 days on house arrest.

[5] On the evening of August 29, 2025, the family traveled to a local speedway. When Parents pulled O.L. from her car seat, she was unresponsive. Father called 911. Montpelier Police Officer Anthony Neumeister responded and found O.L. unresponsive. He observed that Father's eyes were bloodshot and glassy. Mother accompanied O.L. in the ambulance while Father took Children to stay with a relative. He soon joined Mother at the hospital.

[6] O.L.’s urine was screened within minutes at the hospital emergency room. The result was positive for cannabinoids. The screening report noted:

THIS ASSAY PROVIDES A PRESUMPTIVE UNCONFIRMED RESULT. This result is to be used only for medical (i.e. treatment) purposes.

App. Vol. III, p. 138. One of O.L.’s treating physicians thereafter informed Parents that the two-year-old had tested positive for THC and was being treated for THC intoxication.

[7] Parents spoke to both Officer Neumeister and a DCS family case manager (FCM) at the hospital. Parents offered conflicting statements regarding their drug use. They initially denied using or possessing illegal drugs in their home. As the discussion progressed, Father admitted that he smoked marijuana twice daily, although always outside the family home, to offset migraine headaches from his traumatic brain injury. He reported that he stored his marijuana in his locked office inside the home. Father also admitted that he had smoked marijuana between noon and 1 p.m. that day.

[8] Parents also stated that Children were unvaccinated and that they gave them daily drops of “THC/CBD-based” substances. Tr. Vol. II, p. 60. Parents stored these substances in their kitchen cabinets.

[9] Mother later revised her initial denial of drug use, too. She admitted that she smoked marijuana, albeit less frequently than Father. According to Mother, she had last smoked marijuana about a week earlier and last consumed THC gummies about three weeks before that. Mother reported keeping the gummies in the top drawer of the dresser in the bedroom that O.L. and Parents shared. However, she stated O.L. could not open the drawer or the pouch in which the gummies were stored. Mother also stated that she had been watching O.L. continuously on the day of O.L.’s emergency, such that O.L. could not have accessed the drug.

[10] But the FCM also heard Mother tell Father at the hospital that O.L. “got into the stash.” Id. at 153. Parents refused to undergo drug tests, and Father left the hospital before Officer Neumeister and the FCM had completed interviewing Parents. He went to the family home but left again before DCS could assess it.

[11] When the FCM arrived at the home around 1 a.m. on August 30, 2025, she could not enter Father's office because it was locked. In the bedroom, she detected a faint odor of marijuana. She looked in Mother's dresser drawers and found no THC gummies. Meanwhile, O.L. was transferred to another hospital with a pediatric unit and remained hospitalized overnight before being discharged in the afternoon.

[12] The FCM spoke with Parents again several days later. Parents reported they had not used any drugs since the day of O.L.’s emergency, but they refused to undergo drug testing. They agreed not to store any marijuana in the home. Although the hospital's discharge instructions on August 30 called for follow-up care for O.L. by a pediatrician, Father told the FCM that they were considering having a midwife treat O.L. At some point, Parents were asked by DCS to submit Children to hair-follicle testing, and they refused.

[13] DCS petitioned to find Children to be CHINS in October 2025. After an initial hearing, the court ordered Children to undergo hair-follicle testing and ordered Parents to submit to drug screening. Approximately two months after the August 29 incident, DCS completed the hair-follicle testing, which was described as covering approximately 90 days of prior exposure. The results were negative for each child. Before the CHINS fact-finding hearing, Parents tested negative in two drug tests.

[14] After the CHINS filing, DCS staff never observed either parent exhibit signs of impairment during home visits. DCS staff also did not detect any smell of marijuana on them or in the home. During those visits, DCS had no concerns about Children's welfare.

[15] Parents, whose 2024 tax returns showed family income of $26,542, obtained Medicaid coverage for Children in Indiana after the CHINS filing. Mother then took O.L. to a pediatrician for follow-up care in mid-November 2025. No abnormal findings resulted from O.L.’s examination; however, Mother failed to reveal that the child had been hospitalized for THC intoxication 21/212 months earlier. Instead, Mother reported that O.L. had been “hospitalized with seizure-like activity.” Id. at 85. The other children were examined by the same pediatrician later that month. When asked by the FCM to sign a release for the pediatrician's records for O.L., Mother refused and instead provided only a copy of the medical report from that appointment.

[16] Also in November 2025, DCS and Parents reached an agreement for an informal adjustment. The court declined to accept it, given that O.L. had been hospitalized for ingestion of an illegal drug. At the start of the CHINS fact-finding hearing on December 1, 2025, the parties renewed their request for approval of the informal adjustment agreement. The court again rejected it.

[17] At the CHINS fact-finding hearing, during DCS's case-in-chief, Officer Neumeister and the FCM testified about Parents’ admissions regarding their drug use and possession. One of the doctors who treated O.L. during her hospitalization—an inpatient hospitalist for pediatric medicine—testified that she told Parents that O.L. was being treated for THC intoxication. The doctor had treated other children with that condition.

[18] Parents later took the stand and denied ever telling Officer Neumeister and the FCM that they used or possessed drugs in Indiana. Father testified that, when he lived in Ohio, where marijuana is legal, he occasionally smoked marijuana to address migraines related to his brain injury. He also testified that Mother and he kept essential oils in their Indiana home but none containing THC. As to Children's medical care, Father testified that none was needed from the time they moved to Indiana in mid-2024 until summer 2025. He also denied that Mother had ever possessed any THC gummies within their Indiana home, although she had possessed them in Ohio.

[19] Mother similarly testified that Parents did not possess or use drugs in their Indiana home and denied making statements to the contrary to the FCM and Officer Neumeister. Parents appeared to suggest that any statements they made to Officer Neumeister and the FCM about their drug use and possession related solely to the periods when they lived in Ohio.

[20] Parents did not acknowledge at the fact-finding hearing that O.L. was hospitalized for THC intoxication. Both testified to uncertainty about the underlying cause of O.L.’s hospitalization.

[21] During final argument, DCS asked the trial court to find Children to be CHINS because, given Parents’ recent denials of drug use, DCS was concerned they would not address drug use in the family home. Parents argued that DCS had not met its burden of proof because the evidence showed no continuing concerns for Children that would justify the court's coercive intervention.

[22] The court found Children to be CHINS based on Parents’ failure to meet Children's needs for supervision and medical care. The court offered three specific reasons for its decision: (1) O.L.’s THC intoxication and the accessibility of marijuana in the home; (2) Parents’ marijuana use; and (3) the family's lapsed medical insurance—despite clear entitlement to free coverage—and their failure to obtain pediatric care for Children until court supervision began. The court deemed Officer Neumeister, the FCM, and the doctor who treated O.L. at the hospital to be credible. But it found Parents had “lied to the Court at the Fact-Finding Hearing about their previous and persistent use of marijuana before and at the time O.L. was hospitalized.” App. Vol. II, p. 121. The court found it “deeply concern[ing] ․ that Mother was not honest [to O.L.’s pediatrician] about [O.L.’s] recent medical history,” given that children rely on their parents to provide accurate information to the children's health care providers. Id. at 123. The court also concluded that its coercive intervention was necessary because Parents did not appear to take the necessary corrective actions until shortly before the fact-finding hearing.

[23] After a hearing on January 9, 2026, the trial court entered a dispositional order requiring Parents to engage in a variety of services, including parenting and substance abuse assessments, and to follow all resulting recommendations. The court also ordered Parents to refrain from possession or use of illegal drugs.

[24] On the day of the dispositional hearing, Parents were arrested and charged with neglect of a dependent causing bodily injury, a Level 5 felony, in connection with O.L.’s THC intoxication and hospitalization on August 29, 2025. Upon Parents’ arrest, DCS removed Children from Parents’ care on an emergency basis and placed them in the temporary care of their maternal grandmother in Parents’ home. Children were returned to Parents’ care after Parents were released on bond. The criminal charges remain pending at the time of this opinion. Both parents separately appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[25] The trial court found Children to be CHINS under Indiana Code § 31-34-1-1, which specifies:

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.1

[26] DCS therefore was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence three elements in these CHINS proceedings: (1) that Parents’ actions or inactions seriously endangered Children; (2) that this serious endangerment was the result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of Parents to supply Children with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision; and (3) that Children need care that Children are not receiving and are unlikely to receive without the coercive intervention of the court. See In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014).

[27] When reviewing a trial court's determination that these elements were proven, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012). We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the trial court's decision and reverse only if that decision is clearly erroneous. Id.

[28] A trial court need not enter formal findings of fact and conclusions of law to support a CHINS determination, given the lack of any such statutory requirement. Matter of A.M., 277 N.E.3d 972, 981 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026). But where, as here, the trial court entered written findings sua sponte, its findings control as to the issues they cover. Id. With respect to these findings, we apply a two-tiered standard, first determining whether the evidence supports the findings and then deciding whether the findings support the judgment. Id. As to any matter not covered by the findings, we apply the general judgment standard and affirm on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Id.

[29] Parents each contend that the evidence is insufficient to support each of the three elements in Indiana Code § 31-34-1-1. However, neither specifically challenges any of the court's findings. Unchallenged findings are accepted as true. Matter of A.C., 198 N.E.3d 1, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Therefore, Parents’ sufficiency arguments amount to a claim that the trial court's findings do not support the court's judgment.² We find their arguments unpersuasive.

I. Serious Endangerment

[30] Parents first contend that DCS did not prove their actions or inactions seriously endangered Children. They argue that O.L. was not proven to be endangered by ingestion of THC for two reasons: 1) the hospital urine screen was labeled a “PRESUMPTIVE UNCONFIRMED RESULT”; and 2) O.L.’s hair-follicle test two months later was negative. App. Vol. III, p. 138. But the court's unchallenged findings support its conclusion that O.L. and the other children were endangered.

[31] The trial court's findings show that two-year-old O.L. became unresponsive while in Parents’ care, was transported to the hospital by ambulance, and was treated overnight for THC intoxication. The findings also show that: 1) Parents were informed by O.L.’s treating physicians that O.L. tested positive for THC and was being treated for THC intoxication; 2) Mother was overheard telling Father that O.L. “got into the stash”; and 3) Parents admitted using and possessing marijuana in the home. App. Vol. II, p. 110. These findings support the trial court's conclusion that O.L. was endangered by Parents’ actions or omissions.

[32] In any case, the “PRESUMPTIVE” nature of the urine test simply reflects its methodology. Parents offer no reason to believe that the result was clinically unreliable or that the THC intoxication diagnosis and treatment were unfounded. Regardless, the court's finding regarding the positive THC test was not the only evidence that O.L. suffered from THC intoxication. Elsewhere in its findings, the trial court also specifically credited the testimony of the hospital physician who testified that she treated O.L. for THC intoxication.

[33] The negative hair-follicle test taken two months after the incident also does not establish that O.L. did not ingest THC on August 29. The FCM did not agree that a one-time ingestion event would always be detectable in hair-follicle testing approximately two months later. Parents’ arguments amount to an invitation to reweigh the evidence that we must decline. See In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253.

[34] From O.L.’s THC intoxication, the trial court concluded that marijuana was accessible to O.L. in the home and therefore accessible to the four older children as well. The first conclusion is a reasonable inference from the evidence showing that O.L. became intoxicated on THC and that Parents told the FCM that marijuana was present in the home. And if a two-year-old could access the marijuana, the court logically could infer from the evidence and from the court's various findings regarding the placement of the THC products in the kitchen cabinets and in a dresser that her older siblings could access those substances as well. The trial court specifically discredited Parents’ courtroom denials of any marijuana possession in their Indiana home and their claims that marijuana could not be accessed by Children in their home. The court was not required to wait for another child to be hospitalized or otherwise harmed before concluding the risk extended to all five children. See In re C.K., 70 N.E.3d 359, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (courts need not wait for a tragedy before intervening on behalf of a child).

[35] Mother argues at length that parental marijuana use, without a demonstrated nexus to child harm, cannot establish serious endangerment. That is a correct statement of Indiana law. See, e.g., In re S.M., 45 N.E.3d 1252, 1255-56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (finding child was not proven to be endangered where the record contained no evidence explaining how the child was harmed by being born with marijuana-positive meconium).

[36] But this case is not about mere parental marijuana use. A toddler was hospitalized for THC intoxication, and the trial court found that marijuana was present and accessible to children in the family home. Here, the clear nexus between Parents’ marijuana use and child harm is O.L.’s consumption of the marijuana and her resulting THC intoxication, unresponsiveness, and subsequent hospitalization.

[37] The trial court's findings adequately support its conclusion that Children were seriously endangered.

II. Unmet Needs

[38] Parents next claim that the trial court improperly concluded that Children's serious endangerment was the result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of Parents to supply necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision. See Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1. The trial court's findings support this conclusion as well.

[39] As to unmet supervision needs, the trial court reasonably inferred from the evidence that two-year-old O.L. became intoxicated after accessing Parents’ THC products within the family home and that the marijuana was equally accessible to the other children. Based on that inference, the court reasonably concluded that such circumstances establish an unmet need for supervision that seriously endangered Children. That conclusion stands regardless of whether Parents’ subsequent drug screens were negative or subsequent home visits were uneventful, given the court's related determination that Parents likely would not stop their marijuana use or meet Children's needs absent court intervention.

[40] As to Children's unmet medical needs, the trial court found that Mother did not tell O.L.’s pediatrician about O.L.’s THC hospitalization when Mother took the toddler for follow-up care in November 2025. In its conclusions, the court found this “deeply concern[ing]” because children necessarily depend on their parents to provide accurate medical information to their medical providers. App. Vol. II, p. 123. The trial court found the evidence showed that Parents could not be trusted to do so.

[41] The trial court also found that, until court intervention, Parents did not provide timely medical care or procure the government-funded insurance readily available for Children and necessary to pay for their medical care. The trial court further found that Children did not visit a pediatrician from the time they moved to Indiana until after court supervision began. The medical care that Parents ultimately did obtain was “not timely,” according to the court. Id.

[42] All these findings support the trial court's conclusion that Children were seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of Parents to supply medical care. Parents argue that this conclusion was unfounded because all of Children's needs were met by the time of the CHINS adjudication. “A CHINS finding should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it was heard.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290. But remedied conditions are only one factor for a court to consider when making a CHINS determination. See id. (considering both whether the parent had remedied the alleged problems and whether the parent was unwilling or unable to care appropriately for the child without the court's compulsion).

[43] The court's concern here was not just that Children had missed pediatric visits before finally being seen by a pediatrician in November 2025. Of even greater concern to the court was Mother's failure to reveal critical information about O.L.’s hospitalization to O.L.’s pediatrician, given that O.L. was there, in part, to obtain follow-up care as instructed by the hospital at her discharge. That withholding of information, the court reasonably concluded, reflected an ongoing gap in Children's medical care that the passage of time had not closed. See Matter of S.V., 276 N.E.3d 652, 662-63 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (finding the evidence supported the trial court's finding that child, who was in good health after removal, still was seriously endangered, had unmet needs, and needed the court's coercive intervention where parents who, before removal, gave inaccurate reports about child's health to treating physicians and, after removal, failed to take full responsibility for their actions).

[44] For all these reasons, the trial court's findings support its conclusion that Children's serious impairment or serious endangerment was the result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of Parents to supply necessary supervision or medical care.

III. Coercive Intervention

[45] The third element—whether Children's needs are unlikely to be met without the coercive intervention of the court—is the most vigorously contested by Parents. And, as our Supreme Court has recognized, it is the most important. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. It guards against unwarranted state interference in family life, restricting CHINS adjudications to situations where parents lack the ability to meet their children's needs without court involvement—not merely where they have encountered difficulty doing so. Id. (emphasis in original).

[46] As previously noted, courts assess the family's condition not just when the case was filed but also when it is heard. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 580 (Ind. 2017). Voluntary remediation after a CHINS petition but before adjudication can weigh against coercion. Id. at 581. After all, not every endangered child is a CHINS. Id. at 580. Nor does every endangered child need the State to intrude into “the normally private sphere of the family.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287 (citation omitted). This is so because “ ‘[t]he purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not [to] punish parents.’ ” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2010).

[47] But the weight of any remediation necessarily depends on whether the trial court believes a parent's efforts were self-motivated and voluntary or, instead, induced by court coercion. See In re N.E., 198 N.E.3d 384, 393 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (reversing CHINS where father arranged for adequate housing “voluntarily and without court coercion” because State intrusion into the family was not required). Here, the trial court's findings reflect its belief that Parents’ claimed remediation was neither voluntary nor self-motivated.

[48] The court found that Parents lied under oath about the extent of their marijuana use at the time O.L. was hospitalized. It further found that Parents refused drug screens, Children's follicle testing, and family preservation services until the trial court ordered them to do so. Parents also did not obtain medical insurance or seek regular pediatric care for Children until after the CHINS petitions were filed, according to the trial court's findings. Those findings support the coercion conclusion, as well as the court's conclusion that Parents are unlikely to address the problems going forward.

[49] Citing In re A.R., 121 N.E.3d 598, 603-05 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), and In re S.M., 45 N.E.3d at 1253, Parents contend that voluntary remediation defeats the coercion element. But A.R. and S.M. are distinguishable in one material respect: in each, the trial court did not find that the parent had lied under oath about the very conduct that triggered DCS involvement. Thus, the courts in those cases had no specific basis to distrust the apparent remediation. Here, the trial court did. It determined that Parents testified falsely about their substance use. The court then concluded that Parents’ more recent sobriety and cooperation, which came after the CHINS adjudication and not before it, did not reliably signal a lasting change in their approach to Children's safety. That distinction separates this case from A.R. and S.M.

[50] Mother also points to the trial court's observation that, had Parents been honest and transparent with DCS from the start and voluntarily submitted to drug screening, they could have demonstrated that coercive intervention was unnecessary. She reads this as the court punishing Parents for past dishonesty rather than making a forward-looking assessment. The CHINS neglect statute, however, does not require the trial court to ignore dishonesty in assessing what parents are likely to do in the future.

[51] A parent's willingness to make misrepresentations to investigators, and then to the court, is directly relevant to the question of whether that parent will reliably act in a child's best interests without court oversight. See Matter of Mar.M., 253 N.E.3d 585, 589-590 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (affirming finding that parent was unlikely to comply absent court coercion where parent failed to cooperate with DCS and did not participate in services throughout the CHINS proceedings). The trial court considered Parents’ dishonesty as part of a forward-looking assessment, not as a basis for punishment. That was appropriate. See Matter of S.V., 276 N.E.3d at 662-63 (finding evidence supported trial court's findings that considered prospective impact on child of parents’ past and continuing inaccurate reports regarding child's health when determining whether coercive court intervention was necessary). The trial court properly concluded that the third element of Indiana Code § 31-34-1-1 was met—that is, that Children need care they are not receiving and are unlikely to receive without the coercive intervention of the court.

Conclusion

[52] The trial court's findings support its judgment that Children are CHINS under Indiana Code § 31-34-1-1. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The CHINS petition alleged that Children were CHINS under both Indiana Code §§ 31-34-1-1 and -2. The trial court found Children were CHINS under Indiana Code § 31-34-1-1 without addressing Indiana Code § 31-34-1-2.

2.   Father cites the correct appellate standard. Mother cites only the general sufficiency of evidence standard and does not acknowledge that the standard of review is impacted by the sua sponte findings of fact and conclusions of law. Neither parent specifically frames their arguments within the applicable standard of review—that is, they largely do not address specifically whether the unchallenged findings support the judgment. See generally In re A.M., 121 N.E.3d 556, 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (ruling that where findings are unchallenged on appeal, the appellate court may “simply determine whether the unchallenged findings are sufficient to support the judgment”).Instead, their arguments largely are consistent with a challenge to the adequacy of a general judgment, despite the trial court's expansive findings covering the issues that they address. DCS correctly cites to the supporting findings when addressing each of Parents’ challenges to the trial court's judgment. We also will attempt to fit Parents’ “square peg” arguments within the “round hole” standard of review. Parents’ briefs are well-researched and otherwise well written so that we have been able to identify the general claims that they are raising.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.