IN RE: the Adoption of S.T. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] S.T. was born in June 2019. Her father, J.T. (Father), last spent an overnight with her in 2021 or 2022. In the roughly four years that followed, he accumulated criminal convictions, admitted to using methamphetamine before an Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) meeting, spent most of 2025 in jail, and provided no support of any type to his daughter. S.T. began living with relatives in 2023, and Father's total in-person time with her after that was approximately 30 minutes to one hour at a restaurant. When these relatives petitioned to adopt S.T. and Father objected, the trial court determined that Father's consent to the adoption was unnecessary. Father appeals, and we affirm.

Facts

[2] Father and S.T.’s mother were married when S.T. was born. After the couple separated, S.T. lived with her mother, and Father's contact with S.T. diminished. His last overnight visit with S.T. was in 2021 or 2022.

[3] Beginning in 2023, S.T. lived with S.W., her great-aunt, and M.W., her great-uncle (collectively, Adoptive Parents). In February 2024, Adoptive Parents obtained legal guardianship of S.T. They have provided for all of S.T.’s daily care since they began caring for S.T.: schooling, medical and dental care, clothing, meals, and transportation. Neither Father nor S.T.’s mother has contributed anything.

[4] After S.T. came into Adoptive Parents’ full-time care, Father's total in-person contact with her consisted of one visit at a Pizza Hut restaurant in April 2024, lasting roughly 30 minutes to an hour. Father requested the visit through Facebook Messenger, and Adoptive Parents responded within hours and scheduled it. Father also participated in a small number of video calls in 2022 or 2023. After S.T. began living with Adoptive Parents, Father wrote two letters to S.T. addressed to Adoptive Parents’ long-time home. He claimed those letters were returned to sender. Adoptive Parents never saw the letters, and Father did not produce them at the adoption hearing.

[5] Father sent no messages to Adoptive Parents or S.T. in the first two months of 2025 when he was not incarcerated. Father had not spent any holidays or birthdays with S.T. since 2021 or 2022.

[6] During the times in 2024 when Father was not incarcerated, he worked in Michigan for three to four months, earning approximately $27 per hour and grossing close to $1,000 per week. He provided no financial support to S.T. during that time. He later explained that he did not know he was obligated to support S.T. and that no one told him so.

[7] By August 2025, Father, then 27 years old, had accrued a lengthy criminal history. Dating back to 2016, his criminal record included convictions for operating while intoxicated endangering a person, marijuana possession (multiple convictions), illegal consumption of alcohol, domestic battery, and intimidation. He faced pending prosecutions for Level 5 felony burglary and theft in one county and theft in another, with active warrants issued in both.

[8] Father also admitted using methamphetamine before a DCS meeting in 2024. He has lacked a valid driver's license since 2017 due to numerous traffic offenses. He also has not had independent housing since 2021, although he had purchased a new “camper” for $6,000. Tr. Vol. II, p. 28. After his release from incarceration, Father planned to live temporarily at his stepfather's home until arrangements could be made for his own apartment. Father's parental rights to his two other children had been terminated by the Miami Superior Court, although his appeal of that judgment is pending.

[9] Adoptive Parents petitioned to adopt S.T. in February 2025 after caring for the child full-time for the prior 13 months. Both Father and S.T.’s mother objected, but Adoptive Parents alleged that their consent was statutorily unnecessary. After the consent hearing at which Father appeared while incarcerated, the trial court entered detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law finding three independent grounds for proceeding without Father's consent. It also found that S.T.’s mother's consent was unnecessary and later granted the adoption.

[10] By the time of the adoption rulings, S.T. had lived with Adoptive Parents for nearly two years. She called them “mom” and “dad,” was enrolled in school, and was receiving regular medical and dental care. Id. at 79. S.T.’s younger biological sister also lived in Adoptive Parents’ home after DCS placed her there in October 2025.

[11] Father appeals the trial court's determination that his consent to the adoption was unnecessary.¹

Discussion and Decision

[12] Before an adoption petition may be granted, Indiana law generally requires written consent from the adoptive child's parents. Ind. Code § 31-19-9-1(a)(1) (provision requiring consent of the parents to the adoption of their child born during their marriage). That requirement is excused under several circumstances enumerated in Indiana Code § 31-19-9-8 (Consent Statute), which specifies in relevant part:

(a) Consent to adoption, which may be required under section 1 of this chapter, is not required from any of the following: ․

(2) A parent of a child in the custody of another person if for a period of at least one (1) year the parent:

(A) fails without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with the child when able to do so; or

(B) knowingly fails to provide for the care and support of the child when able to do so as required by law or judicial decree

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(11) A parent if:

(A) a petitioner for adoption proves by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit to be a parent; and

(B) the best interests of the child sought to be adopted would be served if the court dispensed with the parent's consent ․

[13] The trial court determined that Father's consent was unnecessary for three separate reasons falling under two subsections of the Consent Statute: (a)(2) and (a)(11). The court first concluded that Father's consent was unnecessary because for a period of at least one year, Father failed without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with S.T. when able to do so. See Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(A).

[14] The court also determined that for a period of at least one year, Father knowingly failed to provide for S.T.’s care and support when able to do so, rendering his consent unnecessary. See Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(B). Finally, the court found that Adoptive Parents had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Father is an unfit parent and S.T.’s best interests would be served if the court dispensed with Father's consent. See Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(11). Although Adoptive Parents also alleged that Father's consent was unnecessary under Indiana Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(1) because he had abandoned S.T., the trial court did not mention that allegation in its findings.

[15] As the petitioners for adoption, Adoptive Parents bore the burden of proving at least one of these grounds by clear and convincing evidence. See In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d 658, 662 (Ind. 2014). Father contends that Adoptive Parents did not meet their burden of proof as to any of the statutory grounds on which the trial court found his consent unnecessary.

[16] When reviewing an adoption court's judgment, we reverse only if the evidence leads to but one conclusion and the court reached an opposite conclusion. “We presume the trial court's decision is correct, and we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the decision.” Id. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. In re Adoption of A.S., 912 N.E.2d 840, 851 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

[17] Because the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we engage in a two-step process when reviewing the trial court's decision. In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d at 662. We first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and then analyze whether the findings support the judgment. Id.

[18] Father does not challenge the trial court's findings, so they “are accepted as true.” Matter of A.C., 198 N.E.3d 1, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Consequently, we need only determine whether the unchallenged findings are sufficient to support the judgment. In re A.M., 121 N.E.3d 556, 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). We conclude that they are, but we address only two of the three alternative statutory grounds on which the trial court found Father's consent unnecessary.

I. Subsection (a)(2)(A) – Failure to Communicate Significantly

[19] Father first contends the trial court's unchallenged findings do not support its conclusion that his consent was unnecessary under subsection (a)(2)(A) of the Consent Statute. A parent's consent to adoption is not required under that provision if, for a period of at least one year, the parent failed without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with the child when able to do so. Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(A). “A determination on the significance of communication is not one that can be mathematically calculated to precision.” In re E.B.F. v. D.F., 93 N.E.3d 759, 763 (Ind. 2018). But the length, frequency, and nature of the communications are proper considerations within the broader context of the other facts and circumstances of the case. See id. at 763-64 (finding parent's minimal, fleeting, and sometimes unintended communications with child were not significant).

[20] The trial court's findings support its conclusion that Father lacked significant communication with S.T. during the requisite period. The court found that S.T. had lived with Adoptive Parents since mid-2023 and that they became S.T.’s guardians in February 2024. Since then, Father's contacts with S.T. consisted of “one in-person visit with [S.T.] in April 2024 at a restaurant and a limited number of video contacts after that,” the court found. App. Vol. II, p. 82. The court's findings also show that Father had spent no holidays or birthdays with S.T. nor had any overnight visits with S.T. since 2021 or 2022. The trial court reasoned that “to the extent [Father] attempted contact, it was minimal and sporadic” and “so isolated and insubstantial in frequency as to not amount to ‘significant communication’ with” S.T. Id. (quotation marks in original).

[21] Father contends these findings do not support the judgment because he had justifiable cause for his limited contacts with S.T. He claims Adoptive Parents thwarted his efforts to communicate with her. He also notes that he was incarcerated during most of 2025, although he does not explain how his incarceration prevented him from telephoning or writing S.T.

[22] But Adoptive Parents presented evidence that they had responded to each of Father's requests for communication with S.T. within a day of receiving them and usually the same day. They also presented testimony showing that they denied Father's requests only when S.T. was not available to talk to Father—that is, away from the home engaging in some activity—and provided options to Father such as contacting S.T. at the other location.

[23] Having heard this conflicting evidence from Father and Adoptive Parents, the trial court declined to find that Adoptive Parents obstructed Father's communication efforts. Father's argument amounts to an invitation to reweigh the evidence that we decline. See In re Adoption of A.S., 912 N.E.2d at 851 (reviewing courts do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility).

[24] Citing In re E.B.F., 93 N.E.3d at 763, Father claims that even a single significant communication can preserve a biological parent's right to consent. But here, the trial court specifically found that Father's communications with S.T. were “minimal and sporadic” and “so isolated and insubstantial in frequency” that they did not constitute significant communication. App. Vol. II, p. 82. Thus, E.B.F. is unavailing.

[25] In sum, the trial court's findings support its conclusion under Indiana Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(A) that for a period of at least one year, Father failed without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with S.T. when able to do so. Given this ruling, we need not address the propriety of the trial court's finding under Indiana Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(B) that Father's consent was unnecessary due to his failure to support S.T. when he was able. See In re Adoption of I.B., 185 N.E.3d 428, 431 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (ruling that Indiana Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(2) is written in the disjunctive and, therefore, proof of either the insignificant contact or the non-support—but not both—is sufficient to find a parent's consent to adoption is unnecessary). We will address, however, the trial court's conclusion that Father's consent was unnecessary based on Father's parental unfitness and S.T.’s best interests.

II. Subsection (a)(11) – Father's Unfitness and S.T.’s Best Interests

[26] A parent's consent is also not required when a petitioner proves by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit and that the child's best interests would be served by dispensing with consent. Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(11). “While the term ‘unfit’ as used in Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(11) is not statutorily defined, this Court has defined ‘unfit’ as ‘[u]nsuitable; not adapted or qualified for a particular use or service’ or ‘[m]orally unqualified; incompetent.’ ” In re Adoption of K.H., 151 N.E.3d 1259, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting In re Adoption of M.L., 973 N.E.2d 1216, 1223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)). In evaluating fitness, courts may consider criminal history, substance abuse, housing instability, failure to engage in recommended treatment, and the parent's ability to meet the child's needs.

[27] Father contends the trial court's findings do not support the trial court's unfitness and best interests conclusions. We disagree. The trial court found, for instance, that Father had “an extensive history of engaging in criminal conduct, alcohol abuse, and illegal drug use.” App. Vol. II, p. 83. The findings note Father's seven criminal convictions between 2016 and 2025, his pending prosecutions for Level 5 felony burglary and theft in one case and theft in another, and his active warrants in both of those pending prosecutions.

[28] The trial court's other relevant findings noted that Father:

• reported that, on one occasion, he hit the boyfriend of S.T.’s mother in the face with an aluminum baseball bat in the presence of his children based on Father's belief that the boyfriend mistreated the children.

• had a history of drug abuse, including methamphetamine use in 2024 and 2025.

• had lacked any valid driver's license since 2017.

• acknowledged he has mental health “issues,” but after receiving a referral for mental health treatment while incarcerated, he did not pursue it upon release.

• had his parental rights to his other two children terminated.

• provided no support for S.T. for the past two years, despite grossing about $1,000 per week for three or four months in 2024 and being free from incarceration during January and February 2025.

• had no significant contact with S.T. for the past few years.

[29] These findings showed a sustained pattern of criminal behavior, unavailability to parent, lack of contact, and lack of support for S.T. that justified the trial court's finding that he was unfit to parent S.T. See In re Adoption of K.H., 151 N.E.3d at 1268-69 (affirming finding of parental unfitness where evidence, among other things, showed parent had violent tendencies, was engaging in substance abuse, and was inconsistent or uninterested in pursuing relationship with child); In re Adoption of K.T., 172 N.E.3d 326, 337 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (ruling that court's determination of unfitness was proper where the father had recently been arrested for domestic battery in front of a minor, was facing a probation violation, and had no stable housing).

[30] Nonetheless, Father contends that he is not unfit because he cared for S.T. during her first three years of life. He also contends that the court offered no explanation for its best-interests finding. Neither argument is persuasive.

[31] Whatever Father's early parenting history, his parental rights as to his other two children were recently terminated, suggesting, when considered with his actions during the past few years, that whatever fitness he had years ago no longer exists. More importantly, the trial court's findings of routine criminal behavior, unavailability to parent due to incarceration, non-support, and non-contact adequately buttress the court's conclusion that Father is an unfit parent. These findings, as well as the trial court's findings regarding the safe, stable home that Adoptive Parents had provided S.T. for nearly two years, essentially explained the trial court's conclusion that S.T.’s best interests would be served by dispensing with Father's consent to the adoption. We therefore find unpersuasive Father's claim that the trial court's findings do not support the trial court's determination that Father's consent was unnecessary under Indiana Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(11).

Conclusion

[32] The trial court's findings support its conclusion that Father's consent to the adoption was unnecessary because he failed without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with S.T. for at least a year when Adoptive Parents had custody of S.T. The trial court's findings also support its alternative conclusion that Father's consent to the adoption was unnecessary because he is unfit and S.T.’s best interests are served by dispensing with his consent. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   S.T.’s mother does not participate in this appeal

Weissmann, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.