Zachary Chavon Diaz, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] The State charged Zachary Chavon Diaz with murder and sought a sentencing enhancement for commission of a felony while using a firearm. A jury found him guilty of Level 5 felony reckless homicide, a lesser included offense of murder, in phase one of his trial. Diaz then waived his right to have the jury hear phase two and admitted to the firearm enhancement.¹ The trial court sentenced him to five years for the reckless homicide conviction, and an additional fifteen years for the firearm enhancement.

[2] On appeal, Diaz argues the trial court should not have sentenced him for the firearm enhancement because the enhancement requires the knowing or intentional use of a firearm which is inconsistent with the elements of the offense for which he was found guilty. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11(d) (2023) (providing a person who has committed a felony under Indiana Code Article 35-42 resulting in death or serious bodily injury may be sentenced to an additional fixed term if the State shows beyond a reasonable doubt the person knowingly or intentionally used a firearm in the commission of the offense); I.C. § 35-42-1-5 (2014) (defining reckless homicide as “recklessly kill[ing] another human being”). In essence, Diaz challenges the factual basis for the enhancement. See Appellant's Br. at 14 (“A factual basis for the Defendant's plea of guilty to the firearm enhancement does not exist.”).

[3] The State counters that Diaz's appeal should be dismissed because he gave up the right to challenge the firearm enhancement by direct appeal when he admitted to it. We agree.²

[4] There is a “long-standing prohibition” against a person who pleads guilty challenging his conviction by means of a direct appeal, and the same prohibition applies to one who admits to habitual offender status. Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394, 395 (Ind. 1996) (determining a defendant cannot directly appeal the trial court's acceptance of a guilty plea to a habitual offender allegation on the ground there was no factual basis to support it); see Stanley v. State, 849 N.E.2d 626, 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (noting admission to being a habitual offender is equivalent to a guilty plea). In Lumbley v. State, 74 N.E.3d 234, 238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied, a panel of this Court applied this prohibition to a direct appeal by a defendant who admitted to a firearm enhancement but claimed on appeal there was no factual basis for his admission. If a defendant wishes to challenge the factual basis underlying his admission, the proper avenue for relief is a petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1. Robey v. State, 7 N.E.3d 371, 383–84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied; see Tumulty, 666 N.E.2d at 396 (reiterating that “post-conviction relief is exactly the vehicle for pursuing the claims [the defendant] seeks to present on direct appeal”).

[5] Having admitted to the firearm enhancement, Diaz cannot now seek to challenge his admission on direct appeal. We therefore dismiss Diaz's appeal.

[6] Dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Diaz did not request a transcript of his trial and did not include in the Statement of the Case in his brief that he admitted to the firearm enhancement. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(5) (requiring the Statement of Case in an appellant's brief to include, among other things, “the course of the proceedings relevant to the issues presented for review”). Nonetheless, this fact is reflected in the Chronological Case Summary entry for September 27, 2024, the last day of his trial. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 10; see also Tr. Vol. 2 at 22 (State reminding the court at a hearing on Diaz's motion to correct error that Diaz “did admit the firearm enhancement”).

2.   The State moved to dismiss Diaz's appeal before filing its Appellee's Brief. The motion was held in abeyance, and the State timely filed its brief. By separate order, we grant the State's motion as of this date.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.