IN RE: The Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of A.L. (Minor Child); (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] L.T. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of the parent-child relationship with her four-year-old daughter, A.L. (“A.L.”). Her sole argument is that the trial court violated her due process rights. Concluding that the trial court did not violate Mother's due process rights, we affirm the trial court's judgment.¹

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court violated Mother's due process rights.

Facts

[3] Mother is the parent of A.L., who was born in November 2020. In late November 2023, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed A.L. from Mother, and in early December 2023, DCS filed a petition alleging that A.L. was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). The petition alleged that Mother was “unable to provide[ ] [A.L.] with a safe and stable home free from substance use.” (App. Vol. 2 at 13).

[4] In January 2024, Mother signed a mediated agreement (“the agreement”), wherein she admitted that “[A.L.] is a child in need of services pursuant to Indiana Law, as defined in IC 31-34-1 because [Mother] needs assistance obtaining and maintaining sobriety thus the coercive intervention of the court is required.” (Ex. Vol. 1 at 13). Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Mother agreed to: (1) complete a substance use disorder assessment and follow all recommendations; (2) abstain from the use of illegal substances; (3) submit to random drug screens; (4) successfully complete homebased case work services; (5) consistently engage in parenting time with A.L.; (6) obey the law; and (7) “obtain and maintain a legal and stable source of income sufficient to support herself and [A.L.].” (Ex. Vol. 1 at 14). The agreement further provided that Mother “acknowledges that her failure to follow the terms of this agreement as required by the Order could lead to the involuntary termination of her parent-child relationship with [A.L.] under Indiana Code 31-35.”² (Ex. Vol. 1 at 15).

[5] During the pendency of the CHINS proceedings, Mother failed to comply with the agreement. Specifically, she did not complete a substance use disorder assessment or participate in homebased case work services despite multiple caseworkers’ attempts to contact her. In addition, Mother missed thirty-seven drug screens, and, when she did submit to drug screens, she tested positive for methamphetamine. Further, she failed to consistently engage in parenting time with A.L. and never progressed beyond supervised visits. Mother also failed to obtain employment.

[6] In March 2025, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental relationship with A.L. Mother continued to test positive for methamphetamine even after DCS filed this petition.

[7] The trial court held a termination hearing in June 2025. At the hearing, the DCS family case manager (“the FCM”) testified that Mother had not completed services and that she had denied using methamphetamine despite the positive drug tests. In addition, during the FCM's testimony, the following colloquy ensued between DCS and the FCM:

[DCS]: Where is [Mother] employed?

[The FCM]: She's not employed.

[DCS]: Has she ever been employed during the time that you have worked with the case?

[The FCM]: Not to my knowledge.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 31). Mother did not object to DCS’ questions or the FCM's testimony regarding Mother's lack of employment.

[8] The FCM further testified that termination was in A.L.’s best interests and that the plan for A.L. was foster parent adoption. In addition, the CASA (“the CASA”) testified that termination was in A.L.’s best interests because Mother had “not demonstrate[d] the stability, safety, and even parenting skills that it would require to parent a child[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 58).

[9] Mother also testified at the hearing. During Mother's testimony, the following colloquy ensued between Mother and her counsel:

[Mother's Counsel]: Now were you employed when the case began?

[Mother]: No.

[Mother's Counsel]: Okay. And why have you not had employment?

[Mother]: Um if I'm being honest with you I just haven't had employment since I've had my daughter being as I've been the one taking care of her by myself.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 82-83).

[10] During cross-examination, the following colloquy ensued between DCS and Mother:

[DCS]: Did I understand your testimony you are not an employed woman?

[Mother]: No I'm not.

[DCS]: When were you last employed?

[Mother]: Um it's been a few years.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 91). Mother did not object to DCS’ questions regarding her lack of employment.

[11] In addition, when DCS asked Mother where she obtained money, Mother responded that family members and her boyfriend gave her money. Further, Mother acknowledged that she used that money to buy marijuana. Mother further testified that the only drug that she used was marijuana and that she did not understand why she had continued to test positive for methamphetamine. When DCS asked Mother when she had last used methamphetamine, at her counsel's suggestion, Mother invoked her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Lastly, Mother testified that she was living in her boyfriend's house. According to Mother, A.L. could live there with Mother and would have her own bedroom.

[12] In September 2025, the trial court issued an order terminating Mother's parental relationship with A.L. That order provides, in relevant part, as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

* * * * *

MOTHER'S INVOLVEMENT:

8. Mother ․ violated a number of the Orders of the CHINS court reflected in her dispositional order, including those to

a. Keep all appointments for herself and [A.L.];

b. Consistently engage in parenting time with [A.L.];

c. Not use or manufacture illegal substances;

d. Obey the law;

e. Successfully complete a program of home-based casework;

f. Complete a substance use disorder assessment and follow all recommendations from that assessment;

and

g. Submit to and pass random drug screens

* * * * *

15. Mother's positive screens reflect that Mother consistently violated the law during the CHINS case beginning no later than in October of 2024 and continuing up to at least two months after the filing of the Verified Petition in this cause.

16. Mother has never advanced beyond supervised visitation with her child.

17. Mother has been inconsistent in her timeliness and her consistency with the supervised visits. (DCS Ex. 6, 7, May 21 Review Order)

18. [A.L.] has exhibited negative behaviors at placement's home and at daycare following visits with Mother.

19. Mother has also failed to complete the ordered home-based casework. Mother is now on her third referral provider, having twice been closed out by providers due to her lack of compliance.

20. Mother tacitly admits she failed to complete the ordered substance abuse evaluation or the screening to which she had stipulated in her mediated agreement.

21. Mother admits that she is not employed and has not been for “a few years”.

* * * * *

SUMMATION OF ANALYSIS:

36. [A.L.] has been out of Mother's care since November 30, 2023.

37. In the more than eighteen (18) months since detention, Mother has not made substantial progress toward reunification with her daughter.

38. Mother has not successfully completed treatment for her long-standing substance use.

39. Mother does not have employment or other resources with which to support herself and meet her daughter's basic needs as a growing child.

40. Mother denies her continuing use of Methamphetamine, but she pled the 5th when asked under oath when was her last use of the substance.

41. Further, Cordant's confirmatory scientific analyses belie Mother's self-serving denials of her continued use.

42. A person who struggles with substance use cannot successfully achieve recovery until she can admit to herself and to others that her use of illegal substances is a problem.

43. Mother has not yet met this low threshold of progress toward recovery.

44. The question before the Court is whether Mother is now or in the immediate future will be able to independently, safely, and competently parent this child.

45. The Court finds that Mother is not able to safely parent this child now or in the near future.

46. Both DCS and CASA question her ability to safely parent [A.L.] and meet her needs.

47. Although Mother may have a stable living arrangement in which to care for [A.L.] (a fact that this Court cannot find, given the incredulity of Mother's testimony about her housing), even were that to be the case, she has not demonstrated she has sufficient income to meet her own basic needs and those of this child.

48. This Court is unwilling to send [A.L] into her biological mother's care when she has not exhibited that she has overcome the long-term substance use issues that have tormented her for at least the last five (5) years.

49. This Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the child's best interest that [Mother]’s parental rights be terminated so that [A.L.] is free to reach permanency through adoption.

50. The Court further finds that the Department has a satisfactory plan for the child, that being adoption.

51. Finally, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that

a. there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied;

b. the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of the local office for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months and, despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(App. Vol. 2 at 7-10).

[13] Mother now appeals.

Decision

[14] At the outset, we note that Mother does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the termination, and she does not argue that the evidence does not support the trial court's findings. Rather, her sole argument is that the trial court violated her due process rights. Mother specifically contends that the trial court violated her procedural and substantive due process rights when it considered Mother's economic status in its termination order.

[15] However, the law is well-established that a party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim. McBride v. Monroe County Office of Family and Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). For example, in In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 834 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), this Court determined that a mother had waived her claim that the trial court had violated her due process rights because she had raised the constitutional claim for the first time on appeal.

[16] Here, Mother did not object when DCS asked the FCM and Mother questions about Mother's economic status and lack of employment, nor did she argue that the trial court's consideration of those factors in the termination proceedings constituted a due process violation. Rather, Mother is raising her due process claim for the first time on appeal. She has therefore waived appellate review of this issue. See id.³

[17] Waiver notwithstanding, we choose to address Mother's arguments. We generally review a trial court's decision to terminate parental rights with great deference. Matter of A.W., 273 N.E.3d 1131, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “However, where, as here, review of a termination order hinges on alleged due process violations, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Id.

[18] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” As we explained in In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied:

The involuntary termination of parental rights is an extreme measure that is designed to be used only as a last resort when all other reasonable efforts have failed. Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among associational rights the United States Supreme Court has ranked as of basic importance in our society and are rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect. A case involving the State's authority to permanently sever a parent-child bond demands the close consideration the Supreme Court has long required when a family association so undeniably important is at stake.

(cleaned up). Accordingly, a parent's right to raise her child is protected by the Due Process Clause. Id.

[19] Here, Mother first argues that “the trial court's considering without notice [Mother]’s economic status in its Order terminating [Mother]’s parental rights violated [Mother]’s procedural rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and under Indiana Constitution Article I, § 12.” (Mother's Br. 5). She specifically contends that “[a]t no time was Mother put on notice that her ability to produce income was necessary for reunification with her daughter.” (Mother's Br. 9).

[20] “The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Due Course of Law Clause of the Indiana Constitution prohibit state action that deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without a fair proceeding.” In re Paternity of M.G.S., 756 N.E.2d 990, 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. The same analysis is applicable to both federal and state claims. Id. at 1005. “An essential principle of due process is that deprivation of life, liberty, or property be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Id. (cleaned up).

[21] In In re M.L.K., 751 N.E.2d 293, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), this Court discussed the appropriate scope of this notice. Specifically, in M.L.K., the parents received notice that the trial court would hold a hearing regarding the State's request to terminate the wardship of their child. At the hearing, the issue of the parents’ obligation to reimburse the State for the amount that it had spent for the care of the child was also addressed. Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order terminating the wardship and also ordering the parents to reimburse the State more than $20,000. On appeal, the parents argued that their procedural due process rights had been violated because they did not have notice that reimbursement would be an issue at the hearing. This Court agreed and explained as follows:

A party is entitled to some notice that an issue is before the court which has not been pleaded or has not been agreed to in a pretrial order. This is especially true where the new issue is not unequivocally clear by the evidence being submitted. This is not being technical. This is being fair. A party should be given an opportunity to meet the issues which the court is considering.

Id. at 296. (cleaned up).

[22] However, the facts before us are distinguishable from those in M.L.K. because Mother had notice that the trial court could consider her economic and employment status when determining whether to terminate her parental relationship with A.L. Specifically, our review of the record reveals that Mother signed the agreement, wherein she agreed to “obtain and maintain a legal and stable source of income sufficient to support herself and [A.L.]” (Ex. Vol. 1 at 14). The agreement further provided that Mother acknowledged that her failure to follow the terms of the CHINS agreement could lead to the involuntary termination of her parent-child relationship with A.L. Because Mother had notice, her procedural due process argument fails.

[23] We now turn to Mother's argument that “the trial court's considering [her] economic status in its Order terminating [her] parental rights violated [her] substantive rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and under the Indiana Constitution Article I, § 1.”⁴ (Mother's Br. 5). Mother specifically argues that the trial court's imposition of “a financial test for [her] to retain her parental rights” violated her substantive due process rights. (Mother's Br. 6).

[24] “Under federal substantive due process analysis, the State may not directly and substantially interfere with fundamental rights.” Freed v. Freed, 227 N.E.3d 954, 962 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (cleaned up), trans. denied. “Substantive due process bars certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Melton v. Indiana Athletic Trainers Board, 156 N.E.3d 633, 659 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (cleaned up), reh'g denied, trans. denied. “The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.” Id. at 660 (cleaned up).

[25] In A.I., 825 N.E.2d at 798, the mother argued that her substantive due process rights had been violated because she had been required to choose between her husband and her child. According to the mother, she had adequately cared for A.I. and DCS had failed to present any evidence that she or her husband had harmed A.I. in the past or were likely to harm her in the future.

[26] However, we concluded that we did not need to “specifically address [the mother]’s substantive due process argument in depth because she [had] mischaracterize[d] the bases upon which her parental rights [had been] terminated.” Id. at 817. We specifically noted that “the trial court [had] not base[d] the termination order on [the mother]’s failure to leave [her husband] but rather on her own failure to accept responsibility and make the necessary changes to appropriately parent A.I.” Id. Further, it was clear to us that the trial court had based its decision to terminate the mother's parental rights on several factors that had extended beyond her relationship with her husband, namely her own failure to manage her extensive substance abuse problem, her failure to maintain stable living conditions, her failure to support A.I., and her failure to make significant changes in her behavior to benefit A.I. Id. We concluded that the mother had quite simply “mischaracterize[d] the nature of the CHINS and termination proceedings and orders by suggesting that the only issue was [her husband]” and had failed to establish a due process violation. Id.

[27] Here, we conclude, as we did in A.I., that we need not specifically analyze Mother's substantive due process argument in depth because she has mischaracterized the bases upon which the trial court terminated her parental rights. Specifically, the trial court did not base its termination on Mother's economic status and financial circumstances. Rather, our review of the trial court's termination order reveals that the trial court based its decision to terminate Mother's parental relationship with A.L. on several factors that extended beyond her economic status and financial circumstances, namely her consistent use of methamphetamine during the pendency of the CHINS proceedings, including after DCS had filed the termination petition, her failure to participate in court-ordered services, her failure to consistently visit with A.L., and her failure to obey the law. In sum, the trial court concluded that based on these numerous factors, Mother was not able to safely parent A.L. at the time of the termination hearing or in the near future. Accordingly, Mother has failed to establish a due process violation. See id.

[28] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A.L.’s father signed a consent to A.L.’s adoption and is not participating in this appeal.

2.   The trial court incorporated the agreement in an order.

3.   We further note that Mother's counsel asked Mother about her lack of employment.

4.   Because Mother has not provided an independent analysis under the Indiana Constitution, she has waived appellate review of her argument based on the Indiana Constitution. See Matter of A.C., 198 N.E.3d 1, 15 n.5 (Ind. Ct App. 2022) (explaining that failure to provide an independent analysis under the Indiana Constitution results in waiver), reh'g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied.

Pyle, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.