Eric M. Stanley, Appellant/Respondent, v. State of Indiana, Appellee/Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After Eric Stanley pled guilty to Level 6 felony methamphetamine possession in Ripley County, the trial court sentenced him to 910 days of incarceration, with 822 days suspended to probation. Stanley soon began violating the terms of his probation in various ways, and the State petitioned the trial court to revoke it. After Stanley admitted to violating the terms of his probation, the trial court ordered that he serve the remainder of his previously-suspended sentence. Stanley contends that the trial court considered improper information in finding that he had violated the terms of his probation and abused its discretion in ordering that he serve the entirety of his previously-suspended sentence. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On September 14, 2022, Stanley pled guilty to Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, and the trial court sentenced him to 910 days of incarceration with 822 days suspended to probation. Stanley, who was facing other charges in Kentucky, “pretty much hit the ‘F’ it button” on his probation, as he wanted to enjoy the “little bit of time that [he] had left to be free.” Tr. Vol. II p. 13. On October 27, 2022, Stanley tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines. Probation scheduled Stanley for a substance-abuse evaluation on November 3, 2022, to which Stanley did not go. Stanley failed to appear for scheduled meetings with his probation officer on November 3, 4, and 7, 2022.

[3] When Stanley's probation officer attempted to conduct a home visit on November 8, 2022, he discovered that Stanley was no longer living at the address he had given to probation; Stanley had not reported any change of address to probation, and his whereabouts were unknown. Also in November of 2022, Stanley committed a new offense of possession of methamphetamine in Kentucky, to which he pled guilty on July 27, 2023. The same day, Stanley was also convicted of three counts of “First Degree Trafficking” in Kentucky, crimes that had been committed in July 2022, before he had been placed on probation in Indiana. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 43.

[4] On November 30, 2022, the State filed a notice of probation violation, alleging the failed drug test, missed substance-abuse evaluation, missed probation appointments, failure to report a change of address, and the new possession of methamphetamine charge in Kentucky as violations. On February 3, 2026, the State filed an amended notice of probation violation, adding in the fact that Stanley had pled guilty to the Kentucky possession charge and the allegation that Stanley had been charged and convicted of the three trafficking counts in Kentucky.

[5] At the start of the probation-violation hearing on February 11, 2026, the State dismissed the trafficking-convictions allegation on the basis that Stanley had committed those crimes before he had been placed on probation. Stanley admitted to committing all of the other alleged violations. In deciding Stanley's sanction, the trial court noted that he had “basically failed in every way, shape and form on probation.” Tr. Vol. II p. 15. The trial court also noted that, although it had not been a probation violation because it had predated probation, Stanley had also accrued a conviction for first degree trafficking, which the court said was “part of his criminal history.” Tr. Vol. II p. 15. The trial court indicated that there were three main things Stanley had needed to do on probation—not test positive, report to probation, and not commit new crimes—and that Stanley had failed all three. The trial court revoked Stanley's probation and ordered that he serve the entire 822 days that had previously been suspended.

Discussion and Decision

I. The Trial Court did not Rely on any Improper Consideration in Determining that Stanley had Violated the Terms of his Probation

[6] The trial court did not rely on an improper consideration when deciding what sanction to impose. The State's amended notice of probation violation had alleged a seventh violation: in a separate case, Stanley had also been convicted of three counts of “Trafficking, Felony in the 1st Degree” in Kentucky on July 27, 2023. As it happened, Stanley had committed those crimes before he had been placed on probation in Indiana, and the State withdrew that alleged violation at the outset of the hearing. While explaining its sanction decision, after reviewing Stanley's many admitted violations, the trial court stated,

Although not part of the basis for the probation violation, the Court does also consider that he has a conviction for Trafficking, as a First Degree. The offense date being September or July of 2022, so that just preceded this case. So, once again, it is not a foundation for the probation violation, however, it is part of his criminal history.

Tr. Vol. II p. 15.

[7] In any probation revocation proceeding, the trial court must make a factual determination that a probation condition was violated, and second, if a violation is found, it must determine what sanction to impose. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). While it is true that a defendant cannot violate probation by conduct occurring before he is placed on probation, see Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(a)(1), Stanley's pre-probation conduct formed no part of the trial court's violation finding. The trial court made it abundantly clear that it was considering the fact of the trafficking convictions only in the context of determining a sanction, considering the prior convictions only as “criminal history.” Tr. Vol. II p. 15. Indiana law is clear that it is proper to consider a probationer's entire criminal record when assessing what sanction is warranted for a violation, which is precisely what the trial court did. See, e.g., Sieg v. State, 271 N.E.3d 620, 625 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (“The trial court properly considered his extensive criminal history [when determining sanction for probation violation], which spans nearly five decades and includes eleven prior felony convictions and multiple previous probation violations.”).

[8] In any event, even if the trial court had erred by considering Stanley's prior trafficking convictions, any such error could only be considered harmless. An error is harmless “where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A); Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 491–92 (Ind. 2023). Stanley had admitted to committing six violations of probation within the first two months of his probationary term, including committing a new felony methamphetamine-possession crime, testing positive for drugs, and failing to undergo a substance-abuse evaluation. Given the number and seriousness of those unchallenged violations, we are confident that the trial court's sanction decision would have been the same even without any reference to the prior trafficking convictions. Even if we assume, arguendo, that the trial court did consider improper information, any such consideration could only be considered harmless.

II. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Ordering Stanley to Serve his Previously-Suspended Sentence

[9] Stanley contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to serve 822 days of his previously-suspended sentence. “Probation is a criminal sanction wherein a convicted defendant specifically agrees to accept conditions upon his behavior in lieu of imprisonment.” Jones v. State, 838 N.E.2d 1146, 1148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). When a trial court finds that a defendant has violated a condition of probation, it may choose to order execution of all or part of the previously suspended sentence. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h); Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 186–87. Trial courts are accorded “considerable leeway” in deciding how to address such violations, and those decisions are reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id.

[10] On October 27, 2022, less than two months after he began probation, Stanley tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. Probation scheduled a substance-abuse evaluation for Stanley on November 3, 2022, to which he did not go. On the same day, Stanley possessed methamphetamine in Kentucky, and he was subsequently convicted of this new felony offense on July 27, 2023. Stanley failed to appear for scheduled meetings with his probation officer on November 3, 4, and 7, 2022. When Stanley's probation officer attempted a home visit on November 8, 2022, he discovered that Stanley was no longer residing at the address he had given to probation; Stanley had not reported a change of address, and his whereabouts at that time were unknown.

[11] Thus, within the first two months of his probation term, Stanley committed six separate violations of probation, all of which he subsequently admitted, including the commission of a new criminal offense. “We have repeatedly ruled that it is not an abuse of discretion to order execution of the entire suspended sentence when a defendant commits a new criminal offense while on probation.” Sieg, 271 N.E.3d at 625. Moreover, Stanley went on to commit other serious violations of the terms of his probation. Stanley tested positive for two controlled substances, and we have noted that “positive drug screens are hardly mere ‘technical’ violations of probation.” Overstreet v. State, 136 N.E.3d 260, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Although Stanley asserts that his underlying problem was an addiction to drugs, (Appellant's Br. 10), he rejected the opportunity to address that problem by failing to attend the ordered substance-abuse evaluation that could have been the first step to placing him in a treatment program. See Utley v. State, 167 N.E.3d 777, 783–84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (finding no abuse of discretion in ordering imposition of the entire previously-suspended sentence when the defendant tested positive for alcohol and was terminated from a substance abuse treatment program within two months of his placement on probation), trans. denied. As the trial court noted, Stanley had “basically failed in every way, shape, and form [possible] on probation.” Tr. Vol. II p. 15.

[12] Stanley's reliance on Brown v. State, 162 N.E.3d 1179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), is misplaced, as that case is readily distinguished. (Appellant's Br. 10). In Brown, an uncertain number of missed appointments with his probation officer was the only violation of probation that the State had proven. Id. at 1182–84. Here, Stanley admitted to numerous, serious violations in this case beyond just the missed appointments, including the commission of a new crime, a positive drug test, and a failure to comply with a substance-abuse evaluation. Stanley's reliance on Brown is unavailing.

[13] Finally, Stanley's suggestion that his violations were not a volitional act is fatally undercut by his own admissions. Stanley admitted in the trial court that he knew when he was sentenced that he was aware of pending charges in Kentucky. As Stanley explained, he “hit the ‘F’ it button” on his probation because he wanted to be “free” in the time he had left before he had to answer for the Kentucky charges. Tr. Vol. II p. 13. In other words, Stanley made a deliberate choice to disregard his probation conditions because he wanted to live as he desired without any restrictions on his behavior. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that Stanley serve the remainder of his previously-suspended sentence.

[14] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.