IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: X.P. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] X.P.-F. (“Child”) was found to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”) on June 8, 2023, after the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received reports that Child was the victim of neglect and lacked a sober caregiver. H.P. (“Mother”) and N.F. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) were ordered to complete certain services. Father did not fully comply with the case plan and failed to make meaningful progress towards reunification with Child. On July 29, 2024, DCS petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights to Child.¹ Following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court issued an order terminating Father's parental rights to Child. Father contends that the juvenile court's findings are insufficient to sustain its order terminating his parental rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born to Parents on September 26, 2022. On April 20, 2023, DCS received a report alleging that Child was a victim of neglect. Specifically, the report alleged that Mother had “neglected her son by means of caregiver impairment.” Ex. Vol. p. 38. The report indicated that on April 17, maternal grandmother had taken Child to stay with a relative after she had “found [Child] in a ‘dope house’ where [Mother] appeared to be under the influence of drugs[.]” Ex. Vol. p. 38. Three days later, on April 20, in an effort to retrieve Child, Mother appeared at the Starke County Sheriff's Department. At the time, Mother “had slurred speech, abnormal mannerisms[,] and sudden movements” that were consistent with drug use. Ex. Vol. p. 29. After a consensual search of Mother's vehicle and belongings, police “located one crack pipe, marijuana[,] and a white powdery substance in [Mother's] vehicle and one crack pipe in Mother's purse.” Ex. Vol. p. 29. Mother admitted to having consumed cocaine and tested positive for “THC, amphetamine, methamphetamine, and cocaine.” Ex. Vol. p. 29. Father's whereabouts were unknown. Child was removed from Mother's care “on an emergency basis” and placed in relative care. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 13.

[3] Child was adjudicated to be a CHINS on June 8, 2023. In its order finding Child to be a CHINS, the juvenile court noted that “Father does not have an active caregiver role or relationship with [Child] and Mother has issues with substance abuse that renders her unable to provide for the safety and care of [Child].” Ex. Vol. p. 29. Following a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court ordered Father to: (1) work towards establishing paternity, (2) engage in supervised visitation with Child, (3) provide a release of information for his probation services, and (4) participate in parenting education and follow all recommendations.

[4] Father initially complied with the terms of his case plan. Father completed a clinical assessment, after which he was diagnosed with cannabis-use disorder, alcohol-use disorder, and a mood disorder. On December 7, 2023, the juvenile court ordered Father to complete the additional following services: (1) complete a substance-use-disorder assessment and follow recommendations, (2) submit to random drug screens, and (3) participate in parenting education. By March of 2024, however, Father was no longer in compliance with his case plan. By this time, Father had been arrested multiple times and charged in multiple criminal actions, had tested positive for THC, had refused to participate in random drug screens, had failed to complete the substance-use disorder assessment, and had declined to participate in recommended services.

[5] On July 29, 2024, DCS petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights to Child. The juvenile court conducted a multi-day evidentiary hearing. During the hearing, DCS presented multiple witnesses and Father, while representing himself, testified.

[6] The juvenile court heard testimony that Father had failed to remedy the conditions that had led to Child's placement outside his care. Since the initiation of the CHINS proceedings, Father had been arrested and charged with criminal offenses on six different occasions. Father had missed at least eighty-seven random drug-screen calls that had resulted in thirty-six missed screens. “[M]issed screens are considered positive screens.” Tr. Vol. I p. 163. When Father did screen, he produced eleven positive screens, with nine positive for THC and the other two positive for amphetamines, methamphetamine, benzoylecgonine, cocaine, and THC.

[7] Although Father had initially shown a willingness to participate in services aimed at improving his mental health, his attitude eventually changed. Adam Johnson, a home-based mental health counselor, worked with Father from “early fall of 2023” to September of 2024. Tr. Vol. I p. 22. While Father was initially receptive to working with Johnson, at some point, Father stopped taking accountability for his actions and began accusing DCS of having “kidnapped” Child. Tr. Vol. I p. 28. Father began using counseling sessions to talk about conspiracy theories instead of focusing on the case plan. By September 2024, Father's progress in anger-management treatment had stalled. Father displayed verbal aggression, yelling and cursing at Johnson. Father was eventually unsuccessfully discharged from services. Father also failed to complete home-based therapy due to lack of progress and the inability to take accountability.

[8] Father participated in parenting-education services with Family Focus visitation provider Kaiden Horn throughout the underlying CHINS case but failed to successfully complete services. Horn worked with Father from June to September of 2024. Horn indicated that he and Father had “got[ten] along at times” but had “butted heads ․ during the parenting education” portion of services because Father “would be a little resistant towards the material.” Tr. Vol. I p. 69. Father was verbally aggressive and confrontational in his interactions with Horn. Father and Horn worked part of the way through the parenting-education curriculum, which was designed to provide education on parenting skills and strategies, but Father did not finish the curriculum. Father's participation appeared to be “more of a checking the box” rather than a genuine desire to improve his parenting skills. Tr. Vol. I p. 71. At some point prior to the unsuccessful termination of services, Father had appeared to be intoxicated before a visitation session with Child, smelling of marijuana and “fumbling around with” what appeared to be “edibles.” Tr. Vol. I p. 72. When confronted, Father became so “verbally aggressive” towards Horn that Family-Focus representatives felt that it would be necessary to change service providers going forward. Tr. Vol. I p. 72.

[9] Child's visitation with Father was suspended on September 26, 2024, at the recommendation of Child's therapist. In suspending Father's visitation, the juvenile court noted that

[Child] has not been rehabilitated. [Child] has tantrums and the severity of his behaviors increased during [the review] period, which correlates with [Parents] resuming visitation after incarceration. [Child] displays behaviors that include head banging, pulling his hair, trouble sleeping, biting, and states of disassociation. [Child's] pediatrician recommended he see a child psychologist for play therapy. [Child's] extreme behaviors frequently occur after visitation with [Parents]. [Child's] psychologist, Dr. Anthony McCrovitz, determined that the visitation with [Parents] is counter productive [(sic)] to [Child's] developmental needs and he recommended visitation stop for [Child's] emotional stability.

Ex. Vol. p. 4.

[10] Additionally, foster mother testified that Child's behavior changed for the worse “once visits [with Father] began.” Tr. Vol. II p. 31. Within two days of Father's visitation resuming, Child had experienced an episode during which he had become extremely upset and his “eyes went blank, his body just stopped. He didn't respond to any prompts[,]” and he “started sobbing.” Tr. Vol. II p. 32. As visitation continued, Child's condition worsened, with Child exhibiting “rage” and experiencing “tantrums that lasted like 40 minutes or more, he was banging his head, he was biting himself ․ just lots and lots of behavioral difficulties. He was also extremely tired. Um, he was sleeping like almost 14 hours at night and he was just wiped.” Tr. Vol. II p. 32. Following the suspension of Father's parenting time, Child's behavior improved dramatically. “[W]ithin a week, tantrums were almost nonexistent․ [a]nd certainly by two and three [weeks] they were gone completely.” Tr. Vol. II p. 35. Foster mother testified that Child is “a sweet little boy. He's got a lot of personality, is very funny, he likes to build stuff.” Tr. Vol. II p. 31.

[11] DCS family-case manager (“FCM”) April Ward testified that Child was “doing really well” in his foster placement that he had “bonded with [foster mother] and her child.” Tr. Vol. I p. 192. FCM Ward indicated that Child was “overall happier and less dysregulated than he was.” Tr. Vol. I p. 192. FCM Ward opined that adoption by foster mother was a satisfactory plan for Child's continued care and that “the reasons for the original removal and continuation of the case still stand today.” Tr. Vol. I p. 193. FCM Ward further opined that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests.

[12] The court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) supervisor overseeing Child's case, Katherine Wells, testified regarding Father's lack of compliance with services and Child's best interests. Wells testified that she and the CASAs who had been assigned to Child's case had discussed with Father the steps that needed to be taken for reunification but that he had failed to take them. Father had refused to take accountability and had “pepper[ed]” Wells with aggressive and constant text messages. Tr. Vol. II p. 102. Wells noted that Father had failed to comply with court orders and to complete services. Wells opined that Child had done “really well” in foster mother's care, explaining that since visitation with Father has ended, Child had learned to come to foster mother for comfort and actively “seeks it out[,]” which he had not done before. Tr. Vol. II pp. 104, 103. Wells further opined that termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests because

[Child] needs to be in a stable and nurturing environment. I don't feel that [Father] has that stability of either employment or housing -- um -- he doesn't take accountability for what has gone on during the pendency of the case, and there's just -- I don't feel like there's enough safety and stability.

Tr. Vol. II p. 104.

[13] Father testified, reiterating his claim that Child had been kidnapped by DCS. Father indicated that he “live[d] in the private” and did not “need to tell the courts where [he] live[d.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 176. Father claimed to have access to a mobile home in Florida where he and Child could live and that the mobile home was owned by a family member, had two bedrooms, and had access to running water and electricity. Father did not appear to be employed, stating that he would earn the money necessary for Child's care by “doing work of some sort.” Tr. Vol. II p. 179. Father admitted that he did not have reliable transportation and had to rely on others for transportation because his “license is suspended[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 179. When asked how he would obtain medical care for Child if it ever became necessary, Father stated

I could either -- I could explain how. Um, there's – there's multiple ways. You -- you could call 911 for a -- an ambulance. I could call any -- any of my friends or relatives that would be more than willing to, you know, take my offspring to a doctor's appointment or -- um -- for a -- a hospital for any kind of medical emergency or a -- any reason that I felt like it would be necessary that he needed to -- that there was somewhere he needed to go and it would, you know, interfere -- which when I do get another vehicle ․ I'd still be able to take him to the hospital in my private automobile.․ Because he's not -- he is not a commercial good. You know, he's not – he's – I'm not a taxi [ ] driver for him.

Tr. Vol. II p. 181. Father claimed to use marijuana for “religious purposes” and to “get closer to God[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 182. Father indicated that he used marijuana “when [he] feel[s] like God needs to talk to” him. Tr. Vol. II p. 183. Father explained that God had told him not to give up on Child and that he is “sovereign” and that “God is the only one that has authority over [him]. The government does not have authority over” him. Tr. Vol. II p. 183. Father acknowledged that he had pending criminal cases, stating that he was representing himself in those cases because he does “not have anything to do with public pretenders.” Tr. Vol. II p. 184. Father's pattern of disruptive and aggressive behavior continued throughout the evidentiary hearing.

[14] On September 30, 2025, the juvenile court issued its order terminating Father's parental rights to Child. The juvenile court found

by clear and convincing evidence that [Child] has been removed from [Parents] for a period of over twenty-three (23) months and that there is a reasonable probability that Father cannot remedy the reasons for [Child's] continual removal due to his lack of progress in services, lack of accountability and change, lack of sobriety, lack of stability, and repeated incarcerations. Substance abuse and neglect was present when DCS removed Child from Mother's care. Father was considered the “non-offending” parent at the time; however, as the CHINS case progressed, it was clear to the CHINS Court and this Court that Father has substance[-]abuse issues that interfere with his ability to safely provide care for Child and make any progress toward reunification. Father tested positive for marijuana or was arrested on marijuana related offenses throughout the case. Father's substance use escalated to methamphetamine in September 2024. Substance use and neglect are still present today along with additional issues of lack of stable housing, continued criminal behavior, lack of accountability, and hostile and aggressive behavior towards others.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 232–33. For these same reasons, the juvenile court found that there is a reasonable probability that continuing the parent-child relationship would pose a threat to Child's well-being and safety. The juvenile court stated that “[i]mpaired caregivers cannot meet” Child's needs, noting testimony from Child's psychologist that visitation with Father “was counter productive [(sic)] to [Child's] developmental needs and visitation needed to stop for [Child's] emotional stability.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 233.

[15] The juvenile court also found that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests, stating that Child

is in need of a safe, stable home environment that is free from substance abuse and neglect and that can meet [Child's] individual daily needs. Father is unable to provide this for [Child]. There is no doubt that Father loves Child; however, Father cannot provide Child with an environment free from neglect for Child to thrive. Father failed to put Child's needs before his own. Father instead focused on conspiracy theories and beliefs that Child was kidnapped by DCS. Father chose to fight the government rather than take accountability for his actions and make positive changes in his life for Child. Father fails to make decisions that are in the best interest of Child.․ DCS and CASA believe that termination of [Father's] parental rights is in the best interest of [Child] and this Court agrees.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 233–34. Finally, the juvenile court found that DCS's plan for Child's continued care, that plan being adoption by foster mother, was satisfactory.

Discussion and Decision

[16] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be subordinated to the best interests of the child. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[17] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Term. of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id.

[18] In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court's findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

[19] In order to terminate a parent's parental rights to a child, DCS must prove that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child and that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)–(3). Of relevance to this case, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) further provides that DCS must also prove the existence of one or more of the following circumstances:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a [CHINS] or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite [DCS's] reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d). Father does not argue on appeal that DCS failed to prove that it has a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of Child, with that plan being adoption. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support termination of his parental rights to Child, Father argues only that DCS failed to prove Indiana Code sections 31-35-2-4(c)(1) and (c)(3).

A. The Evidence is Sufficient to Prove Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1)

[20] In this case, DCS alleged that termination of Father's parental rights was warranted under subsections (d)(2), (d)(3), and (d)(4). Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) explicitly provides that DCS must prove “one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d)[.]” (Emphasis added). Thus, DCS was only required to prove one of the circumstances listed in subsection (d) in support of its petition to terminate Father's parental rights to the Children. See generally In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (addressing the prior version of the statute and explaining that because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) had used the word “or” and had therefore been written in the disjunctive, the juvenile court had only been required to find that one prong of subsection (B) had been proven by clear and convincing evidence), trans. denied.

[21] Pursuant to subsection (d)(3), the juvenile court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Child's continued placement outside of Father's home will not be remedied.

When determining whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In so doing, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the services offered through [DCS]. A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change. Additionally, [DCS] was not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it needed to establish only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change.

In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 18–19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied.

[22] The evidence indicates that, at the time of Child's initial removal from Mother's care, Child lacked a sober caregiver, and Father's whereabouts were unknown. When Father submitted to court-ordered drug tests, most were positive. Father also missed at least eighty-seven random drug-screen calls that resulted in thirty-six missed screens. These missed screens “are considered positive screens.” Tr. Vol. I p. 163. While Father most-often tested positive for THC, he had also tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamine, benzoylecgonine, and cocaine.

[23] Father failed to successfully complete the services recommended by DCS, including mental-health and parenting-education services. Father was verbally aggressive and confrontational with service providers and refused to accept accountability for his actions. Father also failed to prove that he had established stable housing or employment. He committed or was charged with numerous criminal offenses during the pendency of the underlying CHINS and termination proceedings, some of which were pending as of the date of the evidentiary hearing. The evidence supports the juvenile court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that Father's behavior will not change as “[s]ubstance use and neglect are still present today along with additional issues of [a] lack of stable housing, continued criminal behavior, lack of accountability, and hostile and aggressive behavior towards others.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 232–33.

[24] Father claims that the record demonstrates that he had secured housing in Florida for himself and Child. Father, however, presented no evidence beyond his self-serving testimony to support this claim, which the juvenile court, acting as the trier-of-fact, was under no obligation to credit. See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004) (“As a general rule, factfinders are not required to believe a witness's testimony even when it is uncontradicted.”). Father also asserts that his hesitation to participate in services did not reflect an inability to remedy the reasons for Child's continued placement outside his care but rather that he had a distrust of DCS and service providers. Whatever Father's reasons, the evidence before the juvenile court overwhelmingly demonstrates that while Father initially participated in some services, his participation waned and he ultimately failed to successfully complete any of the services or make progress towards reunification. Father's argument to the contrary effectively amounts to a request to reweigh the evidence, which again, we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

B. The Evidence is Sufficient to Prove Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(3)

[25] We are mindful that in considering whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. Id. “A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children.” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

The [juvenile] court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.

In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted).

[26] CASA supervisor Wells opined that

[Child] needs to be in a stable and nurturing environment. I don't feel that [Father] has that stability of either employment or housing -- um -- he doesn't take accountability for what has gone on during the pendency of the case, and there's just -- I don't feel like there's enough safety and stability.

Tr. Vol. II p. 104. “[A] child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child[.]” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224. In light of Child's need for stability and permanency, both Wells and FCM Ward opined that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests. We have previously concluded that the testimony of a case worker and CASA can support a best-interests finding. See Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 374 (providing that the testimony of the case worker, guardian ad litem, or a CASA regarding the children's best interests supports a finding that termination is in the children's best interests).

[27] In addition to Wells's and FCM Ward's testimony, the evidence relating to Father's failure to complete the court-ordered services and lack of progress towards reunification also supports the juvenile court's determination that termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests. Also, the record demonstrates that Child's mental wellbeing was so detrimentally affected by visitation with Father, that Child's psychologist recommended that visitation with Father be terminated. Child is in a safe and loving home where Child is thriving and receiving the stability that he requires.

[28] Father argues that he loves Child and has a plan for Child's care, which includes a move to Florida with Father and being homeschooled. While this may be so, Father has failed to demonstrate that he has the ability to carry through with his supposed plan or to provide Child with the stability and permanency that Child requires. Once again, Father's claim to the contrary is nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, which again, we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

[29] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother voluntarily terminated her parental rights to Child and does not participate in this appeal.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.