Ryan Spence, Appellant-Petitioner v. Jamie Hohne, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Jamie Hohne (“Mother”) moved the trial court to have Ryan Spence (“Father”) held in contempt of court for failing to ensure the parties’ teenaged son engage in parenting time with Mother. The trial court held Father in contempt and ordered him to pay $5,000 of Mother's attorney fees incurred in enforcing the trial court's custody order. Father appeals, raising two issues, which we consolidate and restate as: Did the trial court abuse its discretion by finding him in contempt? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father and Mother (collectively, “Parents”) divorced in 2014. They agreed to joint legal custody of their two sons, with Mother having primary physical custody. In 2017, the trial court approved a mediated agreed entry, which increased Father's parenting time. Over the years, Parents worked with a co-parenting counselor to resolve issues, and “the parenting plan eventually morphed into a shared parenting arrangement” that was not submitted to the trial court. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 30. In early 2023, the now-teenaged sons began spending more time with Father (ten of every fourteen overnights), which Mother “reluctantly” supported on a trial basis. Id.

[3] But in September 2023, Mother moved for a rule to show cause, alleging, in relevant part, Father was no longer abiding by the agreed entry or their private mediated agreement. The same day, Father petitioned to modify custody, parenting time, and child support. Father sought primary physical custody, and Mother sought “a shared plan, alternating custody ․ on a weekly basis.” Id. at 32. By the time the trial court entered its order modifying custody on July 17, 2024 (the “final order”), Parents’ older son was two weeks shy of his eighteenth birthday, so the order focused primarily on their then-fifteen-year-old son, Sheldon. Finding there had been a substantial change in circumstances since the 2017 agreed entry, the trial court ordered, in pertinent part:

28․ The Court finds it to be in the children's best interests for the parties to share joint legal and physical custody. The Court does not find it to be in the children's best interests for Father to have primary physical custody.

29. The parties shall share custody on a week on, week off basis, with exchanges on Sundays at 6:00 PM unless a different date and time are agreed upon by the parties.

* * *

32. Neither parent shall place Sheldon in the middle of adult conversations or issues, nor require the child to be a ‘go-between’ for the parents․ Each parent shall encourage and support Sheldon with respect to his relationship with the other parent.

Id. at 33–34.¹ Neither party appealed this order.

[4] Over email, Parents devised a plan to transition Sheldon to the shared custody arrangement. A few weeks later, on August 6, Mother again moved for a rule to show cause, in which she alleged:

7. Mother respectfully advises the Court that since entry of the [final order], Sheldon has not been in Mother's physical care.

8. Since the Court’[s final order], Mother has made and continues to make repeated and ongoing efforts and requests to exercise Sheldon's shared physical custody as directed by this Court.

9. Father continues to disregard Mother's relationship with Sheldon. Mother has reason to believe that Father has no intention of complying with the Court's [final order].

10. Contrary to the direction of this Court's [final order], Father has failed to encourage and support Sheldon's relationship with Mother. Instead, Father continues to inappropriately empower Sheldon and allows Sheldon to make adult decisions without justification or consequence.

11. Father continues to thwart Mother's parenting time accusing Mother of not listening to or “hearing” Sheldon. (Father's emails to Mother; including July 30 and August 4, 2024).

12. Mother also specifically advises the Court that on August 5, 2024, Mother went to pick Sheldon up from the gym where he walks to after school. Father knew of Mother's intention to pick up Sheldon. Father advised Mother that he couldn't ensure the transition [to Mother's house] given he would be at work. While Mother and Sheldon were sitting in Mother's vehicle talking, Father also arrived at the gym and permitted Sheldon to leave with him. Father's actions, while contrary to his statements to Mother, were in deliberate and complete disregard of this Court's [final order] and denied Mother physical care of Sheldon.

13. Mother believes that Father's actions and behaviors are in willful disregard of this Court's [final order].

Id. at 37–38. Mother requested Father be held in contempt, asked for a hearing and immediate attorney conference, and requested attorney fees incurred for enforcing the final order. The trial court ordered Father to show cause why he should not be held in contempt “for failing to comply with the Court's [final order] regarding shared physical custody.” Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 38. The court's order also summarized Mother's specific allegations, and the court set an attorney conference.

[5] On the same day Mother filed her motion (August 6), she went to pick up Sheldon from the gym, but Sheldon refused to get into her car. Sheldon began walking ten miles to Father's house with Mother following alongside him in her car. Just before midnight, police officers stopped them on the side of the road. Father arrived, and when confronted about whether he would enforce Mother's parenting time rather than permit Sheldon to choose which parent to leave with, Father responded, “I won't be cornered.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 28. Sheldon left with Father. Thereafter, Father gave Sheldon access to an Uber account, which Sheldon used to travel from Father's house to see friends, to attend extracurricular activities, and to come and go from Mother's house as he wished. Later that month, Sheldon went to Michigan with a friend, telling each parent he had the other's permission. In September, Mother exercised a few overnights of parenting time. In November, Father allowed Sheldon to spend time with friends at the mall during what should have been Mother's parenting time, and Sheldon was arrested for shoplifting.

[6] While this was going on, the trial court held four case status conferences on August 9, August 27, October 8, and December 9, and continued to take Mother's contempt motion under advisement. The court also conducted an in camera interview with Sheldon. After the December 9 conference, the trial court entered an “interim order” on parenting time. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 41. The court noted there was no evidence Mother was a danger or physical or emotional threat to Sheldon but set forth a more limited schedule for Mother's parenting time. The court ordered Mother to have “at least one overnight with Sheldon every two weeks” and at least two, two-hour visits per week. Id. The court directed Father to “enforce this order just as he would enforce any other ‘house rule’ or expectation of the child,” including by taking away privileges or imposing punishment. Id. The court set a hearing on the contempt motion for spring 2025.

[7] Moving forward, Father ensured compliance with the interim order's parenting time minimums. Mother did not exercise shared custody as contemplated in the final order. In preparation for the contempt hearing, Mother filed a “Supplemental and/or Subsequent” motion for rule to show cause. Id. at 42. In it, she alleged (1) Father “enable[d] Sheldon to avoid Mother almost completely” from August 6 until the December status conference; and (2) after the interim order, Father “failed to fully support and encourage Mother's relationship with Sheldon.” Id. at 45. The trial court issued another order to show cause identifying the parts of the court's orders which Father was alleged to have violated and summarizing Mother's allegations as follows:

• Since entry of the Court's [final order] (including from August 6, 2024) until the status conference held on December 9, 202[4], [Father] continued to fail to allow [Mother] Sheldon's shared physical custody.

• Since entry of the Court's [final order] (including from August 6, 2024) until the status conference held on December 9, 202[4], [Father] would permit Sheldon to attend events with friends during [Mother's] scheduled parenting time.

• Since entry of the Court's [final order] (including from August 6, 2024) to the present, [Father] has continued to fail to support and encourage [Mother's] relationship with Sheldon.

• In November 2024, [Father] disregarded and dismissed [Mother's] input in addressing an incident involving Sheldon that required parental intervention.

Order Setting Hearing on Rule to Show Cause (April 14, 2025) at 2.² In response, Father moved for sanctions against Mother and requested attorney fees, arguing that because he was complying with the interim order, Mother's pursuit of contempt against him was frivolous.³

[8] The trial court held a hearing on May 16, 2025, at which it addressed all pending motions. Mother, Father, and Mother's husband testified, and Parents introduced documentary evidence of their communications about Sheldon since the final order. Mother's attorney presented evidence that Mother had incurred attorney fees of $14,100 since she filed her first contempt motion.

[9] After the hearing, the trial court ordered Parents to divide summer parenting time equally. It again took Mother's contempt motions under advisement. On August 15, 2025, over a year after Mother filed her original motion, the trial court entered its order on contempt, finding, in pertinent part:

10. After a review of the evidence admitted and presented, the Court finds that Father has willfully failed to comply with this Court's orders.

11. The parties had agreed to an appropriate transition plan to conform with the Final Order at the start of the 2024 Fall Semester. However, the transition never occurred and Mother did not regain shared time of Sheldon with Father. Father has not taken any steps to comply with the Court's Final Order.

12. The parties’ email communication is indicative of Father's lack of support for the relationship and his empowerment of Sheldon, which has unfortunately permeated this matter for over a year.

13. Father's actions of picking Sheldon up from Mother on August 5, 2024, thereby terminating her time, willfully violated this Court's order.

14. The events of August 6, 202[4] were extremely unfortunate; however, Father failed to take action to ensure Sheldon complied with this Court's orders, instead telling law enforcement that “he refused to be cornered.”

15. In November 2024, Father allowed Sheldon to spend time with friends on one of Mother's scheduled weekends, which resulted in another unfortunate incident for Sheldon. It was this circumstance that led to one of the provisions in the Court's Interim Order.

16. Father's continued empowerment of Sheldon contributed to the child playing both parents against each other; for example, when Sheldon went to Michigan without either parent's permission.

17. Father makes some “positive” or “encouraging” statements about Mother's relationship with Sheldon in correspondence; however, his actions demonstrate his willful lack of true support as contemplated by the Court. Father deflects responsibility on Sheldon and when the child refuses to go with Mother, Father is essentially saying to Mother, “there is nothing I can do.” Further, Father is often patronizing to Mother, telling her what she needs to do to fix the relationship and ‘listen’ to Sheldon.

18. As a sanction for Father's contempt, the Court orders attorney fees in the amount of $5,000.00 to be paid directly to Mother's attorney within 90 days.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 27–28. Father filed a motion to correct error, which was deemed denied.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding Father in contempt of court.

[10] Father argues the trial court abused its discretion when it found him in contempt due to his willful disobedience of the court's final and interim orders.

[11] The determination of whether a person is in contempt of court rests within the trial court's discretion. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d 829, 832 (Ind. 2016). We therefore review the trial court's judgment under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. “We will reverse a trial court's finding of contempt only if there is no evidence or inference therefrom to support the finding.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016). “When reviewing a contempt order, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Tincher v. Sweat, 247 N.E.3d 793, 797 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[12] “Generally speaking, contempt of court involves disobedience of a court which undermines the court's authority, justice, and dignity.” In re A.S., 9 N.E.3d 129, 131 (Ind. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Contempt may be direct or indirect. Id. Indirect contempt involves acts committed outside the court's presence which nevertheless tend to interrupt, obstruct, embarrass, or prevent the due administration of justice. Id. at 132. Although the ability to punish a person for indirect contempt is an inherently judicial power, the legislature has codified the elements and procedural requirements to bring an action for indirect contempt. See Ind. Code ch. 34-47-3.

[13] Specificity of Contempt Motion and Orders to Show Cause. As a threshold matter, Father argues Mother's contempt motions and the trial court's orders to show cause were too vague to notify him of the actions alleged to constitute contempt. “An indirect contempt proceeding requires an array of due process protections, including notice and the opportunity to be heard.” Stanke v. Swickard, 43 N.E.3d 245, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). To ensure these protections, the indirect contempt statute requires the person charged with contempt “to be served with a rule of the court against which the contempt was alleged to have been committed.” I.C. § 34-47-3-5(a) (1998). In addition:

(b) The rule to show cause must:

(1) clearly and distinctly set forth the facts that are alleged to constitute the contempt;

(2) specify the time and place of the facts with reasonable certainty, as to inform the defendant of the nature and circumstances of the charge against the defendant; and

(3) specify a time and place at which the defendant is required to show cause, in the court, why the defendant should not be attached and punished for such contempt.

* * *

(d) A rule provided for under subsection (b) may not issue until the facts alleged to constitute the contempt have been:

(1) brought to the knowledge of the court by an information; and

(2) duly verified by the oath of affirmation of some officers of the court or other responsible person.

I.C. § 34-47-3-5(b), (d). If the trial court issues no rule to show cause in compliance with these statutes, the court may lack authority to hold a person in contempt. Stanke, 43 N.E.3d at 248. A court may excuse strict compliance with the statute under certain circumstances when the alleged contemnor had clear notice of the accusations against him. See id.

[14] Here, Mother filed a verified information for rule to show cause in August 2024. She specified which paragraphs of the final order Father was alleged to have violated. Her motion detailed the circumstances alleged to constitute contempt. The next day, the trial court issued an order setting a rule to show cause hearing. In it, the court ordered Father to “show cause of why he should not be held in contempt of this Court's Orders for failing to comply with the Court's Order regarding shared physical custody.” Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 38. The order also summarized the actions Mother alleged to constitute contempt. Throughout the fall of 2024, the trial court took the contempt motion under advisement while it held four status conferences about the custody issue. In the weeks leading up to the hearing, Mother filed her “supplemental and/or subsequent” verified information for rule to show cause. In issuing its second rule to show cause, the trial court followed the same procedures as it did the first time. Again, the trial court's order listed the specific paragraphs of the court's orders which Father was alleged to have violated and summarized and incorporated Mother's supplemental allegations.

[15] Based on our review of the record, Mother and the trial court complied with the procedures set forth in the indirect contempt statute. Mother's motions and the trial court's orders specify the nature and circumstances of the charges against Father, specifically, that he failed to comply with the court's final order on shared physical custody, thwarted Mother's attempts to exercise parenting time, and failed to support and encourage Mother's relationship with Sheldon. There can be no doubt Father had clear notice he was being called before the trial court to answer the accusations related to shared physical custody of Sheldon.

[16] Specificity of Underlying Final and Interim Orders. Father next argues the trial court's orders were “inherently vague,” and therefore he cannot be held in contempt for failing to comply with them. Appellant's Br. at 16. Specifically, Father points to the trial court's directive in the final order that “[e]ach parent shall encourage and support Sheldon with respect to his relationship with the other parent.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 34. He argues the order to “encourage and support” is so ambiguous as to be “practically incapable of compliance.” Appellant's Br. at 19. And because he could not discern what level of encouragement and support the trial court expected, Father contends the trial court abused its discretion when it found him in contempt for demonstrating “willful lack of true support as contemplated by the Court.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 28.

[17] To support a finding of contempt, the order “must have been so clear and certain that there could be no question as to what the party must do, or not do, and so there could be no question regarding whether the order is violated.” City of Gary v. Major, 822 N.E.2d 165, 170 (Ind. 2005). “A party may not be held in contempt for failing to comply with an ambiguous or indefinite order. Otherwise, a party could be held in contempt for obeying an ambiguous order in good faith.” Id.

[18] In support of his argument, Father points to two cases in which this Court has held an underlying order was too ambiguous to support a contempt finding. In In re Graykowski, 268 N.E.3d 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), a trial court found a bank in contempt for violating a guardianship order. Id. at 798. On appeal, this Court reversed because the letters of guardianship indicated a guardianship “without limitations,” but the guardianship order created a limited guardianship. Id. at 801. Because the scope of the guardianship was unclear, the trial court abused its discretion in finding the bank in contempt. Id. at 802. In Bowyer v. Indiana Department of Natural Resources, 798 N.E.2d 912 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), a trial court held a landowner was in contempt for violating a temporary restraining order preventing him from conducting activities below the “shoreline” of a public lake. Id. at 915. At the time the restraining order was issued, the shoreline had not been legally established under a statutory definition. Because “shoreline” was “subject to a number of possible layperson and legal definitions,” required special expertise to determine under the legal definition, and as to the lake in question, had changed over the years, this Court held the word was “inherently ambiguous and highly indefinite.” Id. at 918. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in finding the landowner in contempt where there was no evidence he conducted activities below the actual waterline. Id. at 919–20.

[19] We do not find the case law Father cites persuasive in this situation. Unlike the conflicting orders in Graykowski, the trial court here consistently ordered each Parent to encourage and support the other's relationship with Sheldon. And unlike the term “shoreline” in Bowyer, the phrase “encourage and support” is not subject to a legal definition requiring specialized expertise to determine.

[20] Yet even if we accept Father's argument that the phrase “encourage and support” is impossibly vague, this was not the only basis for the trial court's finding of contempt. The trial court found Father in contempt for failing to adhere to the shared physical custody arrangement it ordered in July 2024. That part of the court's final order could not be more explicit: the court found it was in Sheldon's best interest “for the parties to share joint legal and physical custody” and it was not in his best interest “for Father to have primary physical custody.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 33. And the order clearly and unambiguously provides Parents were to “share custody on a week on, week off basis, with exchanges on Sundays at 6:00 PM unless a different date and time are agreed upon by the parties.” Id. The trial court's order was clear and certain as to what Father must do.

[21] Willful Disobedience. Next, Father argues there was insufficient evidence he willfully or deliberately violated the trial court's orders. “To hold a party in contempt for violating a court order, the trial court must find that the party acted with ‘willful disobedience.’ ” Tincher, 247 N.E.3d at 797 (quoting Himes v. Himes, 57 N.E.3d 820, 829 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied); see also I.C. § 34-47-3-1 (1998) (“A person who is guilty of any willful disobedience of any process, or any order lawfully issued ․ by any court of record ․ is guilty of an indirect contempt of the court that issued the process or order.”).

[22] In arguing there was insufficient evidence to support the contempt finding, Father points to his compliance with the trial court's interim order setting forth a more limited parenting time schedule for Mother of “at least” one overnight with Sheldon every two weeks and “at least” two visits per week. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 41. It is apparent from the trial court's orders and statements on the record that the trial court viewed the interim order as a temporary directive as the parties worked toward shared physical custody. In any case, as Father correctly asserts, Mother testified at the hearing Father technically complied with the interim order, and there was no evidence to the contrary.

[23] But as the trial court acknowledged, Mother's contempt motions were based largely on Father's actions taken before the interim order. See id. at 26 (trial court writing, “If Mother's filings solely alleged non-compliance with the Interim Order, the Court would agree with Father [that Mother's pursuit of contempt against him was frivolous]. However, they do not and in fact focus largely on Father's actions (or lack thereof) since the Final Order in July 2024.”). The trial court's order on contempt specifically pointed to Father's actions in August, September, and November of 2024 as a basis for its contempt finding.

[24] And there is ample evidence to support the trial court's finding that Father willfully failed to comply with the final order mandating shared physical custody. For example, Father picked Sheldon up from the gym on what was to be Mother's first day of parenting time. The next day, Father took Sheldon home after the police interrupted Mother's attempt to pick him up. To police, Father indicated an unwillingness to follow the order. Thereafter, Father thwarted shared physical custody by providing Sheldon with an Uber account and allowing him to use it when Mother was to have physical custody. During what would have been Mother's parenting time, Father gave Sheldon permission to spend time with friends, including on the day he was arrested. And the evidence shows that from the date of the final order until the end of December, Sheldon never spent seven consecutive days at Mother's home. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Father willfully disobeyed the court's final order. See, e.g., Tincher, 247 N.E.3d at 797–98 (holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion when finding a mother in indirect contempt of court for willful disobedience of a court's parenting time order by failing to ensure fifteen-year-old daughter's presence at the designated exchange locations on time and thereby interfering with a father's parenting time).

[25] Sanction and Opportunity to Purge. Finally, Father seems to argue the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a “purely punitive” sanction and failing to give him the opportunity to purge himself of contempt. Appellant's Br. at 23.

[26] Contempt proceedings are technically neither civil nor criminal, but those labels apply to certain categories of contemptuous conduct, largely based on the purpose of the remedy. A.S., 9 N.E.3d at 132. “Civil contempt is not an offense primarily against the dignity of the court, but rather is for the benefit of the party who has been injured or damaged by the failure of another to conform to a court order issued for the private benefit of the aggrieved party.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because civil contempt proceedings are intended to vindicate the rights of an aggrieved party, “the resulting penalties are either coercive or remedial.” Id. Trial courts have inherent authority to award attorney fees for civil contempt. Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d at 835.

[27] Under the indirect contempt statute, a trial court “shall, on proper showing, extend the time provided [until the hearing on the rule to show cause] to give the defendant a reasonable and just opportunity to be purged of the contempt.” I.C. § 34-47-3-5(c). “[T]he ‘purge’ portion of the statute has typically only applied to cases where the trial court has ordered jail time to coerce action by the contemnor.” Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d at 835. As our Supreme Court has explained, this “is likely because jail time is generally punitive in nature and civil contempt orders avoid punishing the contemnor by allowing the party to be purged of contempt.” Id.

[28] Here, the trial court repeatedly took the original contempt motion under advisement throughout 2024. As a result, Father had ample time to comply with the final order after being put on notice of Mother's contempt allegations and before the interim order. As a sanction, the trial court did not order Father to serve jail time but awarded Mother $5,000 of her $14,100 attorney fees to compensate her for the cost of enforcing the final order. The sanction therefore was not purely punitive, and the trial court was not required to give Father further opportunity to purge himself of contempt.

Conclusion

[29] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Father in contempt of court and ordering him to pay $5,000 of Mother's attorney fees as a sanction for contempt.

[30] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The order did not resolve Mother's motion for rule to show cause but noted it would be addressed in a separate hearing later in the month. The resolution of that motion is unclear on this record but not germane to the issues on appeal.

2.   Neither party submitted a copy of this order in its appendix. Because this order is essential to our review of Father's issues on appeal, we obtained a copy via the Odyssey Case Management System.

3.   Again, neither party submitted a copy of Father's motion in its appendix, but the trial court recounted its substance in the order on contempt.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.