Billy Antonio Cross, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Billy Antonio Cross Jr. grabbed a firearm and confronted Kylin Bursey about his involvement in a traffic collision with Cross's wife earlier that day. Bursey began to walk away, and Cross ordered him to stop. As Bursey spun back around, Cross immediately fired numerous rounds in rapid succession, killing Bursey. No weapon was found on Bursey or in his vehicle. Cross later went to trial on multiple felony charges, including murder. He claimed that he fired in self-defense, believing that Bursey was armed. The jury found him guilty of murder, as well as possessing and operating a machine gun.

[2] On appeal, Cross raises two challenges to his murder conviction. He first argues the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, claiming the evidence showed he acted in sudden heat. Cross also contends the court erred by barring on relevance grounds his cross-examination of a detective as to his police training on approaching armed suspects. We find no abuse of discretion in either ruling and affirm Cross's convictions. But because Cross's sentencing documents misstate those convictions, we remand for the documents’ correction.

Facts

[3] Around 3:30 p.m. on April 30, 2024, Cross's wife, Angelia Cross (Angelia), was driving around Gary in her GMC Envoy when she collided with a red Chevy Tahoe. The driver of the Tahoe was later identified as Bursey, and he was accompanied by his girlfriend, Shawntel Rice, as well as Rice's five children and a friend. Angelia and Bursey got out of their cars and argued about who caused the crash. As Rice later explained, they both threatened each other. When Angelia drove off, Rice called 911 to report the collision and provided the Envoy's license plate. Rice described the woman driving the vehicle as wearing a pink tank top and having a long ponytail.

[4] Angelia returned home and told Cross about her collision with the red Tahoe. She told Cross that the Tahoe's driver had threatened her. Soon after, Cross and Angelia began driving around Gary in Angelia's Envoy. Security and traffic cameras captured the Envoy, driven by a woman in a pink top, making various stops and traveling down the same few roads between 4:41 p.m. and 5:03 p.m. The Envoy was often accompanied by another vehicle, a maroon Hyundai Sonata, the driver of which was later identified as Cross and Angelia's son (Son). Cross claimed they were driving to the homes of various relatives to borrow money for rent.

[5] Shortly after 5 p.m., the trio drove down 23rd Avenue, which Cross claimed was near the home of Angelia's father, whom they had been visiting. On 23rd Avenue, they encountered Bursey's red Tahoe parked on the side of the road with the trunk open. Bursey was outside the vehicle, working on its speakers with a few people. Rice and her children were inside the vehicle. According to Rice, she noticed the woman from the collision slowly drive by.

[6] Soon after, Son, driving separately in the maroon Sonata, pulled over behind Bursey's Tahoe. He exited the car and took his shirt off. Angelia, driving the Envoy with Cross as passenger, then pulled over behind Son, about 4 or 5 car lengths away from the Tahoe. As Cross and Angelia exited the car, Cross grabbed a gun from the backseat. According to Cross, he did so because, when they parked, he saw the handle of a gun sticking out of Bursey's waistband.

[7] Cross approached Bursey, who was standing in the street facing him. Cross asked Angelia who had threatened her, and she responded: “Him right there. That little mother-- right there.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 162. Cross and Bursey then exchanged words. According to Cross, Bursey stated: “she could get it too—she going to get it, what you getting too,” presumably referring to Angelia. Tr. Vol. III, p. 162. But according to Rice, who heard the encounter while sitting inside the Tahoe, Cross said to Bursey: “You said you was going to put your hands on my wife.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 163. Bursey then turned and began to walk away.

[8] As Bursey walked away, Cross yelled: “Don't move. Don't move.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 201. Bursey spun around towards Cross, and Cross immediately fired his weapon. According to Rice, the gunfire “sounded like a machine gun.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 164. Bursey fell to the ground, and Cross ran away. He, Angelia, and Son got into their cars and drove away. Rice ran to Bursey, and a witness called 911. Bursey was transported to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead.

[9] Responding officers found no firearm on Bursey's body, in the surrounding area, or in the Tahoe. An autopsy determined that Bursey suffered 6 gunshot wounds, 3 of which were independently fatal: 2 shots to his head and a shot through his lung. Fourteen spent casings and 2 spent bullets were recovered from the scene.

[10] Police eventually traced the Envoy to a home but found the residence empty, with a television still on and food left out. The Envoy was parked outside, and its license plate had been ripped off. The maroon Hyundai was later found abandoned across town. After about a month, Cross was located and taken into custody. He later went to trial on four felonies: murder; Level 4 felony operating a loaded machine gun; Level 5 felony possession of a machine gun; and Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon (SVF). The State also sought a sentence enhancement for the murder charge due to Cross's use of a firearm in the commission of the offense.

[11] At his jury trial, Cross testified that he acted in self-defense when shooting Bursey. He explained that he approached Bursey to get his insurance information and only grabbed a gun—which he claimed was not his—because he first saw a gun in Bursey's waistband. At that point, Cross already “feared for [his] life” but still exited the car, explaining that he did so because his son was already outside his car. Tr. Vol. III, p. 163. Cross testified that he asked Bursey whether he had been in the collision with his wife, which Bursey confirmed, before stating: “[S]he could get it too—she going to get it, what you getting too.” Id. at 162. Cross claimed this placed him in fear of his life and his family's life.

[12] When Bursey walked away, Cross alleged that his fear went “through the roof” because he could no longer see Bursey's hands and he heard Bursey mumble to his friends. Id. at 165. He claimed that he “didn't want the situation to escalate” so he ordered Bursey not to move. Id. at 166. Then, when Bursey “turned, [and] put his hands on that gun,” Cross believed he “had to defend [him]self.” Id. at 166-67. He testified that he never set out to kill Bursey and fled because he was “afraid for [his] life.” Id. at 169.

[13] Multiple witnesses offered conflicting testimony about whether Bursey was armed on the day of the shooting. Rice testified that Bursey did not have a gun on him or in the car at the time of the shooting, and she stated she never removed anything from Bursey's body after he was shot. Rice also explained that Bursey had been holding up his pants the day of the shooting.

[14] Next, Shaquann Anderson testified that he saw a gun in the front seat area of Bursey's Tahoe when the two ran into each other at a gas station 15 or 20 minutes before the shooting. Anderson had done some car work for Bursey in the past, and, while at the gas station that day, Bursey told Anderson he had an issue with his car speakers. Anderson inspected the sound system, observed the gun in the car, and agreed to help fix the speakers. When Anderson later drove to 23rd Avenue to fix the speakers, he did not see Bursey with a gun, though Anderson was admittedly focused on the speaker project.

[15] Cross's counsel attempted to impeach Anderson with his prior testimony from a bail hearing at which Anderson was asked whether he saw a gun in Bursey's waistband at the gas station. Anderson had responded: “At the gas station.” Id. at 45. But Anderson insisted that he only saw the gun in the front area of the Tahoe and explained that he had been confused by the question posed at the bail hearing. Anderson reiterated that he did not see a gun on Bursey at the scene of the crime, and he was not with Bursey in the 15 or 20 minutes between their discussion at the gas station and their reconvening on 23rd Avenue.

[16] Multiple first responders testified that no firearm or firearm accessories were recovered from Bursey's person, the surrounding area, or the Tahoe. All shell casings recovered had been fired by the same weapon.

[17] To summarize the police investigation into Cross's actions leading up to the shooting, the State presented the testimony of Detective Green. He had collected security and traffic camera footage of the Envoy and Sonata and compiled the sightings on a map. Cross then attempted to cross-examine Detective Green as to his field training on interacting with armed suspects. The State objected, arguing the question was irrelevant because the shooting involved only civilians and Detective Green was not present for the shooting. The trial court sustained the objection.

[18] Finally, the State offered into evidence a video of the shooting filmed by a neighbor's home security camera. The footage captures the interactions from a distance, and only some sound can be heard. In the footage, a maroon Sonata parks and its driver exits. The Envoy parks behind the Sonata and Cross and Angelia exit. Cross, carrying an object at his side, walks towards Bursey. Dialogue can be heard, though the words spoken cannot be discerned. A few seconds later, Bursey turns and walks away. Cross is heard yelling, “Don't move, don't move.” State's Exh. 5 at 0:32-33. Bursey then turns with a bent arm, and Cross fires numerous shots in rapid succession. The entire interaction—from Cross exiting his car to shooting Bursey—spans 14 seconds.

[19] At the end of trial, Cross requested a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter, arguing that he had been threatened by Bursey and acted under sudden heat. The trial court denied the request. The jury found Cross guilty of three charges: murder, operating a loaded machine gun, and possession of a machine gun. The trial court entered judgment of conviction on the first two verdicts, but not the third.

[20] The trial then proceeded to a separate phase for the charge of unlawful possession of a firearm by an SVF and the firearm enhancement to murder. The State agreed to dismiss the SVF charge, and the trial court found that the firearm enhancement was proven. Cross was ultimately sentenced to an aggregate term of 83 years, which includes the 10-year firearm enhancement.

Discussion and Decision

[21] On appeal, Cross challenges his conviction for murder. He claims the trial court abused its discretion in two ways: (1) by denying the requested jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter; and (2) by limiting his cross-examination of Detective Green. Unpersuaded by either, we affirm. However, we also address errors in the sentencing documents and remand for their correction.

I. Voluntary Manslaughter Instruction

[22] We review a trial court's decision to refuse a jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. Washington v. State, 808 N.E.2d 617, 626 (Ind. 2004). Because voluntary manslaughter is an inherently included lesser offense of murder, both parties agree that the relevant inquiry here is whether a “serious evidentiary dispute” existed as to sudden heat—the distinguishing element between voluntary manslaughter and murder. Id. at 625.

[23] “ ‘Sudden heat’ is characterized as anger, rage, resentment, or terror sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary person, preventing deliberation and premeditation, excluding malice, and rendering a person incapable of cool reflection.” Hileman v. State, 224 N.E.3d 321, 328 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Suprenant v. State, 925 N.E.2d 1280, 1282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). “Words alone do not constitute sufficient provocation to warrant a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter, especially when the words were not intended to provoke the defendant, such as fighting words.” Id. The alleged provocation must be such that it would obscure the reason of an ordinary person. Id.

[24] When requesting the voluntary manslaughter instruction, Cross argued that Bursey had threatened him and his wife, both during the confrontation and earlier during the traffic incident. Cross also asserted his belief that Bursey was armed. But citing both the video of the shooting and Cross's own testimony, the trial court found that nothing suggested Cross acted in sudden heat. It noted that Cross's attempt to de-escalate the situation demonstrated that his reason was not obscured. Considering Cross's deliberate conduct throughout the escalating series of events, we cannot say that this determination was an abuse of the court's discretion.

[25] Though Cross testified that he was fearful when he saw what he believed was a gun in Bursey's waistband, he still exited his car, armed himself, and approached Bursey to initiate a confrontation. In Hileman, 224 N.E.3d at 329, the defendant similarly claimed that he was scared during a road-rage confrontation in which he shot and killed the other motorist. But this Court affirmed the denial of a voluntary manslaughter instruction after noting the defendant did not close his car window before the other motorist approached and was not “unapprised of the developing situation.” Thus, the “escalating nature of the situation afforded [the defendant] time for ‘cool reflection,’ ” even though the entire encounter lasted just six seconds. Id. Like the defendant in Hileman, Cross was not “unapprised of the developing situation,” as he claimed to identify a weapon on Bursey immediately upon arrival and he attempted to de-escalate the situation by ordering Bursey not to move. Id.

[26] Cross attempts to distinguish Hileman because the defendant in that case had no indication that the victim was armed, whereas here, Cross testified that he saw a gun in Bursey's waistband. But the defendant in Hileman was punched in the face by the victim, and this Court nonetheless determined that the defendant's deliberate acts during the escalating series of events foreclosed a voluntary manslaughter instruction. Id. at 328-29. Given Cross's own deliberate acts during the escalating encounter with Bursey, we find Cross's argument unavailing.¹

[27] Given the foregoing, we cannot say that the court's rejection of a voluntary manslaughter instruction fell outside the scope of its discretion.

II. Limitation on Cross-Examination

[28] Cross next challenges the trial court's limitation of his cross-examination of Detective Green as to his training on how to approach armed suspects. We review the exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion, reversing only when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts before the court. McCoy v. State, 193 N.E.3d 387, 390 (Ind. 2022).

[29] When Cross attempted to question Detective Green about his training with armed suspects, the State objected on relevance grounds. The trial court noted that all those involved in the shooting were civilians and Detective Green was not at the scene. The trial court sustained the State's objection. Cross then made an offer of proof, showing that Detective Green would have testified that when confronted with a suspect that he knew was armed, he would attempt to disarm the suspect. If a suspect with a gun in his waistband walked away before spinning around, Detective Green testified that he would draw his weapon.

[30] Evidence is relevant only if it tends to make a fact of consequence more or less probable. Ind. Evidence Rule 401. Cross claims Detective Green's testimony was relevant because it bore on the reasonableness of his fear, arguing that there is “no practical difference between how law enforcement approaches a person armed with a firearm and [how] a civilian does.” Appellant's Br., p. 15. He cites no authority for this proposition.

[31] But Cross's self-defense claim turned on the reasonableness of Cross's belief that force was necessary under the circumstances as they appeared to Cross—not on what a trained officer would have done in his position. See Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2 (outlining self-defense parameters); Turner v. State, 253 N.E.3d 526, 536 (Ind. 2025) (quoting French v. State, 403 N.E.2d 821, 824 (Ind. 1980)) (assessing reasonableness of defendant's belief from the “standpoint of the defendant at the time and under all the then existing circumstances”). In other words, how a trained officer is taught to approach and disarm a suspect says nothing about what Cross, a civilian, reasonably perceived during the street confrontation with Bursey. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this portion of Detective Green's testimony.

III. Sentencing Errors

[32] Finally, as the State points out, the record here reveals errors in the amended sentencing order and abstract of judgment. We remand for their correction.

[33] The State originally charged Cross as follows:

• Count 1: murder, plus a firearm enhancement;

• Count 2: unlawful possession of a firearm by an SVF;

• Count 3: operating a loaded machine gun; and

• Count 4: possession of a machine gun.

But because the SVF charge required a bifurcated trial, the State amended the information to move the SVF charge to Count 4 and to renumber the other counts accordingly. The revised order of charges became:

• Count 1: murder, plus a firearm enhancement;

• Count 2: operating a loaded machine gun;

• Count 3: possession of a machine gun; and

• Count 4: unlawful possession of a firearm by an SVF.

[34] In the first phase of trial, the jury found Cross guilty on Counts 1 through 3 per the revised numbering system, as reflected on the jury verdict forms. The trial court entered judgment of conviction on Counts 1 and 2 but not on Count 3. In the second phase of trial, the State moved to dismiss Count 4 (the SVF charge) and to proceed only with the firearm enhancement. The court granted the State's motion and ultimately found the enhancement proven. The court's order following trial accurately reflected the dismissal of Count 4.

[35] The proceedings at the sentencing hearing were consistent with the revised numbering used at trial. The court sentenced Cross to 63 years on Count 1 (murder), consecutive to 10 years on Count 2 (operating a machine gun) plus a 10-year firearm enhancement. This sentence was accurately recorded in the court's sentencing order. And though that order correctly noted that Count 4 was dismissed, it incorrectly labeled Count 4 as possession of a machine gun.

[36] A week later, the court entered a nunc pro tunc order to “amend[ ]” the sentencing order, but this only compounded the errors. App. Vol. II, p. 105. The nunc pro tunc order appeared to revert to the original charging information, changing Count 2 to the SVF offense, instead of operating a loaded machine gun; Count 3 to operating a loaded machine gun, instead of possession of a machine gun; and the dismissed Count 4 to possession of a machine gun, instead of the SVF charge. The abstract of judgment repeats the same errors: Count 2 is listed as the SVF charge with a disposition of “Finding of Guilty”; Count 3 is listed as operating a loaded machine gun with a disposition of “Guilty Verdict Accepted, Counts Merged”;² and Count 4 is listed as possession of a machine gun, shown as “Dismissed.” Id. at 108.

[37] Cross does not address this discrepancy. The State recognizes the errors but argues: “The record as a whole, however, clearly reflects that [Cross] was convicted and sentenced for operating a loaded machine gun, not unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon.” Appellee's Br., p. 6. However, the nunc pro tunc order “amend[ed]” the initial sentencing order, and its errors were carried into the abstract of judgment. App. Vol. II, p. 105.

[38] We therefore remand for correction of Cross's sentencing documents to reflect his convictions for murder (Count 1) and operating a loaded machine gun (Count 2), his guilty verdict without conviction on possession of a machine gun (Count 3), and the dismissal of the SVF charge (Count 4).

Conclusion

[39] Finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's rulings on Cross's requested jury instruction and attempted cross-examination of Detective Green, we affirm his convictions. However, we remand with instructions to correct Cross's sentencing documents to properly reflect the disposition of his charges.

[40] Affirmed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Cross also cites to Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566 (Ind. 2018), and Hardin v. State, 273 Ind. 459, 404 N.E.2d 1354 (1980), but neither case addresses a request for a voluntary manslaughter instruction in a murder case. Though Cross is correct that self-defense and voluntary manslaughter are not inherently contradictory, the trial court made an evidentiary determination—that based on the evidence presented, the requested jury instruction was not warranted. See Brantley, 91 N.E.3d at 573 (“[S]elf-defense and killing in sudden heat are not inherently inconsistent and, in appropriate circumstances, juries may be instructed on both.”).

2.   We note that this Court has repeatedly held that merging a conviction alone is not adequate to cure a double jeopardy violation. See Perry v. State, 258 N.E.3d 1028, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Instead, the conviction must be vacated. Id. However, the trial court never entered judgment of conviction on Count 3, so there is no conviction to vacate. Thus, the use of the term “merged” is harmless here, though we caution against its use.

Weissmann, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.