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Cameron Whorton, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
MEMORANDUM DECISION
[1] Cameron Whorton appeals his convictions, following a bench trial, of four counts of Level 1 felony child molesting 1 and two counts of Level 4 felony child molesting.2 He raises one issue: whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the forensic interview of the victim, L.B., as a recorded recollection under Indiana Evidence Rule 803(5). We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In July 2018, C.B. began dating Whorton, and soon thereafter he moved into the Marion County apartment that she shared with her two children, L.B. and C.F. L.B. was approximately six years old when she met Whorton. When C.B. went to work, Whorton cared for her children. C.B. and Whorton stopped living together around 2022, though L.B. and her family continued to have contact with Whorton through 2024.
[3] In November 2024, L.B. told her pediatrician that she had been sexually abused, and the pediatrician reported this information to authorities. The Department of Child Services scheduled a forensic interview with Nicole Phillips, a forensic interviewer at a child advocacy center in Muncie. On November 24, 2024, Phillips conducted a recorded forensic interview of L.B. L.B., who was twelve years old at the time, described multiple incidents of molestation in the interview, and law enforcement began to investigate.
[4] On April 4, 2025, the State charged Whorton with four counts of Level 1 felony child molesting and two counts of Level 4 felony child molesting. Whorton waived his right to a jury trial, and the case proceeded to a bench trial on January 8, 2026.
[5] L.B. was thirteen years old when she took the stand to testify. When the prosecutor first asked about the abuse, L.B. gave no audible responses to several questions and required tissues because she was crying. With the aid of anatomical diagrams, she identified body parts that Whorton had touched, placed the first incident around age six based on its proximity to her seventh birthday party, and identified a separate incident at age ten or eleven at his house. She had not, at that point, testified to any of the types of contact required for Level 1 felony convictions. When asked if the identified parts of Whorton's body were “touching” or “going inside” her body, L.B. indicated that she could not remember. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 61.)
[6] L.B. then confirmed she remembered speaking with forensic interviewer Phillips and that everything she told Phillips was the truth. She testified she had reviewed the video recording of that interview and that she remembered the incidents better at the time of the interview than she did at trial. She also acknowledged that even after watching the video, she was still having difficulty remembering some things. She confirmed the video was a true and accurate representation of what she said.
[7] The State then moved to admit a transcript of the forensic interview as a recorded recollection under Indiana Evidence Rule 803(5). Whorton objected on hearsay grounds. Defense counsel also argued the State should first be required to present the interview to L.B. under Indiana Evidence Rule 612 to refresh her recollection and determine whether reviewing it would restore her memory sufficiently for her to testify from her own revived recollection. The State responded that it was not seeking to refresh L.B.’s recollection under Rule 612 but was proceeding directly under Rule 803(5), under which the contents of the interview would be read into the record as substantive evidence in place of her recollection.
[8] The State then outlined its basis for admission: L.B. could not remember everything in the interview; she was younger and closer in time to the incidents when she gave the interview; she had reviewed the video and confirmed it accurately represented her statements; and those statements were true. In presenting this argument, the State represented to the trial court that L.B. was eleven years old at the time of the interview; however, the transcript establishes she was twelve. The trial court made no specific findings on the record as to each element of the rule but allowed the State to read the interview into the record. L.B. stepped out of the courtroom while the reading took place.
[9] After the interview was read into evidence, L.B. returned to the stand. On continued direct examination, she testified in detail about multiple acts of penetration: Whorton placed his penis inside her vagina at her mom's apartment when she was younger than eight; he placed his penis inside her anus at her mom's apartment also when she was younger than eight; he placed his penis inside her mouth in her bedroom at her mom's apartment when she was younger than eight; and he placed his mouth on her vagina at his house when she was ten years old. She testified Whorton used a condom at least once and took it outside the apartment after he finished so that her mother would not find it. L.B. also testified about two Level 4 felony molestations that occurred. She was cross-examined on each incident.
[10] In announcing the verdict, the trial court stated:
It took a little piece – to piece things together, as [L.B.] did not initially want to speak much in the beginning. And then we had the forensic interview read, and there were quite a few unintelligibles in – or unintelligibles in the beginning of that. But as you were able to put things together, and then when she comes back in and testifies, I think that you are able to put things together and able to see․ I think there is enough differentiation in that once some more questions were asked, she was able to differentiate, and she corrected [the State] on a number of occasions when questions were asked and [the State] said something, so she corrected those things. So I believe that the State has met its burden of proof as to Counts I through VI.
(Tr. Vol. 2 at 152-53.) Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of seventy years.
Discussion and Decision
[11] The admission or exclusion of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewed only for an abuse of that discretion. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1193 (Ind. 2021). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it and errors affect a party's substantial rights.” Id. A trial court's evidentiary ruling may be affirmed on any theory supported by the evidence in the record. Satterfield v. State, 33 N.E.3d 344, 352 (Ind. 2015).
[12] Herein, however, we need not determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the forensic interview because any error that may have occurred would be harmless. Trial court errors do not require reversal unless a party's substantial rights would have been impacted. Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A) (“No error ․ is ground for ․ reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.”). Substantial rights have not been affected if “there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned evidence contributed to the conviction.” Lafayette v. State, 917 N.E.2d 660, 666 (Ind. 2009). As we make this determination, we consider whether a jury would have been swayed or if we are left in grave doubt about the correctness of the verdict. Id. Two independent considerations establish harmlessness herein.
[13] First, the interview was cumulative of L.B.’s own trial testimony. L.B. left the courtroom while the interview was read, and then when she returned to the stand, she provided direct, detailed, cross-examined testimony establishing every element of each Level 1 felony count: on different occasions at her mother's apartment when she was younger than eight years old, Whorton placed his penis inside her vagina, her anus, and her mouth, and Whorton put his mouth on L.B.’s vagina when she was at his house when she was ten years old. That live testimony supplied the proof on which the convictions rest. Where erroneously admitted evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence properly before the factfinder, its admission is harmless. See Housand v. State, 162 N.E.3d 508, 514 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (holding trial court's decision to allow State to read forensic interview into evidence under recorded recollection exception to hearsay rule was harmless because the child's statements in interview were cumulative of her testimony at trial), trans. denied.
[14] Second, this was a bench trial. Whorton's principal argument against any error being harmless is that the forensic interview constituted prejudicial “drumbeat repetition” of L.B.’s account. (See Appellant's Br. at 16, 17) (citing Modesitt v. State, 578 N.E.2d 649, 651-52 (Ind. 1991)). The drumbeat repetition doctrine guards against the risk that lay jurors will be swept along by the cumulative weight of repeated accusations, lending a victim's account an air of reliability it might not otherwise carry. Modesitt, 578 N.E.2d at 652 (holding three witnesses telling victim's story prior to victim's testimony would “unduly prejudice the jury”). That concern does not apply with the same force in a bench trial, wherein judges are presumed to disregard inadmissible evidence and to decide issues “solely on the basis of relevant and probative evidence.” Hall v. State, 722 N.E.2d 1280, 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Griffin v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1261, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied).
[15] The trial court's verdict statement confirms that the forensic interview functioned as context, not as proof. The court noted the interview helped it sequence the evidence, but then the court grounded the verdict in L.B.’s ability, when she returned to the stand, to differentiate incidents, identify specific details, and correct the prosecutor when questions were imprecisely framed. (See Tr. Vol. 2 at 152-53.) Given the independent, detailed, cross-examined testimony L.B. provided to the trial court judge, we hold there was no substantial likelihood that the reading of the transcript of the forensic interview contributed to Whorton's conviction. See Housand, 162 N.E.3d at 514 (holding erroneous admission of forensic interview was harmless error in light of victim's testimony at trial).
Conclusion
[16] We need not determine whether the trial court's admission of the State's reading of the forensic interview was error, because any error was harmless. L.B.’s testimony independently established every element of Whorton's crimes, and the drumbeat repetition concern does not operate with the same force in a bench trial. Accordingly, we affirm.
[17] Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a).
2. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b).
May, Judge.
Pyle, J., and Scheele, J., concur.
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Docket No: Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-CR-545
Decided: June 29, 2026
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana.
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