IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: G.G. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] G.G. (“Child”) was removed from A.S. (“Mother”) and N.G. (“Father”) (collectively “Parents”) because she tested positive for illegal substances at birth and Parents were living in a vehicle. Parents admitted Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). Mother thereafter was unable to maintain stable housing and, despite periods of sobriety, continued to use illegal substances. The trial court ultimately terminated Mother's parental rights to Child. Mother now challenges the termination ¹ and presents one issue for our review: Whether the trial court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights was clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On December 2, 2023, Child was born to Parents with THC ² in her system, prompting the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) to intervene. At the time, the family lived in a vehicle parked in Child's paternal grandparents’ driveway.

[4] In January 2024, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a CHINS. In February, Child was removed from the home due to Parents’ “[in]ability, refusal, or neglect to provide shelter, care, and/or supervision.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 117. In March, Parents stipulated that Child was a CHINS, and Child was adjudicated as such.

[5] The CHINS dispositional order required Parents to engage in services regarding employment, financial stability, housing stability, and sobriety. Parents were also ordered to participate in Family Recovery Court, which they began in June 2024.

[6] Between March 2024 and May 2025, Parents’ “living conditions did not noticeably improve,” and the residence was “never suitable or appropriate for [Child] to reside.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 118. The “biggest obstacle” to Parents’ progress in obtaining suitable housing was “maintaining sobriety.” Id. Mother had “periods of sobriety, but invariably relapsed”; though visits with Child had progressed to community visits, visits “regressed” after the relapse. Id. Parents’ substance use “stunted their bonding” with Child, as Parents did not consistently attend visits and would be “lethargic and not attentive” during the visits they attended. Id. In January 2025, Mother left Family Recovery Court because she was “in active addiction.” Id.

[7] On June 11, 2025, DCS filed a petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Child. Around this time, Mother ended her relationship with Father, and Mother began to make progress toward reunification. Mother moved in with her parents, who are the guardians of Mother's older daughter. Mother consistently attended visits with Child, engaged in services, and it “seemed” as though Mother was “progressing towards reunification,” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 120.

[8] However, in August, Mother “began to regress.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 120. During visits with Child, Mother would “video chat with a male friend who was in the custody of the Vigo County Work Release facility,” she was “distracted,” and “phone use started to become a problem.” Id. Mother used a portion of her income “to support the phone and commissary accounts of her male friend.” Id. Most troubling, Mother was arrested for operating a vehicle with a Schedule 1 or 2 substance or its metabolite in the blood, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of paraphernalia. Mother admitted to the arresting officer that she had recently used synthetic marijuana known as “K2.” Id.

[9] In September, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine. Mother denied that she used methamphetamine, claiming that “the positive methamphetamine screen must have been due to her picking[ ]up methamphetamine residue when the individuals who she was around were using methamphetamine” and that “the individuals who she knows that use methamphetamine[ ] go into the other room to smoke methamphetamine when she is present.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 120.

[10] After her arrest, Mother's father asked her to leave the home, and she lived with a friend for a few weeks. In October, Mother obtained employment which required her to work night shifts. Due to Mother's work schedule, she was “often tired and unengaged” during visits with Child. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 121.

[11] On November 10, the termination factfinding hearing was held. By this time, Mother had returned to her parents’ home. During the hearing, Mother testified that she had been sober since May 2025; as she continued to deny the methamphetamine use, she acknowledged that during her August arrest, she admitted to the law enforcement officer that she smoked synthetic marijuana. Child's court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) and Mother's family case manager (“FCM”) testified that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests.³

[12] After the hearing, the trial court entered a well-written and thorough order terminating Mother's parental rights to Child. The trial court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal would not be remedied; the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being, safety, and health; and termination of Mother's parental rights to Child was in Child's best interests. Regarding the best-interests determination, the trial court found that (1) Mother had not secured stable housing because since Child's removal, Mother had not “spent more than a few months without a disruption in [her] residence”; and (2) Mother had been unable to “overcome” her substance abuse. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 129. The trial court also relied on the CASA's and FCM's testimony that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court's Decision to Terminate Mother's Parental Rights to Child Was Not Clearly Erroneous

[13] Mother challenges the trial court's termination of her parental rights over Child. “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45–46 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied.

[14] We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). In reviewing for clear error, “we determine whether the evidence supports the court's findings and whether those findings support the court's judgment.” Norris v. Norris, 275 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2026) (citing Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016)). A decision is clearly erroneous “only if the findings lack factual support in the record or if the judgment applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Id. (citing Wysocki v. Johnson, 18 N.E.3d 600, 603–04 (Ind. 2014)). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, id. (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123), and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings which Mother does not challenge on appeal.⁴ See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)).

[15] To terminate Mother's parental rights, DCS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that, among other things, termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (effective Mar. 11, 2024, to June 30, 2025). To determine the best interests of a child, a trial court looks at the totality of the evidence and subordinates the interests of the parents to those of the child. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 167–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)), reh'g denied (Jan. 25, 2023), trans. denied sub nom. A.B. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 209 N.E.3d 1168 (Ind. 2023). A central consideration in this determination is the child's need for permanency. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). The trial court also considers whether a child's emotional and physical development is threatened by the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). Permanent impairment of physical, mental, or social development is not necessary before a trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235).

[16] Here, the trial court concluded that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests because both the CASA and FCM believed so and because Mother had not demonstrated the ability to obtain stable housing or maintain sobriety. “[T]he recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” P.B., 199 N.E.3d at 799 (citing In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158–59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied). Here, both the CASA and the FCM testified that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests, and Mother does not challenge the trial court's conclusion that she likely will not remedy the reasons for Child's removal from her care, see R.M., 203 N.E.3d at 564 (citing Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687). This is sufficient to show that termination is in Child's best interests.⁵

[17] As for Mother's housing and substance use, “[a] parent's historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability and supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Castro v. State Off. Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied), trans. dismissed. Mother spent much of the proceedings living in a vehicle. Although Mother eventually moved in with her parents, she was kicked out after her arrest and was only permitted to return shortly before the factfinding hearing. Regarding Mother's sobriety, only months before the termination of parental rights hearing, she was arrested on drug-related charges, admitted to using synthetic marijuana, and tested positive for methamphetamine. At the evidentiary hearing, Mother claimed she had been sober since May 2025 apart from the positive test, but she later admitted that when she was arrested in August 2025, she told the arresting officer she used synthetic marijuana. See In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1047–48 (Ind. Ct. App.) (affirming termination of parental rights based on best interests of the child when father continued to abuse substances and CASA and FCM testified termination of father's parental rights was in the child's best interests), trans. denied sub nom. T.M. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 265 N.E.3d 1009 (Ind. 2025). In denying the drug use that caused her positive screen, Mother seems to miss the importance of abiding by the tenets of sobriety: avoiding the (1) people, (2) places, and (3) things that cause her to use drugs in the first place. Here, Mother acknowledges that she continues to spend time with people at places where drugs are used. This admission also tends to show that Mother's sobriety is tenuous. Mother's inability to obtain stable housing and maintain sobriety support the trial court's best-interests determination.

[18] Mother's appellate arguments that her housing and sobriety have been addressed are merely an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). Based on the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the trial court's decision, we cannot say DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights to Child was in Child's best interests. We therefore cannot say the trial court clearly erred by terminating Mother's parental rights over Child, and we affirm that termination.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father's rights were also terminated, and he does not participate in this appeal.

2.   THC is the abbreviation for tetrahydrocannabinol and is the main active chemical in marijuana. In re A.M.J., 228 N.E.3d 1132, 1136 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citing Medina v. State, 188 N.E.3d 897, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)), trans. not sought.

3.   At this point in the proceedings, Child's foster family was seeking to adopt the Child.

4.   In her Statement of Facts, Mother appears to contest the trial court's finding that Mother “used a considerable portion of her limited income” to support the phone and commissary accounts of the man from the work release facility. See Appellant's Br. at 12 (quoting Appellant's App. Vol. II at 120). Mother does not contest that she used a portion of her income in this fashion but states that “there is no evidence regarding the actual amount of money that Mother placed in the man's commissary and phone accounts.” Id. at 12. However, a witness specifically testified that Mother used a “significant amount” of her income to pursue this new relationship. Tr. Vol. II at 77. Because there was evidence to support the court's finding that Mother spent a “considerable” portion of her income on this new relationship, the finding is not erroneous.

5.   In her Reply Brief, Mother “acknowledges that under current case law, the recommendation of a FCM is sufficient to show that termination is in a child's best interest,” Appellant's Reply at 3 (citing In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158–59), and she asks that we “reconsider this precedent,” id. None of the cases cited by the parties held that a FCM's best-interests opinion is alone sufficient to support a termination of parental rights determination, nor do we hold as much here.

Felix, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.