Jeffrey L. Jackson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A jury found Jeffrey L. Jackson guilty of Level 6 felony domestic battery committed in the presence of a child less than sixteen years old. Jackson later admitted he had a prior conviction for domestic battery against the same victim, and the trial court found him guilty of Level 5 felony domestic battery with a prior conviction. The trial court merged his convictions, then entered a judgment of conviction on the Level 5 felony. Jackson appeals, alleging the trial court fundamentally erred by admitting the victim's testimony that he contacted her despite the court's entry of a pre-trial no-contact order. He also appeals his sentence, alleging it is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). We affirm his conviction and sentence. However, we remand for correction of an apparent scrivener's error in the trial court's sentencing order.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In November 2023, M.G. lived in Vincennes with her then seven- and fourteen-year-old daughters. After Jackson moved into the home, M.G.’s older daughter, A.G., was concerned about her own safety. She asked her grandfather, M.G.’s father, for help. He gave A.G. a new doorknob with a lock and a door jammer for her bedroom. The door jammer was a “bar that goes underneath the doorknob on the inside and latches to the floor[,]” making it “about impossible” to get into the room. Tr. Vol. II p. 142.

[3] On November 8, Jackson arrived home late, sometime between 11:00 p.m. and about 1:00 a.m.¹ M.G. and her daughters locked themselves inside A.G.’s bedroom. Jackson “ran straight to [A.G.’s] door and ․ tried everything he could to get in.” Id. at 166. He damaged the door and locks and kicked the door, leaving footprints behind. A.G. was so scared that she put headphones on and hid in her closet.

[4] Eventually, M.G. exited the bedroom and her daughters followed. Jackson was “aggressive” and “very” angry. Id. at 167, 169. A.G. saw Jackson “[s]hove[ ] [M.G.] on the ground” with “force” and then stand over her while she was lying there. Id. at 169, 168. When M.G. got up, she retreated to A.G.’s room with her daughters. M.G. called her parents while Jackson continued to yell in the background, and M.G.’s father called the police. When police arrived, they heard screaming in the house. Because their knocks on the door went unanswered, police forced entry and arrested Jackson.

[5] The State charged Jackson with Level 6 felony domestic battery committed in the presence of a child less than sixteen years of age and Level 5 felony domestic battery where the defendant had a prior conviction against the same victim.² Before trial, the court granted Jackson's motion in limine, requiring the State to follow the rules of evidence and restricting the State from soliciting “testimony related to criminal convictions of the defendant or prior bad acts made by the defendant” under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b). App. Vol. II p. 158.

[6] On August 26 and 27, 2025, the court held a jury trial on Jackson's Level 6 felony domestic battery charge. The State called M.G. as its final witness and questioned her as follows:

[The State]: I'm just gonna get right to it. A couple of things, I mean, since that night in November of 2023, there has been a no contact order in place. The Judge ordered the Defendant not to have any contact with you. Have the two of you had any contact since November of 23?

[M.G.]: A few times.

Id. at 172. Jackson did not object to M.G.’s statement.³

[7] The jury found Jackson guilty of domestic battery committed in the presence of a child less than sixteen. Jackson later admitted he had a prior conviction for domestic battery committed against M.G., and the trial court found him guilty of Level 5 felony domestic battery with a prior conviction against the same victim. The court merged his convictions, entered a judgment of conviction as to the level 5 felony, and ordered a presentence investigation (PSI) to be completed.

[8] Jackson's PSI report revealed that he had a prior misdemeanor conviction for battery resulting in bodily injury and felony convictions for burglary, theft, criminal confinement while armed with a deadly weapon, obstruction of justice, and domestic battery. It also showed Jackson previously violated probation. Jackson reported that he had a dysfunctional upbringing, that he did not know his father, and that his mother was murdered. He also described his struggles with substance use and stated he was abusing substances when the instant offense occurred.

[9] At sentencing, the State admitted exhibits showing M.G. was the victim of Jackson's criminal confinement and prior domestic battery offenses. M.G.’s father made a victim impact statement, explaining that “the beatings came pretty fast” and M.G. “always had bruises on her face” after Jackson moved in with her. Id. at 216. He also said A.G. was “diagnosed with PTSD [from] watching what took place.” Id. Jackson also made a statement, expressing remorse and noting his troubled family history and need for substance use treatment.

[10] The court found Jackson's remorse to be mitigating. It also found several aggravating circumstances, including Jackson's violation of the pre-trial no-contact order, his criminal history and prior probation violations, and that he committed the offense in the presence of children. Finding the aggravators outweighed the mitigators, the court sentenced Jackson to the maximum of six years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC). Jackson now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Admission of Evidence

[11] Jackson contends the court erred by admitting M.G.’s statement that he had contacted her “[a] few times” despite the court's entry of a pre-trial no-contact order. Tr. Vol. II p. 172. Jackson argues M.G.’s statement was inadmissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) and violated the court's order in limine because his contact with M.G. showed him to be “in violation of the court's order and [was] a criminal offense.” Appellant's Br. p. 8. Because he contends the evidence was inadmissible, he argues the prosecutor's solicitation of such evidence amounted to an evidentiary harpoon.

[12] “We generally review a trial court's decision on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion.” Perry v. State, 267 N.E.3d 20, 32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. “However, the failure to object when evidence is admitted results in waiver of the issue for appellate review unless fundamental error occurred.” Id. Jackson concedes he did not contemporaneously object to the admission of M.G.’s statement, but he asserts the statement was so prejudicial that it “erased” his fundamental right to a fair trial. Appellant's Br. p. 11. The fundamental error exception is “extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (citation omitted), reh'g denied. This exception is only available in “egregious circumstances” where the error made a fair trial impossible. Id.

[13] Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of evidence of a “crime, wrong, or other act” solely to prove the defendant's character “in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” But such evidence “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)(2). However, even when evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b)(2), “[t]he court may exclude the evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Ind. Evidence Rule 403.

[14] The totality of the challenged testimony is M.G.’s single, affirmative response to whether Jackson had contacted her after the court issued a pre-trial no-contact order in the instant case: that is, her response that Jackson had done so “[a] few times.” Tr. Vol. II p. 172. The State asked no further questions about the no-contact order violation or the content of Jackson's contact. Without more, we cannot determine whether the State offered evidence of Jackson's no-contact order violation to prove his character in order to show that he acted in accordance with that character when he committed the instant offense. Jackson simply asserts that the jury was “immediately prejudiced” against him by M.G.’s statement. Appellant's Br. p. 11. He has failed to articulate any error. Likewise, because Jackson has shown neither that the evidence was inadmissible nor that it was deliberately offered to prejudice him, his evidentiary harpoon claim fails. See Blattert v. State, 241 N.E.3d 29, 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (an evidentiary harpoon occurs if inadmissible evidence is placed before the jury to prejudice the defendant), trans. denied.

[15] In any event, if the admission of M.G.’s statement was an error, it was not fundamental. Fundamental error encompasses errors “so blatant that the trial judge should have acted independently to correct the situation.” Nix v. State, 158 N.E.3d 795, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018)), trans. denied. Jackson did not object to the testimony, and the State asked nothing further to belabor the emphasis on Jackson's character. The record does not demonstrate that the brief reference was so blatant that the trial judge should have sua sponte intervened or that it deprived Jackson of a fair trial. Accordingly, Jackson has failed to meet the high bar of fundamental error.

II. Inappropriateness of Sentence

[16] Jackson also argues his six-year sentence in the DOC is inappropriate. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) permits an appellate court to revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” We give “considerable deference” to the trial court's sentencing decision and attempt only to “leaven the outliers” rather than achieve the “perceived ‘correct’ result” in every case. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222, 1225 (Ind. 2008)).

Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) is a rare avenue for appellate relief that is reserved for exceptional cases. Even with Rule 7(B), sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference. Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character). Absent such a sufficiently compelling evidentiary basis, we will not override the decision of ․ the trial court.

Sorenson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 717, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citations, quotations, and brackets omitted), trans. denied.

[17] When reviewing whether a sentence is inappropriate, we acknowledge the advisory sentence is the starting point. Horns v. State, 218 N.E.3d 591, 595 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. The sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is between one and six years, with an advisory sentence of three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b) (2014). Here, the court imposed the maximum sentence of six years.

[18] As to the nature of his offense, Jackson argues his conduct was not the “worst of the worst” because he “did not hit or strike” M.G. and because she was not “injured in any way.” Appellant's Br. pp. 12, 13. We are unpersuaded. When Jackson arrived home after midnight, he tried to force his way into a locked bedroom where M.G. was hiding with her children. Jackson kicked and damaged the bedroom door and did “everything he could” to get into the bedroom. Tr. Vol. II p. 166. When M.G. and her children exited the room, Jackson displayed no restraint approaching M.G. then “[s]hov[ing] her on the ground” with “force[.]” Id. at 169, 168. And he showed no regard for M.G.’s children, who witnessed the battery. Moreover, this was Jackson's third violent crime committed against M.G., which further demonstrates his lack of restraint in offending against her again. Jackson has failed to portray this offense in a positive light.

[19] Regarding his character, Jackson asserts that his remorse, his challenged upbringing, and his chemical dependency are sufficiently redeeming to warrant revision of his sentence. Yet, despite his personal struggles and exposure to violence, he has been convicted of multiple violent crimes. In 2016, he was convicted of Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury after he “grabbed [the victim] by the hair and struck her in the face.” Id. at 219. Then, in 2018, he committed two violent crimes against M.G., i.e., criminal confinement while armed with a deadly weapon and domestic battery. Jackson's criminal history alone reflects poorly on his character and supports an enhanced sentence. See Horns, 218 N.E.3d at 596. What is more, M.G.’s daughter suffers from PTSD from observing Jackson's persistent displays of violence over time. Jackson not only fails to provide examples of his good character, but his conduct demonstrates persistent examples of a violent character despite his prior consequences. Accordingly, his sentence is not inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B).

III. Sentencing Order

[20] The abstract of judgment reflects “guilty verdict accepted, counts merged” as to Count I, Level 6 felony domestic battery. App. Vol. II p. 233 (capitalization omitted). Because the record reflects the court did not enter judgment of conviction on the Level 6 felony, see id. at 209, the use of “merged” on the abstract of judgement is not an error. See, e.g., Easterwood v. State, No. 25A-CR-1980 (Ind. Ct. App. May 4, 2026) (mem.).

[21] However, the court's sentencing order contains an apparent scrivener's error. It reflects the “Judgment of Conviction entered by this Court on August 27, 2025” was for “the offense of Domestic Battery, a Level 6 Felony[.]” App. Vol. II p. 229. But the chronological case summary, judgment of conviction, and abstract of judgment all reflect entry of a conviction Level 5 felony domestic battery. Id. at 2, 209, 233. We thus remand for correction of this error.

Conclusion

[22] We affirm Jackson's conviction for Level 5 felony domestic battery and his sentence. We remand for correction of the scrivener's error in the court's sentencing order.

[23] Affirmed and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record is unclear about the exact time of Jackson's arrival and the surrounding events: one witness testified it was about 1:00 a.m., Tr. Vol. II p. 143, and another testified it was around “eleven [or] twelve o'clock at night[.]” Id. at 155.

2.   The State also charged Jackson with Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, which was dismissed.

3.   The State also mentioned the pre-trial no-contact order in its opening argument. Jackson did not object and does not challenge this on appeal.

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.