Jeremy James Hinson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jeremy James Hinson appeals his conviction for murder. He contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence and in declining to give his proffered jury instructions on voluntary manslaughter. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2024, Hinson and his wife, Michela, lived in Anderson, Indiana, had been married for twenty-nine years, and had two adult sons, Ridge and Nick. The marriage had been troubled for the previous few years, and Michela was thinking about leaving Hinson. Hinson knew this and was “attempting to save the marriage.” Transcript Volume I at 121-122. Hinson owned and regularly carried a 9mm caliber handgun and had seven boxes of ammunition in a safe in the family's home. On June 13, 2024, Hinson used his cell phone to search the internet for “3 Ways to Find My Wife Location Free Without Her Knowing.” Transcript Volume II at 182. Around June 20, 2024, Hinson asked Michela's mother, Deenia, if she believed the “marriage was in as much trouble as he thought it was,” and she responded, “Yes.” Transcript Volume I at 88. Deenia had been living in the same house with the couple for at least five or six years and believed that Hinson was mentally abusive to Michela. Deenia was aware that Michela was considering leaving Hinson.

[3] On June 23, 2024, Hinson used his phone to take a picture of Michela sleeping on the couch and also took a picture of her phone's “recent” call list indicating that she had called “Dt's R Bar.” Exhibits Volume II at 13. Early in the morning on June 26, 2024, Hinson used his phone to search the internet for his father's obituary and for Forestville Cemetery, where his father is buried. Between 6:10 a.m. and 7:05 a.m., both Hinson and Michela's cell phones were located at or near their Anderson home. At 6:38 a.m., Michela texted her cousin, Melody, and discussed picking up McDonald's for breakfast and eating it at Melody's house, which was something the cousins did often. Michela texted Melody that Hinson was with her but that she would bring food over. Michela also texted Melody, “deleting,” to alert her that she was deleting her text stream with Melody so that Hinson would not see it, which she did routinely, because Hinson did not like Melody. Exhibits Volume I at 21.

[4] At 7:05 a.m., Michela and Hinson drove to pick up their son Ridge and drive him to work. Ridge was aware that his parents’ marriage was troubled. In Ridge's opinion, the car ride to work was “pretty quiet,” and his parents dropped him at work at 7:47 a.m. Transcript Volume I at 100. At that same time, Michela texted Melody that she was “leaving now,” so Melody placed the McDonald's breakfast order. Exhibits Volume I at 23. Shortly thereafter, Melody received a text from Michela's phone, “Can you cancel for a few min [Hinson] sick [I'll] get it after I take him home.” Id. at 24. Melody thought the language of the text did not sound like Michela. Melody canceled the order and texted Michela not to worry about breakfast. At 8:00 a.m., Michela's phone was turned off and disconnected from the cellular network.

[5] Meanwhile, Michela drove herself and Hinson to the Forestville Cemetery in Summitville, Indiana, which was about a forty-minute drive. The cemetery sits in the middle of fields off of a county road. Michela parked the vehicle in the back of the cemetery and around the corner from where Hinson's father's grave was located. Within a few minutes of parking, Hinson shot Michela seven times in the chest at close range as she sat in the vehicle's driver's seat. Hinson covered Michela's body with a blanket.

[6] At 9:25 a.m., Michela's cell phone was powered back on and reconnected to the cellular network indicating it was near the cemetery. At 10:10 a.m., Melody texted Michela asking, “U alive?” Id. Melody did not receive a response. At 10:26 a.m., Hinson composed, but did not send, a Facebook post that read in pertinent part:

I'm sorry I just couldn't live my life no more knowing she has evil people telling her I'm not good for her and she would leave me. [Deenia] I ALWAYS LOVED YOU BUT YOU STARTED TREATING ME DIFFERENT IN THE LAST FEW YEARS. SAD AND UNFORTUNATE YOU COUDN GET YOUR NIECE AND OTHERS TO STAY OUT OF OUR BUSINESS AS A MARRIED COUPLE! ․ Out at forrestville cemet[e]ry.

Exhibits Volume II at 14. Around that same time, Hinson composed, but did not send, a post to Melody's Facebook page from Michela's phone that read, “Just remember you did this by not minding your own business #with # Jeremyhinson>*j;emyhinson.” Id. at 20.

[7] When Melody did not hear back from Michela, she alerted Deenia. Deenia was also unable to reach her daughter. The two women looked around town for Michela and also picked Ridge up from work that afternoon because neither Hinson nor Michela arrived to do so. Melody reported Michela as a missing person.

[8] Shortly after 3:00 p.m., a bystander called 911 to report observing two unresponsive people in a vehicle in the cemetery. Madison County Sheriff's Deputy Andrew Williams responded to the scene and found Michela and Hinson locked in the vehicle. Michela was in the driver's seat, and Hinson was in the front passenger seat. After Deputy Williams knocked loudly on the window, Hinson awoke and unlocked the doors. Deputy Williams discovered that Michela was “cold and stiff” and “already ․ deceased at that time.” Transcript Volume I at 135. A paramedic on the scene asked, “[s]o what's going on,” and Hinson declared, “Oh, I'm a piece of shit.” Id. at 136. Deputy Williams could see “a few shell casings” on the floorboard of the driver's seat and so he asked, “Is there a weapon in the car?” Id. Hinson responded, “No.” Id. However, after Hinson stepped out of the vehicle as ordered, Deputy Williams found “a firearm in his right side.” Id. at 137. The handgun, a 9mm caliber Springfield Hellcat, was later determined to be the gun used to fire seven bullets into Michela's chest. At the hospital, where he had been taken for medical clearance, Hinson indicated that “he wished he had never been born.” Id. at 184.

[9] On July 2, 2024, the State charged Hinson with murder. The State subsequently amended the information to include a sentencing enhancement for the use of firearm. A jury trial began on August 18, 2025. The State presented numerous witnesses and offered several exhibits, many of which were admitted by the trial court. Hinson presented no evidence. At the close of the evidence, defense counsel requested a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter and the pattern instruction for the definition of sudden heat. The State objected arguing that no evidence was presented that would support an inference that Hinson acted in sudden heat. The court refused the instruction concluding that there was no evidence of provocation and that Hinson had days and weeks “for cool reflection” and “cooling down” before the murder and thus, there was “not adequate appreciable evidence of sudden heat in the record to justify the giving of a voluntary manslaughter instruction.” Transcript Volume II at 245. After the State presented its closing argument, defense counsel waived closing argument “[i]n light of the court's earlier ruling” as to the voluntary manslaughter jury instructions. Transcript Volume III at 7. In bifurcated deliberations, the jury found Hinson guilty as charged. The court sentenced him to fifty-five years for murder, enhanced by twenty years for the use of a firearm, resulting in an aggregate executed sentence of seventy-five years.

Discussion

I.

[10] We first address Hinson's challenge to the trial court's admission of evidence. Specifically, he contends that the “admission of certain evidence regarding [him] searching through his wife's phone and taking pictures, in addition to the internet searches on his phone, were highly prejudicial.” Appellant's Brief at 14 (emphasis omitted). He argues that “[t]hese items lacked any serious relevance and should not have been admitted.” Id.

[11] Generally, the trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence. Bradley v. State, 54 N.E.3d 996, 999 (Ind. 2016). A trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence is generally accorded a great deal of deference on appeal. Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 466 (Ind. 2015), reh'g denied. We do not reweigh the evidence; rather, we consider only evidence that is either favorable to the ruling or unrefuted and favorable to the defendant. Beasley v. State, 46 N.E.3d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 2016). We may affirm a trial court's decision regarding the admission of evidence if it is sustainable on any basis in the record. Barker v. State, 695 N.E.2d 925, 930 (Ind. 1998), reh'g denied.

[12] During trial, the State offered for admission numerous exhibits that consisted of evidence extracted from Hinson's cellphone. Hinson objected to the evidence asserting lack of “relevance” and that the evidence violates “404.” Transcript Volume II at 162. Following a hearing outside the presence of the jury, over Hinson's objection, the court admitted State's Exhibits 185 (extraction report with thumbnail photos from Hinson's cell phone), 188 (enlarged photo of Michela sleeping on the couch dated June 23, 2024), 191 (enlarged photo of Michela's recent call list showing a call to “Dt's R Bar” dated June 23, 2024), and 195 (internet search on Hinson's cell phone for “3 Ways to Find My Wife Location Free Without Her Knowing”).¹ In overruling Hinson's objections to these exhibits, the trial court agreed with the State that the evidence was relevant to show “intent ․ plan, preparation, motive.” Transcript Volume II at 163. In addition, the court found that Hinson's acts evidenced by the exhibits were “intrinsic to the crime” because they were acts “done in the lead up to the crime itself happening.” Id. at 165. As for Hinson's act of taking a photograph of Michela's recent call log, the court concluded that while such act was “arguably misconduct,” the evidence was not offered to show “action in conformity therewith” as to the charged crime of murder. Id.²

[13] Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency” to prove or disprove a consequential fact. Ind. Evidence Rule 401; Snow v. State, 77 N.E.3d 173, 177 (Ind. 2017). “This liberal standard for relevancy sets a low bar, and the trial court enjoys wide discretion in deciding whether that bar is cleared.” Snow, 77 N.E.3d at 177 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, under Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b), evidence of “a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” But such evidence “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)(2). “The list of other purposes is illustrative not exhaustive.” Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 219 (Ind. 1997).

[14] Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)’s purpose “is to prevent the jury from indulging in the ‘forbidden inference’—that a defendant must be guilty of the charged crime because, on other occasions, he acted badly.” Fairbanks v. State, 119 N.E.3d 564, 565 (Ind. 2019). “But Rule 404(b) does not totally proscribe other-bad-acts evidence—only its use as character evidence.” Id. at 568. When the State claims other-bad-acts evidence is admissible for a proper purpose, the trial court is tasked with deciding whether that evidence “is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act.” Id. (quoting Hicks, 690 N.E.2d at 219).

[15] First, assuming that some of the challenged evidence related to wrongful conduct within the meaning of Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b), we agree with the trial court that the evidence was nevertheless relevant and admissible as intrinsic evidence. Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b) does not bar “evidence of uncharged criminal acts that are intrinsic to the charged offense.” Lee v. State, 689 N.E.2d 435, 439 (Ind. 1997). Uncharged acts are “intrinsic” to the charged offenses if they occurred at the same time and under the same circumstances as the crime charged. Bennett v. State, 5 N.E.3d 498, 509 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Such “evidence of happenings near in time and place that complete the story of the crime is admissible even if it tends to establish the commission of other crimes not included among those being prosecuted.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

[16] We conclude that the challenged evidence was intrinsic to the charged crime as Hinson's actions occurred very near in time to the murder and helps complete the story of the events leading up to the murder. We agree with the State that evidence of Hinson's distrust toward Michela and the “nature of [the couple's] relationship” helps explain the circumstances and chronology of how the crime transpired and thus was admissible as intrinsic evidence. Appellee's Brief at 20.

[17] Even if the challenged evidence was not intrinsic to the murder, it was relevant and admissible under Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)(2) to show motive. The evidence of Hinson's desire to track Michela's location and his acts of monitoring her cell phone activity without her consent was relevant to his motive arising from what other evidence clearly established to be a distrustful and troubled relationship with his wife. See, e.g., Hicks, 690 N.E.2d at 222-223 (holding evidence of prior acts showing hostile relationship between the parties admissible to prove defendant's motive for charged act).

[18] Once evidence is deemed relevant, the trial court then looks to Ind. Evidence Rule 403’s balancing test, under which the court may admit evidence if its probative value is not “substantially outweighed” by the danger of unfair prejudice. Fairbanks v. State, 119 N.E.3d 564, 568 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied, 589 U.S. 974. As all relevant evidence “is inherently prejudicial to a defendant,” the bar for unfair prejudice is high and “courts err on the side of admissibility and consider whether there is risk that a jury will substantially overestimate the value of the evidence or that the evidence will arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury.” Schnitzmeyer v. State, 168 N.E.3d 1041, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

[19] As to the Ind. Evidence Rule 403 balancing test, Hinson does not explain how he was “unfairly” prejudiced by this evidence, other than to assert it painted him “as a jealous and controlling husband.” Appellant's Brief at 17.³ However, nothing about the evidence of Hinson's behavior suggests the jury would substantially overestimate its evidentiary value nor does the evidence appear calculated to arouse or inflame the jury's passions or sympathies. We cannot say the unfair prejudice, if any, to Hinson substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence regarding his prior acts.

[20] In sum, evidence of Hinson's prior acts was not barred under Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b) because such evidence was relevant and admissible as intrinsic to the murder and as evidence of his motive. Moreover, Hinson has not demonstrated that he was unfairly prejudiced by the evidence. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence.

II.

[21] Hinson also contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of murder. We review a trial court's jury instructions for an abuse of discretion. Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 484 (Ind. 2015), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016). Regarding instruction on a lesser-included offense, the Indiana Supreme Court has explained:

During a criminal trial, either party can request a jury instruction on a lesser included offense. Webb v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1103, 1108 (Ind. 2012). When this occurs, the court must engage in the analysis we set forth in Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563, 566-567 (Ind. 1995). First, the court must determine whether the lesser offense is inherently or factually included in the charged offense. Id. If it is either, the court must then determine whether “a serious evidentiary dispute” exists between the elements that distinguish the offenses. Id. at 567. In other words, there must be sufficient evidence for the jury to find the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the charged offense. Id. If a dispute exists, the court must give the instruction. Id.

Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662, 668 (Ind. 2021) (footnote omitted)

[22] It is well settled that voluntary manslaughter is an inherently lesser-included offense of murder. Isom, 31 N.E.3d at 485. However,

[t]his is not a typical example of a lesser included offense in that what distinguishes voluntary manslaughter from murder is the existence of sudden heat, which is not an element of murder, but rather a mitigating factor in conduct that would otherwise be murder. Sudden heat occurs when a defendant is provoked by anger, rage, resentment, or terror, to a degree sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary person, prevent deliberation and premeditation, and render the defendant incapable of cool reflection. Thus, an instruction on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense to a murder charge is warranted only if the evidence reflects a serious evidentiary dispute regarding the presence of sudden heat.

Id. at 485-486 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Although the defendant bears no burden of proof with respect to sudden heat, the defendant bears the burden of placing the issue in question where the State's evidence has not done so. Dearman v. State, 743 N.E.2d 757, 761 (Ind. 2001).

[23] Hinson asserts that the evidence presented at trial created a serious evidentiary dispute as to whether he was “acting while in a fit of rage” when he shot Michela. Appellant's Brief at 14. In particular, he contends that testimony indicated that “everything was quiet and normal on the morning of incident” but then he later sat “a mere two (2) feet from his wife, in the same vehicle” and “shot her seven (7) times at close range.” Id.

[24] Contrary to Hinson's suggestion, the evidence presented reveals no serious evidentiary dispute as to the existence of sudden heat. The record reveals that Hinson spent days, and perhaps even weeks, keenly aware of and reflecting on the poor state of his marriage. He knew that Michela intended to leave the marriage, and he was angry about it. He looked at her phone without her knowledge, and he investigated ways to track her phone. On the day of the murder, he looked up his father's obituary and location of the cemetery before directing Michela to go to that remote location. Hinson was armed with a loaded 9mm caliber handgun, he turned off her phone, and he shot her seven times in the chest shortly after arriving at the cemetery. Other than evidence that he knew Michela intended to leave him, there was no evidence that Michela took any action toward Hinson to provoke his alleged fit of rage. Moreover, the record supports the trial court's conclusion that Hinson had ample opportunity for cool reflection prior to the murder. Based upon the record, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to give Hinson's proffered jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. See Massey v. State, 955 N.E.2d 247, 257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“A mere expression of one[’]s desire to end a relationship cannot, as a matter of law, constitute sufficient provocation to induce passion that renders a reasonable person incapable of cool reflection sufficient to warrant a voluntary manslaughter instruction”); Collins v. State, 873 N.E.2d 149, 159-160 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that anger alone is not sufficient to support an instruction on sudden heat), trans. denied.

[25] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Hinson's murder conviction.

[26] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record reveals that the court sustained Hinson's objection as to the admission of other evidence extracted from his cellphone.

2.   The court observed that Hinson's actions of snooping on Michela's phone without her consent was “arguably” a misdemeanor crime of computer trespass pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-43-2-3. Transcript Volume II at 163-165.

3.   To the extent the State suggests that Hinson waived a claim of unfair prejudice and application of the Ind. Evidence Rule 403 balancing test for failing to raise it below, we decline to find waiver.

Brown, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.