De.V. (Father), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Dr.V. (Child) is an 8-year-old child with autism who is nonverbal and requires constant supervision. When Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) staff first observed him in 2024 in the home of his mother, B.L. (Mother), Child had a suspicious red mark on his thigh shaped like an adult's hand. In addition, he once had arrived at school with caked vomit or dirt under his arms and on his chest and blood and mucus under his nose. Child had missed so much school that he was at risk of expulsion.

[2] Three weeks after this initial observation of Child, DCS staff and law enforcement found him dirty and alone in Mother's home near an open oven into which he apparently had crawled. Meanwhile, Mother was unconscious in the garage, and Father was in jail.

[3] Over the next year, Father was released and ordered to complete services. He did not complete most of them, allegedly tested positive for methamphetamine while on probation, and was sent back to prison for three years after he admitted various probation violations. DCS then petitioned to terminate the parental rights of both Father and Mother. Father appeals that judgment, arguing that DCS failed to present sufficient evidence and that the trial court improperly admitted records of his criminal history.¹ We affirm.

Facts

[4] Child, born in June 2018, is diagnosed with autism and remained largely nonverbal throughout the trial court proceedings. His condition requires consistent supervision. He is not a candidate for traditional schooling.

[5] DCS became involved with Child's family in May 2024 after receiving a report from his school that he had a large red mark on his right thigh suspected to have been caused by an adult hand. The school also reported that it had threatened to discharge Child based on his 20-plus absences in the prior six months. When Child did attend school, he often was dressed in dirty clothing. He once arrived at school with caked vomit or dirt under his arms and on his chest and with dried blood and mucus under his nose.

[6] On May 28, 2024, DCS staff visited Mother's home, which was cluttered and dirty. DCS returned the following day and found Mother unconscious in the driver's seat of a car in the driveway. She reported that she was sleeping and that Child and his grandmother were in the home. At the time, Father was on probation for a January 2024 felony conviction for unlawful carrying of a handgun in case number 03C01-2210-F5-4963 (Case 4963). Mother refused to provide Father's contact information to DCS.

[7] About two weeks later, DCS staff made another unannounced visit to Mother's home. Although no one opened the door after repeated knocking, DCS staff heard Child inside and therefore called police. Responding officers found Mother passed out in the garage and two other adults sleeping inside the house. Child was alone and dirty. The oven door was open, and Child appeared to have ash-like substances on his body, leading to concerns that he had climbed inside the appliance. Mother was arrested on child neglect charges. DCS took emergency custody of Child and petitioned for him to be deemed a child in need of services (CHINS). At the time, Father was incarcerated for alleged probation violations in Case 4963.

[8] In late July 2024, the trial court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS based on separate stipulations from Father and Mother. Father stipulated that he had struggled with sobriety and was then incarcerated and unable to take custody of Child. Father also stipulated that Child needed care that he was not receiving. The dispositional order required Father to contact the DCS family case manager (FCM) weekly, submit to random drug screens, participate in Fatherhood Engagement, engage in supervised visits, and complete a substance abuse evaluation and follow all resulting recommendations.

[9] Father was transferred to work release in Case 4963 in approximately October 2024. His supervised visits with Child while he was on work release were appropriate. However, the visitation supervisor never recommended unsupervised visits.

[10] Father completed a substance abuse assessment in November 2024 but was discharged because he did not follow the resulting recommendations. Although he had participated in Fatherhood Engagement while incarcerated, he stopped once released. When DCS renewed the referral, Father stated he did not need it. He stopped submitting to drug screens in February 2025. During this period, the FCM had difficulty contacting Father, who frequently failed to respond to texts and calls.

[11] By May 2025, the trial court found Father was no longer complying with services and approved a change in the permanency plan from reunification to concurrent reunification and adoption. In June 2025, Father admitted he violated the terms of his probation in Case 4963 by possessing alcohol and paraphernalia and testing positive for alcohol. Although the State had alleged that he also violated the terms of his probation by testing positive for methamphetamine, Father did not admit that allegation. The criminal court revoked his probation and ordered his return to incarceration for three years.

[12] Father's last visit with Child was shortly before his probation revocation. Afterward, Father declined virtual visits during his incarceration, telling the FCM that visits would be too difficult while he was incarcerated. He also declined to participate in Fatherhood Engagement or other services while incarcerated, stating he did not believe he needed them.

[13] DCS petitioned to terminate the parental rights of Father and Mother in July 2025. When the hearing on that petition began four months later, Father had not seen Child in more than six months. During DCS's case-in-chief, the trial court admitted DCS Exhibit 2, which consisted of records from Father's 2017 criminal convictions in case number 03D01-1509-F6-4668 (Case 4668) for Level 6 felony criminal confinement and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. The exhibit also detailed Father's probation violations and revocation in that case. Father objected to the exhibit on relevance grounds, arguing the conviction and violations predated DCS involvement with the family. Noting that Father was still on probation in that case when Child was born, the trial court admitted DCS Exhibit 2 but only for purposes of establishing Father's probation violations after Child's birth.

[14] The DCS FCM supervisor (Supervisor) testified at the hearing that the conditions prompting Child's removal and continued placement outside the home of his parents had not been remedied. Given Father's instability and Child's special needs, the Supervisor testified that continuing the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being and that adoption was in Child's best interests. The Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) also recommended termination of the parental rights of Mother and Father.

[15] Father testified that he anticipated release from incarceration in May 2026 at the earliest. He described plans to obtain housing and employment after release and stated that his mother and sister would help care for Child while he worked. Father's testimony offered no specifics of such care or where he and Child would live, although Father testified he would have a home upon his release. Father acknowledged that DCS had not been able to observe or assess his proposed housing and that his family had been unwilling to serve as a placement for Child during the CHINS proceedings.

[16] Child has been in his pre-adoptive placement since July 2024. When that placement began, Child was non-communicative, could not use utensils or a communication device, and drank from a child's cup while lying down. By the time of the hearing, he ate with utensils, drank from a cup at a table, used a communication device, and had spoken his first words.

[17] The trial court terminated Mother's and Father's parental rights. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court determined, among other things, that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the continued placement outside the home will not be remedied by Mother and Father, termination of their parental rights was in Child's best interests, and that adoption was a satisfactory plan for Child's care and treatment. Father appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[18] The parent-child relationship is one of the most valued relationships in our culture, and the decision to sever it permanently is not taken lightly. That decision is not made to punish a parent but to protect a child. Matter of A.L., 273 N.E.3d 481, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).

[19] To terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, three elements: (1) that termination is in a child's best interests; (2) that there is a satisfactory plan for the child's care; and (3) that one or more of the circumstances enumerated in Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(d) exists. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (2025). Here, DCS alleged, and the trial court found, that the following subsection (d) circumstances existed:

• there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied; and

• there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of Child.

See generally Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3), (4) (2025).

[20] Father raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues the trial court erred by admitting DCS Exhibit 2 into evidence. Second, he challenges the trial court's termination of his parental rights as to Child on several grounds.

I. No Error in the Admission of DCS Exhibit 2

[21] “The admission of evidence is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court” and “overturned only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion.” In re S.L.H.S., 885 N.E.2d 603, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). We also presume that trial courts know and follow the law. Matter of N.K., 249 N.E.3d 607, 617 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). Father claims the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence DCS Exhibit 2, which consisted of records from his 2017 criminal convictions in Case 4668 for Level 6 felony criminal confinement and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. These records showed that his probation was revoked in that case in 2022 based on his use of methamphetamine. He contends this evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial because the convictions occurred before Child's birth.

[22] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting DCS Exhibit 2. The CHINS statutes “contemplate that a parent's past, present, and future ability to provide sufficient care for his or her child forms the basis for a CHINS adjudication and that the parent's character is an integral part of assessing that ability.” Matter of J.L.V., Jr., 667 N.E.2d 186, 190 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).

[23] Consequently, courts may consider evidence of prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, and failure to provide support within the limits set by the applicable rules of court. See, e.g., id. (affirming admission of evidence of prior CHINS proceedings as to parent's other children); Matter of L.T., 145 N.E.3d 864, 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (affirming admission of exhibit containing information about a conviction that predated Child's birth and was the foundation for a pending charge); see also In re S.L.H.S., 885 N.E.2d at 615 (ruling that decade-old statements of father's alleged sexual molestation victims were admissible in termination of parental rights proceeding). Contrary to Father's claim, the probation violations occurring after Child's birth in Case 4668 were directly relevant to Father's character because they illustrated his challenges with drugs and a pattern of incarceration that left him unable to care for Child. See Matter of J.L.V., Jr., 667 N.E.2d at 190. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

[24] To the extent Father separately argues that admission of the evidence violated his procedural due process right to a fair hearing, he has waived that argument by not raising it in the trial court. At trial, Father objected to DCS Exhibit 2 solely on relevance grounds. A party may waive a constitutional claim, including a due process claim, by raising it for the first time on appeal. In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016).

II. No Error in the Termination of Father's Parental Rights

[25] We apply a two-tiered standard of review in determining whether DCS proved the statutory elements required for terminating parental rights. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). We first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the judgment. Id. The judgment is set aside only if clearly erroneous, meaning that either the findings do not support the conclusions of law or the conclusions do not support the ultimate decision. Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019).

[26] Father challenges two of the trial court's findings of fact and three of the trial court's conclusions. In reviewing Father's claims, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility and consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). The standard is deferential, and unchallenged findings stand as true. Id.; In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 610 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

A. Challenged Findings

[27] Father specifically challenges parts of these two findings:

25. The pattern of incarceration by both Mother and Father has caused a lack of stability and a home for the Child. Mother does not have stability or a home for the Child and Father cannot provide a home or stability for the Child because he is serving a prison sentence in the Department of Corrections (sic).

****

27. Father is incarcerated in the Department of Correction and reports that he may be released May 2026, at the earliest. Father could not give a plan for housing, stability, or the 24-hour care that the Child would require.

App. Vol. II, p. 28. “ ‘Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.’ ” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996)).

[28] Father notes he testified at the termination hearing that he had a home to go to after his release from prison and that his mother and sister would help care for Child while Father was at work. However, he never identified the proposed home and conceded that DCS had never had the opportunity to see it. Moreover, his mere reference to two relatives helping with Child falls far short of “a plan for ․ stability, or the 24-hour care that [Child] would require.” App. Vol. II, p. 28. As the record supports the challenged findings, Father has not established that they are clearly erroneous.

B. Challenged Conclusions

[29] Father challenges the trial court's conclusions that: (1) a reasonable probability existed that the conditions leading to Child's removal were unlikely to be remedied; (2) continuing the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being, safety, physical health, or life; and (3) termination of his parental rights and adoption of Child was in Child's best interests.

1. Remedying Conditions

[30] We engage in a two-step inquiry when determining whether there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642. First, we identify the reasons for removal or continued placement outside the home before determining whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. Id. at 643. The trial court assesses parental fitness “as of the time of the termination proceeding.” Id. (quoting Bester v. Lake Cty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 152 (Ind. 2005)). However, a parent's recent improvements must be balanced against “habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” Id. (quoting K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013)).

[31] Child was removed due to neglect. After Father stipulated at the outset of this case that he struggled with sobriety, he was ordered to address it. He completed an assessment but largely ignored its recommendations. He stopped drug screening. He refused renewed referrals for Fatherhood Engagement, telling DCS that he did not need it. Nearly a year after the CHINS petition was filed, he allegedly tested positive for methamphetamine and was re-incarcerated after admitting other probation violations. He remained incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing. Evidence of a parent's pattern of inability, unwillingness, or lack of commitment to address parenting issues and to cooperate with services demonstrates the requisite reasonable probability that conditions will not change. Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); see also A.F. v. Marion Cty. Off. Of Fam. & Children, 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (observing that courts may consider a parent's habitual patterns of conduct, including criminal history, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment).

[32] In addition, by the time of the termination hearing, Father had not seen Child in more than six months due to his own choice. When he was re-incarcerated for violating his probation after testing positive for methamphetamine, Father declined virtual visits with Child on the basis that they would be too hard—for Father. But the visits existed to serve Child, not Father, as the trial court expressly noted. App. Vol. II, p. 28. The failure to exercise the right to visit one's child demonstrates a lack of commitment to complete the actions necessary to preserve the parent-child relationship. See Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 372.

2. Threat to Well-being

[33] Father next challenges the trial court's conclusion that continuing the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being, safety, physical health, or life.

[34] As previously determined, the evidence and findings support the trial court's conclusion of a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Child's removal will not be remedied. Because Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(d) (2025) is written in the disjunctive, proof of one subsection (d) circumstance is sufficient to support termination. J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Therefore, we need not address the threat to well-being conclusion. Id.

3. Best Interests

[35] Finally, Father challenges the trial court's conclusion that termination was in Child's best interests. In determining the best interests of a child, the trial court looks to the totality of the evidence and subordinates the parent's interests to those of the child. Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. Central among a child's interests is the need for permanency. Id. Children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to achieve reunification. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648.

[36] Where, as here, the conditions resulting in a child's removal are unlikely to be remedied, the dual recommendation of a FCM and a CASA to terminate parental rights is sufficient to support a best interests conclusion by clear and convincing evidence. A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158-59. Here, the FCM, Supervisor, and CASA all recommended termination and adoption.

[37] Nonetheless, Father argues that his bond with Child and his post-release plans weigh against termination. But Child's need for permanency cannot be deferred on the hope that Father will someday demonstrate the sobriety and stability required to parent a child with such profound needs. Child requires constant supervision. Father had not served as Child's primary caregiver before removal, had not progressed beyond supervised visitation during the entire CHINS case, and declined all contact with Child in the months before the termination hearing. He also remained incarcerated during the hearing. A parent's historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability, and supervision, coupled with a current inability to do so, supports a best interests conclusion. Castro v. State Off. of Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

[38] Meanwhile, Child has thrived in foster care. He arrived at his pre-adoptive placement unable to use utensils, a communication device, or a cup at the table. By the time of the termination hearing, he did all of these things and had said his first words. The trial court's best interests conclusion is not clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[39] The trial court did not err by admitting DCS Exhibit 2 into evidence or by entering the challenged findings and conclusions. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment terminating Father's parental rights.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother did not appeal the termination of her parental rights.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.