Joseph Odell, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Joseph Odell appeals from his sentence of seven years in the Indiana Department of Correction, three years of in-home detention, and five years suspended to supervised probation for his conviction of one count of Level 3 felony child molesting. Odell pleaded guilty to that offense. He argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character. We conclude that Odell has not met his burden of persuading us that revision of his sentence is warranted, and we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The State charged Odell with one count of Level 5 felony sexual misconduct with his stepdaughter, A.P., a minor. The State later added two charges of Level 1 felony child molesting. On October 14, 2025, the State and Odell entered into a plea agreement providing that Odell would plead guilty to a lesser-included child molesting charge as a Level 3 felony. The agreement further provided that the sentence would be capped at fifteen years with not more than ten years executed. A pre-sentence investigation revealed that Odell was diagnosed with cerebral palsy, and that no criminal history could be located.

[3] The trial court held a sentencing hearing on December 16, 2025 at which A.P. testified. She informed the court that Odell's molestations began when she was in the seventh grade in 2022 and that since then she had bottled up her “overwhelming fear” and anger resulting from Odell's crimes against her. She explained that she has released those bottled-up feelings “on so many people that [she] shouldn't have.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 10. A.P. stated that Odell's crimes against her have “screwed [her] over” because she has trust issues and trouble expressing things “because [she's] held it in for so long.” Id.

[4] After hearing A.P.’s victim impact statement, the court considered aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The court found Odell's lack of criminal history, his cerebral palsy diagnosis, and the fact that Odell's dependents rely on his monthly check from Social Security for disability as mitigating circumstances. The court further noted that Odell's plea may be a mitigating factor. However, the trial court found as an aggravating factor that “the harm, injury, or loss or damage suffered by the victim . . was significant and greater than the elements necessary.” Id. at 19. The court also found that Odell's “position of having care, custody control of the victim when the offense was committed” was another aggravating factor. Id.

[5] Operating within the terms of the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Odell to seven years in the DOC, three years of in-home detention, and five years on supervised probation. Additionally, the court ordered that Odell follow all terms of the sex offender adult probation requirements and register for a lifetime on the sex offender registry. Odell appeals from the trial court's sentencing order.

Discussion and Decision

[6] As an initial matter, we observe that in the Summary of Argument and Argument sections of Odell's brief he argues both that the sentence is inappropriate and that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to properly weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See Appellant's Br. pp. 10, 17. However, “The relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found or those which should have been found is not subject to review for abuse.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007).

[7] We now address Odell's request for us to review his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) permits an Indiana appellate court to “revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Robinson v. State, 61 N.E.3d 1226, 1228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). We assess the trial court's recognition or nonrecognition of aggravators and mitigators as an initial guide to determining whether the sentence imposed was inappropriate. Id. The principal role of appellate review is to “leaven the outliers.” Id. (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). A defendant must persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence has met the inappropriateness standard of review. Robinson, 61 N.E.3d at 1228

[8] Additionally, “appellate review under Indiana Appellate Rule 7 may include consideration of the totality of the penal consequences found in a trial court's sentence.” Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1023, 1024 (Ind. 2010). “In determining the penal consequences for a convicted defendant, trial courts have a variety of options beyond that of determining the length of a sentence.” Id. at 1025. “In imposing a sentence, trial judges may order, for example, suspension of the sentence, probation, home detention, placement in a community corrections program, executed time in a Department of Correction facility, or serving of sentences on multiple convictions concurrently rather than consecutively.” Id. (footnotes omitted). “And the General Assembly provides for additional penalties that can be levied against a defendant such as restitution and fines.” Davidson, 926 N.E.2d at 1025. “Upon the review of sentence appropriateness under Appellate Rule 7, appellate courts may consider all aspects of the penal consequences imposed by the trial judge in sentencing the defendant.” Id. Thus, while Odell complains that he was sentenced to the maximum ten years executed allowed under the terms of the plea agreement, under Rule 7(B) we consider the sentence as a whole, which include three years of in-home detention.

[9] Here, Odell admitted that he committed one count of Level 3 felony child molesting against his stepdaughter, A.P. The sentencing range for a Level 3 felony is a fixed term of between six and twenty years with the advisory sentence being nine years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(b) (2014). Additionally, Odell's plea agreement explicitly provided that he “shall be sentenced to the Indiana Department of [Correction] for a period of fifteen (15) years with a maximum executed sentence not to exceed ten (10) years. [Odell] shall be placed on supervised probation for the balance of his suspended sentence.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 122. Thus, under the terms of the plea agreement, the maximum executed sentence Odell could receive was ten years, which is also one year above the advisory sentence for a Level 3 felony.

[10] We note that the parties and the court refer to Odell's plea as an open plea. “An ‘open’ plea is one in which the sentence to be imposed is left to the discretion of the court, bounded only by the statutory maximums and minimums.” Nguyen v. State, 837 N.E.2d 153, 158 n.14 (Ind. Ct App. 2005). “A ‘range’ plea establishes a range of possible sentences somewhat narrower than that allowed by statute; this would include a plea in which the sentence is capped.” Id. “A ‘fixed’ plea specified the exact number of years to be imposed.” Id. Odell's plea was a range plea. As the trial court noted, his plea agreement may be a valid mitigating circumstance, but he received a substantial benefit from his plea agreement by way of a cap on his executed sentence and the dismissal of other charges, such that it is not necessarily a substantial mitigating factor. “ ‘[N]ot every plea of guilty is a significant circumstance that must be credited by a trial court.’ ” Howard v. State, 266 N.E.3d 304, 321 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Trueblood v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1242, 1257 (Ind. 1999)). “Specifically, ‘a guilty plea does not rise to the level of significant mitigation where the defendant has received a substantial benefit from the plea or where the evidence against [the defendant] is such that the decision to plead guilty is merely a pragmatic one.’ ” Id. (quoting Wells v. State, 836 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied).

[11] Under our Rule 7(B) review, we turn now to the nature of the offense. “Our analysis of the ‘nature of the offense’ requires us to look at the extent, brutality, and heinousness of the offense.” Borroel v. State, 241 N.E.3d 8, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. “The nature of the offense is found in the details and circumstances of the offense and the defendant's participation.” Perry v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Whether the sentence is inappropriate “ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other factors.” Casco-Canales v. State, 243 N.E.3d 370, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[12] In his argument, Odell takes exception with the trial court's finding that “the harm, injury, or loss or damage suffered by the victim . . was significant and greater than the elements necessary.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 19; Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 151 (written sentencing order). He contends that there is inadequate factual support for that aggravating factor. But he does not challenge A.P.’s testimony describing how she suffered from Odell's molestation.

[13] The State also notes and Odell does not dispute that he faced allegations that he engaged in a pattern of conduct in addition to the single offense to which he pleaded guilty. See Appellant's Br. p. 8; Appellee's Br. pp. 8, 10-11, 14-15. And a habitual pattern of conduct is a proper aggravating circumstance when a court considers the particularized circumstances of the offense. Hale v. State, 128 N.E.3d 456, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. Multiple incidents of abuse underscore the deliberate nature of the crime. Id. Moreover, when considering the nature of the offense to which he pleaded guilty, we note that Odell was in a position of trust with A.P. He does not challenge the existence of this aggravating circumstance. See Appellant's Br. p. 14. His admission to the offense establishes his abuse and violation of that position of trust.

[14] “A harsher sentence is also more appropriate when the defendant has violated a position of trust that arises from a particularly close relationship between the defendant and the victim, such as a parent-child or stepparent-child relationship. Hamilton v. State, 955 N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ind. 2011). “Abusing a position of trust is, by itself, a valid aggravator that may support a maximum sentence.” Baumholser v. State, 62 N.E.3d 411, 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. And “[a] single aggravating circumstance may be sufficient to enhance a sentence.” Baumholser, 62 N.E.3d at 417.

[15] Odell has failed to meet his burden of persuading us that the nature of the offense warrants a downward revision of his sentence.

[16] Next, under our Rule 7(B) review, we turn to the character of the offender. “[A]nalysis of the ‘character of the offender’ involves a ‘broad consideration of a defendant's qualities.’ ” Adams v. State, 120 N.E.3d 1058, 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Aslinger v. State, 2 N.E.3d 84, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)). “The character of the offender is found in what we learn of the offender's life and conduct.” Croy v. State, 953 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We defer to a trial court's sentencing decisions and “[s]uch deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[17] Odell highlights the mitigating factors found by the trial court; namely his lack of prior criminal history,¹ diagnosis of cerebral palsy, undue hardship on his dependents from imprisonment, and entering into a plea agreement. Odell notes that, in contrast, “[t]here were no aggravating factors listed as ‘significant’ or ‘substantial.’ ” Appellant's Br. p. 14.

[18] We observe, however, that Odell's violation of a position of trust and authority over A.P.’s life is evidence of poor character. See Heckard v. State, 118 N.E.3d 823, 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“Violating his position of trust does not bode well for [defendant's] character.”), trans. denied. And he does not challenge that he was alleged to have engaged in a habitual pattern of conduct.

[19] Odell has not met his burden of persuading us that his character warrants a downward revision of his sentence.

Conclusion

[20] Odell has not met his burden of persuading us that either the nature of the offense or his character warrant a downward revision of his sentence. The trial court's decision to sentence him to one year above the advisory sentence for his crime, and within the parameters of the sentencing provisions of his plea agreement, is not inappropriate. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's sentencing order.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Odell had a pending misdemeanor charge for resisting law enforcement at the time the sentencing hearing.

Najam, Senior Judge.

Pyle, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.