Kristin Varnhagen, Appellant-Petitioner v. David Varnhagen, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Divorced parents Kristin Varnhagen (Mother) and David Varnhagen (Father) have different parenting styles. Mother is more nurturing and accommodating with their 16-year-old child, K.V. (Child), while Father is more rules-oriented and structured. Child has autism and has had anxiety associated with Father for nearly a decade. But in 2022, the trial court granted Father sole legal custody and primary physical custody of Child after Mother allowed Child to skip Father's parenting time on multiple occasions and to miss a significant amount of school. Around this same time, Child began making unsubstantiated claims of physical and emotional abuse by Father. And shortly thereafter, Child began reporting suicidal ideations at having to remain in Father's care.

[2] In 2024, Mother petitioned to modify custody, seeking sole legal custody and primary physical custody of Child. The trial court denied Mother's petition, finding Father's parenting style had contributed to Child's academic success, an elimination of disciplinary and attendance problems at school, and an improvement in Child's overall wellbeing. Mother appeals the denial of her petition but does not challenge these critical findings, which support the court's conclusion that modifying custody was not in Child's best interests. We therefore affirm.

Facts

[3] Mother and Father (collectively, Parents) divorced in October 2017, when Child was 8 years old. Child was having “significant behavior issues at school” around this time, and in November 2017, he began counseling for “Adjustment Disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct.” Findings of Fact & Conclusion of Law, pp. 8, 10, (issued May 24, 2019).¹ Meanwhile, Parents continued to litigate the issue of Child's custody.

[4] In May 2019, the trial court granted Mother sole legal custody and primary physical custody of Child, subject to Father's parenting time. In its custody order, the trial court observed that Child wished to reside with Mother and that Father and Child's relationship was “somewhat strained and a source of stress for [Child].” Id. at 17. The court also explained:

The parties have shown through their actions, communications and testimony that they disagree on almost every major issue for [Child] including healthcare, schooling, counseling and activities. The parties cannot effectively communicate with one another. These disagreements and lack of effective communications have delayed the parties in seeking out counseling for [Child], and have further delayed addressing underlying issues related to [Child's] behavior problems at school.

Id. at 15.

[5] From March 2021 through January 2022, Parents filed with the trial court a variety of motions and petitions concerning Child's custody. These culminated in Father filing a petition to modify custody, in which he sought sole legal and primary physical custody of Child. In November 2022, the court granted Father's petition to modify custody, and another panel of this Court affirmed that decision in Varnhagen v. Varnhagen, No. 22A-DC-3057, 2023 WL 5126168 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2023) (mem.) (hereinafter “Varnhagen I”). Then, in January 2024, Mother filed her own petition for custody modification, seeking to regain sole legal and primary physical custody of Child. After several hearings on a variety of custody-related matters, the trial court denied Mother's petition.

[6] What follows is a more detailed review of the events preceding both the trial court's grant of Father's petition to modify custody and its subsequent denial of Mother's petition to modify custody.

Events Preceding the Grant of Father's Petition to Modify Custody

[7] During the initial custody proceedings, the trial court appointed Portland Schnitzius as guardian ad litem (GAL) for Child and Stephanie Gookins as Parenting Coordinator (PC) for Parents. At the recommendation of PC Gookins, the court later ordered that Mother and Father ensure that Child bring his schoolwork to the other parent's home so the other parent could assist Child in completing it. This Schoolwork Order eventually became a point of contention between Parents.

[8] In March 2021, Mother petitioned to vacate the Schoolwork Order, alleging: “[C]hild has expressed extreme anxiety in having to take schoolwork to Father's house”; “Father often threatens the [Child] with respect to his schoolwork and [Child] has expressed to Mother great concern with respect to taking his schoolwork to Father's house”; and “[C]hild exhibits extreme anxiety as it relates to Father's house as well as Father's extreme consequences and difficult demeanor with respect to completion of the schoolwork.” V. Pet. to Modify, p. 2 (filed March 22, 2021).

[9] In May 2021, Father petitioned to modify custody, seeking joint legal custody of Child. In his petition, Father alleged a pattern of Child failing to complete his homework assignments while in Mother's care. According to Father, this unfairly required Father to be the “bad cop” parent who assisted Child in both catching up on homework and completing his current homework assignments during Father's parenting time. Answer & V. Pet. to Modify, p. 2 (filed May 7, 2021).

[10] In July 2021, Father moved for a rule to show cause, alleging Mother had denied him parenting time on one occasion during the month prior and had “call[ed] law enforcement to get involved.” V. Mot. for Rule to Show Cause, p. 1 (filed July 7, 2021). Father also alleged that Mother had violated the trial court's Schoolwork Order.

[11] In November 2021, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on all pending issues. PC Gookins testified at this hearing, and this Court later summarized her pertinent testimony as follows in Varnhagen I:

[PC] Gookins ․ described Father as “more rules-oriented and structured while Mother is more nurturing and accommodating.” PC Gookins also identified that the parties suffer from numerous issues, including different communication styles and “different visions as to how [Child] should be parented.” The difference in parenting styles became a “source of conflict” and “fostered a litany of issues” for [Child].

Varnhagen I, 2023 WL 5126168, at *1 (internal citations omitted).

[12] Because the presentation of evidence was not concluded at the November 2021 hearing, the trial court continued the matter for further hearing at a later date. Meanwhile, in December 2021, Mother petitioned to reduce Father's parenting time with Child, alleging in pertinent part: “Father harasses [Child] with respect [to] his school work”; “[C]hild is under immense stress due to Father's harassment, yelling and continued questioning of the minor child”; “[C]hild shows extreme signs of anxiety and stress when he discusses Father or upon going to/returning from Father's home”; and “[C]hild has expressed fear of Father and expressed to Mother that he no longer feels safe in Father's presence.” V. Pet. to Modify Parenting Time, pp. 1-2 (filed December 7, 2021).

[13] In mid-January 2022, while her petition to reduce Father's parenting time was still pending, Mother filed an emergency petition to suspend Father's parenting time, alleging:

That on or about the evening of January 14, 2022, [Child] ran away from Father's home to a neighbor's residence and asked them to call the police. That the police were called to Father's residence in response to [Child's] report. That [Child] reported not feeling safe in Father's home. That the police instructed Mother to take the minor child home in her care for the remainder of the weekend.

V. Emerg. Pet. to Suspend Parenting Time, p. 1 (filed January 18, 2022).

[14] In late January 2022, Father filed a second petition to modify custody, this time seeking both sole legal custody and primary physical custody of Child. Father also moved again for rule to show cause, alleging Mother had denied him scheduled parenting time on eight occasions earlier that month.

[15] In February 2022, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Mother's emergency petition to suspend Father's parenting time and on Father's motion for rule to show cause. This Court later summarized the evidence presented at this hearing as follows in Varnhagen I:

[GAL] Schnitzius indicated that doing homework at Father's house is “probably the largest source of anxiety” between [Child] and Father. As a result, GAL Schnitzius recommended that homework not be part of Father's parenting time and that, unless the trial court were to provide “some guidance ․ on this homework issue,” increased parenting time through Monday overnight visits was not in [Child's] best interests․ Mother admitted that sometimes [Child] did not complete his homework assignments when at Mother's home. Despite these difficulties around completing his homework, [Child] has been “a good student” and has maintained “all A's and B's all along.”

Sometime between the November 3, 2021 hearing and the scheduled February 14, 2022 hearing, Mother and [Child] relocated to Mother's fiancé’s residence. Mother did not inform Father of this move until November 8, 2022. Mother did, however, relay this information to [Child's] therapist, David Doan, on October 11, 2021, at which point [Therapist] Doan began discussing the intended move with [Child].

․ [Therapist] Doan testified that he had been working with [Child] regarding stress and school-related issues. [Therapist] Doan additionally testified about an incident that had occurred on January 14, 2022, during Father's parenting time. At some point, [Child] had reported “not feeling safe” at Father's home and had reported to [Therapist] Doan that Father had “threatened to hit him” on two occasions. More specifically, when [Child] had arrived at Father's house that day, he had run to a neighbor's house and the neighbor had subsequently called the police to report that [Child] had been “attacked or hit by his [F]ather[.]” However, after [Police] Officer Brian Graves had arrived and evaluated [Child], he found no signs to corroborate that report. At that point, Officer Graves, Father, and [Child] had attempted to call Mother, but she had not answered their calls. A few hours later, Mother had returned their calls and had met with them at Father's residence to pick up [Child]. Officer Graves had described Father as “calm” during this interaction. Officer Graves had further determined that [Child] had lied about Father hitting him. As a result of this incident, Mother had withheld Father's parenting time until the February 14, 2022, hearing.

․ [Therapist] Doan testified that Father and [Child] had vacationed in Florida in December of 2021 and that [Child] had told him that he had “had fun” and had participated in “fun activities” with Father. GAL Schnitzius testified that it appeared that Father and [Child] had “had a nice time together” on vacation. However, GAL Schnitzius also testified that, while Father's parenting time should not be suspended, she would like it to occur “in public” to “rebuild some of the trust and the relationship” after the January incident.

Varnhagen I, 2023 WL 5126168, at *1-2 (paragraph numbers and internal citations omitted).

[16] After the February hearing, the trial court issued an order denying Mother's emergency petition to suspend Father's parenting time, finding in pertinent part:

[T]here are behavioral issues present in the minor child centered around Father's parenting time, but these issues are likely a result of the parties’ intense distrust and animosity towards one another which is now affecting the child and his relationship with his parents;

The Court finds that there are numerous examples of behavior between the parties which unnecessarily place stress and discomfort on the child by placing him in the middle of their disagreements. For example, Mother withheld for weeks, if not months, pertinent information from Father regarding her living situation, and a new residence and family structure for the minor child. These are major life events where co-parenting could make transitions much easier. As another example, Father quizzes the minor child about life at Mother's residence and openly video records parenting exchanges and interactions with the minor child. Doing so creates a situation where the child is an unwitting partner in evidence gathering and simple parenting moments are used for litigation purposes. Enough is enough. Such behavior should cease immediately and the parties should begin working together to place the child's interests first and foremost.

Order on Hr'g, p. 2 (issued February 17, 2022) (paragraph numbers omitted). The court also found Mother in contempt for denying Father parenting time with Child. However, the court took under advisement whether sanctions against Mother were warranted.

[17] In September 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on all pending issues. Shortly after this hearing, Father again moved for rule to show cause, alleging Mother had denied him scheduled parenting time on four occasions since the September hearing. Father also alleged that Child had “missed over forty-two percent (42%) of his days in school since the new year started on August 10, 2022.” V. Mot. for Rule to Show Cause, p. 2 (filed September 19, 2022).

[18] Mother responded to Father's motion in writing, stating: “Mother does not know what else to do at this point to force [Child] to attend parenting time.” Resp. to Mot. for Rule to Show Cause, p. 2 (filed September 20, 2022). Mother claimed she had “informed [Child] that he is required to go to parenting time with his Father,” “encouraged [Child] ․ to attend parenting time,” “thought out creative solutions in order to get [Child] to attend parenting time,” and “instituted discipline for [Child's] ․ failure to attend parenting time.” Id. at 1. Yet, according to Mother, “[Child] absolute[ly] refuses to attend parenting time with Father despite Mother's efforts.” Id. at 2.

[19] In October 2022, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Father's motion for rule to show cause. At the conclusion of this hearing, the court found Mother in contempt, ordered her to serve 30 days in the Hamilton County Jail, but stayed the sanction pending compliance with the court's parenting time order. The court conducted a compliance hearing the following month, which this Court summarized as follows in Varnhagen I:

At the November 1, 2022, review hearing, Mother explained that while [Child] had attended parenting time with Father the previous weekend and it had gone well, there had been an incident the weekend before that. Two weekends before the November hearing, [Child] had visited Father's home and had again tried to run away and a neighbor had called the police. [Child] had called Mother and had told her that the police had come, he had tried to run away, and that Father had hurt him. As a result, Mother had asked Father to return [Child] to her that night as previously agreed; however, Father had not shown up. Mother had then explained to Father that if he did not return [Child], she would call the police and request their assistance in returning [Child] to her. When Father had not appeared, Mother had called the police.

After hearing that testimony, the trial court expressed concern with Mother's choice to call the police and deny Father “the opportunity to be ․ the parent, to step up, to deal with it.” The trial court explained that Mother “inserted the police into a situation that they really didn't need to be in, thereby causing more trauma” and “took a resistant child and ․ added one more layer to that resistance.” The trial court acknowledged that Mother had been denying Father “the opportunity to be a parent” and her actions “still cloud [the] issue” of whether Father can effectively parent [Child]. Additionally, at the time of the review hearing, [Child] had missed twenty-one days of school while under Mother's care, which the trial court found to be “a big problem.”

Varnhagen I, 2023 WL 5126168, at *3 (paragraph numbers and internal citations omitted).

[20] Later that November, the trial court granted Father's petition to modify custody, awarding him sole legal custody and primary physical custody of Child, subject to Mother's parenting time.² In its custody modification order, the court explained, in pertinent part:

The parties have very different styles of parenting which have been a source of conflict between themselves and have also fostered a litany of issues for [Child]. Father is more rules-oriented and structured while Mother is more nurturing and accommodating. Neither of these styles is inherently bad or good. Neither of these styles is unique to this family. Such differing styles can and do work well in tandem with one another because children need nurturing parenting roles as well as structured parenting roles.

Father has argued that Mother's parenting style does not serve the best interests of [Child]. Mother has made the same argument about Father's parenting style. Both are correct, in part, and incorrect, in part. Either style, to the exclusion of the other, would not be in the child's best interests. Mother, as primary custodian, is in a position to carry out the best interests of the child by exposing the child to both parenting styles as much as possible. In that same role, she is also in a position to shield the child from the other parent's parenting style, which would be to the detriment of the child.

Unfortunately, Mother has chosen to shield [Child] from Father's parenting style, denying Father parenting time on multiple occasions and making major decisions for the child without involving Father in any meaningful way. The Court cannot find justification for these denials. When Father has parenting time, he [has] not responded in kind, leading the Court to conclude that he would be a better safeguard of Mother's parenting rights and time than Mother has proved to be of his.

Prior to these hearings, Mother was found to be in contempt of the court's orders regarding Father's parenting time on two separate occasions. Mother has made major decisions involving the child, including moving residences and switching schools, all without informing Father. While Mother had sole legal custody at the time and could make such decisions on her own, these transitions can be made easier if both parents are working in tandem. Instead, Father is effectively excluded not only from the decision-making, but also the responsibility of helping the child through the transition of the change. This is not in the best interests of the child.

The Court finds that the best interests of [Child] would be served by having a close relationship with both parents. The Court understands that [Child] has needs in the home and at school which are unique to him and will require special care and attention by both parents. The parties will have to work together to provide the best atmosphere for [Child] at school and at home. Father has pledged to do this. Mother has pledged to do this but has not fulfilled that pledge while in a position to do so. For instance, Mother has allowed [Child] to miss a tremendous amount of school this year. While Mother has worked to keep [Child] up to date on most of his classes, the Court cannot find that this ultimately serves [Child's] best interests.

***

․ Father is getting the chance to lead as he has pledged to work with Mother and others in serving the best interests of [Child]. Mother's time to lead in this regard is forfeit[ed] precisely because she has repeatedly denied Father the opportunity to be an equal co-parenting partner. Father's failure to do as he has pledged going forward may result in the Court taking further action.

Order of Modification, pp. 3-5 (issued November 28, 2022).

[21] Mother appealed the trial court's custody modification order, and this Court affirmed the judgment in Varnhagen I. That decision was certified in October 2023.

Events Preceding the Denial of Mother's Petition to Modify Custody

[22] In January 2024, Mother petitioned to modify custody, seeking to regain sole legal custody and primary physical custody of Child. In her petition, Mother alleged, among other things: “[Child] has reported emotional and verbal abuse and physical altercations while under Father's care”; “[Child] has continued to express fear of Father and has expressed to Mother that he does not feel safe in Father's presence”; and “Mother is concerned for [Child's] physical, emotional and mental health as [Child] exhibits extreme anxiety as it relates to Father.” App. Vol. II, pp. 64-65.

[23] In February 2024, while Mother's petition to modify custody was pending, Mother filed an emergency petition to suspend Father's parenting time with Child, alleging in pertinent part: “[O]n or about February 6, 2024, [14-year-old Child] and [Father] were engaged in an altercation at Father's home, leaving marks on [Child's] person.” Id. at 78. The trial court promptly conducted a hearing on Mother's emergency petition, at which the court heard testimony from GAL Schnitzius, Mother, Father, and Nicole Kubisz, a Family Case Manager (FCM) with the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS).

[24] GAL Schnitzius testified that Child had reported to her as follows. On the morning of February 6, 2024, Father and Child got into a disagreement over what Child would wear to school. Child wanted to wear a hoodie while Father insisted on a heavier jacket. The dispute escalated and became physical, with Father pushing Child onto the couch, getting on top of him, and pulling his hair. Father then pushed Child against the wall, causing Child to hit the back of his head. Father's glasses also broke and scratched Child's forehead during the altercation. Upon arriving at school, Child immediately told a teacher that Father had assaulted him. And later that day, Child was called to the school's front office to meet with a DCS caseworker.

[25] Mother testified that, on February 6, 2024, the resource officer at Child's school called and informed her that had Child reported being assaulted by Father. Mother went to Child's school and spoke with the officer, among others. She then removed Child from school and took him to the police station to file a police report. At some point, Mother emailed Father and informed him that she was doing so. But Mother did not explain to Father the reason why; she assumed the school had already informed him of Child's allegations. At the police station, officers took Child's statement and photographed a small scratch on Child's forehead, a small bruise on his right wrist, and a small scrape on his left knee.

[26] Father testified that no physical altercation took place between him and Child on February 6, 2024. He specifically denied pushing Child onto the couch, getting on top of him, pulling his hair, pushing him against a wall, or touching him in any way on the morning in question. Father also denied that his glasses had been broken, displaying them to the trial court during his testimony to confirm they remained intact. According to Father, Child was lying about the alleged assault.

[27] FCM Kubisz testified that DCS opened an assessment into Child's allegations of abuse by Father, during which she interviewed Child, Mother, and Father, among others. According to FCM Kubisz, she personally observed a very faint scratch on Child's forehead, a small bruise on his right wrist, and a small scrape on his left knee. She also noted that Child was crying and very emotional while being interviewed. But following the assessment, DCS determined that Child's allegations were “unsubstantiated,” meaning there was insufficient evidence to prove it was more likely than not that abuse occurred. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 47, 49.

[28] After argument from counsel, the trial court denied Mother's emergency petition to suspend Father's parenting time. The court expressed significant uncertainty about what, if anything, had occurred on February 6, 2024. The court noted it had previously found Child had lied to police about Father and that prior similar allegations against Father had been unsubstantiated. The court also expressed frustration that both parents continued to act unilaterally rather than communicating with each other and co-parenting Child.

[29] In July 2024, GAL Schnitzius filed with the trial court an interim custody report in which she stated, among other things:

GAL has grave concerns about [Child's] mental health. On July 8, 2024, [Child] reported to GAL that Father[ ] “made constant threats to him over the past weekend in his home. Father yelled and threatened to make [Child's] life a living hell and to beat the sh*t out of him next weekend.” [Child] shared that Father also made death threats about Mother and GAL. Father is angry about a forensic interview tomorrow that [DCS] scheduled, and told [Child] there would be law enforcement at the interview and if [Child] doesn't return to Father's care, [Child] may be put into foster care.

․ On July 12, 2024, Mother took [Child] to Northwest Health emergency room in Porter County, Indiana; and on July 15, 2024, Mother faxed the chart notes to GAL from the visit, which GAL reviewed. The notes read that [Child] presented with anxiety and was diagnosed with suicidal ideation, referred him to DCS, and discharged to Mother's care. [Child] reported to the medical team that he had an emotional breakdown at home, threatened to kill himself because of Father's abuse and stated, “he would rather die than go to Father's home to be hurt, that Father threatened to beat him up and he is scared.”

GAL does not know what goes on in Father's home. GAL has asked [Child] to make written statements, but [Child] refuses, stating that Father monitors his computer; and refuses to handwrite statements, because he says Father gives him no privacy in his home․

***

GAL can only speculate that there is something very unhealthy about [Child] and Father's relationship, which has now come to a head. GAL has grave concerns about [Child's] recent suicidal ideation.

Exhs. Vol. IV, pp. 61-63 (indentations omitted).

[30] The day after GAL Schnitzius filed her interim report, Mother filed another emergency petition to suspend Father's parenting time. In her petition, Mother alleged, in pertinent part: “[S]ince approximately February 20, 2024, [Child] has maintained that Father has been physically, mentally, and emotionally abusive during his parenting time with Father”; and “on or about July 12, 2024, [Child] told Mother that he would kill himself if he was forced to go back to Father's home.” App. Vol. II, p. 99. The trial court promptly conducted a hearing on Mother's emergency petition, at which the court heard testimony from GAL Schnitzius, Mother, Father, and FCM Andrew Long, among others.

[31] GAL Schnitzius testified that Child had been growing increasingly frustrated, anxious, and emotionally distressed since Mother's first emergency petition to suspend Father's parenting time was denied. According to GAL Schnitzius, Child felt that nothing was being done despite his repeated reports of abuse by Father. GAL Schnitzius also testified that, in the days leading up to Child's July 12, 2024 emergency room visit, Child expressed profound fear of returning to Father's home, stating Father “wants to kill me” and “wants to kill Mother.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 84. GAL Schnitzius found these statements deeply concerning, regardless of their ultimate accuracy. She also described Child's suicidal ideation as a new development that she took seriously.

[32] When asked if she had concerns about Child continuing to have unsupervised parenting time with Father, GAL Schnitzius responded:

I'm very concerned about what [Child] shared with me in the days leading up to the ER visit, his fear, great fear that if he returned to the house [Father] was going to beat the sh*t out of him, to use his words. I don't know if that's true. I don't know if that happened. But what I do know is whatever is going on with his relationship with [Father], it's come to this point. Either it's so distressing to him because it's true, or it's so distressing to him he feels like he needs to lie about it, and I don't know which of the two it is. But it's the same end. And something has got to change.

Id.

[33] Mother similarly testified that, since the denial of her first emergency petition to suspend Father's parenting time, Child's emotional and mental health had been steadily deteriorating. She described Child as exhibiting panic attacks before parenting exchanges, rocking back and forth, and saying he could not go back because Father was going to hurt him. According to Mother, she took Child to the emergency room because he suffered a complete emotional meltdown at her home, during which he made statements about harming himself.

[34] Father was not questioned about Child's reports of suicidal ideation. But he again denied ever physically or mentally abusing Child in any way. According to Father, Child was lying about the abuse allegations. Father also testified that he had not observed any severe emotional outbursts from Child.

[35] FCM Long testified that he had witnessed a forensic interview of Child following his July 2024 emergency room visit, and that DCS had preliminarily determined that Child's corresponding allegations of abuse by Father were “unsubstantiated.” Id. at 115. More specifically, FCM Long testified that he did not believe Child's abuse allegations were true and that his assessment, at the time, was that the abuse had not occurred.

[36] In addition to witness testimony, the medical records from Child's emergency room visit were admitted into evidence. These records included the following notation from Child's treating physician: “Patient so anxious when describing his relationship with his father and the fear he has of his father beating him up I had offered him a benzodiazepine. Patient ultimately refused however he had that high level of anxiety when talking about it.” Exhs. Vol. IV, p. 12. The records, however, noted that Child's “Risk for Suicide” was “Low” and that there was “No action required.” Id. at 22.

[37] After the hearing, the trial court denied Mother's second emergency petition to suspend Father's parenting time, stating: “The Court does not find sufficient evidence to suggest an emergency exists or that there is evidence of abuse of any kind on the part of [Father].” App. Vol. II, p. 106. The court added, however:

The Court is deeply concerned with the report made by the Guardian ad Litem, particularly that there may be aspects of mental or emotional health of [Child] not sufficiently evaluated or addressed by [Parents]. The Court is further concerned that the parties’ profound mistrust of each other may be blinding them to a possibility that a problem exists that isn't the fault of the other parent, but one that must be addressed through professional psychological therapy.

Id. The court therefore ordered Child to undergo a psychological evaluation.

[38] Robin Kohli, Psy.D, conducted a psychological evaluation of Child in October 2024 and later filed a report thereon with the trial court. In her report, Dr. Kohli diagnosed Child with Autism Spectrum Disorder Level 1 and Major Depressive Disorder with Anxious Distress. Among other things, Dr. Kohli observed:

[Child] ․ appears to have symptoms of anxiety and depression associated with his placement with [Father] and the stress of the custody situation, as well as feelings of isolation and rejection by peers. Given the significance of his anxiety and depressive symptoms, which have led to occasional thoughts of suicidal and homicidal ideation, it is strongly recommended that [Child] be referred to a child psychiatrist who specializes in youth with Autism Spectrum Disorder, as he may respond less typically to medication trials than neurotypical youth.

Exhs. Vol. IV, p. 56

[39] In February 2025, GAL Schnitzius filed her full custody report with the trial court, detailing the history of the case and her interviews and interactions with numerous witnesses, including Child, Mother, Father, and Dr. Kohli. GAL Schnitzius ultimately concluded that it was in Child's best interests for “Mother to serve as primary physical custodian, and sole legal custodian, of [Child].” Id. at 105.

[40] In June 2025, the trial court held the final hearing on Mother's petition to modify custody. In conjunction with this hearing, Mother unsuccessfully moved for the court to conduct an in-camera interview with Child. At the hearing, the court heard testimony from Dr. Kohli, GAL Schnitzius, Mother, and Father. The court also took judicial notice of the evidence presented at the hearings on Mother's emergency petitions to suspend Father's parenting time.

[41] Dr. Kohli testified that, during Child's psychological evaluation, Child presented as emotionally distressed, cried unexpectedly, apologized frequently, and appeared highly anxious and volatile. According to Dr. Kohli, this level of distress far exceeded what she typically observes, even in children who have been through extensive court and evaluation processes. She attributed Child's distress to genuine trauma rather than the cumulative burden of the protracted custody proceedings.

[42] Additionally, Dr. Kohli testified that Father's authoritarian parenting style is fundamentally incompatible with the nurturing, flexible environment a child with autism requires. On the question of Child's abuse allegations, Dr. Kohli explained that, while there appeared to be a kernel of something real and consistent in his accounts, Child's autism caused him to generalize experiences by taking something that may have happened once or twice and describing it as a constant pattern. This made Child less reliable as a reporter of the frequency and severity of events, even if his underlying sincerity was not in doubt.

[43] Father testified that things had been going well between him and Child—Child was doing well in school and at home, attending counseling, and becoming more socially engaged. More specifically, Father explained that Child had been on the distinguished honor roll for over two years, had won the academic team state championship in both 2024 and 2025, had developed a core group of friends at school with whom he ate lunch, had begun tutoring classmates, and had achieved a 3.94 GPA for ninth grade. Father also noted Child's PSAT score of 1240, the equivalent of roughly a 1400 on the SAT, putting him on track for future scholarships.

[44] Father further testified that DCS had investigated more than 20 reports of abuse or neglect of Child since Father gained custody in 2022. According to Father, each of these reports was deemed “unsubstantiate[d].” Tr. Vol. III, p. 46. Father believed Mother was using the DCS process to undo the court's custody order. He also believed that Child was lying when he made reports of suicidal ideation. When asked how he proposed to resolve the ongoing situation of Child making serious allegations against him, Father suggested that Mother end the litigation and agree to sit down and communicate with him as they had done previously.

[45] In September 2025, the trial court denied Mother's petition to modify custody, explaining, in pertinent part:

The Court does not find that there has been a continuing and substantial change in circumstances warranting modification of the Court's prior Order as it relates to custody, parenting time and child support.

Since the last Order, there have been numerous calls and complaints made to authorities alleging that Father is physically and verbally abusive to the child. The local Department of Child Services ha[s] investigated each of these allegations and ha[s] unsubstantiated all of them. Father has not been arrested or charged for any violations of the law.

Prior to the last order, multiple claims were made against Father. All of those were denied by Father and unsubstantiated by authorities. While Mother has pointed to some of these reports as grounds for a substantial and continuing change of circumstances, it is unfortunately just more of the same.

The Court has expressed and continues to express concerns that [Child] has made reports containing suicidal ideations. These must be taken seriously. The evidence presented shows that both parents are taking such reports seriously.

Mother and Father have differing parenting styles. Mother is more nurturing. Father has more rules. Such a difference in styles can be very beneficial to a child, providing structure and discipline to grow and develop, but also be surrounded by the love and attention that is necessary to grow and develop appropriately. When moms and dads live together, or even when they have a close co-parenting relationship at separate residences, these differing styles are compl[e]mentary and have the benefit of working in tandem to raise children. When there is not a good coparenting relationship, as here, it requires extra effort on the part of the custodial parent to make sure the dominant style is tempered at least a bit with the other style.

Here, when Mother was the primary custodian, her nurturing style certainly served the child's emotional needs, but her limitations on Father's disciplinary style caused the child to suffer academically and in other ways. Following the Court's order to change custody, Father's style has contributed to academic success, a disappearance of disciplinary and attendance problems in school, and the child's overall health has improved. However, deprived of the high level of Mother's nurturing parenting style, the child is acting up towards Father and disrespecting him. He is making allegations against Father. He is making reports to Mother and other authority figures against Father.

These reports, however, lack corroboration or substantiation.

A change in custody is not in the child's best interests. Returning to the custody and parenting time arrangements which were in place prior to November 202[2] would be detrimental to the child.

This Court stated, in its order modifying custody, “Father is getting the chance to lead as he has pledged to work with Mother and others in serving the best interests of [Child]. Mother's time to lead in this regard is forfeit[ed] precisely because she has repeatedly denied Father the opportunity to be an equal coparenting partner. Father's failure to do as he has pledged going forward may result in the Court taking further action.”

The Court finds that nothing has changed with respect to Mother's willingness to work with Father. The Court also finds that Father has sought out Mother's opinions on parenting decisions, has provided her with opportunities for additional parenting time, and has reached out to her in an effort to co-parent. He has done what he said he would do.

App. Vol. II, pp. 135-37 (paragraph numbers omitted).

Discussion and Decision

[46] Mother appeals the trial court's denial of her petition to modify custody. As required by Indiana Code § 31-17-2-8.2(b)(1), the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its judgment. We will “not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). “A judgment is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the judgment.” K.I. ex rel. J.I. v. J.H., 903 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 2009). “A judgment is also clearly erroneous when the trial court applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Id.

[47] Mother argues that the trial court clearly erred by: (1) applying the wrong legal standard to her petition to modify custody; (2) finding Child's allegations of abuse by Father lacked corroboration or substantiation; and (3) failing to issue sufficient findings to support the denial of a custody modification. None of these arguments prevail.

I. The Trial Court Applied the Correct Legal Standard

[48] Mother first challenges the legal standard applied by the trial court in denying her petition to modify custody. Her petition was governed by two pertinent statutes: Indiana Code § 31-17-2-21 (the “Modification Statute”); and Indiana Code § 31-17-2-8 (the “Best Interests Statute”). The Modification Statute provides, in pertinent part:

(a) The court may not modify a child custody order unless:

(1) the modification is in the best interests of the child; and

(2) there is a substantial change in one (1) or more of the factors that the court may consider under [the Best Interest Statute].

(b) In making its determination, the court shall consider the factors listed under [the Best Interest Statute].

Ind. Code § 31-17-2-21.

[49] The Best Interests Statute provides, in pertinent part:

In determining the best interests of the child ․ [t]he court shall consider all relevant factors, including the following:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child's parent or parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child's parent or parents;

(B) the child's sibling; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests.

(5) The child's adjustment to the child's:

(A) home;

(B) school; and

(C) community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.

(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall consider the factors described in section 8.5(b) of this chapter.

(9) A designation in a power of attorney of:

(A) the child's parent; or

(B) a person found to be a de facto custodian of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8.

[50] Mother argues that the trial court failed to consider “all relevant factors,” as required by the Best Interests Statute. Id. More specifically, she claims the court did not consider Child's wishes, interaction and interrelationship with Father, adjustment to Father's home, mental and physical health, and allegations of abuse by Father. This argument fails for two reasons.

[51] First, Mother bases her argument solely on the lack of certain findings in the trial court's order, claiming the order “ignores,” “disregards,” “overlooks,” and is “devoid of any mention” of the challenged factors. Appellant's Br., pp. 25-36. “[T]he plain language of the [Best Interest Statute] only requires a court to ‘consider’ the [statutory] factors, not to make a finding regarding each one.” Anselm v. Anselm, 146 N.E.3d 1042, 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Thus, the absence of a particular finding does not constitute error in and of itself.

[52] Second, we “generally presume [that] trial courts know and follow the applicable law,” and we will not abandon that presumption unless “the trial court's findings lead us to conclude that an unjustifiable risk exists that the trial court did not follow the applicable law.” Ramsey v. Ramsey, 863 N.E.2d 1232, 1239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). No such risk exists here. The trial court's order quotes the Best Interest Statute in full, demonstrating the court's awareness of the governing framework and the statutory factors requiring consideration.

[53] Contrary to Mother's claims, the order also includes findings on most of the challenged factors. As for Child's adjustment to Father's home, the trial court found that Father's parenting style has contributed to both academic success and the disappearance of school discipline and attendance problems. As for Child's interaction and interrelationship with Father, the court found that Child is acting up towards Father and disrespecting him. As for Child's mental health, the court expressed “concerns” with Child's reports of suicidal ideation. App. Vol. II, p. 136. And as for the allegations of abuse by Father, the court found that they lack substantiation and corroboration.

[54] The trial court also heard evidence on all the challenged factors. See generally Matter of J.M., 246 N.E.3d 303, 309 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (ruling custody modification order did not evince unjustifiable risk that trial court failed to comply with applicable law where record contained evidence touching on challenged factors). Mother highlights that the order does not mention Child's wishes, autism and depression diagnoses, or fear and anxiety about living with Father. But GAL Schnitzius and Dr. Kohli testified about each of those issues during the final hearing on Mother's petition to modify custody. The issues were also addressed in the written reports filed by those witnesses, which the trial court specifically acknowledged in its order:

The Guardian Ad Litem issued an Interim GAL Report on July 17, 2024, noting extreme concern for [Child's] mental health due to recent suicidal ideation. The same was admitted as Petitioner's Exhibit 3 at the final hearing.

***

On February 25, 2025, the Guardian Ad Litem issued her Report, and the same was admitted at the final hearing as Petitioner's Exhibit 4.

On March 3, 2025, [Child's] psychological evaluation performed by Dr. Kohli was filed with the Court by Mother, and the same was admitted as Petitioner's Exhibit 2 at the final hearing.

App. Vol. II, pp. 132-33 (paragraph numbers omitted).

[55] For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court applied the correct legal standard in denying Mother's petition to modify custody.

II. The Evidence Supports the Challenged Finding

[56] Mother next challenges the trial court's finding that Child's allegations of abuse by Father “lack[ed] corroboration or substantiation.” Id. at 137. According to Mother, this finding equates to a determination that Child was not credible, which the evidence does not support because the court denied Mother's requests for an in-camera interview with Child. This argument also fails for two reasons.

[57] First, it rests on a faulty premise. The trial court did not find that Child was not credible; it found his reports of abuse were not corroborated or substantiated. Those are distinct assessments. Credibility concerns the character of a piece of evidence. Corroboration and substantiation speak to the verification of a fact through independent evidence. See Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “corroboration” as “[c]onfirmation or support by additional evidence ․”; defining “substantiate” as “[t]o establish the existence or truth of (a fact, etc.), esp. by competent evidence”; and defining “credibility” as “[t]he quality that makes something ․ worthy of belief”).

[58] Second, the record contains direct evidence that Child's allegations of abuse by Father lacked corroboration or substantiation. At the hearing on Mother's first emergency petition to suspend Father's parenting time, FCM Kubisz testified that DCS determined that Child's allegations of abuse by Father on February 6, 2024, were “unsubstantiated.” Tr. Vol. II, pp. 47, 49. At the hearing on Mother's second emergency petition to suspend Father's parenting time, FCM Long testified that DCS had preliminarily determined that the abuse allegations corresponding to Child's July 2024 emergency room visit for suicidal ideation were also “unsubstantiated.” Id. at 115. And at the final hearing on Mother's petition to modify custody, Father testified that, since he gained custody in 2022, more than 20 reports of abuse or neglect had been deemed “unsubstantiate[d].” Tr. Vol. III, p. 46.

[59] For these reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err in finding that Child's allegations of abuse by Father lacked corroboration or substantiation.

III. The Trial Court's Findings Are Sufficient

[60] Finally, Mother challenges the sufficiency of the trial court's findings to support the denial of her petition to modify custody. As stated above, the Modification Statute provides that a trial court “may not modify a child custody order unless: (1) the modification is in the best interests of the child; and (2) there is a substantial change in one ․ or more of the factors that the court may consider under [the Best Interests Statute].” Ind. Code § 31-17-2-21(a). Additionally, Indiana Code § 31-17-2-8.2(b)(1) requires that a trial court's custody order include “the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law on which the custody order is based.” “We accept unchallenged findings as true, and we will affirm if the unchallenged findings are sufficient to support the judgment.” N.R. v. A.R., 273 N.E.3d 1118, 1125 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), trans. denied.

[61] Here, the trial court's unchallenged findings support the trial court's conclusion that modifying custody was not in Child's best interests. Most notably, the court found:

[W]hen Mother was the primary custodian, her nurturing style certainly served the child's emotional needs, but her limitations on Father's disciplinary style caused the child to suffer academically and in other ways. Following the Court's order to change custody, Father's style has contributed to academic success, a disappearance of disciplinary and attendance problems in school, and the child's overall health has improved. However, deprived of the high level of Mother's nurturing parenting style, the child is acting up towards Father and disrespecting him. He is making allegations against Father. He is making reports to Mother and other authority figures against Father.

***

The Court finds that nothing has changed with respect to Mother's willingness to work with Father. The Court also finds that Father has sought out Mother's opinions on parenting decisions, has provided her with opportunities for additional parenting time, and has reached out to her in an effort to co-parent. He has done what he said he would do.

App. Vol. II, pp. 136-37 (paragraph numbers omitted).

[62] Mother does not challenge the above findings. Instead, she generally claims the trial court's findings are insufficient because they fail to explain why the court did not follow the recommendations of GAL Schnitzius and Dr. Kohli. She points to the reports filed by those witnesses, in which each observed that Child's emotional functioning had declined since the trial court granted Father primary physical custody of Child. Mother also emphasizes that Dr. Kohli associated Child's anxiety and depression with his placement with Father. And Mother highlights that GAL Schnitzius's concerns for Child's mental health outweighed her concerns for his academic performance.

[63] Mother's claim, however, is a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Julie C. v. Andrew C., 924 N.E.2d 1249, 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “A finder of fact is not required to accept the opinions of an expert simply because [they are] an expert.” Periquet-Febres v. Febres, 659 N.E.2d 602, 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). And Mother provides no authority for her inherent suggestion that a factfinder must explain the reasons why it may not have agreed with an expert's recommendation. Findings of fact are sufficient if they “enable this Court to dispose of the issues upon appeal.” Jones v. Gruca, 150 N.E.3d 632, 641 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Dowdell v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind. 1999)). Here, to the extent Mother challenges the trial court's best interests conclusion, the court's unchallenged findings sufficiently enable us to dispose of the issue.

[64] For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Trial court filings and orders not contained in Appellant's Appendix were accessed via Indiana's Odyssey Case Management System. This opinion cites to all such records as they appear on the Chronological Case Summary for In Re: Marriage of Varnhagen, Cause No. 29D05-1703-DC-002717. See generally Indiana Appellate Rule 27 (“The Record on Appeal shall consist of the Clerk's Record and all proceedings before the trial court or Administrative Agency, whether or not transcribed or transmitted to the Court on Appeal.”)

2.   The trial court also summarily denied all pending motions not specifically addressed in its custody modification order.

Weissmann, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.