IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: S.H. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] K.H. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to S.H., D.H., and Kw.H. (collectively, “Children”). Father presents multiple arguments for our review, which we consolidate and restate as:

1. Whether the trial court violated Father's due process rights during the Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) proceedings by accepting the agreed entry of waiver (the “Agreed Entry”) wherein he waived his right to a fact-finding hearing and agreed that he would not be provided services due to his incarceration;

2. Whether the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) violated Father's due process rights during the termination proceedings when it:

2.1 did not apprise Father of the allegations against him in the petitions to terminate his parental rights to Children; and

2.2 did not provide reunification services; and

3. Whether the trial court erred when it accepted the Department of Child Services’ (“DCS”) proposed findings with few changes.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Children – D.H., born May 2018; S.H., born May 2019; and Kw.H., born November 2021 – lived with S.R. (“Mother”)¹ until DCS removed them on January 30, 2024, based on reported neglect.² At the time of removal, Father could not be located, had an outstanding warrant for his failure to appear on charges naming Mother as the alleged victim, and was barred from contacting Mother and Children by a protective order.

[3] DCS filed CHINS petitions on February 1, 2024. On March 15, 2024, Mother entered a “Deny and Submit Agreement” that waived fact-finding and allowed the court to consider the allegations contained in DCS's preliminary inquiry and CHINS petitions. (Ex. Vol. I at 61.) Based thereon, the trial court adjudicated Children as CHINS.

[4] Police arrested Father on the outstanding warrant on May 9, 2024, and he was held thereafter in the Marion County Jail. After an initial hearing on July 12, 2024, Father entered an Agreed Entry that waived fact-finding and did not contest the CHINS allegations. The Agreed Entry provided that no services would be ordered “due to [Father's] incarceration” and that he would contact DCS within seventy-two hours of his release so DCS could petition to modify the dispositional decree. (Id. at 71). On July 24, 2024, Father pled guilty to Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon ³ and was sentenced to ten years incarcerated, with five years suspended. The protective order remained in effect.

[5] On September 13, 2024, the trial court held a hearing to consider Father's Agreed Entry. Father did not appear because he was held at the Department of Correction's Reception Diagnostic Center and could not be transported. His counsel confirmed that Father wished to proceed with the waiver. On September 17, 2024, the trial court re-affirmed the Children's adjudication as CHINS and entered a dispositional order requiring no services at that time but ordering Father to contact DCS within seventy-two hours of his release from prison so DCS could recommend services upon his release. Father did not appeal.

[6] Father remained incarcerated and received no services through February 2025. On February 25, 2025, DCS filed a petition ⁴ to terminate Mother's and Father's parental rights that alleged that “there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied[.]” (App. Vol. II at 30.) The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on October 24, 2025.

[7] At the hearing, Father testified that his release was scheduled for January 17, 2027. He told the trial court that he was taking classes toward “construction business” or “welding industry” but had not taken any classes addressing the reasons for removal or his parenting ability. (Tr. Vol. II at 76.) Father explained that reunification services were hard to access while incarcerated. He told the trial court that he had not seen Children since July 2024 and, before that, had not visited them from April to November 2023 while jailed on another case. He confirmed the protective order remained in place.

[8] Family Case Manager Kristen Lorenzano (“FCM Lorenzano”) called Father's criminal history “concerning” given his history of violence and domestic violence. (Id. at 46.) FCM Lorenzano was unsure whether Father had received any related education in prison. She testified that, if Father were released immediately, she would not recommend placing Children with him because he would still need a substance abuse assessment, a domestic violence assessment, and a legal source of income. Asked whether termination should be postponed until Father's release, she said no because Children had not had significant contact with him for several years, had no bond with him, and did not ask about him. Even immediate release, she said, would not eliminate the steps DCS would require before placing Children with him.

[9] Father testified DCS had not contacted him during either proceeding and his own attempts to reach DCS went unanswered. FCM Lorenzano acknowledged she had not spoken with Father since receiving the case in April 2025 and had not sent an “incarcerated parent letter” providing her contact information and a status update. (Id. at 54.) Guardian ad Litem Brittany Lismon (“GAL Lismon”) testified her organization normally sent out letters to parents when a GAL is assigned to a case ⁵ but she had not personally contacted Father.

[10] The trial court terminated Father's parental rights on November 24, 2025. It found that Father's continued incarceration had kept Children from his care and that, upon release, he would need to complete domestic violence and substance abuse services and obtain a stable home and legal income, which were requirements that “could indefinitely delay [Children's] permanency.” (App. Vol. II at 194.) The trial court also found Father's prior OWI convictions would make obtaining stable employment for himself and housing for Children “challenging” upon release. (Id. at 196.)

Discussion and Decision

[11] Father challenges the involuntary termination of his parental rights to Children. “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” In re A.L., 223 N.E.3d 1126, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. However, a juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Id. “If ‘parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities,’ termination of parental rights is appropriate.” Id. (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Ofc. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). The termination of the parent-child relationship is “an ‘extreme measure’ and should only be utilized as a ‘last resort when all other reasonable efforts to protect the integrity of the natural relationship between parent and child have failed.’ ” K.E. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Ofc. of Fam. & Child., 841 N.E.2d 615, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied).

[12] To terminate a parent-child relationship in Indiana, DCS must allege and prove “one (1) or more” of the circumstances listed in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d). Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (2024). Such circumstances include:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d) (2024). In addition, DCS must prove that termination is in the child's best interests, Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(3) (2024), and that there exists a satisfactory plan for the child's care following termination. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2) (2024).

[13] DCS must provide clear and convincing proof of these allegations at the termination hearing. In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. “[I]f the State fails to prove any one of these statutory elements, then it is not entitled to a judgment terminating parental rights.” In re K.E., 162 N.E.3d 565, 569 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1261 (Ind. 2019)), trans. denied. Because parents have a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise their child, the State “must strictly comply” with the statutory requirements for terminating parental rights. In re Q.M., 974 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Platz v. Elkhart Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 631 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)).

[14] When reviewing a trial court's termination of parental rights,

we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment and give due regard to the trial court's unique opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. We will set aside the trial court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous.

In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). When “the trial court has made findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review: ‘we must first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the judgment.’ ” In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d 658, 662 (Ind. 2014) (quoting In re Adoption of T.W., 859 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks any evidence or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support them.” In re Paternity of Winkler, 725 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). “We accept unchallenged findings as true.” Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[15] When the State seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship, it must do so in a manner that provides due process. In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011).

Due process embodies the idea of fundamental fairness and the “opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 917 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)). Due process is “flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334, 96 S. Ct. 893 (quotation omitted). When determining the process due in a termination of parental rights proceeding, we balance three factors: (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure. C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 917. The balancing of these factors often turns on the risk of error created by DCS’ actions and the trial court's actions because a parent's private interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her child and the State's parens patriae interest in protecting the welfare of a child are both substantial. Id. at 917-18.

Matter of A.B., 226 N.E.3d 791, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

1. CHINS Proceedings

[16] Father argues the trial court violated his right to due process when it accepted the Agreed Entry without his signature, did not hold a fact-finding hearing to determine if Children were CHINS, and ordered that no services be offered to Father until he was released from incarceration. Father also contends the trial court violated his due process rights because he had a right to be present at the hearing during which the trial court accepted the Agreed Entry. All these issues arose from the CHINS proceedings. Father had ample opportunity to challenge the actions, as he was present during one permanency hearing and did not contest the conditions of the Agreed Entry at any time. Thus, his argument is waived for failure to present the issue to the trial court. See In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016) (“a party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim, including a claimed violation of due process rights, by raising it for the first time on appeal”). Further, the issues are waived because Father did not file an appeal of the CHINS proceedings. See Ind. App. R. 9(A)(1) (party must file an appeal within thirty days after the entry of a final judgment); and Ind. App. R. 9(A)(5) (“[u]nless the Notice of Appeal is timely filed, the right to appeal shall be forfeited”).

[17] Father asserts that if we hold he waived his attendance at the Agreed Entry hearing, that issue survives because it was fundamental error. He claims the trial court committed fundamental error because he “could not demonstrate to the court that any waiver was made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary manner and the court could not advise him on the circumstances and consequences.” (Father's Br. at 20.) Our Indiana Supreme Court has stated:

[A]ppellate courts may analyze an issue under the fundamental error doctrine to examine an otherwise procedurally defaulted claim. However, this review is extremely narrow and available only when the record reveals a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles, where the harm or potential for harm cannot be denied, and which violation is so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible.

Matter of Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1214-15 (Ind. 2019) (quotations and citations omitted). However, “an incarcerated parent has no absolute right to be physically present” at CHINS proceedings. In re Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). The trial court did not commit fundamental error because Father does not have the absolute right to be present at a hearing.

2. Termination Proceedings

2.1. Notice of Allegations Supporting Termination

[18] Father claims the trial court erred when it terminated his parental rights to Children because DCS's petition for termination did not include specific allegations supporting its petition. Father did not present this issue to the trial court, and therefore it is waived. See McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Ofc. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (issue waived because it was not first presented before the trial court).

2.2. Reunification Services

[19] Father argues the trial court erred when it terminated his parental rights because DCS did not offer him services toward reunification with Children. First, Father contends that DCS's failure to communicate with him and offer him services violates his due process rights. While Father did not mention the due process issue during the termination fact-finding hearing, he asserts the issue is preserved for appellate review because he included statements regarding reunification services in his proposed findings. However, a party cannot present an issue for the first time in its proposed findings because the other party is “not afforded the opportunity to respond” to issues asserted in those proposed findings. In re Guardianship of Knepper, 861 N.E.2d 717, 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (on reh'g). Therefore, Father's due process argument is waived for failure to first present it to the trial court. See McBride, 798 N.E.2d at 194 (issue waived because it was not first presented before the trial court).

[20] Father also contends that if there is not a due process violation, the trial court erred when it terminated his parental rights to Children because DCS did not refer him to reunification services as required by Indiana Code Section 31-34-21-5.5(b), which states:

(b) ․ [The] department shall make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families as follows:

* * * * *

(2) If a child has been removed from the child's home, to make it possible for the child to return safely to the child's home as soon as possible.

We have long held that

although the DCS is generally required to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families during the CHINS proceedings, that requirement under our CHINS statutes is not a requisite element of our parental rights termination statute, and a failure to provide services does not serve as a basis on which to directly attack a termination order as contrary to law.

In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (emphasis in original), trans. denied. “[E]ven a complete failure to provide services would not serve to negate a necessary element of the termination statute and require reversal.” In re E.E., 736 N.E.2d 791, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

[21] As part of the CHINS case, Father entered an Agreed Entry which stated he would be provided with no services while he was incarcerated. Therefore, DCS did not provide him with reunification services while he was incarcerated. Father did not pursue reunification services on his own, though they were offered at the facility where he was incarcerated. Father was prohibited by a no contact order from visiting Children and did not attempt to have the no contact order lifted for the purpose of reunification. “[A] parent may not sit idly by without asserting a need or desire for services and then successfully argue that he was denied services to assist him with his parenting.” In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Therefore, we conclude Father cannot attack the termination order based on lack of services.

3. Adoption of DCS's Proposed Order

[22] Father argues the trial court erred when it adopted DCS's proposed findings and conclusions with minor changes.

When a trial judge signs a party's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, they become the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court is responsible for the correctness of the findings of fact and conclusions of law and they are not weakened because they were adopted verbatim. If the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law did not state the facts as the trial court found them to be, it would not have adopted them as its own․ [T]he trial courts have the discretion to adopt a party's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as their own.

Scoleri v. Scoleri, 766 N.E.2d 1211, 1214 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Father does not appeal any of the trial court's findings or conclusions, and thus they stand proven. See Henderson, 139 N.E.3d at 232 (“We accept unchallenged findings as true.”) When Father has not challenged any of the trial court's findings or conclusions as inaccurate, we cannot hold the trial court committed error by adopting DCS's proposed findings and conclusions when it entered its order terminating Father's parental rights to Children.

Conclusion

[23] Father waived any due process arguments regarding the CHINS proceedings because he did not raise them before the trial court and did not file a timely appeal of the adjudication of Children as CHINS. Relatedly, the trial court did not commit fundamental error when it held the Agreed Entry hearing in Father's absence. Similarly, Father waived his arguments regarding notice of the allegations against him in DCS's petition to terminate his parental rights to Children and a violation of his due process rights based on DCS's failure to provide services because he did not present the arguments to the trial court. Finally, Father has not demonstrated that the trial court committed any error when it adopted DCS's proposed order as its order terminating Father's parental rights to Children. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother's parental rights to Children were also terminated but she does not participate in this appeal

2.   During the termination proceedings, the details of the neglect report prompting DCS's initiation of the CHINS action were redacted from the record.

3.   Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c).

4.   Unless otherwise indicated, we will use the language of the termination petition for S.H. because those documents concerning Children are virtually identical.

5.   It is unclear from the record whether the paralegal sent this letter.

May, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Scheele, J., concur.