Kelsey R. Rummel, Appellant v. State of Indiana, Appellee (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Kelsey R. Rummel appeals the trial court's revocation of her probation and order that she serve her previously suspended sentence in the Department of Correction (the “DOC”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On October 7, 2025, Rummel pled guilty to Count I, maintaining a common nuisance as a level 6 felony; Count II, possession of marijuana as a class B misdemeanor; and Count III, possession of paraphernalia as a class C misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Rummel to concurrent terms, all suspended to probation, of 545 days on Count I, 180 days on Count II, and 60 days on Count III. As a condition of probation, Rummel agreed to “Report to the Probation Department as directed by [her] Probation Officer, keep all appointments and answer all reasonable inquiries.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 22.

[3] On October 23, 2025, Chief Probation Officer Brian G. Campbell filed a Verified Petition of Probation Violation alleging:

4. [T]he Franklin County Probation Department attempted to conduct a home visit at [Rummel's] residence on October 22, 2025, to no avail. On October 23, 2025, [Rummel] appeared in the Franklin Circuit Court II for initial hearings on pending matters in 24C02-2510-JC-l11, 24C02-2510-JC-112 and 24C02-2510-JC-113. This affiant indicated directly to [Rummel] that she is to report in person immediately following the conclusion of these hearings. [Rummel] failed to report to the Franklin County Probation Department as requested.

[Rummel] has allegedly absconded.

5. That because of the aforesaid facts, [Rummel] has not behaved well and has not been a satisfactory probationer.

Id. at 27-28.

[4] On December 18, 2025, the court held a hearing. Officer Campbell testified that he learned that a hearing in a child in need of services (“CHINS”) case was scheduled for October 23, 2025, at which “Rummel was to appear,” that he met with her in person prior to the hearing, that he “gave her strict instructions to report to the probation department” immediately following that hearing, and that she did not report to his office. Transcript Volume II at 10. Officer Campbell indicated his office was about “[t]hree minutes” or “[h]alf a block” from the court. Id. at 16.

[5] Rummel testified she “was in court for a CHINS case” on October 23, 2025, and the hearing “was just for them to take my kids.” Id. at 23-24. She testified that Officer Campbell introduced himself and asked her to “please come see me today after this appointment” and that “just then the judge came out.” Id. at 25. She indicated the hearing lasted for about one hour, she “was traumatized,” and her “only thought was to get to [her] kids and to explain to them what was going on.” Id. at 26. When asked, “[d]id you intentionally not meet with him, or did you forget,” Rummel replied, “I forgot. I didn't even think about -- the only thing I thought about was getting to my kids.” Id. at 28. Rummel indicated that she understood the terms of her probation, that Officer Campbell “asked [her] to come over to that building,” and that she “kn[e]w where that building is.” Id. at 34.

[6] Following argument from the attorneys, the trial court stated:

What is clear to the Court is that Mr. Campbell, who is Ms. Rummel's probation officer, was clear and indicated to her you are to meet with me after this hearing. She understood that. She testified to it today. She chose not to do that for whatever reason, but she has a duty, being on probation, to make all reasonable inquiries. All it would have been was a stop outside of the door on the way of leaving this place. It couldn't get much more reasonable than being in that vicinity, and she still chose not to do that, and it wasn't as if she just forgot and showed up an hour later. She never came. So it's a blatant violation of probation, and so therefore the Court does find that the State has met its burden and that Ms. Rummel ․ has violated the terms of her probation. We will proceed to sentencing in this matter. Are they [sic] parties ready to proceed with that?

Id. at 39. The court heard testimony from Rummel and two of her friends. Rummel testified that she had employment arranged at a diner, that she intended to comply with the Department of Child Services in the CHINS case, that she had been participating in a program for recovering addicts while in jail, and that she was sorry for violating probation. The prosecutor argued that “probation is just pointless.” Id. at 51. The prosecutor stated that Rummel's criminal history included possession of paraphernalia as a class C misdemeanor in 2022, possession of paraphernalia as a class C misdemeanor in 2020, OWI as a misdemeanor in 2018, OWI as a class A misdemeanor in 2012, prostitution as a class A misdemeanor in 2010, and minor consumption charges in 2009.

[7] Rummel's counsel argued that Rummel was remorseful and, in light of her lack of any felonies and her relatively minor misdemeanor convictions, that an appropriate sanction for the violation was the time she had already served of fifty-seven days. He argued Rummel's incarceration would negatively impact her children and it would be beneficial for Rummel to be given the opportunity to begin participating in services toward reunification. The court noted Rummel's remorse and that her criminal history consisted of “a long stream of substance offenses, and then ․ in this case, you were in here for maintaining a common nuisance as a Level 6 felony.” Id. at 53. The court ordered Rummel to serve her previously suspended sentence in the DOC and gave her credit for time served.

Discussion

[8] Rummel argues that “the trial court improperly revoked [her] probation sentence without first determining that revocation was appropriate and warranted under the circumstances.” Appellant's Brief at 8. She asserts the court found that she violated her probation, “[a]s such, the first step of the revocation process was likely satisfied,” “[h]owever, the trial court immediately moved to sentencing,” and “[a] review of the transcript, in fact, reveals that at no point in time did the court even mention revocation, seemingly assuming it was automatic upon the finding of a violation.” Id. at 10. She also argues the court abused its discretion in ordering her to serve her previously suspended sentence, “[t]his was a technical violation,” and “[a]n individualized assessment of [her] actions, viewed in the context of the timing of the violation and the chaos that had entered [her] life, does not warrant revocation and it does not warrant [her] serving her entire suspended sentence.” Id. at 12-13.

[9] The Indiana Supreme Court has held:

The minimum requirements of due process that inure to a probationer at a revocation hearing include: (a) written notice of the claimed violations of probation; (b) disclosure of the evidence against him; (c) an opportunity to be heard and present evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; and (e) a neutral and detached hearing body. Isaac v. State, 605 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ind.1992).

Probation revocation is a two-step process. First, the court must make a factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation actually occurred. If a violation is proven, then the trial court must determine if the violation warrants revocation of the probation. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479-480, 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972); Stephens v. State, 818 N.E.2d 936, 941-942 (Ind. 2004) (observing the statutory scheme “reflects the Legislature's intent that trial courts have the flexibility both to use and to terminate probation when appropriate”). Indiana has codified the due process requirements of Morrissey in Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3 by requiring that an evidentiary hearing be held on the revocation and providing for confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses by the probationer. When a probationer admits to the violations, the procedural safeguards of Morrissey and the evidentiary hearing are unnecessary. Instead, the court can proceed to the second step of the inquiry and determine whether the violation warrants revocation. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480, 92 S. Ct. 2593. However, even a probationer who admits the allegations against him must still be given an opportunity to offer mitigating evidence suggesting that the violation does not warrant revocation. United States v. Holland, 850 F.2d 1048, 1051 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).

Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008).

[10] Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h) provides:

If the court finds that the person has violated a condition at any time before termination of the period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, the court may impose one (1) or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

[11] We review trial court probation violation determinations and sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013) (citing Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007)). The Indiana Supreme Court has explained that, “[o]nce a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed” and that, “[i]f this discretion were not afforded to trial courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be less inclined to order probation to future defendants.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. As long as the proper procedures have been followed in conducting a probation revocation hearing, the trial court may order execution of a suspended sentence upon a finding of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Goonen v. State, 705 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

[12] To the extent Rummel asserts that she was denied due process or that the trial court did not follow the two-step process described in Woods, we note that she did not object at the hearing before the trial court or raise such claims. Accordingly, the issue is waived. See Terpstra v. State, 138 N.E.3d 278, 285-286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (failure to raise due process claim at probation revocation hearing resulted in waiver), trans. denied. Waiver notwithstanding, Rummel received notice of the claimed probation violation and admitted that she did not report to the probation department as instructed. Although the trial court may not have used the term “revocation” when it determined that Rummel violated the terms of her probation, we cannot say that the court was required to do so, and we note the record shows that the court first made the factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation occurred and then moved forward with hearing arguments regarding whether the violation warranted revocation of the probation. See Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 640. The court heard evidence and argument regarding the appropriate sanction, and Rummel had the opportunity to challenge the evidence presented by the State, cross-examine Officer Campbell, and present evidence and argument. We find no due process violation.

[13] With respect to the court revoking her suspended sentence, the court was able to consider the testimony and arguments regarding Rummel's criminal history, her participation in a program for recovering addicts, her remorse, the impact of her incarceration, the CHINS proceedings, and the significance of her violation. In light of the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that Rummel serve her previously suspended sentence in the DOC.

[14] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court.

[15] Affirmed.

Brown, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur