Davina Ellis, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judges Mathias and Felix concur.

[1] Davina Ellis appeals following the trial court's revocation of her suspended sentence and imposition of sanctions against her for violating the conditions of her probation. Ellis argues: (1) the court abused its discretion when it revoked Ellis's suspended sentence and ordered her to complete a drug treatment program and to serve 365 days executed in the Howard County Work Release Center, 365 days executed on In-Home Detention, and 365 days on supervised probation; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to order that she receive credit for her time at the recovery center toward her 365 days executed on Work Release.¹ We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On April 28, 2023, Davina Ellis agreed to plead guilty to three counts of Level 5 felony dealing in methamphetamine.² In exchange, Ellis received a sentence of six years with 361 days executed in the Howard County Jail, 734 days on Howard County Community Corrections Work Release, and three years suspended on supervised probation. By the time of sentencing, Ellis had served 271 actual days in jail and received 90 credit days, such that she was immediately transferred to Work Release.

[3] In November 2023, the State filed a notice of noncompliance, alleging that Ellis violated the conditions of her Work Release placement by failing to return, failing to pay user fees, and refusing to submit to required drug screens. In January 2024, the trial court sanctioned Ellis to time served and continued her placement on Work Release.

[4] On August 13, 2025, while Ellis was on supervised probation, the State filed a petition to revoke Ellis's suspended sentence. The State alleged that Ellis violated the conditions of her probation by using methamphetamine twice in August and refusing to submit to required drug testing twice in July and once in August. The petition included a probation officer's recommendation that Ellis “be allowed the chance to complete a rehabilitation program and then be sentenced to execute 365 days executed to Howard County Work Release, 365 days executed on Howard County In-Home Detention, and then 365 days back on Supervised Probation.” (Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 163.)

[5] At a fact-finding hearing on October 1, 2025, Ellis admitted the State's allegations that she violated the conditions of her supervised probation by using methamphetamine and refusing to appear for required drug screenings. At the hearing, Ellis explained that she struggled with addiction for thirty years and “really need[ed]” rehabilitation. (Tr. Vol. II at 11.) The trial court agreed that it would follow the probation officer's recommendation that Ellis complete a rehabilitation program and serve a modified version of her remaining sentence. The trial court filed its written dispositional order, which read, “The Court orders the defendant to complete 365 credit days on Work Release, to include the rehabilitation program with First City Recovery Center; then, serve 365 [days] on In Home Detention, and then 365 days on supervised probation.” (Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 176.)

Discussion and Decision

1. Revocation of Supervised Probation

[6] Ellis asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked Ellis's supervised probation and ordered that she complete a drug treatment program, serve 365 days in the Howard County Work Release Center, 365 days on In-Home Detention, and 365 days on supervised probation.

The trial court determines the conditions of probation and may revoke probation if the conditions are violated. Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed․ Accordingly, a trial court's sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard. An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.

Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (internal citation omitted).

[7] “Probation revocation is a two-step process. First, the court must make a factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation actually occurred. If a violation is proven, then the trial court must determine if the violation warrants revocation of the probation.” Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008). If a defendant violates the conditions of her probation, the court may impose one (1) or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h).

[8] As part of her supervised probation, Ellis was required to submit to drug testing when ordered to do so, was prohibited from violating any laws, and was prohibited from “consum[ing] or possess[ing] ․ any controlled substance (illegal drug)[.]” (Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 161.) However, Ellis admitted to allegations in the State's petition to revoke her suspended sentence that she violated the conditions of her supervised probation by failing to appear for drug testing on three separate occasions in July and August 2025 and using methamphetamine twice in August 2025.

[9] Ellis argues the trial court's revocation and sanction was an abuse of discretion because this was her “first violation.” (Appellant's Br. at 11.) However, this was not her first violation of the conditions of her six-year sentence for dealing in methamphetamine. Ellis previously violated the terms of her Work Release by failing to return, failing to pay user fees, and refusing to submit to required drug screens. Nonetheless, even if this had been her first violation, “[o]ne violation of a condition of probation is enough to support a probation revocation.” Pierce v. State, 44 N.E.3d 752, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[10] Ellis also argues revocation of her probation is “not at all appropriate” because she continued to struggle with drug addiction and mental health challenges throughout her probation period. (Appellant's Br. at 10.) Ellis admits she has struggled with drug addiction for thirty years, which has led to numerous legal issues, including her underlying convictions here of dealing in methamphetamine. Ellis violated her Work Release sentence by failing to return and refusing to submit to required drug testing. Then, Ellis violated the conditions of her supervised probation by using methamphetamine and refusing to submit to mandated drug screens - violations directly related to her underlying conviction. Given the nature of Ellis's repeated sentence violations, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to revoke Ellis's suspended sentence or to impose sanctions against her that dictated increased supervision initially to support her addiction recovery and then lessened over time. Thus, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in revoking Ellis's probation and imposing one year each of Work Release, In Home Detention, and supervised probation.

2. Credit Time for Treatment

[11] Ellis argues the trial court also abused its discretion by not giving her credit toward her time in Work Release for the time she was to spend in the inpatient treatment program. Ellis's argument is based on discrepancies within the trial court's statements at the sanction hearing. She asserts we need to examine the oral and written statements “together to discern the intent of the sentencing court.” Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 738 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

[12] During the sanction hearing, the trial court made conflicting statements about whether Ellis would receive credit toward Work Release for her treatment program. That wavering suggests the trial court remained undecided about whether Ellis's time in the recovery center would be credited toward her Work Release sentence. However, the trial court's dispositional order was clear. It required Ellis “to complete 365 credit days on Work Release, to include the rehabilitation program with First City Recovery Center; then, serve 365 credit day (sic) on In Home Detention, and then 365 days on supervised probation.” (Tr. Vol. II at 176.) Because the trial court's written order clearly indicated Ellis was to receive credit against Work Release for her time in the treatment program, we decline to modify that order and hold no abuse of discretion occurred.

Conclusion

[13] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Ellis's suspended sentence and imposed the specified sanctions against her for violating the conditions of her supervised probation. Based on the record before us, we hold the trial court intended for Ellis's time spent in drug treatment to be credited against her time on Work Release. We accordingly affirm the trial court's judgment.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ellis also argues that, even if the trial court did not so order, she should be given credit for the time spent in the recovery center. Because we hold the trial court ordered her to receive credit against her Work Release sentence for the time spent in the recovery center, we need not address this third issue raised by Ellis.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1.

May, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Felix, J., concur.