IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of K.F. (Mother) and H.K. and C.S. (Minor Children) K.F. (Mother) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] K.F. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to two of her children. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother has six children, but this case concerns only two: H.K., born in 2018, and C.S., born in 2022. H.K.’s father, A.K., and C.S.’s father, S.S., voluntarily relinquished their parental rights and therefore do not participate in this appeal.

[3] Mother and S.S. have been together for six years and have a history of domestic violence and drug use. Mother was prescribed painkillers due to complications while giving birth to C.S. She began abusing the painkillers and later turned to methamphetamine. In May 2023, Mother and S.S. were both charged with Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct after a fight.¹ A no-contact order was issued in S.S.’s case prohibiting contact with Mother, but they continued living together with H.K. and C.S. despite the order. That July, the Department of Child Services (DCS) received a report of domestic violence and methamphetamine use in the home. Initially, Mother and S.S. participated in an informal adjustment. But over the next several months, they were uncooperative, and the domestic violence between them continued—by Mother's account, “for about nine months it happened about every day,” sometimes in front of the children. Tr. p. 102.

[4] In October 2023, DCS filed petitions alleging that H.K. and C.S. were children in need of services (CHINS). The case began as an in-home CHINS, with the children remaining in Mother's and S.S.’s care. In December, upon admissions by Mother, the trial court adjudicated the children to be CHINS. In its dispositional order, the court required Mother to, among other things, maintain suitable and stable housing, complete a parenting assessment and any resulting recommendations, undergo a substance-abuse assessment and follow all treatment recommendations, and participate in domestic-violence programming.

[5] Mother completed substance-abuse treatment at Anabranch in February 2024. Anabranch recommended that she move into a sober-living facility from there, but she returned home instead. Two months later, in April, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine after drinking S.S.’s “krung coffee.” Id. at 76. “Krung coffee” is coffee made from “krung water,” which is “the remains of liquid used to manufacture methamphetamine.” Appellee's Br. pp. 8-9. After learning that the “krung water ․ was left in the presence of the children where they could have accessed that and drank it themselves,” DCS removed H.K. and C.S. from Mother's and S.S.’s care. Tr. p. 164.

[6] DCS initially placed the children in foster care because no relative placement could be identified. But then in May, DCS placed the children with S.S.’s brother and his wife, where they have since remained. At the time, C.S. was two years old and “completely non-verbal ․ because she did not get attention and did not have the interaction that she should have at her age due to the parents being impaired and not actively involved with the children.” Id. at 183. C.S. began weekly speech therapy and later attended a developmental preschool. H.K., then five, struggled with emotional regulation, in part due to the domestic violence she'd witnessed. When DCS Family Case Manager (FCM) Jennifer Hawks tried to address H.K.’s struggles with Mother, Mother “minimized” them and didn't “fully underst[an]d” the impact that the domestic violence had on H.K. Id. at 182.

[7] Following her April relapse, Mother last used methamphetamine in June 2024. That August, she began residential treatment at Next Step to “prepare” for “a sober lifestyle.” Id. at 99. But she was unsuccessfully discharged after being caught with S.S. in her room in violation of Next Step's policies. After that, Mother was referred to several sober-living facilities, but she either didn't go or was kicked out. Over the next year, Mother tested positive for THC a few times, but her screens were negative for methamphetamine and opioids. Some of Mother's screens were also positive for suboxone, which she was prescribed to take twice a day. But later on, her screens were negative for suboxone because she was “trying to wean [her]self off of it,” “not by recommendation of a physician but on [her] own.” Id. at 139-40.

[8] DCS twice referred Mother and S.S. for domestic-violence services, but they never engaged. In March 2025, Mother began working with Wendy Burke at Family Support Services on setting boundaries and healthy relationships. This included “address[ing] domestic violence in general,” but “not specifically between her and [S.S.].” Id. at 170. Burke's only knowledge of the domestic violence between Mother and S.S. was what Mother “self report[ed],” and Mother told Burke that S.S. was “a good guy” and that there'd only been one incident of domestic violence between them. Id. at 210, 214. And while Mother met with Burke biweekly, the domestic-violence service DCS referred her for was a 40-week program.

[9] DCS also referred Mother and S.S. to Hamilton Center for supervised visitation and home-based casework. They had four-hour visits with both children together once a week. Throughout 2024 and into 2025, Mother didn't have a driver's license, so the supervisor had to provide transportation. Mother was often unprepared for visits, and they'd have to stop on the way to get basic necessities that Mother hadn't brought such as food, drinks, diapers, and wet wipes. Mother never progressed past supervised visitation for four hours a week. At one point, she had the opportunity to increase her visits, but she opted not to because she didn't want to have visits without S.S., and S.S. wasn't allowed to have increased visitation because he was still actively using drugs.

[10] Kristin Callans, the caseworker at Hamilton Center, tried to work with Mother and S.S. on their communication and advised them multiple times to end the relationship “because it was volatile” and “[t]hey are not good for each other.” Id. at 79. There were times when Mother “would make progress” but “then she would reconnect with [S.S.] and regress every time.” Id. at 82. After Callans left Hamilton Center in September 2024, Kylie Foltz took over as caseworker. Foltz worked with Mother and S.S. on securing steady housing—throughout the proceedings, they had around a dozen residences, including rentals from which they were evicted, friends’ homes, a camper, and several transitional sober-living facilities. Mother's last appointment with Foltz was in June 2025. By then, Mother had obtained her driver's license and a steady job, but she and Foltz “ha[d]n't really been able to touch on” her “day in, day out routine” in their work. Id. at 48.

[11] Mother also completed a parenting assessment. The provider recommended that she participate in therapy one to three times a week to work on coping skills and managing her emotions. But despite telling DCS that she'd “us[ed] drugs to deal with her emotions,” Mother didn't attend therapy as ordered, claiming it was difficult to attend due to her work schedule. Id. at 167. In 2025, she attended only five appointments.

[12] In July, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights to H.K. and C.S. The trial court set a fact-finding hearing for October 23. The weekend before the hearing, Mother had a visit without S.S., but it was “more overwhelming than normal,” and she struggled to “handl[e] both the girls by herself.” Id. at 60.

[13] By the time of the hearing, Mother had been living in a two-bedroom apartment for about six weeks. She admitted that she didn't have beds, furniture, or clothing for the children there yet. Initially, S.S. moved into the apartment with her, and his name was on the lease. S.S.’s drug screens were positive while living there. Mother claimed that at that time, she and S.S. “weren't really a couple,” but she “just couldn't make him go” because she “didn't want to just throw him out on the streets.” Id. at 105. She testified that S.S. wasn't part of her life anymore and that he was no longer living with her because he'd entered treatment at Next Step a couple of weeks earlier. But Mother acknowledged that some of S.S.’s belongings were still at the apartment and that she'd talked to him four or five days ago. She also admitted that she and S.S. had separated “a couple times” before, but their separations were “not very long.” Id. at 104.

[14] Despite Mother's account, Foltz testified that her understanding was that Mother and S.S. were still together. Similarly, when Mother's counsel suggested during cross-examination of Callans that Mother “ha[d] separated permanently from” S.S., Callans said, “I wouldn't buy it.” Id. at 84. And FCM Hawks explained that Mother had told DCS multiple times that “she was going to choose the kids and leave [S.S.], and every time she ended up back with [S.S.] within a very short window of time.” Id. at 171. FCM Hawks also noted that S.S. had told one of his service providers, “I'm going to just leave so that it looks like I'm gone so that [Mother] can get the girls back.” Id. at 179. FCM Hawks opined that termination of Mother's parental rights and adoption by their current placement is in H.K.’s and C.S.’s best interests because they need stability and an opportunity to thrive. Katelyn Wells, the children's court-appointed special advocate (CASA), also testified that termination and adoption are in the children's best interests because they've made tremendous progress with their current placement, and “it's been long enough.” Id. at 197.

[15] In December, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to H.K. and C.S.

[16] Mother now appeals.²

Discussion and Decision

[17] Mother contends there is insufficient evidence to support the termination of her parental rights. When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013). Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the trial court's judgment. Id. When a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id. To determine whether a judgment terminating parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings and whether the findings support the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). DCS must prove the allegations in a termination petition by clear and convincing evidence. See Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2.

[18] Here, DCS filed its termination petition under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4. A petition under that section must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c). Mother does not challenge any of the circumstances alleged and found under subsection (d) or that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the children; her only challenge is to the trial court's conclusion that termination is in the children's best interests.

[19] In determining whether termination is in a child's best interests, the trial court must look at the totality of the evidence and subordinate the parent's interests to those of the child. In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019), reh'g denied. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is a “central consideration” in determining the best interests of a child. Id. “Indeed, children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49 (quotation omitted).

[20] As both DCS and the trial court acknowledged, Mother has made significant progress throughout the proceedings, especially in maintaining her sobriety. She successfully completed treatment at Anabranch, and her drug screens have been negative for methamphetamine and opioids since June 2024. But DCS was still concerned about Mother's substance-abuse problems because S.S. had positive drug screens while living with Mother until shortly before the fact-finding hearing, Mother hadn't addressed the issues underlying her drug use because she failed to participate in therapy as ordered, and she wasn't taking suboxone as prescribed—she was supposed to take it twice a day, but her drug screens were negative for suboxone for several months because she was “trying to wean [her]self off of it,” “not by recommendation of a physician but on [her] own.” Despite the recommendation that she participate in therapy one to three times a week, Mother attended only five therapy appointments in 2025.

[21] Additionally, a parent's historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability, and supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same supports a finding that termination is in the child's best interests. Castro v. State Off. of Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. As Foltz explained at the fact-finding hearing, “stability of housing” (or lack thereof) was “a problem until ․ the last six weeks.” Tr. p. 49. Throughout the proceedings, Mother and S.S. had around a dozen residences, including rentals from which they were evicted, friends’ homes, a camper, and several transitional sober-living facilities. Although Mother had secured a two-bedroom apartment by the time of the hearing, she did so less than two months beforehand. And she admittedly didn't have beds, furniture, or clothing for the children in the apartment. Mother also struggled to provide adequate supervision for the children. She was often unprepared for visits, and the supervisor sometimes had to take her to pick up basic necessities beforehand such as food, drinks, diapers, and wet wipes. When Mother had visitation without S.S. the weekend before the fact-finding hearing, the visit was “more overwhelming than normal,” and she struggled to handle H.K. and C.S. by herself. And Mother never progressed past supervised visitation for four hours a week. Although she had the opportunity to increase her visits, she declined because she didn't want to without S.S., who wasn't allowed increased visitation because he was still actively using drugs.

[22] This brings us to Mother's biggest barrier to success, which is, as the trial court put it, that she “has made progress, but she continues to prioritize being with [S.S.].” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 208. At the start of DCS's involvement, Mother and S.S. were living together with H.K. and C.S. in violation of the no-contact order in S.S.’s disorderly-conduct case. Mother admitted that for nine months from 2023 to 2024, S.S. abused her almost daily, sometimes in front of the children. H.K. struggled with emotional regulation due to the domestic violence she'd witnessed, but Mother minimized these struggles and didn't fully understand the impact that the domestic violence had on H.K. Critically, Mother never participated in the domestic-violence services for which DCS referred her. Though Mother “address[ed] domestic violence in general” with Wendy Burke at Family Support Services, they didn't address domestic violence “specifically between her and [S.S.].” As the trial court found, Mother “significantly downplayed the domestic violence that was occurring in the home” to Burke—she said that there'd only been one incident and that S.S. was a good guy. Id. And while Mother met with Burke biweekly, the domestic-violence service DCS referred her for was a 40-week program.

[23] Although Mother claimed that she and S.S. were no longer together, she also admitted that she'd tried to leave him several times before, but it never lasted long. Indeed, FCM Hawks testified that every time Mother told DCS that “she was going to choose the kids and leave [S.S.],” she ended up back with him after a short period. Foltz believed that Mother and S.S. were still a couple, and Callans said she “wouldn't buy” that Mother “ha[d] separated permanently from” S.S. Mother said she let S.S. live in the apartment with her initially because she “just couldn't make him go” and “didn't want to just throw him out on the streets.” She claimed that he'd moved out to enter treatment, but some of his belongings were still there. And S.S., who never engaged in any domestic-violence programming, reportedly told one of his service providers, “I'm going to just leave so that it looks like I'm gone so that [Mother] can get the girls back.” Mother's failure to complete domestic-violence programming as ordered and refusal to separate from her abuser pose a risk that the children will be exposed to domestic violence in the future if they were returned to her care. See In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (finding evidence sufficient to support trial court's conclusion that termination was in children's best interests where “Mother's issues with substance abuse and domestic violence have not been remedied and pose a risk to the safety of the Children if they were to be returned to her care”), trans. denied.

[24] Permanency is also a central consideration in determining the children's best interests. Both FCM Hawks and CASA Wells opined that termination of Mother's parental rights and adoption of the children by their current placement are in their best interests because they need stability, and “it's been long enough.” When DCS first became involved, C.S., then two, was “completely non-verbal ․ because she did not get attention and did not have the interaction that she should have at her age due to the parents being impaired and not actively involved with the children.” As a result, C.S. had to attend weekly speech therapy and a developmental preschool. But CASA Wells testified that both C.S., now four, and H.K., now seven, had made tremendous progress in their current placement, to whom they are bonded and who wish to adopt them. The totality of the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that termination is in the children's best interests.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother pled guilty to Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct in April 2024 and received a suspended sentence of 180 days.

2.   Two weeks after her deadline to file a notice of appeal, Mother moved for leave to file a belated appeal, which our motions panel granted. DCS didn't oppose Mother's motion or file a motion to reconsider after it was granted. Now, nearly four months later, DCS argues in its brief that “this appeal is untimely and should be dismissed as forfeit [sic].” Appellee's Br. p. 17 n.4. The time to make this argument has passed, and we decline to reconsider our motions panel's decision.

Vaidik, Judge.

Altice, J., and Foley, J., concur.