IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: N.G. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] N.G., E.S., and E.A. (collectively, “Children”) are the biological children of N.A. (“Mother”). After more than ten years of informal adjustments and child in need of services (“CHINS”) proceedings, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to Children. Mother now challenges that termination ¹ and presents one issue for our review: Whether the trial court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights was clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Since August 2014, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) has been involved with Mother and Children.² DCS and Mother have agreed to several plans of informal adjustment over the years, and Children have each been adjudicated a CHINS at least once prior to 2023. These interventions were the result of domestic violence, physical abuse, Mother's untreated mental health needs, and Mother's substance abuse.

[4] In mid-April 2023, DCS received three reports alleging Children were victims of neglect by Mother. The reports alleged Mother “screamed at [E.A.], called her stupid, and struck her on the arm,” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 48; Mother's home “was dirty and cluttered,” id.; Mother was “extremely triggered by the children, causing her to act erratically, yell, and scream,” id. at 48–49; Mother “was overwhelmed with the stress of caring for her children and had spanked [E.A.],” id. at 49; Mother “admitted to using marijuana and methamphetamine within the past 10 days,” id.; and Mother “was transported to an inpatient treatment facility for mental health treatment,” id. DCS investigated, removed Children from Mother's care, and filed petitions alleging Children were each a CHINS. On Mother's admission, Children were each adjudicated a CHINS. In an ensuing dispositional order, the trial court ordered Mother to, among other things, not consume illegal substances, submit to random drug screens, complete parenting and substance abuse assessments, complete all recommendations based on those assessments, and attend all visitations with Children.

[5] Mother repeatedly tested positive for illegal substances such as methamphetamine and marijuana, and even though some of Mother's drug screens were negative, she “was using Spice because DCS was not testing her” for it. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 50. In August 2024, Mother was driving “all over the roadway,” causing other drivers “to take evasive maneuvers to avoid a collision.” Id. Law enforcement stopped Mother and discovered she was seriously impaired. Consequently, Mother was convicted of operating while intoxicated endangering a person. Mother did not tell DCS or the CHINS court about her conviction or use of Spice.

[6] In January 2025, Mother progressed to “intermittently supervised” visits with E.S. and E.A., and soon thereafter she started having overnight visits with Children. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 51. “To obtain these overnight visits, [Mother] continued to mislead the [trial c]ourt and DCS about her ongoing drug use.” Id. In early May, E.S. and E.A. witnessed Mother using drugs while they were alone with her. E.S. and E.A. “could not wake” Mother despite attempts to do so, including E.S. “smack[ing]” Mother “in the face.” Id. at 69. E.S. and E.A. “thought [M]other was dead.” Id. Following this incident, Mother's visits “were returned to fully supervised,” id. at 52, and DCS learned about Mother's operating while intoxicated conviction. During a Child and Family Team Meeting a few days later, Mother told DCS that she had “relapsed by using Spice,” id.; had “stopped taking her medications so she could use drugs,” id. at 55; and “cannot maintain sobriety for more than six months at a time,” id. at 69.

[7] On July 31, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights to Children. In September, Mother “engaged in a profanity laced tirade” during a school event for E.S. and E.A. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 69. The visitation supervisor ended the visit, and DCS filed a motion to suspend Mother's visits with E.S. and E.A., which the trial court granted. Mother continued visiting N.G., but during a typical six-hour visit, Mother and N.G. “may only interact for 45 minutes,” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 60. N.G. “does not view [Mother] as a parental figure,” and their relationship is “non-existent.” Id. N.G. also knew Mother “was using drugs” and had thrown some of her drugs away “more than once.” Id. at 52.

[8] After a factfinding hearing, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights over Children. In support, the trial court entered the following relevant findings and conclusions:

III. Termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interests of the children.

A. Over the last ten years, [Mother has] demonstrated that [she is] not capable of providing the children with a safe and stable home.

B. The impact of [Mother's] conduct on the children has been profound. When [the social worker] began working with the children, [E.S.] was experiencing nightmares and somatic complaints. [E.A.] would pick at her skin. She suffered from urinary accidents. [Mother]’s inability to control her emotions resulted in increased emotional distress and trauma for [E.S. and E.A.]. After [E.S. and E.A.] found [Mother] unconscious, they thought she was dead. The incident caused a setback in [E.S.]’s treatment. [E.A.]’s skin-picking increased․ Delay in permanency would be detrimental to [E.S.’s and E.A.’s] mental health.

C․ [N.G.] does not view [Mother] as a parental figure. His interactions with her are limited.

* * *

E. [E.S.] and [E.A.] have spent most of their lives in the care of their grandfather ․ and step-grandmother․ [N.G.] has spent almost half his life with [their grandfather and step-grandmother].

F. The children see [their grandfather and step-grandmother] as parental figures․

G. Clearly, termination of parental rights and adoption is in the best interests of [Children].

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 70–71 (emphasis in original). This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court's Decision to Terminate Mother's Parental Rights to Children Was Not Clearly Erroneous

[9] Mother challenges the trial court's termination of her parental rights over Children. “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45–46 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied.

[10] We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). In reviewing for clear error, “we determine whether the evidence supports the court's findings and whether those findings support the court's judgment.” Norris v. Norris, 275 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2026) (citing Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016)). A decision is clearly erroneous “only if the findings lack factual support in the record or if the judgment applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Id. (citing Wysocki v. Johnson, 18 N.E.3d 600, 603–04 (Ind. 2014)). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, id. (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123), and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings that Mother does not challenge on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)).

[11] To terminate Mother's parental rights, DCS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that, among other things, termination of the parent-child relationship is in Children's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c). To determine the best interests of a child, a trial court looks at the totality of the evidence and subordinates the interests of the parents to those of the child. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 167–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)), reh'g denied (Jan. 25, 2023), trans. denied sub nom. A.B. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 209 N.E.3d 1168 (Ind. 2023). A central consideration in this determination is the child's need for permanency. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). The trial court also considers whether a child's emotional and physical development is threatened by the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). Permanent impairment of physical, mental, or social development is not necessary before a trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235).

[12] On appeal, Mother argues that DCS failed to present sufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that termination of her parent-child relationship with Children is in their best interests. First, “the recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d at 799 (citing L.S. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied). Both the family case manager (“FCM”) and Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) in this case testified that termination was in Children's best interests, and Mother does not challenge the trial court's conclusion that she likely will not remedy the reasons for Children's removal from her care, see R.M., 203 N.E.3d at 564 (citing Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687). This alone is sufficient to show that termination is in Children's best interests.

[13] Second, in challenging the trial court's best-interests conclusion, Mother does not specifically challenge any of the trial court's findings; consequently, we take all those findings as true. See R.M., 203 N.E.3d at 564 (citing Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687). To the extent Mother's arguments can be read to challenge particular findings or conclusions, those arguments are merely invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). For instance, Mother asserts she “made significant progress through the CHINS case,” Appellant's Br. at 10, and “was consistent in services, had improved in treatment, and had made progress in regulating her emotions,” id. at 11. The family's social worker testified that Mother “very much struggled to implement” parenting skills the social worker taught her, Tr. Vol. II at 53, and did not demonstrate any meaningful improvement in her parenting abilities. The FCM testified that Mother “has made and has shown no meaningful progress” in services, id. at 209; has not demonstrated “an ability to provide [Children] with a safe stable home with a sober and appropriate caregiver,” id. at 216; and is “unable to provide [Children] safety from abusive or neglectful situations,” id. The CASA testified that Mother made “small movements forward,” but she did not believe Mother could “maintain[ ] a positive ․ track forward.” Id. at 104. The trial court found the FCM's, social worker's, and CASA's testimony to be “truthful and accurate.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 56, 60, 64.

[14] Based on the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the trial court's decision, we cannot say DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights to Children was in Children's best interests. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err by terminating Mother's parental rights over Children.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court also terminated the parental rights of Children's fathers, who do not participate in this appeal.

2.   N.G. was born January 10, 2011; E.S. was born June 15, 2014; and E.A. was born January 23, 2018.

Felix, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.